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Foreword by Joel Anderson 
OVPR and Development 
Director 
Foreword to Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
by 
Joel D. Anderson, Colonel USMC (Ret); 
Development Director Office of Research 
Development/Office of the Vice President for Research Kansas 
State University 
I am pleased and honored to recommend Counter Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems Technologies and Operations for your use as both 
an educational text and practical reference for the student and 
practitioner alike. 
 
Within the text you will find a logical and data rich foundation for 
current, emerging and yet unforeseen applications, considerations/
approaches and practices relevant to the ever-unfolding world of 
unmanned autonomous systems. The evolution of work found in 
both the First and Second Editions of  Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
in the Cyber Domain: Protecting USA’s Advanced Air Assets
(Nichols & et.al, 2019) and now this sister textbook covering Counter 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems Technologies and Operations (C-UAS) 
underscores one profound yet enduring theme: 
 
Technology is changing the landscape at a rapid if not exponential 
rate.  The ability to respond and mitigate known and unknown 
challenges remains an integral factor in our education, 
understanding and collective ability to remain relevant. 
 
In that context, the authors have striven to provide a valuable 
xiv  |  Foreword by Joel Anderson
OVPR and Development Director
understanding of the “as-is” environment while endeavoring to 
maintain an enduring framework of practices and insight necessary 
to respond to the unfolding “to-be” environment of the future.  I 
think you will find this sister edition, as with the previous two, of 
immense value and insight.  In it, you will find its organization into 
sections on: 
 
• CUAS operations as a Concept, 
• Technologies and Processes, 
• Counter C-UAS, and 
• Legal and Administrative Issues to be logically and 
informatively laid out. 
 
Within the respective sections and nested chapters, the authors 
lay the foundation for logical and enduring insights.  Insights 
beneficial to our collective ability to learn, assess, understand and 
respond with relevance–now and into the future.  The chapters of 
the text provide a framework of intuitive understanding of both 
related technology/material solutions and important/enduring 
approaches necessary for conceptual planning, response and legal 
considerations. I am confident that the nature of this text will 
remain a directional beacon over time providing a holistic, realistic 
and tangible framework in understanding and addressing current 
and long-term needs. 
 
My involvement with “drones” began in the mid-1980s when the 
Pioneer Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) was delivered to Camp 
Pendleton, California.  Shortly afterwards, my unit was asked to 
support an operationally relevant environment test of a system 
called the Pointer UAV, then a small Styrofoam system thrown by 
hand and carrying a small video sensor.  The intent was to assess the 
utility of a system that could be used for close in reconnaissance; to 
see what was on the “other side of the hill.”  As a technical solution, 
Foreword by Joel Anderson OVPR and Development Director  |  xv
these “systems” were not necessarily new but the maturity of drone 
technology then, created an environment where operationally, they 
would become an integral part of military framework across what 
is now referred to as multi-domain operations.  The emergence of 
unmanned systems technology created a number of dilemmas for 
planning, employment, airspace coordination and de-confliction. 
The widespread use of unmanned systems today are just an 
expanded manifestation of those considerations only a much wider 
scale. Then, as now, their introduction was not without controversy, 
nor challenges with integrating them into a complex technical 
framework that is non-trivial at the local, regional, national and 
international levels. 
 
A challenge, then as now, is that technology development just may 
be the easy thing.  It is the nature and impact of emergent often 
times disruptive technology that presents challenges in response. 
The response factor coupled with time latency in understanding 
intended and unintended consequences arguably presents a lagging 
approach and relatively long lead time in putting context to 
necessary considerations and approaches.  I believe that the 
authors of this text get in front of the “boom” of technology by 
supporting a comprehensive and integrated approach to factors and 
considerations far too often ignored. 
 
As we look forward, Pillar II of the current National Security 
Strategy (NSS) discusses the importance of leadership in “Research, 
Technology, Invention and Innovation.”  Undoubtedly, UAS will 
remain part of that innovation ecosystem well into the future. 
Globally, we are witnessing rapid technical change and use of these 
systems in a myriad of context that also influence an increasingly 
complex top to bottom security environment.  Nested within the 
NSS our National Defense Strategy (NDS) calls for agility in 
responding to both the technical and security challenges in our 
future by integrating and adapting at “The Speed of Relevance.” 
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This context is important on three levels. 
 
1. First. Platform development and use has become pervasive as a 
major economic technology powerhouse globally.  Unmanned 
aerial systems are in fact becoming ubiquitous. 
 
2. Secondly. Because technology has matured to a point where 
unmanned systems have become a fully integrated reality of 
commercial use and applications within the National Air Space, 
they must be addressed holistically. 
 
3. Finally. We are experiencing introduction of newer 
technologies daily. Their usage will continue to challenge our 
understanding of the materials and manufacturing space and 
our collective ability to respond to change. Counter UAS will be 
a critical enabler as we move forward. 
 
On the latter point, this sister edition provides exceptional insight 
and practical understanding into a technology domain that is 
experiencing development at break-neck speed, disruptive use 
across an expansive application domain, and yes, even 
unanticipated implications in their development, usage, 
employment and ramifications therein. 
 
Today, the challenges, gaps and opportunities of assessing 
platforms, sensors, communications, information technology, cyber 
and use cases for surveillance and reconnaissance require a 
foundation for legal and ethical insight, knowledge and best 
practices. 
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The value of this sister edition is that it provides a long term 
and enduring foundation and fundamental framework of insights, 
best practices and considerations for “Counter Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems Technologies and Operations” that can and will serve the 
reader well. 
 
 
Joel D. Anderson 
Colonel USMC (Ret) 
Development Director 
Office of Research Development (ORD) 
Office of the Vice President for Research 
Kansas State University 
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Preface 
As the quarter-century mark in the 21st Century nears, new 
aviation-related equipment has come to the forefront, both to help 
us and to haunt us. (Coutu, 2020) This is particularly the case with 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).[1] These vehicles have grown in 
popularity and accessible to everyone. Of different shapes and sizes, 
they are widely available for purchase at relatively low prices. They 
have moved from the backyard recreation status to important tools 
for the military, intelligence agencies, and corporate organizations. 
New practical applications such as military equipment and 
weaponry are announced on a regular basis – globally. (Coutu, 2020) 
Every country seems to be announcing steps forward in this 
burgeoning field. 
In our successful 2nd edition  of Unmanned Aircraft Systems in 
the Cyber Domain: Protecting USA’s Advanced Air Assets (Nichols, 
et al., 2019), the authors addressed three factors influencing UAS 
phenomena. First, unmanned aircraft technology has seen an 
economic explosion in production, sales, testing, specialized 
designs, and friendly / hostile usages of deployed UAS / UAVs / 
Drones. There is a huge global growing market and entrepreneurs 
know it. Small UAS companies have been reproducing like rabbits. 
Only the FAA has been a stumbling block trying to balance UAS 
safe integration into the National Airspace against hundreds of 
thousands of new recreational and commercial operators testing 
their meddle in the skies. FAA’s best efforts surround its decision 
to register UAS and provide a process for Part 107 Certification. 
(Nichols, et al., 2019) Certification[2] brings sanity and education 
into a chaotic public market in the US. 
Second, hostile use of UAS is on the forefront of DoD defense 
and offensive planners. They are especially concerned with SWARM 
behavior. Movies like “Angel has Fallen,” where drones in a SWARM 
use facial recognition technology to kill USSS agents protecting 
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POTUS, have built the lore of UAS and brought the problem 
forefront to DHS.  The author presented at several international C-
UAS conferences which were attended by commercial, educational 
and military organizations for the purpose of hardening USA air 
assets against hostile drone activities.  These were serious 
conversations and workshops – many of them – behind closed doors 
and interacting with military brass. (Nichols, et al., 2019) 
Third, UAS technology was exploding. Everyday our team reads 
/ discusses new UAS developments in navigation, weapons, 
surveillance, data transfer, fuel cells, stealth,  weight distribution, 
tactics, GPS / GNSS elements, SCADA protections, privacy 
invasions, terrorist uses, specialized software, and security 
protocols. (Nichols, et al., 2019) Our team has followed / tracked 
joint ventures between military and corporate entities and 
specialized labs to build UAS countermeasures. The number of 
professional C-UAS conferences around the world are significant. 
This is a growing field like INFOSEC was a predictable offshoot to 
cybercrime. 
As authors, we felt compelled to address at least the edge of some 
of the new C-UAS developments. It was clear that we would be 
lucky if we could cover a few of – the more interesting and priority 
technology updates – all in the UNCLASSIFIED and OPEN sphere. 
Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Technologies and Operations 
is the companion textbook to our 2nd edition. The civilian market 
is interesting and entrepreneurial, but the military and intelligence 
markets are of concern because the US does NOT lead the pack 
in C-UAS technologies. China does. China continues to execute 
its UAS proliferation along the New Silk Road Sea / Land routes 
(NSRL). It has maintained a 7% growth in military spending each 
year to support its buildup. (Nichols, et al., 2019) [Chapter 21]. They 
continue to innovate and have recently improved a solution for 
UAS flight endurance issues with the development of advanced 
hydrogen fuel cell. (Nichols, et al., 2019) Reed and Trubetskoy 
presented a terrifying map of countries in the Middle East with 
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armed drones and their manufacturing origin. Guess who? China. 
(A.B. Tabriski & Justin, 2018, December) 
Our C-UAS textbook has as its primary mission to educate and 
train resources who will enter the UAS / C-UAS field and trust it will 
act as a call to arms for military and DHS planners. 
Step up the U.S. defense game (spending) or teach your children 
to learn Chinese.[3]  If you have been asleep at the wheel for a 
while, you might want to look into WeChat, a super social media 
app designed by Tencent, a Chinese tech company. You can do 
everything on your phone. Everything. It has 850 million users. The 
Chinese government uses it to keep an eye on all its citizens, censor 
public posts , chats and banned words, alert police to potential 
riot conditions or just unacceptable group gatherings. It is used to 
create a “social credit score” to impose restrictions on those citizens 
that have breached some “trust.” (Deutsche Welle, 2017) Trust is 
defined by the Chinese government. What’s the connection? China 
uses surveillance drones to augment this people control strategy for 
not only its own citizens but those they have military or economic 
agreements with along the NSRL from the South China Seas, Asia, 
Europe, and Africa [the newest testing playground for UAS / C-UAS 
technologies for several nations.] (Nichols, et al., 2019) 
 
Here is the condensed outline of topics in our sister textbook: 
SECTION 1:  Counter-UAS (C-UAS) Operations as a Concept 
Chapter 1:   The Role of Information Technologies (Automated 
decisions, Artificial Intelligence (Weak and Strong), 
Communications, Networking, Remote Sensing)] 
Chapter 2: Understanding C-UAS Purpose and Process 
Chapter 3: Developing a C-UAS Strategy, Goals, Options, Target 
Analysis, Process Selection, Operational Metrics, Approaches to 
Countering UAS Activities (First Principles) 
Chapter 4:  Planning for Resiliency and Robustness Expecting 
pushback, When Secrecy is Needed, How to Shield Operations 
SECTION 2:  C-UAS Technologies and Processes 
Chapter 5: Surveillance and Reconnaissance 
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Chapter 6: C-UAS Evolving Methods of Interdiction 
Chapter 7: UAS Area / Airspace Denial 
Chapter 8: Emerging Interdiction Technologies 
Chapter 9: Non- Kinetic: Military Avionics, EW, CW, DE, SCADA 
Defenses 
SECTION 3:  Counter C-UAS 
Chapter 10:When the Other Side Fights Back – Cyberwarfare, 
Direct Energy Weapons, Acoustics, Integrating  C-UAS into Planning 
Chapter 11: Thinking Like the Enemy: Seams in the Zone 
SECTION 4:  Legal and Administrative Issues 
Chapter 12: C-UAS Regulation, Legislation & Litigation from A Global 
Perspective 
 
SECTION 1 Enumerates the concepts of Counter Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems. It is concerned with the role of information 
technology, the Strategy, Goals, Options, Target Analysis, Process 
Selection, Operational Metrics, and Approaches to Countering UAS 
Activities. 
 
SECTION 2 looks at the C-UAS technologies and processes. To 
wit: Surveillance and Reconnaissance; Evolving Methods of 
Interdiction;  UAS Area / Airspace Denial; Emerging Interdiction 
Technologies; and  Non- Kinetic: Military Avionics, EW, CW, DE, 
SCADA Defenses. 
SECTION 3 broaches the sensitive subject of Counter C-UAS and 
current research into Cyberwarfare, Direct Energy Weapons, 
Acoustic / IFF defenses; Integrating  C-UAS into Planning and 
Thinking Like the Enemy. 
SECTION 4 puts our work into a global legal framework: C-UAS 
Regulation, Legislation & Litigations. 
 
 
We trust our newest book will enrich our students’ and reader’s 
understanding of the purview of this wonderful technology we call 
C-UAS. 
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Abbreviations and Acronyms 
Abbreviations: Acronyms [Rev 66A] 
 
The following terms are common to the UAS industry, general 
literature or conferences on UAS/UAV/Drone systems. 
 
A2 / AD          Anti-access / Area Denial 
A /Aref            Amplitudes of source and reference points, see 
Eq-20-6,7 
AA                  Anti-aircraft / Adaptive Antennas 
AAA               Anti-aircraft artillery 
AAIB              Air Accidents Investigation Board 
AAM              Air-to-air missile 
AAV               Autonomous air vehicle 
ABI                 Aviation Block Infrastructure 
A/C                 Aircraft 
ACAS             Airborne collision avoidance system / Assistant Chief 
of the Air Staff 
ACL                Agent communication language / Autonomous control 
levels 
ACOUSTIC    Detects drones by recognizing unique sounds 
produced by their motors 
ACRP             Airport Cooperative Research Project 
ACS                Airbome (defense) control station (system) 
ACTD             Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration 
AD                 Air Defense / Ansar Dine terrorist group 
A/D                 Attack / Defense Scenario Analysis 
ADAC            Automated Dynamic Airspace Controller 
ADC               Air data computer 
ADF               Automatic direction finder/finding 
ADMS            Air defense missile (radar) system 
ADS                Air Defense System (USA) 
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ADS-B            Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast 
systems 
ADT                Air Data Terminal 
AESA             Active electronically scanned array 
AEW              Airbome early warning 
AF                   Adaptive Filtering 
AFCS              Automatic flight control system 
AFRICOM     US Africa Command 
AGL                Above ground level 
AGM               Air- to- surface missile 
AGARD         Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and 
Development (NATO) 
AGM-65         Maverick (USA) is an air-to-surface missile (AGM) 
designed for close air support. It is the most widely produced 
precision-guided missile in the Western world, and is effective 
against a wide range of tactical targets, including armor, air 
defenses, ships, ground transportation and fuel storage facilities. 
AHA               Autopilot Hardware Attack 
AHD               Analog high definition 
AHRS             Attitude and heading reference system 
AI                    Artificial intelligence 
AIAA              American Institute of Aeronautics and Aerospace 
AIC                 Aeronautical Information Circular 
AIP                 Aeronautical Information Publication 
AIS                 Automated Identification System for Collision 
Avoidance 
AJ                    Anti-Jam 
ALB                Air Land Battle 
ALERT           Advanced Low-observable Embedded 
Reconnaissance Targeting system. 
AM                  Amplitude Modulation / al-Mourabitoun terrorist 
group 
AMB               Agile Multi-Beam 
AMRAAM     Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile 
ANSP              Air Navigation Service Provider 
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ANO               Air Navigation Order (UK) 
AO                  Area of Operations 
AoA                Angle of Attack 
APEC              Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
APG                Asia-Pacific Gateway 
APKWS          Advanced precision kill weapon system 
AQ                  Al-Qaida Terrorist Group – “the Base” 
AOA               Aircraft operating authority 
AQIM             al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 
Ar                            Receive antenna effective area, m2 
AR                  Aspect ratio 
AR drone        AR stands for “Augmented Reality” in AR drone. AR 
Drone can perform tasks like object recognition and following, 
gesture following. 
ARM               Anti-Radiation Munitions 
ARS                Airborne Remote Sensing 
ARW               Anti-radiation weapons 
AS                   Airborne Sensing Systems 
ASB                Advisory Service Bulletin  / Air Sea Battle 
ASEA             Active electronically scanned arrays 
ASEAN          Association of Southeastern Asian Nations 
ASL                Airborne Systems Laboratory 
ASMS             Automated Separation Management System 
ASTM             American Society of Testing and Materials (ASTM) 
ASTER           Agency for Science, Technology and Research 
ASuW             Anti-surface unit warfare 
ASW               Anti-submarine warfare 
AT                  Aerial target 
ATC               Air Traffic Control 
ATHENA       Lockheed Martin Advanced Test High Energy Asset 
ATM               Air Traffic Management 
ATR                Automatic Target Recognition 
ATS                Air Traffic Service 
AUDS             Anti-UAV Defense System 
AUV               Autonomous Underwater Vehicle 
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Avionics          Aviation electronics in manned or unmanned 
aircraft 
AUVSI            Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems 
International 
AV                  Air Vehicle 
AWSAS          All Weather Sense and Avoid System 
B                     IF equivalent bandwidth, Hz 
BAMS             Broad Area maritime surveillance 
Backhauling    Intermediate links between core network or 
internet backbone and small subnets at the edge of the network 
Bandwidth       Defined as the Range within a band of wavelengths, 
frequencies or energy. 
Think of it as a range of radio frequencies occupied by a 
modulated carrier wave, assigned to a service over which a device 
can operate. Bandwidth is also a capacity for data transfer of 
electrical communications system. 
BDA                Battle Damage assessment 
BER                Bit error rate 
BLOS              Beyond line-of-sight 
BNF                Bind and Fly – with custom transmitter 
BRI                 Belt and Road Initiative 
BR&T             Boeing Research and Technology 
BSR                Bilinear Signal Representation 
BSs                  Base Stations 
BVR                Beyond visual range 
c                      Speed of light ~ (3 x 108 m/s) [186,000 miles per 
sec] in vacuum named after Celeritas the Latin word for speed or 
velocity 
c                      speed of sound (344 m/s) in air 
C                     Combined methods of CR 
C2 / C2W        Command and control / Command and Control 
Warfare 
C3I                  Command, control, communications and 
Intelligence 
C4                   Command, control, communications and computers 
Abbreviations and Acronyms  |  xliii
C4I                  Command, control, communications and 
computers, intelligence 
C4ISR             Command, control, communications, computers, 
intelligence, surveillance &  reconnaissance 
C4ISTAR        Command, control, communications, computers, 
intelligence, surveillance, target 
acquisition and reconnaissance 
CA                  Collision Avoidance / Clear Acquisition (GPS) / 
Cyber Assault (aka CyA) 
CAA               Control Acquisition cyber attack 
CAS                Close Air Support / Common situational awareness 
CASA             Civil Aviation Safety Authority 
CASIC            China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation 
C of A             Certificate of Airworthiness 
CAP                Civil Air Publication 
CAT                Collision Avoidance Threshold 
CC / CyC        Cyber Crime 
CCCI/II          Classical Cryptography Course Volume I/II (Nichols 
R. K., Classical Cryptography Course Volume I / II, 1996) 
CCE                Cyber Counter Espionage 
CCI                 Command control interface / Cyber 
Counterintelligence 
CCS                Cyber Counter Sabotage 
CCT                Cyber Counter Terrorism 
CC-UAS         Counter-Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
CD                  Conflict Detection 
CDL                Common data link 
CDMA            code division multiple access 
CDR                Collision detection and resolution systems 
(automated SAA in UAS) 
CEA                Cyber electromagnetic activities (Cyber, EW, 
Spectrum warfare) 
CETC              Chinese Electronics Technology Group 
CF                   Computer Forensics 
CFTA              Continental Free Trade Area 
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CFT                Certificate of flight trials / Cross-functional teams 
CHIMERA     Counter-electronic HPM Extended range base air 
defense 
CI / CyI           Cyber Infiltration 
CIA                 Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability / Central 
Intelligence Agency 
CIAD              Cyber- Multi-layered Integrated Air Defense 
Systems 
CIED              Computer improvised explosive device 
CIN                 Common Information Network 
CIR                 Color Infrared – artificial standard where NIR bands 
shifted so that humans can see the infrared reflectance 
CLE                Airport code for Cleveland 
C/N                 Carrier to Noise ratio in HAPS, => C/ N0 
CM / CyM       Countermeasure / Cyber Manipulation 
CN3                Communications / navigation network node 
CNI                 Critical National Infrastructure 
CNKI              China-North Korea-Iran technical weapons 
cooperation agreements 
CNO               Chief Naval Operations 
CNPC             Control and non-payload links 
COA               Certificate of Waiver or Authorization 
COB                Chief of the Boat 
COMINT        Communications intelligence 
COMJAM       Communications Jamming 
COMSEC       Communications Security 
CONOP(S)      Concepts of Operations 
CONUS          Continental United States 
COS                Continued Operational Safety 
COTS              Commercial off-the-shelf 
CPA                Closest Point of Approach 
CPA Spoof      CPA spoof involves faking a possible collision with a 
target ship 
CPL                 Commercial pilot’s license 
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CPNI               Center for Protection of National Infrastructure 
(UK) 
CPRC              Communist Party of the Republic of China 
CR                   Conflict Resolution / Close range / Cyber Raid (aka 
CyR) 
CRH                Coaxial rotor helicopter 
CRX                      Received Signal Power, watts 
CS                   Control station 
CSDP              Common Security and Defense Policy missions (EU) 
CSR                Compact Surveillance Radar 
CSfC               Commercial Solutions for Classified Program 
CSIRO            Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research 
Organization 
CT                   Counter Terrorism / Counter Terrorism Mission 
CTOL             Conventional take-off and landing 
C-UAS            Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems (defenses / 
countermeasures) 
CUAS             CSIRO Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
CV                  Collision Volume 
CW / CyW      Cyber Warfare 
D                     distance from transmitter in Range equation (Adamy 
D. -0., 2015) 
DA                  Danger area 
Danger Close 
Definition www.benning.army.mil/infantry/magazine/issues/
2013/May-June/Myer.html Nov 14, 2013 – 1) danger close is 
included in the “method-of-engagement” line of a call-for-fire 
request to indicate that friendly forces are close to the target. 
… Danger close is a term that is exclusive from risk estimate 
distance (RED) although the RED for 0.1 percent PI is used to define 
danger close for aircraft delivery.  Pi = Probability of incapacitation. 
2) Definition of “danger close” (US DoD) In close air support, 
artillery, mortar, and naval gunfire support fires, it is the term 
included in the method of engagement segment of a call for fire 
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which indicates that friendly forces are within close proximity of 
the target. 
DARO            Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office 
DARPA          Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
DAS                Detection by Acoustical Signature 
dB                   decibels 
DC                  Direct Current 
DCPA             Distance between vessels approaching CPA 
DDD               Dull, dangerous, and dirty 
DDOS             Distributed Denial of Service cyber attack 
DE                   Directed Energy 
DEF CON       DEF CON is the world’s longest running and largest 
underground hacking conference. 
DE / EP           Directed energy / Electromagnetic pulse 
DEW               Directed energy weapons 
DF                   Direction finding 
DFCS              Digital Flight Control System 
DHS                Department of Homeland Security 
DIME              Diplomatic, information, military and economy 
DIRCM           Directed Infrared Countermeasures 
DIY                 Do-it-yourself (amateur built drones or modified 
racing drones) 
D j                    Jammer location – to-target receiver location 
distance, in km, FM 34-40-7 
DJ                    Data Jamming / Drone Jammer 
DJI                  Popular and functional Chinese made drone series: 
Mavic, Phantom, Ryze, Matrix, Spark, Enterprise, Inspire, Tello 
{However, banned by USA Army} (Newman, 2017) 
DL                   Downlink in HAPS 
DLA                Date last accessed (usually a web reference) 
DLI                 Data Link interface 
DNA               Deoxyribonucleic acid 
DoD                Department of Defense 
DOF                Degrees of Freedom 
DOS                Denial of Service cyber attack 
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DPM               Direct power management / Dynamic Power 
Management 
DPRK             Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
D-R-O-N-E     FAA Guidance: Direct, Report, Observe, Notice 
&Execute 
DSA                Detect, sense and avoid / Dynamic Sense-and-Act 
DSS                 Decision Support System 
DSSS              Direct sequence spread spectrum 
D t                   Enemy transmitter location -to- target receiver 
location, in km, FM 34-40-7 
DT                   Directional transmission / Department of 
Transport (UK) 
DTDMA         Distributed Time Division Multiple Access (DTDMA) 
network radio system 
DTED             Digital terrain evaluation data 
DTF                 Drug Task Force 
DTH                Direct-To-Home 
DTI                 Direct Track & Identify 
DTRA             Defense Threat Reduction Agency 
DUO               Designated UAS operator 
EA                   Electronic Attack 
EARSC           European Association of Remote Sensing Companies 
EAS                Equivalent airspeed 
EAU                East Africa union comprising of Israel and six East 
African states, Kenya, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda and 
South Sudan 
(Eb / No)         Thermal noise power spectral density ratio 
ECCM / EP     Electronic counter-countermeasures / Electronic 
Protection 
ECM               Electronic countermeasures 
ECR                Electronic combat reconnaissance 
EDC                Estimated Date of Completion 
EDEW            Effects of Directed Energy Weapons 
EEZP              Exclusive economic Zone protection 
EHS                Enhanced surveillance 
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EIRP               Effective isotopic radiated power 
Electrolaser     Electroshock weapon that is also a DEW. Uses 
lasers to form electrically conductive laser-induced plasma charge 
ELINT            Electronic Intelligence 
ELT                Emergency locator transmitter 
ECM               Electromagnetic compatibility 
EM                  Electromagnetic 
EMC               Electromagnetic compatibility 
EME                Electromagnetic environment 
EMI                Electromagnetic interference 
EMO               Electromagnetic operations 
EMP               Electromagnetic pulse 
EMR               Electromagnetic Radiation 
EMS                Electromagnetic Spectrum 
EMSVIS         Electromagnetic Spectrum Visible Light 
EMW              Electromagnetic Waves 
EO                  Electro-optical (sensing) / Earth Observation 
EOTS              Electro-optical targeting system 
ERPJ                Effective radiated power of the jammer, in dBm 
ERPS                Effective radiated power of the desired signal 
transmitter, in dBm 
ESM / ES        Electronic support measures / Electronic warfare 
support / Earth station  &             ESM                         Electronic 
Signal Monitoring 
EU                   European Union 
EUNAVFOR  European Union Naval Force’s anti-piracy naval 
mission 
EUTM             Somalia Military training mission in Somalia 
EVTOL           Electric Vertical Take-off and Landing 
EW                  Electronic warfare, see 9-15 & footnotes 
F                      Field theory methods of CR 
F                      Fundamental frequency is defined as the lowest 
frequency of a periodic waveform 
f                       Frequency, cycles / second RRE) 
Fo                    Resonant frequency of string, Hz see Eq. 20-5 
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F                      Frequency in MHz, FM 34-40-7 
FAA                Federal Aviation Administration 
FACE              Future Airborne Capability Environment 
FAR                False Alarm Rates 
FBL                 Fly-by-Light, a type of flight-control system where 
input command signals are sent to the actuators through the 
medium of optical-fiber … 
FBW               Fly-by-wire 
FCC                Federal Communications Commission 
FCS                 Flight control systems / Flight Control Station 
FDF                 Frequency Domain Filtering 
FDM               frequency division multiplexing 
FHSS              Frequency hopping spread spectrum 
FIR                  Far Infrared (25-40) to (200-350) um 
FIRES             definition (US DoD – JP 3-0) the use of weapon 
systems to create a specific lethal or nonlethal effect on a target. 
FL                   Flight Level 
FLIR               Forward-looking infrared 
Fly-by-Wire     Predetermine flight mission path based on GPS 
coordinates 
FMS                Flexible manufacturing system 
Follow-Me      UAS autopilot automatically follows operator 
Fom                 HAPS Figure of merit in upload /download link 
FoV                 Field of view 
FFOV              Forward Field of View 
FRAGO          Fragmentary Order – to send timely changes of 
existing orders to a subordinate 
FPV                 First Person View – live streaming video used in 
racing drones 
FPGA              Field programmable gate array 
FS                    Fixed service 
FSS                 Fixed satellite service 
FW                  Fixed wing 
G                     Geometric methods of CR 
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G5S                 G5 Sahel (G5S) Joint Force, has membership of five 
states; Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Chad 
GAO               General Accounting Office USA 
gAR                Receiving Antenna Gain as a Factor 
GBU               Guided Bomb Unit 
GCHQ            Government Communications Headquarters 
(Britain) 
GCS                Ground control station 
GDPR             European Union’s (EU) General Data Protection 
Regulation 
GDT                Ground data terminal 
GEO                Geostationary Earth orbit satellite 
GeoFence        A geo-fence is a virtual perimeter for a real-
world geographic area 
GLOW            Gross lift-off weight for a missile / rocket 
GNSS              Global Navigation Satellite System 
GLONASS     Global Satellite Navigational System 
GPS                 Global Positioning System / Geo Fencing 
GPS/INS         Use of GPS satellite signals to correct or calibrate 
a solution from an inertial navigation system (INS). The method is 
applicable for any GNSS/INS system. 
GPSSPOOF    Hack of GPS system affecting UAS commands 
GPWS             Ground proximity warning system 
G R                     The receiving antenna gain in the direction of the 
desired signal transmitter, dBi 
G RJ                    Receiving antenna gain in the direction of the 
jammer, in dBi 
GS                   Ground segment of HAPs 
GSE                Ground support equipment 
GSHM            Ground Station Handover Method 
GSM               Global System for Mobile Communications 
GT                   Game Theory methods of CR 
G/T                  Ratio of the receive antenna gain to system noise 
temperature 
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(G /Ts) dB      Represents the figure of merit of the HAPS receiver, 
in dB 
GT                    Gain of the transmit antenna, dB 
GTA                  Ground -to -Air Defense 
Hard damage   DEW complete vaporization of a target 
Harmonic        Frequency, which is an integer multiple of the 
fundamental frequency 
H                     Elevation of the jammer location above sea level, 
feet, FM 34-40-7 
HAE                High altitude endurance 
HALE             High altitude – long endurance 
HAPS              High Altitude Platforms (generally for wireless 
communications enhancements) 
HAPS UAVs  UAVs dedicated to HAPS service (example to 
communicate via CNPC links) 
HEAT             High-explosive anti-tank warhead 
HELWS          High energy laser weapon system 
HITL               Human in-the-loop 
HMI                Human machine interface 
HO                  Home Office (UK) 
HPA                High power amplifier 
HPL                High powered laser weapon 
HPM               High powered microwave defense 
H t                          Elevation of enemy transmitter location above 
sea level, in feet, FM 34-40-7 
HUD               Heads-up display 
HUMINT        Human intelligence (spy’s) 
HVT                High value target (generally, for assassination) 
I                       Sound intensity, W x m-2 [Source strength S / 4πr2] 
(Uni-wuppertal, 2019) 
IA                    Information Assurance / Intentional cyber warfare 
attack 
I-actors            Intentional Cyber Actors 
IADS              Multi-layered integrated air defense systems 
IAI                  Israeli Aerospace Industries 
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IAS                 Indicated airspeed 
ICAO              International Civil Aviation Organization 
I.C.B.C           International Center for Boundary Cooperation 
(China) 
ICBM              Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles 
ICGs               Information centers of gravity 
ICS                  Internet Connection Sharing 
ID                    Information Dominance / Inspection and 
Identification 
IEDs                Improvised Explosive Devices 
IEEE               Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
IEWS              Intelligence, electronic warfare and sensors 
IFF                  Identification, friend or foe 
IFR                  Instrument flight rules 
I&I                  Interchangeability and Interoperability 
IIT                   Intentional Insider Threats 
Imaging Sensors ARS sensors that build images 
IL                    Intensity level of sound measured, dB, Eq. 20-2 
IMINT            Imagery intelligence 
IMM                Interacting-multiple-models tracker 
IMU                Inertial Measurement Unit 
INS                 Inertial navigation system 
IMU                Inertial Measurement Unit 
INFOSEC       Information Security 
IO                    Information Operations, see Figure 9-11 & footnotes 
IOC                 Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission 
IOR                 India Ocean Region 
IoT                  Internet of things 
IIoT                 Industrial Internet of things 
IPL                  Insitu Pacific Limited 
IR                    Infrared Sensors 
IRST               Infrared search and tracking 
IS                    Information Superiority 
ISIS                 Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) 
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ISR                  Intelligence, Reconnaissance and Surveillance UAS 
Platform 
ISTAR            Intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and 
reconnaissance 
IT                    Information Technology 
ITU                 International Telecommunications Union – 
Standards Organization 
ITU-R             International Telecommunications Union – Radio 
Sector 
IW                   Information Warfare 
JAGM             Joint-Air-to-Ground Missile 
JAUS              Joint architecture for UAS 
JDAM             Joint direct attack munitions 
JFO                 Joint fires observer 
JP                    Joint Publication – followed by military identifier 
JDAM             Joint Direct Attack Munition 
JNIM               Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin 
JOAC              Joint Operational Access Concept 
JOPES             Joint Operation and Planning System / Execution 
System 
JP                    Joint Publication 
J / S                 = the ratio of the jammer power to the desired 
signal power at the input to the receiver being jammed in dB 
JTAC               Joint Terminal Attack Controller; 
JTIDS              Joint Tactical Information Distribution System 
(JTIDS) is an L band DTDMA 
K                     Boltzmann’s constant (Noise component, RRE) (1.38 
x 10 -23 J/K), Kelvin 
K                     2 for jamming frequency modulated receivers 
(jamming tuner accuracy), FM 34-40-7 
KAMIKAZI   Means “Divine Wind,” Tactic best known for Japanese 
suicide A/C attacks on Allied Capital Vessels in WWII. UAS TEAMS 
or SWARMS could be directed in the same way. 
KE                   Kinetic energy 
KEW               Kinetic energy weapons 
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KM                  Katiba Macina Groups 
L                      λ / 2 in Eq. 20-5 
LAANC          Low Altitude Authorization and Notification 
Capability 
LASER           “A laser is a device that emits light through a process 
of optical amplification based on the stimulated 
emission of electromagnetic radiation. The term “laser” originated 
as an acronym for “light amplification by stimulated emission of 
radiation”. A laser differs from other sources of light in that it emits 
light coherently, spatially and temporally. Spatial coherence allows 
a laser to be focused to a tight spot, enabling applications such 
as laser cutting and lithography. Spatial coherence also allows a 
laser beam to stay narrow over great distances (collimation), 
enabling applications such as laser pointers. Lasers can also have 
high temporal coherence, which allows them to emit light with a 
very narrow spectrum, i.e., they can emit a single color of light. 
Temporal coherence can be used to produce pulses of light as short 
as a femtosecond. Used: for military and law enforcement devices 
for marking targets and measuring range and speed.” (Wiki-L, 2018) 
Laser JDAM   Laser Joint Direct Attack Munition – dumb bombs, 
all weather precision –guided munitions. Guided by an integrated 
inertial guidance system. 
Laser rangefinder Scope to assist targeting of munitions. 
Countermeasure: laser-absorbing paint 
LGWs             Laser-guided weapons 
Latency           Processing difference between time interval signal 
is transmitted and signal is received 
LCDR             Lieutenant Commander 
L/D                  Lift to drag ratio 
LDCM            Low Duty cycle methods 
LEO                Low Earth Orbit Satellite 
LGB                Laser-guided bomb, a guided bomb that uses semi-
active laser guidance to strike a designated target with greater 
accuracy than an unguided one 
Abbreviations and Acronyms  |  lv
LGTF              Liptako-Gourma task force (LGTF) established by 
Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger to secure their shared border region 
LIDAR           Light (Imaging) Detection and Ranging 
LFS                 Free- Space Loss as a Factor 
LIPC               laser-induced plasma channel 
LJ                     Propagation loss from jammer to receiver, in dBi 
LMADIS        Light Marine Air Defense Integrated System (family 
of C-UAS systems) 
LMM               Lightweight Multi-role Missile (by Thales) 
LOS                Line-of-sight / Loss of Signal / Loss of Separation 
LOSAS           Low cost Scout UAV Acoustic System 
LPA                Log periodic array 
LPI                  Low Probability of Intercept 
LR                   Long range 
LRA                Long range artillery 
LRAD             Long Range Acoustic Device (Weapon) (Yunmonk 
Son, 2015) 
LRCS              Low radar cross section 
LRE                Launch and recovery element 
LRF                 Laser rangefinder 
LS                            Losses existing in the system (lumped 
together), dB (RRE) 
LS                    The propagation loss from the desired signal 
transmitter, in dBm 
LSDB              Laser Small Diameter Bomb 
LST                 Laser spot trackers 
LTA                Lighter than Air (airship) /Low noise amplifier 
LTE /LTE+     Long Term Evolution – refers to mobile 
telecommunications coverage 
LWIR              Long wave Infrared (sensor or camera) 
M                     Mass in Eq. 20-5 
MA                  Multi-agent methods of CR 
MAD               Magnetic anomaly detection 
MADIS           Marine Air Defense Integrated System 
MAE               Medium-altitude endurance 
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MAGTF          Marine air-ground task force 
MALDRONE Malware injected into critical SAA for UAS 
MALE             Medium-altitude, long endurance UAS 
MALE-T         Medium altitude long endurance – tactical UAS 
MAME            Medium altitude, medium endurance. 
MASINT         Measurement and Signal Intelligence 
MATS             Mobile Aircraft Tracking System 
M-AUDS        Mobile Anti-UAV Defense System 
MAV               Micro-air vehicle 
Maverick        AGM -65 (USA) Missile 
MCE               Mission control element 
MCM              Mine countermeasures 
MCU               Master Control Unit 
MDR               Missed Detection Rates 
MEB               Marine expeditionary brigade (14,500 marines and 
sailors); 
MEMS            Micro-electromechanical systems 
MEO               Medium Earth Orbit satellite 
MFD               Multi Function display 
MGTOW         Maximum gross takeoff weight 
MHT               Multiple-hypotheses-testing 
MIM                Man in the Middle cyber attack 
MINUSMA    Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in 
Mali 
MIR                Mid Infrared 5 to (25-40) um 
MIT                 Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
MLRS             Multi launch rocket systems 
MLU               Mid-life upgrade 
MMI                Man-machine interface 
MORS             Military Operations Research Society 
MPA               Maritime patrol aircraft 
MPI                 Message-passing interface 
MPO               Mission payload operator 
MR                  Medium range 
MRE               Medium-range endurance 
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MS                  Mobile service 
MSL / AGL    MSL altitudes are measured from a standard datum, 
which is roughly equal to the average altitude of the ocean. So, an 
aircraft traveling 5,000 feet directly above a mountain that’s 3,000 
feet tall would have an altitude of 5,000 feet Above Ground Level 
(AGL) and 8,000 feet MSL. 
MSR                Maritime Silk Road (China) 
MTCR             missile Technology Control Regime 
MTI                 Moving target indication 
MTOM            Maximum take-off mass 
Modulation     Signal Modulation is the process of varying one or 
more properties of a periodic waveform, called the carrier signal, 
with a modulating signal that typically contains information to be 
transmitted 
MORS             Military Operations Research Society 
MTOW            Maximum takeoff weight of an aircraft at which the 
pilot can attempt to take off, due to structural or other limits. 
MTS                Multi Spectral Targeting System 
MTTR             Multitarget tracking radar/Mean time to repair 
MUAV            Mini-UAV or maritime UAV 
MUJAO          Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa 
MUM              Manned-unmanned teaming 
MW                 Microwave 
MWIR             Midwave Infrared 
MW                 microwave towers 
N                     Available Noise power, watts for HAPS 
N                     Terrain and ground conductivity factor, FM 34-40-7 
5 = very rough terrain with poor ground conductivity 
4 = moderately rough terrain with fair to good ground 
conductivity 
3 = Farmland terrain with good ground conductivity 
2 = Level terrain with good ground conductivity[1] 
The elevation of the jammer location and the enemy transmitter 
location does not include the height of the antenna above the 
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ground or the length of the antenna. It is the location deviation 
above sea level. 
NAC               Network Access Control 
NACA            National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics 
NAS                National Airspace (USA) 
NASAMS II   National Advanced Surface to Air Missile System 
NATO             North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NAV               Nano-air vehicle / NAV data message for GPS 
systems 
NBC                Nuclear, biological and chemical warfare 
NCO               Network-centric operations 
NCW               Network Centric Warfare 
NDRC             National Development and Reform Commission 
(China) 
NEC                Network enabled capability 
NGO               Non-Governmental Organization 
NIEM              National Information Exchange Model 
NIR                 near Infrared 
NLOS             Non-line-of-sight 
NM                  Nautical Miles 
NMAC            A NMAC is defined as an incident associated with the 
operation of an aircraft in which a possibility of collision occurs as 
a result of proximity of less than 500 feet to another aircraft, or a 
report is received from a pilot or a flight crewmember stating that a 
collision hazard existed between two or more aircraft. 
NMLA            the National Movement for Liberation of Azawad 
(Tuareg Rebellion) 
NO                  Numerical Optimization methods of CR 
NOLO             No onboard live operator (USN) 
NOTAM         Notice to airmen 
NPD                Near Peer Doctrine 
NPS                 National Park Service 
NSA                National Security Agency (US) 
NSRL              New Silk Road Sea / Land routes (Chinese) 
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NTIA              National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration 
NTSB              National Transportation Safety Board 
NTT                 Non-Threat Traffic 
NULLO          Not using live operator (USAF) 
O                     Other methods of CR 
OEM               Original Equipment Manufacture 
OIO                 Offensive Information Operations 
OLOS             Out-of-the-line-of-sight 
OODA            Decision Loop: Observe, Orient, Decide, Act 
OPA                Optionally piloted aircraft 
OPAV             Optionally piloted air vehicle 
OPSEC           Operations Security 
OSI                 Open systems interconnection 
OTH                Over- the- horizon 
P                       Isotropic source of an electromagnetic pulse of 
peak power, Mw 
PANCAS        Passive Acoustic Non-Cooperative Collision Alert 
System 
PB                   Particle Beams, Particle beams are large numbers of 
atomic or subatomic particles moving at relativistic velocities. 
PCAS              Persistent close air support 
PCS                 Personal Communication Services 
PEIRP             Transmitter’s effective isotropic radiated power, 
watts 
PFMS              Predictive Flight Management System 
PEMSIA         Partnership in Environmental Management of the 
Seas of East Asia 
PGB                Precision guided bomb 
PGM               Precision guided missile 
PHOTINT       Photographic intelligence (usually sky – ground) 
PHX                Airport code for Phoenix 
PI                    Probability of Incapacitation 
PII                   Personal Identifiable Information 
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PIM                 Position of intended movements/Previously 
intended movements 
PIT                  Proximity Intruder Traffic 
P j                           Minimum amount of jammer power output 
required, in watts, FM 34-40-7 
PL                   Power level, dB, Eq. 20-1 
PLA                Chinese People’s Liberation Army 
PLAN             Peoples Liberation Army Navy (China) 
PLC                 Programmable Logic Controllers 
PMIAA           Permissions Management: Identification, 
Authentication and Authorization 
PNF                 Plug and Fly with custom transmitter, receiver, 
battery and charger 
PO                   Psychological Operations 
POS                 Position and Orientation System 
POV                Point of View 
PPP                 Precise Point Positioning 
PPS                 Precise positioning service (GPS) 
PRC                Peoples Republic of China (China) 
Primum Non Nocere – First Do No Harm (Latin) 
PSD                 Power Spectral Density 
PREACT         Partnership for Regional East Africa 
Counterterrorism (PREACT) 
PRF                 Pulse repetition frequency codes 
PRM                Precision Runway Monitor 
PSH                 Plan-symmetric helicopter 
PSR                 Primary Surveillance Radar 
P t                     Power output of the enemy drone, in watts, FM 
34-40-7 
PW /PSYWAR Psychological Warfare 
PWO               Principal Warfare officer 
P(Y)                Precise Signal (GPS) 
QOS                Quality of Service in HAPs 
QUAS             QUT UAS 
QUT                Queensland University of Technology 
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R                     1 /Tb is the bit rate (b/s) in link equation 
R4                           Energy density received at detected target 
range, R, nm 
RA                  Resolution Advisory 
RAC                Range air controller 
RADAR          Radio Detection and Ranging 
RADINT         Radar intelligence 
RAM               Radar absorbing materials 
RAS                Radar absorbing structure 
RAST              Recovery, assist, and traverse 
RB                   Rule-based methods (Conflict Resolution) 
RBW               Red- breasted Woodpecker 
RCE                Remote Code Execution 
RCO                Remote-control operator 
RCS                Radar cross-section 
RCTA             Surf Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics 
RED                Risk Estimate Distance 
RES                 Radio electronic systems 
RF                   Radio Frequency 
RGB                Red Green Blue for VIS camera 
RGT                Remote ground terminal 
Rician PDF     Rician probability density function 
RIMPAC        Rim of the Pacific Exercise – Maritime 
RL                   Ramp launched 
RMS                Reconnaissance management system /Root-mean-
square 
RN                  Ryan-Nichols Qualitative Risk Assessment Equations 
17-2, 17-3 
RNRA             Ryan – Nichols Attack / Defense Scenario Risk 
Assessment for Cyber cases 
ROA               Remotely operated aircraft 
ROC                Republic of China (Taiwan) / Regional Operations 
Center (USA) 
RPA                Remotely piloted aircraft 
RPH                Remotely piloted helicopter 
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RPV                Remotely piloted vehicle 
RR                   Radio regulations 
RRE                Radar Range Equation 
RSA                RSA (Rivest–Shamir–Adelman) -authors of early 
public –key cryptographic system 
RSTA              Reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition 
RTA                Dubai Roads and Transport Authority 
RTF                 Off- the- shelf, Ready -to -Fly 
RTK                Real Time Kinematic 
RTS                 Remote tracking station/Request to send/Release 
to service 
RTU                Remote Terminal Unit 
RUAV            Relay UAV 
RWR               Radar warning receiver 
S                      Intensity at surface of sphere 
SA                   Situational Awareness 
SAA                Sense and Avoid & 
SAA                Sense and Act Systems; replaces See and Avoid 
function of a human pilot 
SAASM          Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module 
SAE                Society of Automotive Engineers 
SAM               Surface to Air Missile 
SAMPLE        Survivable autonomous mobile platform, long-
endurance 
SAP                 Systems Applications and Products also the name of 
a company 
SAR                Synthetic aperture radar / Search and rescue- 
especially using helicopters 
SAS                 Safety Assurance System 
SATCOM       Satellite communications 
SCADA          Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition systems 
SCHEMA       Security Incident Identification 
SCIF               Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility 
SCS                 Shipboard control system (or station) / Stereo 
Camera System / South China Sea 
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SE                   Synthetic environment 
SEA                Airport code for Seattle 
SEAD             Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses 
SECDEF         Secretary of Defense 
Shadowing      Airframe shadowing – UAV- Ground signal 
degradation during maneuver 
SEZ                 Special economic zones 
SHM               Simple harmonic motion – represented by sign wave 
SHORAD       Short Range Air Defense systems 
SIGINT           Signals Intelligence 
Signature         UAS detection by acoustic, optical, thermal and 
radio /radar 
SJM                 Salafi-Jihad Movement 
SKASaC         Seeking airborne surveillance and control 
SKYNET        Fictional artificial intelligence system that becomes 
self-aware 
SLAMRAAM Surface launched AMRAAM 
SM                  Separation Management 
SMC                Single moving camera 
SME                Subject matter expert 
SMR                Single main rotor 
S/N                  S / N = is one pulse received signal to noise ratio, 
dB; Signal to Noise ratio at HAPS receiver 
SOA                Static Obstacle – Avoidance system 
Soft damage    DEW disruption to a UAS computer 
SPL                 Sound pressure level, dB = 20 Log p / po [ measured 
pressures to reference pressure]          see Eq. 20-3,4; 6-7 
SPS                 Standard position service (GPS) 
Spoofing         A Cyber-weapon attack that generates false signals 
to replace valid ones 
Spot sensors    ARS sensors that measure single locations without 
image library. 
SQL                SQL Injection – common malevolent code injection 
technique 
SR                   Short range 
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SRBM             Short range ballistic missile, ex SCUD missile 
SRL                 Systems readiness level 
SSA                 Static Sense-and -Act 
SSBN              Ballistic missile submarine force 
SSP                 Smart Skies Project 
SSR                 Secondary Surveillance Radar 
SST                 Self – Separation Threshold 
STANAG 4856 Standard interfaces of UAV Control System for 
NATO UAV 
STK                 Satellite toolkit 
STOL              Short take-off and landing 
sUAS              Small Unmanned Aircraft System 
SUAVE          Small UAV engine 
SWARM         High level, dangerous collaboration of UAS, UUV, or 
unmanned boats 
SWAT             Special Weapons and Tactics (police / paramilitary) 
SWAP             Size, weight and power 
SWIR              Shortwave infrared, 1400-3000 nm, 1.4 -3.0 um 
wavelength range 
SZ                   Safety Zone is defined as the horizontal and vertical 
separation criteria which form a cylindrical airspace volume around 
the UAS. In figure 3-2 that volume is defined by 1000 ft radius and 
200 ft height. It is assumed that initially the UAS is in the center with 
100 ft above and below the A/C. 
T                      In Range equation & environment, strength of a 
received signal, function of square or fourth power of distance, d, 
from transmitter (Adamy D. -0., 2015) 
T                      Time, sec (RRE) 
T                      Tension in Eq.20-5 
TA                   Traffic Advisory 
TAC                Target air controller 
TACAN          Tactical air navigation 
TAR                Antenna noise temperature, Kelvin 
TAS                 True airspeed 
TBO                Time between overhauls 
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TC                   Type certificate 
TCAS              Traffic alert and collision avoidance system 
TCPA              Time to reach Closest Point of Approach 
Te                    Effective input noise temperature, Kelvin, 
TEAM (UAS) High level, dangerous collaboration of UAS, UUV, or 
unmanned boats; differs from SWARM in that it has a UAS Team 
Leader, (TL) where SWARM does not. TL directs the UAS team and 
is the primary counter UAS target to disrupt. 
TETRA           Terrestrial Trunked Radio for terrestrial terminals / 
services 
Thermobaric   Metal augmented charge 
THOR             Tactical high-power operational responder 
TIR                  Thermal infrared = 8000 – 15000 nm, 8 -15 um 
TL                   Team Leader 
TO                   take-off 
Tort                 A tort is an act or omission that gives rise to injury 
or harm to another and amounts to a civil wrong for which courts 
impose liability. 
TP                    Trajectory Prediction 
TRANSCOM  U.S. Transportation Command networks 
TRL                 Technology readiness level 
TS                    Measured noise temperature, Kelvin units above 
absolute zero 
TSTCP            Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. TSCTP 
partners include Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Mali, 
Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia. 
TT & C           Telemetry, tracking and command 
TUAV             Tactical UAV 
UA                  Unmanned Aircraft (non-cooperative and potential 
intruder) 
U-Actors         Unintentional Cyber Actors 
UAE                United Arab Emirates 
UAM               Urban Air Mobility (vehicle) 
UAPO             Unmanned Aircraft Program Office 
UAS                Unmanned aircraft system 
lxvi  |  Abbreviations and Acronyms
UASCdr          Unmanned aircraft system commander 
UASIPP          UAS Integration Pilot Program 
UAS-p             UAS pilot 
UAV               Unmanned aerial vehicle 
UAV-p            UAV pilot 
UBR                Uplink bit rate, Mb/s 
UCAR             Unmanned combat armed rotorcraft 
UCARS          UAV common automated recovery system 
UCAV            Unmanned combat air vehicle 
UCWA / UA   Unintentional cyber warfare attack 
UGCS             Unmanned Ground Control Station 
UGS                Unmanned ground-based station 
UGV               Unmanned ground vehicle 
UHF                Ultra High Frequency, 300 MHz – 3 GHz 
UIT                 Unintentional Insider Threats 
UK                  United Kingdom 
UL                   Upload link 
UMTS             Universal Mobile Telecommunications System 
U.N.                United Nations 
UNESCO        United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization 
UNICEF         United Nations Children’s Fund 
USD                Unmanned surveillance drone 
UTM               Unmanned Traffic Management 
UTV                Unmanned target vehicle 
UUV               Unmanned underwater vehicle 
UUNs / DUNSs Urgent / deliberate universal needs statements 
V                     Visible 
VFR                Visual flight rules 
VIKI               Virtual Interactive Kinetic Intelligence 
VLA                Very light aircraft 
VLJ                 Very Light Jet 
VLAR             Vertical launch and recovery 
VLOS             Visual Line of Sight 
VMC               Visual Meteorological Conditions 
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VNIR              Visible light and near infrared 400 – 1400 nm, 0.4 – 
1.4 um wavelength range 
Voloport          Landing site for Volcopter 
VTOL             Vertical take-off and landing 
VTUAV          Vertical take-off UAV 
WEF                World Economic Forum 
WEZ               Weapon Engagement Zone 
WMD              Weapons of Mass Destruction 
WRC               World Radio Conference Standards Organization 
XO                  Executive Officer of Naval vessel 
ZIGBEE or KILLERBEE      Sniffing / penetration tools specific to 
UAS 
 
Greek Symbols 
λ                      Wavelength in Hz, c / f where c= speed of light 344 
m/s and f = frequency, Hz. 
Σ                      Radar Cross Sectional Area, m2 
 
 
 
Sources plus Bibliography below: (Nichols R. K., 2019) 
Austin, R, (2010) Unmanned Aircraft Systems: UAVS Design, 
Development and Deployment, West Sussex, UK: Wiley, [Condensed 
with additions from eleven-page “Units and Abbreviations Table.” 
Pp. ix-xxix] Additional sources generated from / specific to Chapter 
development / discussion. A few definitions taken from Wikipedia. 
Cyber terminology from: Nichols, R. K. (Sept. 5, 2008) Cyber 
Counterintelligence & Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility 
(SCIF) Needs – Talking Points & (Randall K. Nichols J. J., 2018) 
& (Nichols R. K., Hardening US Unmanned Systems Against Enemy 
Counter Measures, 2019) & (Randall K. Nichols D. , Chapter 20 
Acoustic CM & IFF Libraries V SWARMS Rev 1 05142019, 2018) 
& (Randall K. Nichols and Lekkas, 2002)& (NIST, September 2012) 
Alford, L. D., Jr., USAF, Lt. Col. (2000) Cyber Warfare: Protecting 
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Military Systems Acquisition Review Quarterly, spring 2000, V.7, No. 
2, P, 105, (Nielsen, 2012) 
Nichols, Randall K.; Mumm, Hans C.; Lonstein, Wayne D.; Ryan, 
Julie J.C.H.; Carter, Candice; and Hood, John-Paul, “Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems in the Cyber Domain” (2019). NPP eBooks. 27. 
https://newprairiepress.org/ebooks/27 
Http://Www.Dtic.Mil/Dtic/Tr/Fulltext/U2/A487951.Pdf 
Appendix 1: Standard Acoustic Principal Physical Properties 
(Entokey, 2019) 
and (Gelfand S. A., 2009) 
 
A majority of the technical abbreviations come from (Nichols, et 
al., Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the Cyber Domain, 2019) 
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Chapter 1:   The Role of 
Information Technology 
J.J.C.H. RYAN 
Student Learning Objectives: 
After completing this block, the student will be able to use the 
conceptualization of an OODA loop in order to: 
— describe the role of automated decisions in UAS operations 
— analyze communications pathway weaknesses between UAS 
components 
— identify points of attack in a notional UAS architecture 
— explain types of sensing and how they are used to support 
decision making 
–– ideate countermeasures to UAS operations 
 
Introduction 
In counter unmanned aerial systems (C-UAS) operations, there 
are basically just two ways to actually do something to counter 
the UAS activity: physically interfere with the system(s) or virtually 
interfere with the system(s).  In this text, a wide variety of methods 
will be presented that employ one or both of these approaches.  It 
is useful to have a structure upon which to consider those methods, 
which is why this chapter is first. 
A UAS is, at its most abstract, an information processing system. 
Data is sensed, processed, shared, and communicated in order to 
control flight parameters (speed, altitude, etc.), internal sensors, 
external sensors, navigation, and mission execution.  Data can be 
shared internally and externally, with other UASs, ground control 
elements, and computational backend systems.  But this abstraction 
hides an incredible complexity of configuration.  The various 
configurations of UASs range from stratospheric balloons (Loon 
LLC, 2020) (Sampson, 2019) to high altitude 
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jets (AirForceTechnology.com, 2019) to hobbyist 
quadcopters (Fisher, 2020).  Uses for UASs include surveillance, 
communications, weapons deployment, and entertainment.  They 
exist in single system configurations, multiple element 
collaborations, and swarms.  Simply put, the complexity and 
numbers of UAS configurations are legion.  Therefore, it can be 
useful to abstract a construction of a UAS in order to have a way 
of discussing the issues without being bound by and constrained by 
implementation details. 
In such an abstract description, a UAS consists of at least the 
following elements:  a propulsion system, a control system, and 
a housing system.  The propulsion system is what provides the 
mechanisms for flight and maneuver.  The control system, which 
may be partially or completely autonomous, is what provides 
guidance to the UAS.  The housing system is the physical structure 
that brings all components together to create a single operational 
UAS.  A UAS may also include sensors, decision-making systems, 
communications systems, weapons, and defensive systems.  Of all 
these components, only one may be bereft of information 
technology: the housing system.  It follows, then, that 
understanding the role of IT in UAS operations is critical to 
understanding such mission-critical elements as targeting, effects, 
and execution of counter UAS activities. 
Note that UAS operations could (and probably should) consider C-
UAS actions prior to actual execution of a mission.  In considering 
the potential C-UAS actions that a particular mission might 
encounter, the operators of a UAS might engage in counter C-UAS 
(CC-UAS) activities.  These might include mission planning to avoid 
C-UAS capabilities, hardening of systems to resist C-UAS actions, 
and engaging in deception activities to confuse or deny C-UAS 
action effects.  Simply put, considering how adversaries might try to 
disrupt and deny mission execution gives operators the opportunity 
to plan ways to subvert those adversarial activities.  Thus, a mission 
planner needs to not only plan how to execute the mission but also 
to how to mitigate the actions that an adversary will take to thwart 
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the mission.  From the other perspective, a C-UAS operator must 
consider that an adversary might anticipate the C-UAS actions and 
have prepared alternatives and defenses.  Whether you are Blue or 
Red in this scenario, the other side gets a vote. 
The following Table 1-1 is a simple exploration of how UAS, C-
UAS, and CC-UAS operations relate to each other.  These are simply 
notional, are not intended to be a complete exposition, and are 
simply offered as a way to more easily integrate the concepts into a 
single operational construct. 
 
Table 1-1 UAS, C-UAS and CC-UAS Operations Relationships 
 
UAS 
operations 
Counter-UAS 
operations Counter Counter-UAS operations 
Flight path MIJI activities redundant systems alternative flight paths 
Surveillance Dazzling Camouflage 
Multiple types and numbers of sensors 
with different capabilities 
Swarm 
coordination 
Communications 
interference Redundant channels 
Source: Ryan, J.J.C.H (2020) Private Notes 
 
When you think through these possibilities, it becomes clear that 
the potential for physical interference to UAS operations is limited: 
you can shoot down a UAS, but that’s about it.  But shooting down 
a UAS can be tricky, especially if the UAS is operating very remotely 
(like a stratospheric balloon) or in a swarm (where there are too 
many UAS to target individually).  Plus, shooting down a UAS can 
deny the mission but is pretty darn obvious.  A more subtle C-UAS 
operation might be to hijack the data feed or cause the UAS to 
operate in an area slightly different from the goal target.  So, the 
real target may very well be the information systems embedded in a 
UAS. 
Disrupting the Decision Cycles 
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To oversimplify significantly, the importance of embedded 
information processing technologies is to support and enhance 
decision-making capability.  Should the UAS change course?  Does 
the UAS have enough fuel to get home?  If not, what should happen? 
Is the UAS about to fly into a tree?  The entire flight of a UAS, 
whether alone or in a swarm, is filled with the need to make and 
execute decisions. 
The point of integrating advanced information technologies into 
UASs is to speed up the ability to make and execute appropriate 
decisions.  Those two phrases: “make and execute” and 
“appropriate” are critical to understanding the problem space. 
“Make and execute” imply data input to a decision-making system, 
data output from such a decision-making system, and a triggering 
mechanism for a decision acting element.  “Appropriate” implies 
that the decision and triggering processes have been thoroughly 
tested to comply with the rules of engagement and the policies that 
exist for the mission profile.  These are decision cycles: a decision 
made based on input, action is done based on the decision, and a 
reassessment of the situation is performed to see if further action is 
needed.  Rinse and repeat, as needed. 
The point of attacking information technologies in UASs is to 
disrupt or deceive the decision cycle, for one or more purpose. 
Therefore, it is useful to have a short discussion on conceptualizing 
decision cycles.  There are many different ways to conceptualize 
how decisions are formed, but one that has currency and broad 
based acceptance is the OODA Loop, first conceptualized by John 
Boyd (Richards, 2012) and updated by many, including Julie Ryan in 
1996 (Nichols, Ryan, & Ryan, 2000).  There have been many other 
contributors to the nuanced application of the OODA Loop as well, 
including criticisms (Forsling, 2018).  The point is that the useful 
but only as far as the nuanced application of it allows.  Further, 
the model was developed in a time when decisions were definitely 
restricted to the human brain, hence the development of OODA 2.0 
(Nichols, Ryan, & Ryan, 2000, pp. 477-488).  Both versions of the 
model are useful in planning C-UAS activities. See Figure 1-1. 
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The original OODA Loop is normally simplified to a simple loop 
that encompasses four steps connected with arrows.  The four steps 
comprise a decision cycle.  The first step is to observe what is 
going on.  The second step is to orient those observations within 
the context of the environment and activities.  The third step is 
to create candidate decisions based on the observations, the 
orientation, and mission.  The fourth step is to act on the decision(s) 
that are deemed appropriate.  Finally, the cycle repeats as needed. 
The following diagram depicts the OODA Loop as normally drawn: 
Figure 1-1: Simplified OODA Loop 
 
 
Source: (Richards, 2012) 
 
The literature is clear to point out, however, that the OODA 
conceptualized by Boyd was much more nuanced, considering the 
role of feedback, mental biases, and experience level throughout 
the entire model.  Figure 1-2, taken from (Richards, 2012), shows the 
version of the OODA drawn by Boyd: 
 
Figure 1-2: Boyd’s Drawing of the OODA Loop 
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Source: (Richards, 2012) 
 
Both versions of the OODA Loop capture the essence of the 
process, in that a decision is made as a result of observing 
something in the environment that can be characterized (oriented) 
as something worth acting upon. 
An interesting way of conceiving of this process includes layering 
time over the various steps.  Using the simplistic version, simply to 
control the resultant complexity of the diagram, one can conceive 
that there are hard physical limits to each step of the process. 
Hard physical limits derive from the speed of light, the speed of 
neural transmission, the speed of thought conversion from sight 
to context, and the speed at which cognition occurs.  These hard-
physical limits, when characterized in scenarios, describe the 
ultimate maximum speed at which any decision cycle can occur. 
Figure 1-3 shows the simple version of the OODA Loop with such 
time overlays. 
 
Figure 1-3: Time Elements of the OODA Loop 
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Source: (Ryan, Lecture Notes, EMSE 218/6540/6537, 1997) 
 
The time elements shown include the times required to execute 
any of the given steps (T) plus the time to transition between steps 
(Tr).  When the laws of physics and neurobiology have been pushed 
to their limits, there is a hard stop as to how fast this cycle can be 
executed. 
Effective management of any situation depends on making 
decisions, typically with less than perfect data.  Waiting for perfect 
data is a recipe for being last in the race to action but jumping 
into action with data that is imperfect is risky.  When the potential 
impacts of a decision are low, then the pressure to be absolutely 
correct is reduced.  When the impacts of a decision are high, 
including perhaps causing death or committing an act of war, then 
the requirement for better data is concomitantly high. 
On the other hand, the faster a decision is made, and the 
necessary action executed, the faster the results occur.  Fast, 
effective, and appropriate decisions depend on experience, 
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education, and supporting capabilities.  When a decision is needed 
very quickly, automation of some or many components of the 
system is a must. 
Advanced information technology allows us to “cheat”, as it were. 
Incorporating advanced processing and automated reasoning 
enables a rethinking of this abstraction.  Consider: what if all 
possible flight paths, potentials scenarios, and problem sets were 
modeled prior to any need for a decision to be made?  Would that 
change the need for observation?  What if all possible decisions 
based on all possible scenarios were categorized and stored prior to 
the mission?  Would that change the need for real-time analysis of 
potential courses of action? 
The answer is, of course: yes.  This technology enhanced decision 
cycle can be modeled as OODA Loop 2.0, which isn’t actually an 
OODA loop at all but an ODAO Loop.  Figure 1-4 shows the modified 
OODA Loop 2.0, with some technology suggestions associated with 
each step. 
In this OODA 2.0 variation, preliminary preparation using 
databases, modeling, simulations, and expert systems provide a rich 
backdrop to the potential mission, allowing strategists to work with 
tacticians to flesh out the potential variations that the mission can 
involve.  Based on these comprehensive analyses, a set of decisions 
can be predetermined, not unlike the decisions that are 
programmed into autonomous vehicles of all sorts.  Decision 
parameters, such as values, rules of engagement, and geopolitical 
considerations, are integrated with expert systems in order to 
create a rich environment of allowable decisions responses under 
certain conditions.  Note that the conditions must be completely 
describable as well: that is necessary in order to characterize the 
observables that comprise the triggering actions.  Those set of 
activities with those types of technologies create the Orient and 
Decide phases of the OODA 2.0. 
When those are completed, a system instrumented with sufficient 
sensors and actuated elements can wait for the conditions to be 
met that trigger a decision.  The decision is triggered automatically, 
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which causes the preprogrammed actions to be taken, and then the 
system goes back to observing.  When considering this variation, it 
is useful to point out that the OODA 2.0 includes not one but two 
decision cycles: a tactical decision cycle and a strategic decision 
cycle.  Both are critically important to the speed of operations, and 
both are points of vulnerability.  Feedback is provided in two ways: 
strategically to the expert systems that model potential outcomes 
and inform decision options, and tactically to the observation 
sensors. 
These decision cycles occur at the speed of computational 
processes and electronic communications, which is to say: very 
fast.  There are two case studies that inform the design and use of 
systems employing the OODA 2.0 approach:  the stock market crash 
of 1987 and the Vincennes tragedy of 1988. 
The stock market crash of 1987 was the result of automated 
elements (bots) deployed in financial transaction systems to speed 
up the purchase or sale of assets in order to react to market 
conditions faster.  In 1987, the number of bots had risen to the point 
that when the market moved in a certain direction, the bots reacted, 
as programmed, to buy or sell.  These actions were detected and 
acted upon by other bots, which reacted in kind, and a feedback 
loop was created very quickly that led to wholesale selling.  The 
humans, who were not in the decision loop, stepped in to stop the 
market and reassess the system architecture.  (Kenton, 2019) 
 
Figure 1-4: OODA Loop 2.0 
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 Source: (Ryan, Security Challenges in Network-Centric Warfare, 
2001) 
 
The Vincennes tragedy of 1988 was a result of an automated 
system on a warship mistaking an Iranian airliner for an incoming 
attack: the warship’s systems automatically launched what was 
thought to be a defensive strike on the airliner.  Hundreds of people 
died.  (Halloran, 1988)  The relationship between Iran and the US 
continues to be haunted by this very deadly mistake.  (Gambrell, 
2020) 
These two cautious tales have the side effect of pointing out 
that any system using the OODA 2.0 approach is vulnerable to two 
attacks: the incitement of positive feedback loops, which may 
trigger undesirable decision states, and the enticement of data 
suggesting eminent danger, which may also trigger undesirable 
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decision states.  But these are not all of the opportunities that might 
be taken advantage of by a clever C-UAS planner.  Using the OODA 
Loop analysis framework, both 1.0 and 2.0, can assist a planner in 
identifying many such opportunities to subvert, deny, or disrupt 
UAS missions by focusing on the information systems that enable 
the UAS operations. 
Conceptualizing the Information Systems in UASs 
The UAS is a “box” propelled through the air, controlled through 
remote and onboard means, focused on conducting a mission.  The 
mission can vary both in terms of geospatial coverage and in terms 
of active or passive interaction with the target.  There are several 
truisms. 
• 1) At the beginning of a mission and until some certain point 
(which may be quite soon after launch), there are usually active 
communications between the UAS and the ground control 
station. This time may be a short period of time, such as 2 
minutes or less, or it may be for the entirety of the mission. 
• 2) The UAS may have some capability to detect and avoid 
objects, so as to avoid mid-air collisions. This capability may be 
extremely rudimentary, or it may be quite sophisticated. 
• 3) The UAS has a propulsion system that provides adequate 
power to move in the manner it is intended to move. Control of 
this propulsion system may be through artificial intelligence, 
as in the case of the Alphabet Project Loon (Loon LLC, 2020), 
or they may be controlled through remote pilotage. 
• 4) The UAS may have some capability to navigate 
autonomously or semi-autonomously. In relatively simple 
systems, like balloons, this may involve means to change 
altitude.  In more complex guided systems, this means that it 
may be able to simply fly to an emergency landing field when 
certain circumstances arise.  In other systems, this means that 
there is an onboard computer system dedicated to navigation 
that controls the flight of the system when released from 
active external control (whether ground or air based) and 
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continues that control until commanded to return to base or 
resume responding to external control. 
• 5) The UAS may have some capability to sense its surroundings. 
This may be rudimentary radar sensing, it may be optical 
sensing, or it may be multispectral sensing.  The interpretation 
of the sensed data may be computed on board, either partially 
or completely, or may be computed off-board, perhaps with 
derived data returned to the system for action. 
• 6) The UAS may have some capability for action, depending on 
the mission. This may include deploying decoys, munitions, or 
taking evasive action.  The capability for action may be 
initiated remotely or may be autonomous, in which case a 
decision support system must be onboard. 
These capabilities require computational systems and 
communications.  And all of these may be targets for C-UAS 
activities.  So, let’s take a look at the information systems in a 
conceptual UAS. 
Internal 
A UAS can’t fly (very far) if it doesn’t have internal systems to 
parse received instructions, make decisions based on sensed data, 
and control its onboard systems in a UAS.  The internal systems 
can be thought of as the internal nervous system of a UAS.  Sensed 
data is collected and may possibly undergo some preprocessing, 
prior to being transferred to a decision support system, a suite of 
AI support elements, or external communications for relay to other 
UASs and/or command and control elements, such as an airborne 
control system or a ground control system.  The internal systems 
interpret and instruct navigational control, mission execution, and 
propulsion control.  When emergency situations occur, the internal 
systems execute preprogrammed options, which could include 
autonomously navigating to safe zones or self-destructing.  The 
internal systems also monitor the health and welfare of the UAS 
according to the instrumentation included onboard.  This may 
include fuel level monitoring, damage assessment, and interference 
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detection.  According to design, the internal systems may relay 
information continuously, on schedule, or in emergencies. 
Any successful attack on internal systems could affect mission 
execution.  Internal systems could potentially be attacked in many 
different manners, many of which will be discussed in the following 
chapters.  But for the time being, consider these two obvious 
options: 
• Electronic beam attack, where the strength of the focused 
energy disrupts or disables the electronic components of the 
internal systems. For example, a powerful beam may 
overwhelm delicate circuits, rendering them inoperable. 
• Malicious software (malware) injection using channels of 
communication to the UAS, or activation where the malware 
has been included in components of the UAS before launch and 
triggered by operational parameters. 
In order to a priori protect against such activities, a UAS designer 
would need to consider the potential for these types of attacks and 
design in protections that mitigate the possibilities of such attacks 
being successful.  For instance, the design architecture could 
include using hardened chips that are resistant to an electronic 
beam attack or incorporating a Faraday Cage into the design of the 
housing system to protect vulnerable electronics. 
Boundary systems 
Boundary systems are those systems that exist on the boundary 
of the UAS.  These include any sensors, such as air pressure, 
altitude, navigation aids, and mission specific sensors, as well as 
external communications elements, such as antennae.  These are 
elements that interface between the external conditions in which 
the UAS is operating and the internal systems. 
A successful attack on boundary systems can subvert the entire 
UAS mission. Designing protections for these systems is tricky, 
though, since by definition they need to be on the boundary of the 
physical system in order to operate.  Because some missions may be 
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dependent on ground-based data processing backend systems, the 
compromise of data transfer systems may result in a mission abort. 
Similarly, if external sensors are compromised, the ability for a UAS 
to operate safely could be undermined. 
Examples of boundary systems include: 
• Passive sensors, which receive data without stimulating the 
environment. These include cameras and navigation aids. 
• Active sensors, which stimulate the environment in order to 
collect data. These include radar and lidar systems. 
• Communications system components, such as receivers and 
transmitters. These include data communications systems and 
automated identification transponders. 
External 
External information systems are those that are wholly or 
partially contained in one or more systems external to the UAS. 
These may include data servers, control systems, mission execution 
support systems, or backend processors.  Because these elements 
are external to the UAS, there are two points of vulnerability: the 
external system itself and the communications pathway between 
the external system and the UAS. 
External systems may include: 
• Active mission control, for part or all of a mission. The external 
elements may include systems tracking many UAS missions as 
well as navigation assistance. 
• Data processing systems to support big data analysis, 
characterization, and integration. 
• Data processing systems to support sensor data processing, 
interpretation, and application. 
Understanding the potential for attack and defense on external 
systems is specific and dependent on the mission and uses. 
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How Complex information Technologies Are Used in UAS 
operations 
 
Decision Support Systems 
A decision support system (DSS) is an information technology 
system that supports the making of decisions concerning mission 
operations. The DSS requires a knowledge base of facts and rules 
relevant to the mission. In support of mission planning, a DSS may 
use models or analytic methods to review and evaluate alternatives. 
During the mission a DSS may assist the controllers with decisions 
concerning options for mission execution, using the knowledge 
base together with sensor data from the UAS and perhaps other 
current intelligence. 
Expert Systems 
Expert systems are information technology systems that emulate 
decision-making by human experts. In a UAS, such systems can 
make decisions even when communications to mission controllers 
is not available. An on-board expert system requires access to an 
appropriate knowledge base of facts about the mission and rules 
that apply to the mission under various contingencies. The system 
must have an inference engine capable of applying the rules to facts 
about the status of on-board systems and sensor data, as well as 
mission plans and rules, to make decisions regarding continuing 
operations. For example, if communications is lost with mission 
controllers, the expert system may take control and direct the UAS 
to a contingency holding area or landing field. 
 
AI 
What is “artificial intelligence” or AI?  This is a subject of much 
debate, even today.  The various definitions that have been offered 
range from a full replication of generalized intelligence (as defined 
by sensing and reacting to internal and external stimuli of both 
expected and unexpected nature), an ability to mimic human 
behavior, an ability to execute specific complex tasks (such as 
sensory aspects of biological life, including smell, hearing, vision, 
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and touch), and being able to detect patterns in complex data from 
multiple sources in order to make correct decisions (such as 
identifying a terrorist in a crowd of people).  These are just a few of 
the types of definitions that have been offered, but they provide a 
view into the breadth of the contribution for AI in every aspect. 
The types of AI are variously referred to as belonging to “strong” 
or “weak” classes of AI.  Strong AI implementations are, as one might 
imagine, more towards the fully generalized and autonomous types 
of intelligences.  A classic test of a strong AI system is the Turing 
test, in which an AI is tested as a black box to see if a human can 
figure out if the system is an actual person or a machine.  There are 
other, more nuanced, tests as well, but this gives you the sense of 
strong AI. (Huang, 2006) Weak AI is not, in fact, weak, but simply 
limited by design.  Artificial vision, for example, can be considered 
weak AI.  Advanced decision support systems (DSSs) can also be 
considered weak AI (James, 2019). 
Why devote some time to AI in a C-UAS book?  Advanced 
information technology, including all forms of AI, is very important 
to both UAS and C-UAS operations.  Consider:  humans are bad at 
several activities that are critical to UAS operations.  Augmenting 
or replacing humans as decision makers, actuators, or monitors of 
elements of UAS missions is an important application of technology. 
One of the things in which humans have limited capability is 
multi-tasking: humans have severe limitations in their ability to do 
more than one thing at a time.  Even people who think they are good 
at multi-tasking are demonstrably not so when tested. (Miller, 2017) 
This limitation means that an operator, when trying to keep track of 
many UAS operations and support activities, is very likely to either 
miss or delay reaction to a problem.  The use of specialized AI frees 
up people to focus on one thing at a time. 
Another problem with humans is that they get bored.  When 
bored, their attention wanders, they daydream, and they zone out. 
Maybe even fall asleep.   Also, when they get bored, they make 
mistakes. 
Further, humans are slow to react.  Very slow, compared to 
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automation.  What counts as fast for a human is a few minutes.  Very 
fast is a few seconds.  For automation, fast can be a few milliseconds 
and very fast can be a few nanoseconds.  In the OODA Loop 
2.0 (Nichols, Ryan, & Ryan, 2000, pp. 468-489) world, speed matters, 
a lot.  Harnessing the power of automation can mean the difference 
between success and failure.  The speed issue comes into play in 
several different areas of UAS and C-UAS operations.  First, UASs 
can fly very fast.  Hypothetically, a UAS flying at 60 miles per hour 
can cover 1 mile in 1 minute.  In 15 seconds, that UAS can fly 440 
yards (1320 feet). 
To put that distance in perspective, consider this analysis of 
human reaction times during an ordinary situation: driving a car. 
Suppose a person is driving a car at 55 mph (80.67 feet/sec) 
during the day on a dry, level road. He sees a pedestrian and applies 
the brakes. What is the shortest stopping distance that can 
reasonably be expected? Total stopping distance consists of three 
components: 
Reaction Distance. First. Suppose the reaction time is 1.5 seconds. 
This means that the car will travel 1.5 x80.67 or 120.9 feet before the 
brakes are even applied. 
Brake Engagement Distance. Most reaction time studies consider 
the response completed at the moment the foot touches the brake 
pedal. However, brakes do not engage instantaneously. There is an 
additional time required for the pedal to depress and for the brakes 
to engage. This is variable and difficult to summarize in a single 
number because it depends on urgency and braking style. In an 
emergency, a reasonable estimate is .3 second, adding another 24.2 
feet3. 
Physical Force Distance. Once the brakes engage, the stopping 
distance is determined by physical forces (D=S²/(30*f) where S is 
mph) as 134.4 feet. 
Total Stopping Distance = 120.9 ft + 24.2 ft + 134.4 ft = 279.5 ft 
(Green, 2013) 
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Simple arithmetic tells us that humans cannot keep up with 
detection and closure rates. 
Suffice it to say, automation is needed to augment human actions. 
Sometimes it replaces the human entirely while other times it 
simply augments human capabilities.  But it is incredibly valuable in 
all circumstance. 
So, let’s get back to the types of AI that can be used and what it 
means in terms of footprint, infrastructure, backend support, and 
vulnerabilities. 
Strong AI, including full replication of generalized intelligence, is 
still a long way away from existing in a small form factor.  While 
great strides have been made in creating intelligent-like capabilities, 
some scarily intelligent, the resultant systems are dependent on 
very large banks of backend processors for computational support 
so that the user-facing systems can be smaller. (Tozzi, 2019) 
Replicating intelligence is actually pretty tricky.  Ignoring the 
methods in which data is collected and transferred from outside a 
system to inside the system (analogous to human eyes perceiving 
objects and transmitting the information to the brain to be 
considered, classified, and integrated into the human’s thought 
process), there are really interesting issues associated with 
developing a system capable of taking data and making sense of it. 
Part of the challenge is simply classifying the data as belonging to 
one type or another: is this a bird or a bear?  Is it a duck or a goose? 
Is it a Canadian Goose or an Arctic Swan? And so on, with increasing 
detail and specificity. 
Another part of the challenge is distinguishing truth from 
falsehood: is this data input truly representative of reality or is 
it a falsehood?  Falsehoods can come from a variety of sources, 
including sincerely held beliefs.  For AI systems that are collecting 
textual postings, such as from sources like books, tweets, and 
newspapers, distinguishing truth can be extremely tricky.  This is 
one of the challenges that Watson, the IBM system, has had to 
confront in order to execute such things as participating in 
Jeopardy (Gray, 2017). 
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All this leads to the issue of training data.  AI classifiers are 
developed, or trained, using data sets. By inserting false or 
misleading data into the training sets, it is possible to cause the AI 
to make mistakes when deployed in real world situations (Moisejevs, 
2019) (Bursztein, 2018). 
A less robust AI, with the ability to mimic human behavior, an 
ability to execute specific complex tasks (such as sensory aspects 
of biological life, including smell, hearing, vision, and touch), can 
fit into a smaller form fit, depending on the function.  One of the 
things most home users don’t realize about voice recognition and 
interpretation systems, such as Siri, is that the voice interpretation 
and characterization does not occur on the handheld phone or the 
small speaker system.  Instead, the data is collected and transmitted 
to backend processors, where the actual data crunching 
occurs (Goel, 2018). This distributed processing is necessary in 
order to bring the amount of computing power to bear that is 
needed to interpret all the various types of voices, circumstances, 
and commands, and even then, mistakes are made.  There are 
examples of voice recognition systems that are fully functional on 
standalone home computer systems, such as Dragon Naturally 
Speaking (Nuance, 2020), but these work only because the first 
thing the user needs to do is to train the software to interpret 
the user’s voice, including cadence, accent, and structure.  Every 
year, these systems are getting more capable but there is still a fair 
amount of processing needed when more than one unique user is 
interfacing with the AI. 
Systems that are trained to sense and interpret environmental 
elements may be limited by the technology used for 
sensing (Vincent, 2017).  The examples of automated vehicles hitting 
pedestrians illustrates some of this challenge (Wakabayashi, 
2018) (McCausland, 2019). It becomes even more problematic when 
complicated scenarios are envisioned, such as being able to detect 
patterns in complex data from multiple sources in order to make 
correct decisions (such as identifying a terrorist in a crowd of 
people) (Tarm, 2010). 
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It goes without saying that the increasing miniaturization of 
electronic components, the incorporation of alternatives to 
electronics, such as optics, and the development of special purpose 
processors have and continue to revolutionize the ability to squeeze 
capabilities into a small size form factor.  Size reduction has a lot of 
advantages: it can mean lower power requirements, faster execution 
of computational cycles, and less heat generation.  It can also have 
some inherent disadvantages, including less robust physical 
components.  Protecting advanced microelectronics from directed 
energy attacks, for example, can require significantly increased 
shielding, which can in turn affect overall energy requirements for 
flight operations.  In mission situations where energy efficiency and 
UAS maneuverability are important, tradeoffs need to be considered 
in overall system design.  However, great strides have been made 
in both the development of specialized processors that execute AI-
like capabilities and the integration of those processors on common 
chip sets.  Integration of multiple special chips in a system can 
provide a marked improvement in on-board intelligence (Morgan, 
2019). 
The integration of advanced automation, including AI, into UAS 
architectures can be thought of as having several faces.  First, 
decision support systems with pre-programmed rules of 
engagement can be embedded onboard the individual systems. 
Next, specialized AI processors can be included as well.  Naturally, 
more complex AI and decision support solutions can be 
implemented that rely on backend (either terrestrial or airborne) 
processing for the heavy computational lifting.  Finally, all of these 
can be integrated together. 
The interesting thing about automated decision support systems 
is that all possible scenarios must have been considered by the 
human programmers who created the system.  The scenario 
analysis allows the humans to catalog the potential decisions that 
must be made.  In a trivial example, consider an automated water 
tap.  There is a sensor that detects when something matching the 
profile of human hands is placed under the tap.  The system is 
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programmed to decide in those circumstances: if the profile of the 
detected object matches the profile loaded into the system, activate 
a switch that allows water to flow.  When the sensor loses detection 
of that object, activate a switch that stops the water from flowing. 
All of that needs to be specifically programmed into the system: no 
decisions are possible without a priori structural design. 
The same type of a priori structural design is needed for all 
autonomous decision systems, including and especially complex 
systems in complicated situations.  For example, in an autonomous 
car, a scenario to consider might be that an old lady and a child 
run into the street in front of the car so suddenly that the car must 
(because of physics) hit one or the other of the people.  The decision 
must be made which one to hit.  In a strong AI system, the internal 
intelligence would process the data and make the decision based on 
internal logic.  If the processing is sufficiently fast, the car would 
then execute the system’s decision, taking out either the old lady 
or the child.  In weak AI or a conventional decision support system, 
the system would simply execute the pre-programmed decisions 
embedded in the system.  These decisions might take something 
like the following structures, depending on the programmer team 
considerations: 
 
• if two objects block the path with insufficient time to avoid 
both, 
• • hit the one to the right 
 
The decision, of course, could have just as easily been: 
 
• • hit the one to the left 
OR 
• • navigate between the objects 
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 Alternatively, a more complex system might have the following 
type of logic path: 
• if two objects block the path with insufficient time to avoid 
both, 
• • characterize the identity of the objects 
• •• are both objects members of a protected class? 
If yes, hit the one to the right 
If no, then: 
• •• is one a member of protected class? 
If yes, hit the other object 
If no, then hit the one on the right 
 
The point of this thought exercise is to illustrate that 
“independent thinking” by a machine is dependent on thinking done 
by programmers in designing the system. 
Implications for C-UAS Operations 
A UAS may have decision processes in place that impel the UAS 
to avoid hitting members of its swarm, deploy electronic 
countermeasures when certain threats are detected, or increase 
power when the rate of altitude change exceeds certain thresholds. 
Each of these decisions structures is necessary to support the semi- 
or fully autonomous aspects of the mission.  Each of these decisions 
can provide an exploitable aspect for C-UAS activities. 
Understanding what the decision structure is provides the C-UAS 
mission planner with the opportunity to create situations that 
trigger certain decisions that can lead to desirable outcomes, like 
diverting the flight path of a swarm. 
Similarly, if the UAS is dependent on backend processing to 
support decision processes, then denying the link between the UAS 
and the backend processes will have an obvious effect.  A competent 
24  |  Chapter 1:   The Role of Information Technology
architect will have programmed in failsafe decisions in the event 
of a lost link — forcing this outcome may or may not be a desired 
outcome.  Spoofing the link and replacing the authentic backend 
processing with alternative processing may be a more desirable 
outcome, if it can be accomplished (probably very difficult if 
possible, at all).  A middle level attack, where the link is degraded 
to the point that the decision cycle slows down significantly can 
be the more desirable outcome, as it provides the C-UAS operator 
additional time to pursue the C-UAS mission objectives. 
Bottom line:  understanding the level and complexity of onboard 
intelligence is an important part of C-UAS planning. 
How Sensing is Used to Support UAS Operations 
Other elements of the UAS information processing architecture 
that are potential targets for C-UAS activities include the sensors. 
A UAS is blind and deaf without sensors interacting with the 
environment and providing data about the environment to the 
control systems.  Sensors include thermometers, barometers, visual 
spectrum cameras, multispectral sensors, wind speed sensors, 
hydrometers, and as many other types of sensors as can be 
imagined.  Some of these may provide data to external systems, 
such as navigation aids or intelligence data collection systems, while 
others may provide data solely for use by the UAS. 
Each of these sensors should be considered as potential targets 
for C-UAS activities. Confusing sensors that support navigation may 
cause a UAS to failsafe into an automated return to base profile. 
Denying the intelligence data gathering sensors may not do much 
to the flight operations of the UAS but would degrade or deny the 
effectiveness of the mission.  Finally, attacking the sensor systems 
though electronic means to physically degrade or destroy the actual 
sensing apparatus provides a more enduring effect that the 
adversary would have a harder time recovering from. 
In summary, there are more options to C-UAS than simply 
shooting the systems out of the sky.  Although that is always an 
option. 
Summary 
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UAS operations are complex symphonies of activities of many 
operators, both automated and humans.  Understanding and 
analyzing interfaces can provide the C-UAS mission planner with 
many opportunities for vulnerability exploitation.  In reading 
through the rest of this book, think about how each element fits into 
a larger analysis. 
Questions for Reflection 
 
1. Diagram the likely coordination communications network for a 
UAS swarm.  Identify potential points of compromise that 
would degrade the swarm activity. 
2. Describe the probable effect of jamming the ground to UAS 
control link. 
3. Explain the contribution that information technology makes to 
autonomous UAS operations. 
4. Your side is in a tense geopolitical conflict where both sides 
are using UASs to surveil the situation.  There is pressure to 
avoid escalating the conflict by engaging in overtly hostile 
actions.  However, it is necessary to move some military forces 
in order to be better positioned to react in case the situation 
degrades.  Movement secrecy is desired, which means that 
some means must be found to deny the adversary’s 
surveillance capabilities while the move is taking place.  The 
known capabilities of their UAS surveillance systems include 
radars and visual spectrum cameras with video capabilities. 
The data is collected onboard the UAS and uploaded to a high-
altitude relay system, which sends it through other relays to 
the adversary intelligence data  processing center.  Your boss 
has asked you to come up with a C-UAS plan that is non-
aggressive, but which provides cover for the force movement. 
What options can you provide for C-UAS activities in this 
scenario? 
5. A spy has revealed that The Flaming Arrow terrorist group is 
planning on using UASs in a swarm formation, designed to 
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appear as a flying arrow, to deliver many small explosive 
devices to a key energy generation node.  This node lies within 
a densely populated area that spreads out for 10 miles radius. 
There is a park one mile away from the targeted node.  Once 
the UAS swarm is launched and released into autonomous 
mode, the explosives will be armed, with detonation occurring 
upon collision with some other object.  The UASs to be used 
will be small, capable of flying 40 miles per hour for a distance 
of 5 miles while under load.  There will be approximately 50 
UASs in the swarm, flying approximately 50 feet above the 
ground.  Each UAS has a basic decision support system 
onboard that allows fully autonomous mission execution once 
launched.  Navigation is accomplished through image-based 
terrain feature recognition, where the visual data is collected 
through cameras and compared to onboard maps.  The lead 
UAS establishes the route, but each of the UAS is capable of 
navigating independently.  The spy has revealed the structure 
of the decision support system processes, which includes the 
following rule:   if a swarm member to the right moves within 
10 feet distance, move to the left until 10 feet separation is 
maintained.  Your challenge is to design a C-UAS to cause the 
UAS system to divert to the park rather than hit the energy 
node.  Keep in mind that you don’t know where the launch 
point is, but you know it has to be somewhere within the flight 
parameter limitations.  Also, keep in mind that destruction of 
any UAS will cause the bomb to detonate.  Your goal is to 
minimize the damage and keep the bombs away from both the 
energy node and the populated areas. 
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Chapter 2:  Understanding 
C-UAS Purpose and Process 
CANDICE CARTER 
Introduction 
 Drone technologies are evolving rapidly and, not surprisingly, 
counter-drone technologies are as well (Cole, 2019). The threat of 
UAS used by insurgents for surveillance or to delivery of hazardous 
payloads has increase 
 
Each industrial revolution has included changes in the 
industrialization of warfare. An industrial revolution increases the 
killing power, mobility, and production of weapons along with the 
growing advancement of technology and population. The Fourth 
Industrial Revolution has not been different then predecessors, it 
continues to bring dramatic changes to how war is waged. The 
addition of space and cyber as domains of battle has made our world 
more complex than ever before. Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) 
are unique, they can be used in all war domains (air, land, sea, space, 
and cyber) in single or multiplex scenarios. The threat of UAS is the 
strongest multi-domain battlefield weapon of our time. Countering 
this emerging threat requires strength in understanding how UAS 
is used for good and evil, the growing technological advancements 
of UAS, and the ability to predict how UAS will evolve in the future. 
The global market for C-UAS is to two billion dollars by 2024 (Global 
Aerospace Techology Network, 2019). 
 
In terms of complexity of C-UAS, the size of UAS needs to be 
taken into consideration. Small UAS (sUAS) can be used in all war 
and domestic domains. The sUAS, can carry a deadly payload, be 
used to identify targets, confuse systems, and send critical target 
information.  sUAS are ideal for asymmetric warfare with the 
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characteristics of being stealth, pervading, and inexpensive. The 
complexity of sUAS as a multi-vector threat are endless, creating 
the largest challenge in the Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
(C-UAS) industry. Larger UAS, while limited in threat vectors, has 
proven to be an asset in battle. Large UAS can also carry a deadly 
payload, be used to identify targets, confuse systems, and send 
critical information. However, they are predictable in execution of 
these capabilities. UAS can also be segmented into private, 
commercial, and military. These verticals have similarities and 
differences, however overall the common characteristic is they are 
a valid threat vector. 
 
 Figure 2-1: Flock of Drones in the Air 
Source: (Ruff, 2017) 
 
Driving forces for increasing the demand for C-UAS 
 
UAS can be beneficial when used for good. However, to 
understand the need for C-UAS, the level of threat of UAS poses 
has to be considered. Low cost has makes UAS widely attainable at 
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all levels of the population. The evolving risks of UAS used for evil, 
in the military theater and homeland. Outside the military theater, 
UAS can be used for attacks against critical infrastructure, 
terroristic attacks and target intelligence collection, and assist 
members of organized crime. Inside the military theater, small 
commercial UAS can transport critical surveillance data and 
explosives for a terrorist group. As far back as 2014, Daesh militants 
use DJI quadrotors for reconnaissance against Kurdish fighters 
(Defence iQ, 2019). 
 
The traditional methods of interdiction serve as the base for the 
evolution of disruptive technologies needed to build an equal, 
eventually superior, countermeasure to rogue UAS. Currently when 
a threating UAS situation can be mitigated, the threat has been met 
with defense measures verses offensive countermeasures. Viable 
threats and attacks of UAS has limited the C-UAS space to just 
interception and detection of all sizes of UAS (Michel A. H., 2019). 
Predicting the threat of UAS is far from perfection, with the gap 
growing. Offensive security measures are ideal to have in place to be 
consistently successful in defeating threats. The progression of C-
UAS technologies has the challenge of keeping up with the evolution 
of UAS, defensively and offensively. 
 
C-UAS and the Fourth Industrial Revolution 
The Fourth Industrial Revolution is characterized by an 
unprecedented speed, scale and scope of technological change, 
with governments around the world struggling to adapt their 
approaches to policy and regulation in the face of these 
transformations (World Economic Forum, 2018). The Fourth 
Industrial Revolution has not been different then predecessors, it 
continues to bring dramatic changes to how war is waged. The 
addition of space and cyber as domains of battle has made our world 
more complex than ever before. UAS are the airspace Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems (UAS) are unique, they can be used in all war 
domains (air, land, sea, space, and cyber) in single or multiplex 
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scenarios. The threat of UAS is the strongest multi-domain 
battlefield weapon of our time. Countering this emerging threat 
requires strength in understanding how UAS is used for good and 
evil, the growing technological advancements of UAS, and the ability 
to predict how UAS will evolve in the future. The global market for 
C-UAS is to two billion dollars by 2024 (Global Aerospace Techology 
Network, 2019). 
In December 2018, a commercial UAS became a threat at Gatwick 
Airport. With over sixty reports of UAS sightings near the runway, 
airplanes (a prior industrial revolution invention) were under 
possible attack from its next evolutionary competitor. The majority 
of modern airports are not prepared to respond to an UAS attack, 
nor prior to this global impacting incident, had not thought about 
UAS as a threat. Ben Marcus, Chairman of AirMap, recommends 
combining to an Unmanned Traffic Management (UTM) system with 
a C-UAS system to complete the airspace operation environment 
(Marcus, 2019). The integrated system, will supply information 
related to any aircraft detected by C-UAS is exchanged with the 
UTM system and remotely identified as either collaborative 
(registered) or non-collaborative, requiring intervention (Marcus, 
2019). Gatwick is one event of an airport facing the threat of a 
rogue drone. Events of UAS threat have occurred globally including 
New York and Dubai. While UAS is widely recognized as part of the 
fourth industrial revolution, C-UAS needs to be acknowledged at all 
levels as part of the revolution in order to evolve at the rapid rate 
necessary to match the advancements of UAS. The use of one vector 
of C-UAS will not solve an issue, other disruptive technologies will 
have to be combined to thwart this fourth industrial revolution. 
Figure 2-2: UTM and C-UAS 
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 Source: (Image: AirMap) (Marcus, 2019) 
 
Disruptive technologies that will innovate the future of C-UAS 
A disruptive technology is one that provides a non- typical 
technological solution to simplify our everyday life. UAS can be 
considered one of the ultimate disruptive technologies of our time. 
UAS has been the most dynamic growth sector of the global 
aerospace industry in the last one decade. The present day UAS is 
an amalgamation of advances made in different domains of science 
and technology, such as composite materials, aerodynamics, 
communication systems, radars, propulsion systems, precision 
navigation systems, sensors, digital signal processing and so on 
(Sharma, 2017). These characteristics are true for C-UAS. When 
combining C-UAS with artificial intelligence (another disruptive 
technology), the ability to extend flights, identify and remember 
objects, and understand and collect intelligence. 
 
The difficultly of tasks for C-UAS grows almost daily as 
technology continues to evolve at a rapid pace. At the time of this 
writing, the effort to keep ahead of the curve at times is 
overwhelming. 
Chapter 2:  Understanding C-UAS Purpose and Process  |  35
 Proven, is the instability of using one type of technology for 
countering UAS. The traditional method of high-performance Radio 
Frequency (RF) is a thing of the past. Deaf drones or drones that 
do not follow the pattern of library of sounds for acoustic sensors 
demonstrate RF is not effective as a countering method. Another 
example is the combination of Electro-Optical systems (EO) with 
Infrared Sensor (IR) cannot successfully distinguish a bird from an 
airplane in broad daylight (Michel A. H., 2019). Thus, causing a great 
deal of false positives, rendering the detection unreliable and 
unusable. Detection technology must evolve to be able to properly 
identify the target UAS despite weather, time of day, and/or sound 
pollution. For example, at a large sporting event, the airspace may 
be crowded with legitimate aerial cinematography drones that do 
not pose a security risk (Michel A. H., 2019). In the military theater, 
C-UAS system that cannot tell the difference between allied and 
adversary unmanned aircraft could accidentally shoot down 
friendly drones (Michel A. H., 2019) Therefore, the C-UAS system 
will need to be able to read intent of the incoming UAS, forcing the 
need for the disruptive technology of Artificial Intelligence (AI). 
 
Applying countermeasures also comes with legal implications. In 
the theater, peacetime verses wartime uses of C-UAS different 
policies apply by country law. The method of C-UAS could also be 
a factor in legality. If C-UAS is used as a matter of public safety 
versus military engagement. Could innocent human life being at risk 
outweigh a defensive measure? 
The Need for Innovation of C-UAS 
In 2016, commercial UAS new developments included 
waterproofing, robotic arms, and functionality to remotely control 
the UAS from mobile device. There was the introduction of a pocket 
size drone that could identify an object, remember it for tracking 
at a later time. Today. commercial UAS technology has developed 
to include sense and avoid capability, artificial intelligence to learn 
patterns from collected data and run pre-programmed flight path. 
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In 2020, commercial drones will have sharper picture/video quality, 
greater storage, longer flight time, all packed into a device that is 
smaller than an iPhone. 
Military C-UAS has traditionally focused on RF and GPS. Future 
military C-UAS will need to address speed, ease of installation, 
precision detection, ease of mobility and versatility (large/small 
UAS, swarms, etc.) Military C-UAS have focused on defending 
against large UAS verses sUAS. 
With the rapid innovation and use of commercial UAS, C-UAS 
needs to not only match but exceed functionality to be a successful 
combatant. The ideal future C-UAS will use artificial intelligence 
(AI) algorithms that automate the detection, identification, locating, 
and tracking of drones with minimal false detections, and directed 
energy weapons that can mitigate multiple drones quickly and/or 
simultaneously (Global Aerospace Techology Network, 2019). 
There is a need integrate multiple technologies to combat the 
multiply vectors of attack; for example, anti-swarm, complex 
tracking, signal jamming, ability to be cellular controlled and 
operate in a congested air traffic area. The commercial user 
community would like the future C-UAS have functionality to locate 
drone operators and operate on open architecture software that 
allows for integration into existing security systems (Global 
Aerospace Technology Network, 2019). 
Figure 2-3: Black Sage UASX-L3 Automatic Drone Disruptor 
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Source:  (Black Sage, n.d.) 
 
The Black Sage C-UAS, UASX-L3 Automatic Drone Disruptor, is 
leading the market with functionality.  The UASX-L3 detects, tracks, 
identifies and disrupts UAVs using a new type of doppler Compact 
Surveillance Radar (CSR), artificial intelligence and long-range video 
tracking and RF jamming components (Black Sage, n.d.). Black Sage 
was recently acquired by Acorn Growth Companies, a private equity 
firm. This could impact the advancement and direction of Black 
Sage. Other C-UAS start-up companies in Silicon Valley have felt 
backlash in the form of protests and code deletion, based on 
political and ethical beliefs of the employees. 
 
UAS and C-UAS Qualify as the New Global Arms Race 
 
At the end of World War II marked the beginning of the arms 
race between the U.S., Russia, and respected allies to build the best 
nuclear warfare program in the world. Starting in 1987, countries 
came together and through a series of treaties and initiatives the 
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global superpowers and their allies agreed to take steps to limit 
and stop the creation of nuclear missiles and cap military wartime 
inventory. For thirteen years, Russia and the U.S. did not change 
their approach. Suspicions let to cracks in agreements, and slowly 
the effort to control arms has crumbled. The new arms race is not 
between two nation-states, it is become a global race among larger 
players that threaten not only each other but are all face a common 
unpredictable threat of terrorism. 
 
Russia has developed a comprehensive strategy for using UAS 
in warfare. The Russian military perceives this strategic approach 
foremost as “no-contact warfare”, described as a war where Russian 
military can defeat a hostile state without the engagement of 
regular Russian forces (Sharma, 2017). February 2019, the anti-drone 
forces development by Russia released their first mobile units, part 
of the radio engineering forces armed with the “Kasta 2-2″ radar 
and an automated air defense control system (ACS) (Bendett, 2019). 
Kasta 2-2 uses landscape features combined with the ability to 
monitor objects that fly at a low altitude with little false positives. 
 
Russia’s “Silok” C-UAS can debilitate the control channels, 
communications, and telemetry of sUAS.  Another Russian C-UAS 
solution, created by the Sozvezdiye Group, is a radio electronic 
system based on artificial intelligence to fight illegal drones 
(Bendett, 2019). This C-UAS learns10,000-20,000 standard 
situations to produce selective impacts on objects. Enabling this C-
UAS to make ‘friend or foe’ decisions based on an array of signs, 
situations and the object’s behavioral characteristics (Bendett, 
2019). 
 
Currently the U.S. Air Force is embarking on a year of testing and 
training of High Energy Laser Weapon Systems (HELWS) supplied 
by Raytheon. According to Raytheon’s website, HELWS is an open 
architecture laser weapon system that can work on land, in the 
air and at sea, providing 360-degree coverage (Raytheon, 2019). In 
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addition, the U.S. Air Force is testing Lockheed Martin’s Advanced 
Test High Energy Asset (ATHENA), an anti-drone laser. ATHENA 
has the capability to shoot down multiple fixed wing and rotary 
drones. Raytheon’s defense customers are “likening drones to the 
improvised explosive device (IED) situation 20 years ago, when we 
saw an adversary take a readily available technology and weaponize 
it in a low-cost way,” says Todd Probert, vice president of Raytheon 
Intelligence, Information, and Services (Dulles, Virginia) (Cole, 2019). 
 
Figure 2-4: Russia’s Kasta 2-2 
Source: (Bendett, 2019) 
 
Figure 2-5: U.S. High Energy Laser Weapon Systems (HELWS) 
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Source:  (Raytheon, 2019) 
The Italian company, IDA Ingegneria Dei Sistemi, has created a 
military grade system, NO-DRONE. The system has been tested in 
China and in North America. NO-DRONE has been released in North 
America by a third party, 34 North Drones, for all government and 
civilian protection applications. NO-DRONE uses EMP, powerful 
multiband jamming, GPS spoofing or live fire systems to disable, 
redirect or destroy threats (UAS Weekly, 2019) Italy is not the only 
smaller country exploring C-UAS. Singapore’s ST Engineering 
Electronics Ltd. sells a 6.6-pound radar gun powered by a 24-pound 
battery backpack that can jam a drone’s GPS signal and disrupt 
the radio link to its operator (Wall, 2019). Diehl Defense has a fire 
electronic laser that has a range of more than 0.6 miles and also 
comes in a smaller, civil version with about half that range (Wall, 
2019). 
 
Figure 2–6: IDS NO-DRONE 
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Source: (UAS Weekly, 2019) 
 
China Central Television reported in September 2019, China 
Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC) has developed 
a counter-drone system consisting of multiple weapons and 
equipment, including land-based rockets and drone-hunting drones 
that can shoot huge webs and vehicle-based detection devices 
(Chan, 2019). In 2018, at the China Airshow CASIC showcased a 
vehicle-based laser weapon called LW-30, which could use a 
directional-emission high-energy laser to quickly intercept many 
kinds of aerial targets (Chan, 2019). Early in 2018, in Abu Dhabi, the 
Chinese “Silent Hunter”, the portable drone killing laser, can shoot 
from 2.3 miles (Military Aerospace Electronics, 2018). Chinese state-
owned Poly Technologies Inc. has a truck mounted drone downing 
laser with range of up to 4 kilometers. 
 
Figure 2-7: China’s LW-30 
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Source: (Chan, 2019) 
Conclusions 
The rapidly growing industry of C-UAS is a needed force to 
combat rogue UAS activity. C-UAS are used to locate, track and 
neutralize unwelcomed UAS. The growing need for C-UAS spans 
from the commercial to the military space, since the threat of 
unidentified UAS in the civil and military theater increases. The 
is not an international standard for the design of C-UAS and not 
all C-UAS systems work as advertised. Along with evolving C-UAS 
technology, global standards and policies will need to be developed. 
But make no bones about it, the need is being addressed. From 
jamming rifles to ground installations that fire nets, a new report 
lays out the expansive Wild West of anti-drone tech entitled: “Report 
on 537 Anti-Drone Systems Shows How Wild the Market Has 
Become.” (Gault, 2019) Bard University also has addressed the 
Counter Drone Systems 2nd Edition. (Michel A. H., 2019)[1] 
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Chapter 3:  Developing a 
C-UAS Strategy Goals, 
Options, Target Analyses, 
Process Selection, 
Operational Metrics 
Approaches to Countering 
UAS Activities (First 
Principles) 
H.C. MUMM 
Student Learning Objectives 
The student will gain knowledge on the concepts and framework 
as it relates to the process of developing an end-to-end Counter-
Unmanned Aerial System (C-UAS). The student will gain knowledge 
through real-world examples and a case study, allowing the student 
to use critical thinking skills to apply learning to multiple C-UAS 
situations. 
History 
When drones became dangerous, counter-drone responses had 
their start.  One of the more famous counter-drone operations was 
waged against the German V-1 Buzz Bomb.  Due to its speed and 
size, this was a difficult drone to destroy.  The British air defense 
used anti-aircraft guns, static balloons where the cable was the kill 
mechanism, and fighter aircraft. (Military-history-now, 2015)  Only 
the fastest fighters would do, such as the de Havilland Mosquito. 
British fighter aircraft would be alerted and guided to the V-1 by 
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ground radar.  Once the fighters intercepted the V-1, they would 
place their wingtip under the wingtip of the V-1.  The disruption in 
the airflow would tip the V-1, which would cause the primitive gyro 
stabilization to tumble and send the V-1 crashing to the ground.  The 
fighters would also shoot down the V-1, which was a risky decision 
as the V-1 could detonate and also destroy the attacking fighter. 
Post-World War II, counter-drone tactics have been mostly anti-
aircraft guns. 
 
C-UAS Analysis Framework 
 
1. Analyzing the Threat  
 
Careful study will allow for an in-depth analysis of the threat, and 
thus a critical first step in the process. By answering the questions 
in the C-UAS analysis phase, the requirements will be determined, 
and a solution can be devised to build an appropriate counter-
drone system.  Mistakes in this first step can result in developing 
an ineffective system or a system inappropriate for the job.  There 
are several types of questions that need to be answered within 
the analysis steps: what is the nature of the threat; what are the 
aerodynamic abilities of the threat; what is the overall design of the 
threat; is it a singular or multiple entity threat? As well as what is the 
navigation method used by the threat? 
 
Understanding the Purpose and Weaponization of the Threat 
 
The analysis needs to include answers to the following questions: 
What is the nature of the drone threat?  Is it just surveillance? 
Is it reconnaissance? Is it directing fire support?  Is it a Kamikaze 
drone?  A Kamikaze drone can be as small as a commercial 
quadcopter with explosives onboard to a significantly larger aircraft 
or even cruise missile.  Does the drone have the ability to release 
weapons and return home?  If the vehicle is equipped with a 
warhead, can it be detonated in flight? Is the drone delivering 
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contraband items over a barrier? Small drones are commonly used 
to drop contraband drugs over prison walls (Biesecke, 2011). Once 
the nature of the threat is determined, the next step is to determine 
the aerodynamic capabilities of the threat. 
Understanding the Aerodynamics of the Threat 
 
These questions should include as much information as possible 
about the offending drone (s): How fast? How high? What is the 
range?  What is its payload capacity? As the speed of the drones 
increases, the potential response methods decrease. As these 
questions are answered, the expense and level of effort to develop 
the defense can be determined. Additional questions that need to 
be asked include: How can it be tracked? Does the drone use stealth 
technology?  Stealth technology may be applied to radar, infrared, 
visual, or auditory signatures.  Most of the time, the drone is 
considered stealthy just because of its size and that it is made from 
material with little or no metal except for the avionics.  Another 
component of a drone’s signature is speed.   It is very common for 
modern radars to be dependent on the Doppler Effect for detection 
and tracking.  Slow objects can fall into the notch designed to 
eliminate ground clutter (vehicles) and birds.  Objects that are not 
moving towards or away from the radar (called the beam) can 
disappear altogether from the radar scope (Saabgroup, 2018). 
Understanding the Air Vehicle Design of the Threat  
Air vehicle design is an important factor in creating an effective 
defensive response.  Questions need to be asked to determine what 
materials were used to construct the aircraft.  Is it metal, plastic, 
or a composite? Non-metallic aircraft are more susceptible to a 
variety of counter technologies, including tactical lasers. For the 
main body and flight surfaces: what will it take to breach the body 
or disable the flight surface?  Does the vehicle have exposed rotors 
or propeller that can be attacked? Rotors and propellers can be 
destroyed by lasers, broken by impact, or snagged by a net. Does 
the vehicle has exposed electronics or electronics that can be easily 
jammed, interfered with, or destroyed using lasers, jammers, radio 
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waves, or by overpowering a frequency?  Can the warhead (if 
equipped) be detonated in flight? 
 
Is it One Drone or Multiple Drones? 
 
Are there current intelligence reports that indicate the tactics 
that are or are expected to be employed by the enemy?  Are they 
using one type of drone or multiple types? Are these drones 
operating independently, together, or using swarm tactics? As the 
numbers of drones increase, so does the complexity of the 
response. Drone tactics, techniques, and procedures are largely 
unwritten as the technology is adopted and adapted into the civilian 
and military arena at a rate of speed that has not allowed for in-
depth, intelligent gathering, databasing or analysis to occur. 
 
Understanding the Navigation 
 
Threat control and navigation methodology can be fundamental 
to the potential solution.  What frequencies is the drone using for 
control, information gathering, and distribution? What navigation 
platform does the drone use?  A great variety of drones use either 
GPS (Global Positioning System) or GLONASS (Global Satellite 
Navigation System) or both.  Some drones are extremely dependent 
on these navigational signals.  Other drones have an IMU (inertial 
measurement unit) that provides both altitude and location 
references.  The smaller the IMU, the higher the drift rate usually 
is and thus the dependence on GPS type signals for frequent 
corrections. (UNOOSA, 2019) 
 
2. Solution Limitations 
 
Before starting on a proposed response solution, limitations must 
be identified.  Many limitations are governmental in origin, while 
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others are weather or terrain-related, based on the location for the 
deployment of the counter-drone solution. 
 
Frequency Limitations 
 
Many world governments control the frequency spectrum for 
their country.  In the U.S., that control comes under the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) (Commission-Licensing, 2019). 
UAV operators can passively listen to the frequency spectrum, but 
as soon as the solution involves transmitting on a particular 
frequency or frequencies, then permission and approval must be 
sought from the FCC (or similar agency) for that transmission.  This 
is especially true when it comes to using jammers as part of the 
solution as “Federal law prohibits the operation, marketing, or sale 
of any type of jamming equipment, including devices that interfere 
with cellular and Personal Communication Services (PCS), police 
radar, Global Positioning Systems (GPS), and wireless networking 
services (Wi-Fi)” (FCC, Jammer Enforcement, 2019).  When it comes 
to exemptions: “Only federal agencies are eligible to apply for and 
receive authorization” (Commission-Licensing, 2019).  Smaller 
drones often fall into the Wi-Fi set of frequencies, while larger 
drones often use a variety of radio or satellite frequencies.  There 
are other countries in the world where this limitation is not as 
restrictive.  Combat operations also open up the solution to a 
variety of jammers.  During combat operations, it is easier to 
coordinate the jamming of data linked frequencies than it is to 
coordinate GPS jamming, due to the dependence that U.S. military 
forces have on GPS.  As more GPS jam-resistant equipment makes it 
into military services, this limitation of GPS jamming will decrease. 
 
Global Governance 
 
In addition to particular frequencies, airspace is also controlled 
in many countries.  In the U.S. that airspace control is governed by 
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).  Drones in the U.S. are 
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currently limited to 400ft AGL (above ground level) unless otherwise 
approved by the FAA.  There are at least two drone-on-drone 
counter methodologies that would also fall under this limitation. 
Other countries have different limitations, and some countries have 
little or no limitations defined at this time.  Any drone defense 
system will need to be coordinated with the host country or the 
combatant command within a war zone.  Mutual coordination is 
especially true for any projectile or tactic that destroys the UAS, 
commonly referred to as a kinetic kill mechanism. 
If the area to be defended is urban or suburban versus rural, 
the kill mechanism may be further limited; especially kinetic kill 
mechanisms.  Bullets or missiles that are deployed and do not hit 
the intended target and can potentially injure or kill someone, and 
if the drone is large enough, the drone itself may crash into people 
or property.  There are two caveats to consider when determining 
the risks of kinetic C-UAS against a lethal drone. One, the drone 
may cause much more damage if it is not destroyed, and two, even 
though an urban environment has a high population density, the 
odds of a drone crashing on an individual is surprising low.  This 
is because people are physically a small portion of the area in an 
urban environment and often protected from this type of impact by 
buildings and other sturdy structures. This is especially true of all 
but the largest of drones; even they have limited mass per square 
foot of impact area.   (C. Horowitz, 2016). 
 
Legal Ramifications 
 
Country, State, and local laws regarding drones and counter-
drone operations are proliferating at a great rate around the world 
with no consistent theme.  Some counter-drone technologies have 
been designated as illegal in some countries while not being 
recognized in other countries. Additionally, there are anti-hacking 
and technology laws that affect aircraft (in general) that can impact 
the use of certain counter-drone technologies.  Hacking a drone to 
render it safe seems like a technically good idea; however, the legal 
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ramifications can be significant, including being charged with grand 
larceny for drones ranging in price from $400 to $1,000.  According 
to 18 U.S.C. § 32, it is a felony to willfully damage or destroy aircraft 
(§ 130i., 2019). Although many courts have chosen to sidestep these 
cases, a counter-drone engagement could subject the operator to 
civil, criminal, and tort liabilities.  In the U.S., criminal and liability 
limits are disclosed, but these penalties (many severe) are not always 
disclosed in other countries.  It is critical for the solution to adhere 
to the national and local laws including getting proper permissions 
or exemptions before any drone engagement. A major exemption 
falls under 6 U.S.C. § 130i Protection of certain facilities and assets 
from unmanned aircraft (§ 130i., 2019).  Similar laws give the Coast 
Guard and Secretary of Energy Counter UAV authorization.   Other 
countries are developing their own laws/rules for facility and asset 
protection. 
 
Atmospheric Limitations 
 
Weather is another limitation of a C-UAS solution.  Atmospheric 
considerations are a key element in support of UAS flight testing. 
The local atmospheric environment (wind speed and direction, wind 
shear, temperature, precipitation, and turbulence) must be 
characterized and understood  (Edward Teets, 1998).   In regions 
where cloud cover and/or fog are prevalent for a significant portion 
of the year, most sensors used for the identification of UAS are 
significantly degraded. 
 
 3. Developing a Counter-drone Response: 
 
Range 
 
The range required for detection and interdiction of the drone 
or drones must be determined.  If the drone can release weapons, 
that adds to the range required for detection and interdiction.  The 
faster the incoming threat, the lower the approach, the larger the 
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area needed to defend, the more lethal the weapon portion; the 
further out the drone needs to be detected and interdicted. 
There is also the need to identify the number of response layers 
for the appropriate range.  Will there be two or more response 
layers or just a one-point defense layer?  Will there be a shoot-look-
shoot requirement to produce the desired probability of kill on the 
drone?  If there is a wave of attacking drones, more than one layer 
of defense is recommended. 
 
Detection 
 
There are several passive and active detection technologies 
available to include as part of the solution.  Electronic Signal 
Monitoring (ESM) is a very desirable passive detection system.  ESM 
systems detect the communication frequencies of the drone and its 
associated ground station. Depending upon the antenna sensitivity 
and the output power of the drone, these signals can be discovered 
at significant ranges. The key advantages of these systems are is 
that the ground station controlling the drone may be located and 
engaged and that the systems are numerous (İ, 2017). 
 
When selecting a signal detection system, all of the potential 
frequency ranges must be considered to counter all of the potential 
threats. If only a sample of frequencies is known, then the solution 
might be lacking during execution. The systems that receive 
commercial drone frequency bands are proliferating and 
significantly increasing in capability.  Additionally, these frequency 
detection systems can quickly identify the signals for the drone 
and ground station.  Some frequency detection systems include the 
ability to produce a digital fingerprint that can be leveraged as 
evidence for later prosecution.  However, these frequency detection 
systems that are available on the open market lack the frequency 
bands of the more sophisticated commercial drones as well as the 
military drone frequency bands. 
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There are acoustic sensors to detect drone sound signatures, but 
because of their short-range and limitations in noisy environments, 
they can be part of a solution; however, it is rare that a single sensor 
technique be a part of a complete in the overall C-UAS solution. 
 
A key part of detection is identification.  Other passive types of 
detectors such as long-range cameras, IR (infrared) sensors, and 
SWIR (short-wave infrared) can provide the necessary identification 
(Red-ID) that the object is a drone and a threat. There are software 
packages available that can provide a much quicker and longer-
range identification than a human operator.  Additionally, some 
detectors include powerful illuminators within a frequency band 
that provide a stronger return and fewer false alarms.  Illuminators 
in the infrared bands are invisible to the eye. 
 
Active detection is primarily centered on various radar types. 
Conventional military radars pick up large and fast-moving targets 
easily and reject slow or non-moving targets to reduce false alarms. 
There are some new tactical radars that are designed to pick up 
the smaller, slower set of drones in addition to the larger ones. 
One radar variety uses an active electronically scanned array (AESA), 
and another variation uses a continuous wave radar.  The latter is 
currently range limited, but technology can be extended (İ et al., 
2017). 
 
4. Interdiction 
 
Small Drones 
 
As small drones have proliferated, so too have the small drone 
counter systems.  An initial favorite is the Radio Frequency (RF) 
jammer. These are designed to jam the control uplink for the drone. 
If a drone frequency is successfully jammed, there are multiple 
possible outcomes. One possible outcome could be the drone flying 
back to home base, which would be useful in capturing the 
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operator.  However, if the operator designated the target as the 
home base, this method would be ineffective. A second outcome 
might be that the drone makes a controlled landing. The least 
desirable outcome is that the drone exhibits uncontrolled behavior 
and crashes. 
A GPS spoofer can gain a type of control over the drone by 
manipulating the GPS location.  The drone can be directed to a safe 
location for capture and de-arming if necessary. 
Figure 3-1: XBee Chip 
Source:  (BBC, 2016) 
 
Hacking a drone is facilitated by having multiple manufacturers 
using similar avionic designs and somewhat predictable drone 
behaviors.  A relatively inexpensive set up like a telemetry module 
by Mr. Rodday using an XBee chip acquires the unique key and 
takes command of the drone, rendering it harmless.  This action 
is significantly more difficult if the chip has been encrypted. (BBC, 
2016). Nets are an effective tool against the typical small commercial 
drones as long as they are not too fast.  See Figure 3-2. There are 
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several varieties of employment: e.g., another small drone can carry 
a small net cannon and launch the net at another drone. 
Figure 3-2: UAV Net 
Source: (Openworksengineering, 2019) 
This methodology usually comes with an attached line that allows 
the shooter to gently lower the offending drone to the ground.  Nets 
can also be launched from the ground using equipment that looks 
like a bazooka.  Less reliable unless used by an expert are the nets 
deployed by a shotgun shell. 
A relatively inexpensive but effective system is a kamikaze type 
drone.  See Figure 3-3. This can protect a fairly large area and can 
“shoot down” a variety of small drones.  The key challenge is they 
must hit a vulnerable part of the target drone.  As opposed to a 
missile, these types of systems can reattack if they miss. 
 
Figure 3-3: Kamikaze Drone Example 
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Source: (Dormehl, 2019) 
 
This capability is a function of the target drone speed. Another 
proven method is the use of a predatory bird to attack and 
potentially capture the drone.  Though proven effective, this 
method requires a high level of maintenance. 
 
Medium Drones 
 
The medium drone classification is mostly made up of military 
drones designed for surveillance. The world market is seeing more 
and more kamikaze type drones entering the medium-sized 
classification.  Iran has placed significant emphasis in this area and 
has a variety of direct attack drones. 
 
Some of the same counter techniques used for small drones are 
also effective on medium drones.  RF jamming, for example, can be 
effective, albeit with some limitations.   Medium drones generally 
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require more RF jamming power and across a variety of frequency 
bands.  However, once in the target area, they may no longer need 
external control from a ground station.  These drones can proceed 
to the target coordinates on their own.  If the attack drone requires 
GPS/GLONASS, this can be jammed to limit precision, but the drone 
will land somewhere. 
A more direct counteraction is required to be effective against 
this class of drones to include the use of missiles, bullets, and lasers. 
The type of missile to be used is dependent on the size of the 
offending drone and its signature.  Generally, medium-sized drones 
have a very small infrared signature, which makes it difficult to 
deploy IR missiles as a countermeasure.  This category of drones 
also has a limited radar signature. Radar guided missiles are most 
effective when they have their own terminal radar and can be 
guided by a more powerful ground radar data uplink.  Surface-
launched AMRAAM (SLAMRAAM) is an example of this type of 
weapon. The SLAMRAAM is no longer used by the U.S. military 
due to priority changes; however, there are indications that other 
countries will employ these weapons in a C-UAS scenario. An 
effective weapon is a laser-guided missile that does not have the 
signature limitation that the other missiles do, and it has a very 
limited countermeasure set to work against. 
 
Bullets tend to be a last line of defense due to their limited range. 
There are two techniques that can be effective. First is the hail of 
bullets typically from a Gatling gun type system.  The second is 
from a rapid-fire cannon that has bullets that fragment just before 
hitting the drone.  There are 25mm bullets that fit into this desired 
capability.  As a point of consideration, as the area to be defended 
increases, so does the required number of gun sites and ammunition 
needs. 
 
High-Powered Microwave (HPM) systems directly attack the 
electronics onboard the drone.  Depending on the power and range, 
the system disrupts the data links, and eventually, the actual 
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circuitry as the power increases, and the range decreases.   These 
systems can be indiscriminate, so a focused system and a clear 
background are important.  See Figure 3-4. 
 
Lasers, because of their price tag, are normally limited to military 
applications.  These systems are getting more and more powerful 
and, therefore, more effective and capable of engaging at longer 
ranges. These systems target a vulnerable flight control on the 
drone. See Figure 3-5. 
 
Large Drones 
 
This classification includes both commercial and military drones; 
however, it is the military drones that represent the threat.  [ 
Figures 3-6 and 3-7] These military drones range from slower, 
higher altitude, surveillance drones (some with weapon capabilities) 
to stealthy fighter-type drones.  The latter of these two is more 
dangerous and more difficult to eliminate. 
 
 
 
 Figure 3-4 High Powered Microwave System 
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 Source: (Trevithick, 2019) 
 
Figure 3-5: Laser Sensor Ball 
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Source: (spazio-news.it, 2019) 
The flight control is damaged, which then sends the drone out of 
control and to an eventual crash.  There are now several versions of 
laser weapons available. 
Manned attack aircraft are also included in this response 
category, especially for cruise missile type systems.  For attack 
drones that fly under 200 knots, a propeller-driven light attack 
aircraft with an onboard gun system is sufficient.  Once the speed 
rises about 200 knots, a jet-powered fighter-type aircraft is 
required.  While missiles and guns are available, generally, the most 
effective choice is the gun for single drone engagements.  In a 
situation where there are several attacking high-speed drones, the 
fighter aircraft will be required to use its missiles and follow up with 
guns or missiles on the ones that survive the initial response. 
Some of the defenses for medium-sized drones carry over into 
the large drones.  Defensive systems designed for attacking manned 
aircraft become prominent in this large drone category. 
Figure 3-6: Iranian Drone 
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Source:  (Singh, 2019) 
 
Figure 3-7: Chinese Drones on Parade 
 
Source:  (George, 2019) 
Jamming systems, though somewhat effective on some drones in 
this category, generally fall off as a primary defense system because 
the satellite uplink can be jammed.  Jamming the uplink is a typical 
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point defense solution unless it is space-based or has an included 
airborne relay.  Bullets can no longer be used as a primary point 
defense system due to their short range and limited altitude 
coverage. 
 
High-end missile systems, such as the US Patriot system, can be 
brought to bear for these type threats.  Typically, missile systems 
are an early choice because they are already in the military 
inventory.  For wealthy countries, the poor cost exchange of using 
expensive missiles against often less expensive UAS is not much of 
a factor.  The potential cost of damage from an enemy UAS often 
outweighs the cost of the missile.  Interdiction success is the 
primary metric.  Stealthy drones are the most challenging, but 
acquisition ranges, though shorter, are typically sufficient for a 
successful engagement.  The most significant limitation of this 
drone response is the amount of area that is being protected is 
relatively small. 
 
Directed energy weapons, though of limited use against manned 
aircraft, are becoming a weapon of choice for larger drones. 
Directed energy weapons include high powered microwaves and 
lasers, which are considered point defense systems.  If the attack 
corridors are known and limited, then these types of systems can be 
set up like a picket fence formation to protect a much larger area 
and engage threats much earlier.  Of the two, the high-powered 
microwave systems tend to be more effective due to the short 
engagement time required.  Lasers often must dwell on the target 
for several seconds to be effective.  Against the slower end of the 
large drone category, lasers can be extremely effective.  Faster 
aircraft are more problematic for current lasers, but as the lasers 
become more powerful, the dwell time required will go down, and 
this type of weapon system will be effective against the fast-moving 
UAS in this category. 
 
Manned aircraft become a primary part of the defense to protect 
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larger areas and engage the threat much earlier.  Large drones, 
including the stealthy ones, can be easily terminated by a fighter 
jet as these drones have no self-awareness and have limited 
maneuverability.  Since these drones usually have no weapons to 
fight back, they can be attacked and re-attacked with impunity. 
Fighter pilots quickly become drone aces.  The most challenging 
scenario is a swarm of stealthy attack drones.  Fighter squadrons 
must determine if there are enough missiles and gun rounds to 
take out all of the attacking drones before the drones reach their 
intended targets (U.S. Air Force Major Jay Snyder, 2019). 
 
Case Study 
 
The case study below reviews the swarm drone attack in Saudi 
Arabia on the morning of September 14, 2019.  Although the event 
is real and well documented, the analysis, limitations, and solutions 
are fictional and designed to demonstrate the C-UAS analysis 
framework. 
 
Background: 
 
On the morning of September 14, 2019, two state-owned Saudi 
Arabian oil production sites were attacked. The Abqaiq and Khuraid 
oil fields are the largest oil production facilities in the world. These 
two plants account for almost 8% of the world’s oil supply (bbc, 
2019). The attacks were conducted using drones and cruise missiles 
from an unknown origin. “According to the Saudi Defense Ministry, 
eighteen drones and seven cruise missiles were fired at the 
kingdom”  (Frantzman, 2019).  Defense News stated, “If ever the 
world needed a reality check for the threat posed by drone swarms 
and low-altitude cruise missiles, this was it” (Frantzman, 2019). 
 
The news reports differ as to the specific number and types of 
drones and missiles used in the attack. Four missiles did hit their 
intended oil field targets; however, it is unclear how many did not 
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complete the mission. (Frantzman, 2019). This was a major 
escalation in UAS attacks given the type and number of utilized 
drones.  There also continues to be speculation as to the 
geographical origins of the attack.  Previous drone attacks had come 
from Yemen and were limited in size, scope, and range. It is widely 
believed by Saudi Arabia and the United States that Iran was the 
source; however, Iran has not claimed credit for this attack. 
 
What is remarkable is that despite the heavy defenses of the 
Abqaiq oil field, none of the systems or technologies thwarted the 
attack. The facility is believed to have air defenses that include 
an American Patriot system, a Swiss-made 35 mm anti-aircraft 
Oerlikon cannon in conjunction with a Skyguard radar, and a 
French-designed Shahine, which is a surface to air missile system. 
    (Frantzman, 2019). The Patriot missile defense system is the only 
component specifically designed to defend against UAVs. It is highly 
possible that the drones were guided using on-board sensors and 
not GPS programmed, which, given the infrastructure of an oil 
processing facility, was quite advantageous. 
 
If US-supplied air defenses were not oriented to defend against 
an attack from Iran, that’s incomprehensible. If they were, but they 
were not engaged, that’s incompetent. If they simply weren’t up to 
the task of preventing such precision attacks, that’s concerning, said 
Daniel Shapiro, a former U.S. Ambassador to Israel. (DM, 2019). 
 
Brig. Gen. Pini Yungman believes that the “primary challenge in 
stopping an attack like that in Saudi Arabia is not the ability to shoot 
down the threats, but rather to detect things that can sneak in near 
the ground” (DM, 2019). 
 
Creating a Solution 
 
Analyzing the Threat: 
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In this case study, the threat determination is more speculative 
than defined.  Iran denied launching the attack, but the weapon 
systems were most definitely Iranian in design and possibly in 
manufacturing. The origin of the drones was determined by these 
same drones being previously used against Saudi Arabia and the 
recovered wreckage.  There is some speculation that one type of 
drone was used against the Patriot defense system, while the 
second type of UAS was used against the oil facility, based on the 
wreckage from numerous sites. The recovered delta-winged drone 
was determined to be most likely from a Toofan Iranian drone or a 
similar design class with a greater range. 
 
 
Toofan Drone 
 
The Toofan drones are a series of drones developed and used 
by Iran specifically for suicide missions. Iran does not publish 
information about the drones it builds and designs. The Toofan 
drone is considered small and is known to be very fast – up to 
250km/hr. One of the advantages is its’ undetectable launch. All of 
these features make it difficult for an effective C-UAS response. See 
Figure 3-8. 
Figure 3-8: Toofan Drone 
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Source: (“Iran Suicide Drones,” 2019) 
Industry analysts who have seen the Toofan describe it having 
a small radar cross-section and appearing to be made with 
lightweight radar-absorbing materials and guided by cutting edge 
avionics. It can fly for over one hour.  There is also a front-facing 
camera in the nosecone which transmits live images until the 
moment of impact. All of these characteristics make the Toofan a 
very effective suicide drone (memri, 2019). 
 
Although the Toofan has a small radar signature, the estimated 
speed of approximately 135 knots places it in the detectable range. 
The other possible drone used in the attack was most likely a 
Yemeni Houthi militia Quds-1 cruise missile (memri, 2019). 
 
Possible Cruise Missiles 
 
Cruise missiles are slower than traditional missiles, fly at lower 
altitudes, and are small – all radar-evading advantages. Another 
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advantage is that cruise missiles are typically lower in price than 
other types of missiles. (armscontrolcenter, 2017) Cruise missiles 
can be launched from almost any location:  by land, from the air, or 
an ocean vessel (armscontrolcenter, 2017). These types of missiles 
can have multiple guidance systems depending upon the design. 
The missiles can be completely pre-programmed for GPS flight or 
can be guided by an operator using a forward-positioned camera. 
 
Quds-1 Missile 
 
Initially thought to be designed in Yemen by the Houthi, the 
Quds-1 cruise missile is powered by a Czech built turbojet engine. 
See Figure 3-9. However, based on an Iranian industry analyst, the 
Qud-1 might have been developed and designed in Iraq 
(armscontrolcenter, 2017).  The Iranians have been developing 
several different types of missiles for the past few decades. The 
Quds-1 is smaller than the Soumar and Hoveyzeh missiles and has 
less thrust than the Ya Ali missile. (armscontrolcenter, 2017).  The 
Quds-1 appears to be primarily made out of metal, based on the 
wreckage.  The signature is likely small but in line with other cruise 
missile signatures (Hinz, 2019). 
Figure 3-9: Quds-1 Cruise Missile 
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Source:  (Hinz, 2019) 
Potential DIANA Missile Usage 
 
Since little is known about the Quds-1 cruise missile besides the 
suspected range of 425 miles, the DIANA target cruise missile can 
be used as a surrogate for analysis since it has the same engine and 
is approximately the same size (Hinz, 2019).  This gives the Quds-1 
a suspected speed of 330-350 knots. Manufactured by Equipaer 
Industria Aeronautica, the DIANA has a flight altitude variance of 
10m – 8,000m and is designed for high speed / high 
maneuverability. It is advertised to have a maximum speed of 380 
mph (equipaer, 2011). 
 
Tactical Analysis: 
 
The oil facility attack demonstrated a precise and sophisticated 
attack utilizing multiple drones with different attack profiles to 
multiple locations within a small amount of time.  It is suspected 
that multiple Toofan drones first attacked the Patriot radar, 
followed by additional Toofan drones and Quds-1 cruise missiles 
attacking the oil facilities.  The Toofan’s optical final guidance could 
have been employed.  That would mean the human controller(s) 
would have to be part of the attack.  The Quds-1 most likely uses an 
IMU and GPS for guidance (Hinz, 2019). This is consistent with what 
is known about their anti-ship cruise missiles. The attackers used 
low-cost attack vehicles specifically designed to evade radar. The 
attackers knew the specific locations for the radar defenses and the 
overall defenses of both facilities. Additionally, the attackers used 
a combination of manned and unmanned systems – but no human 
support was physically located at either oil field. 
 
Solution Limitations: 
 
In this scenario, the use of the Patriot radar and patriot missile 
response, coupled with little intelligence against an unknown 
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number of targets, limited the effectiveness of the system. It has 
been reported that the guards at the facility attempted to use their 
rifles and handguns to defend the installation (DM, 2019). 
 
Preservation of Existing Infrastructure 
 
Saudi Arabia’s oil fields have high value and are in a protected 
area, which is relatively remote; there are fewer limitations on the 
potential solution. As this is an industrial site, the solution needs 
to consider minimal damage to the physical facilities as well as the 
electronic and communication systems of the facility infrastructure. 
 Returning to the concept of not incurring damage to the physical 
facilities, mitigation plans need to be developed if friendly or 
threatening drones are destroyed over the oil fields. There should 
be special care taken to consider any combustible materials. 
 
Governance 
 
Additionally, military and commercial air traffic need to be 
accounted for in the plan.  If GPS/GLONASS jamming is to be part of 
the solution, it needs to be coordinated and approved by the Saudi 
government. The oil fields are owned by the Saudi government; 
this fact should assist in any governance being written, altered or 
waivered to protect this critical infrastructure. 
 
Atmospheric Limitations 
 
Several atmospheric limitations exist in the Middle East Region. 
The weather in Saudi Arabia is normally sunny with mixed or no 
cloud cover, and the week of September 8 – 14, 2019, the weather 
in this region averages from 80 – 107 degrees Fahrenheit. The days 
are coolest just before midnight until approximately 7 am. During 
September, the dew point average is 6 %. Abqaiq skies experience 
cloud cover between 7-29 % of the time for this month 
(weatherspark.com, 2019). In this region, there are sand storms, 
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heatwaves and even fog in the air near the ground.  These 
conditions don’t preclude laser solutions, but it does have an impact 
on them.  Consideration should be made to elevating the laser above 
the ground if it is part of the system, possibly in a guard tower 
or in an airborne platform.   The topography is considered to have 
modest variations with a 1,270 ft variation for a 50-mile radius. 
 
A Multi-Layered Counter Drone Response Plan 
 
The multiple drones used in the Saudi oil field attacks are 
considered medium drones; therefore, the solution should consider 
all appropriately sized and quantity countermeasures. The 
countermeasure response should account for multiple drones 
attacking at once; more than one type of drone; with one drone 
being relatively high speed; and a sprawling soft infrastructure to be 
protected; all lead to more than one layer of defense and that the 
first engagement should far enough away to allow for an assessment 
and engagement of leakers before they can reach the facility.  As the 
first layer of defense is extended out, the larger the engagement arc 
distance grows. 
 
For this case study, the first layer should be about 25 miles out 
from the protected area.  This perimeter allows for advancing 
targets and receding targets, as well as enough time to coordinate 
the second layer response.  The proximity of the coastline is a factor 
in the system placement.  The expanse of the perimeter precludes 
the use of shorter-range systems because of the number of sites 
required.  Bullets, lasers, and high-powered microwaves concede to 
missile-based solutions at this range. Ground-based missile systems 
are a more practical choice for protection than aircraft-based 
missile systems.  The cost of the aircraft and pilot patrolling the 
airspace becomes astronomical for an irregular threat. 
 
The range for the point defense second layer needs to be far 
enough out to interdict the drone and not have it come down within 
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the facility boundaries; while at the same time not creating an arc 
distance that is too big not to be cost-effective.  In this case that 
range would be approximately 5 miles to account for the cruise 
missile type attack drone.  With the shorter coverage zone, the 
variety of shorter-range systems can be considered. 
 
Detection 
 
Detection is one of the more challenging portions of the solution. 
At least one of the threat drones is a low altitude ingress type 
drone, and therefore the detection system needs to be elevated. 
The Quds-1 is unlikely to be transmitting any signal for an ESM 
type system.  The Toofan may or may not be transmitting.  The 
interdiction system selected needs a precise location for weapon 
guidance, and since sensors in the light spectrum have too short of a 
range for this protection ring, the best choice is a radar type system. 
 
The next decision is the type of elevation method.  Is the radar 
system on a tethered balloon or an extendable arm or a fixed tower? 
 Due to the risk of sand storms, a tethered balloon is not the best 
solution.  For maintenance reasons and sand storm considerations, 
the extendable arm is preferable over the fixed tower.  Although 
stationed on the outer perimeter, the radar needs to be effective 
across the entire facility. 
 
Interdiction 
 
Interdiction is best done when layering defense technologies, 
methodologies, and systems. Numerous scenarios need to be 
considered when designing an effective counter-drone defense 
solution.  Combination systems can be more effective, especially 
when defending against different types of drones.  As an example, 
the Toofan type drone is more susceptible to a directed energy 
weapon, whereas the Quds-1 cruise missile is more susceptible to a 
hard kill.  Each layer should have overlapping interdiction systems 
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to preclude multiple attack drones attempting to overwhelm a 
single sector. Additionally, if ground missiles are part of the overall 
solution, then, the number of ground stations, missiles and support 
personnel need to be considered as part of cost and maintenance. 
 
Graphical representation of the anticipated engagement envelope 
can be particularly useful when determining point positioning. Most 
engagement envelopes are not a circle; effective engagement zones 
look much more egg-shaped. The narrow end is drawn for the 
receding targets and the wide end for the advancing targets.  The 
faster the incoming target, the more the egg shifts such that the 
receding target zone gets smaller.  The faster the intercepting 
missile, the larger the egg gets, and the greater the receding target 
capability (Snyder, 2019). 
 
Integration 
 
When dealing with a variety of interdiction methods, the system 
needs to be evaluated so that no one part of the system conflicts 
with any other part of the system.  It would be counterproductive 
to have a communications system that is susceptible to the jamming 
solution. If an HPM is being integrated, it should be analyzed to 
make sure it will not damage other system components. 
Additionally, shots fired at receding targets should not cause 
collateral damage to the property being protected. All components 
should be tested with every other component to validate that all 
components work harmoniously together and do not harm the 
home facility (U.S. Air Force Major Jay Snyder, 2019) 
 
 
The Chosen Solution: 
 
Figure 3-10 shows a SAAB Giraffe AMB Radar.  The Giraffe is a 3D 
detection system that can detect small, low, and slow targets as well 
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as aircraft, cruise missiles, rockets, artillery, etc.  The radar is on an 
extendable arm to increase the detection range of low-level targets. 
Outer Layer 
Figure 3-10: SAAB Giraffe AMB Radar 
Source: (Saabgroup, 2018) 
 
The radar system operates out to approximately 65 nautical 
miles.  The small signature of the Toofan drone reduces the 
maximum detection and tracking range of the system.  SAAB 
demonstrated detection and tracking of a small drone with a 
signature of .001 square meters at a range of 4 km. (SAAB, 2019) 
 
Extrapolating this information to the Toofan (using the Harpy 
drone as a surrogate) delivers an approximate detection and 
tracking range of 25 km.  By placing the radars approximately 40 km 
apart, there is good detection range throughout the arc with small 
notches. See Figure 3-11. (US Army, 2019) 
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Figure 3-11: Toofan Detection System 
Source: (US Army, 2019) 
 
Interdiction is provided by a ground-launched version of the 
AMRAAM-ER missile.  It comes in a six-box configuration that can 
be ground or vehicle-mounted.  This is called NASAMS II (National 
Advanced Surface to Air Missile System).  The AMRAAM-ER is a 
Mach 4 missile with an approximate range of 27 nautical miles (50 
km).  (globalsecurity.org, 2019)  The missile launch systems will also 
be  24 miles (40 km) apart to provide dual coverage to the arc. 
Twelve missiles per site deliver the capability to shoot down up to 24 
drones in any given sector before requiring a reload (US Army, 2019) 
Based on the potential threat approach directions, an initial arc of 
270 degrees will be used for the outer layer.  The arc can be reduced 
or increased depending on enemy tactics. 
 
The StarStreak II is a Mach 4 class missile system is designed for 
a kinetic kill with a range of approximately four nautical miles.  It 
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employs three tungsten darts that are laser-guided and immune to 
all known countermeasures (Sparks, 2017). See Figure 3-12. 
 
 
        Inner Layer 
Figure 3-12: Stark-Streak II Missile System 
 
Source: (Sparks, 2017) 
This permits the engagement of targets with extremely small 
signatures. (Minister, 2008)  To complement this system for the 
inner layer is a High-Powered Microwave (HPM) system designed to 
fry the internal electronics of the attacking drone. 
 
The system will be deployed on a fixed turret with an 8-missile 
configuration.  The turrets will be remote-controlled from the 
Command Center.  They will be deployed at six nautical mile 
increments around the inner 5-mile ring.  This provides continuous 
and overlapping coverage.  The typical concept of operations would 
use a shoot-look-shoot methodology.  The concept of operations 
is facilitated by the speed of the missile.  The StarStreak II is a 
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very versatile weapon system and is capable of handling inner layer 
defense against a large variety of medium and large drones. 
 
To complement the StarStreak system for the inner layer is a 
High-Powered Microwave (HPM) system designed to destroy the 
internal electronics of the attacking drone. There are two viable 
systems for this particular solution: Boeing’s Thor and BAE Systems’ 
HPM.  See Figure 3-13. 
Figure 3-13 Example of a High Powered Microwave System 
Source: (Vavasseur, 2019) 
Since this will be a component of the inner layer of defense, the 
BAE Systems’ HPM is a logical 
choice.  The Boeing system is overkill for the inner layer due to its 
size and power output (Vavasseur, 2019) 
 
 
 
 
 
BAE Systems HPM is “Scalable and designed for use on all sizes of 
surface combatants[.] HPM instantaneously defeats a wide range of 
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air and surface threats at tactically significant ranges (such as UAV, 
Aircraft, Helicopters, USV, Fast Attack Craft…)” (Systems, 2018)  A 
High-Powered Microwave System was chosen to prevent the overall 
system and especially the inner layer from being overwhelmed with 
the number of simultaneous attacking drones.  The HPM type of 
defense system also permits the overall system to defend against 
swarming small drones if or when those also become part of the 
threat matrix.  The HPM system will be deployed on a six-mile 
arc, halfway between the StarStreak systems.  This slightly more 
forward deployment is to prevent possible interference with the 
StarStreak systems (Vavasseur, 2019). 
 
    Command and Control 
 
The more complex the system and the more layers involved, the 
more integrated the command and control system must be. 
Sensors, weapons, and communications need to be integrated and 
robust.  Threat or no threat determinations need to be made in a 
quick and efficient manner to include an appropriate method of 
engagement. The number of personnel to accomplish this can be 
reduced by an expert or an AI system (U.S. Air Force Major Jay 
Snyder, 2019). 
 
For this case study solution, all of the detection and interdiction 
components will be commercial off the shelf components to create 
the final comprehensive, integrated command and control center. 
Although many of these components have been integrated in the 
past, they have not been integrated with the inner layer systems. 
To minimize labor hours required and to maximize effectiveness, 
Artificial Intelligence (AI) will be leveraged as much as possible into 
the solution. When integrating a system of systems, it is always 
best to involve a major system vendor in that integration.  There 
are several defense contractors who excel at complex integration, 
testing, and receiving government authorization for the final 
solution.  Creating a new command and control system will most 
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likely involve multiple vendors including one like the ARES 
Corporation to work with the lead integrator (Snyder, 2019).  The 
ARES’ mantra is “Protecting the world’s most critical assets”  (ARES 
Security, 2019). 
 
ARES AVERT C2 product, as seen in Figure 3-15, creates a singular 
scalable interface that integrates partners’ command and control 
portal.  The company touts the configurability of the system to 
adapt to multiple situational awareness and incident response 
needs utilizing role-based security.  The proprietary system can 
link unique network systems, sensors, with unique customizable 
client requirements collaborative response. (ARES Security, 2019) 
See Figure 3-14. 
Figure 3-14: Sample Image of an AVERT C2 System 
Source: (Vavasseur, 2019) 
 
As this is a static design, the primary communications solution 
should be fiber optic cabling.  The hard-wired cable provides a 
stable, consistent communication platform and avoids possible 
interference problems with the radars and HPM systems and can 
be secured. Wi-Fi or satellite links could be jammed, cause 
interference, receive interference, or have intermittent to poor 
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performance (Snyder, 2019).  Figure 3-15 is a composite of the 
overall solution coverage. 
 
Figure 3-15: Case Study C-UAS Solution Diagram 
Source: (U.S. Air Force Major Jay Snyder, 2019) 
 
Conclusions 
 
This chapter has examined some of the challenges and thought 
processes required to build a C-UAS framework for a given area. 
Developing a solution requires a multi-step process to avoid 
potential pitfalls and achieve a very high degree of success. 
Analyzing the threat or threats is the first step in the process.  This 
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process could involve something as easy as a quadcopter delivering 
contraband into a prison yard or as hard as cruise missiles and 
attack drones with the added challenge of having limited 
intelligence data available.  The drone’s mission and potential level 
of weaponization will determine the appropriate C-UAS response. 
The number of attacking drones will also govern the complexity of 
the overall solution. 
Before contemplating a counter-drone solution, careful 
consideration needs to take place regarding the limitations to the 
possible solution set.  Some limitations are physical, such as the 
weather, but some limitations could create legal issues, including jail 
time.  Those limitations are set by the government of the respective 
country.  Working with a government agency or requesting a waiver 
may be the only path to a successful counter-drone system. 
As a counter-drone system is developed: range, detection, and 
interdiction will be the supporting foundation.  At what distance 
does the drone need to be detected, and at what distance does the 
drone need to be engaged or interdicted?  As these distances and 
perimeters increase, so does the need for a line-of-sight limitation 
solution.  More than one layer or ring may be needed.  Passive 
detection systems are fantastic if the drone and possibly the ground 
station are emitting RF signals. However, if the attacking drones 
are radio silent, then a radar type system will likely be necessary. 
Interdiction choices are often driven by the size of the drone and 
whether it is carrying weapons that can be released.  As the size 
increases, the interdiction methods move from a soft interdiction 
using jammers, nets, etc. to more traditional weapons for aircraft 
that include bullets and missiles.  As the number of attacking drones 
increase, the interdiction method moves from kinetic attacks to 
the non-kinetic realm of directed energy such as lasers and high-
powered microwaves. 
 
Do not forget the limitations and requirements for command and 
control in the overall solution.   The command and control solution 
may be extremely simple and potentially designed for a variety of 
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commercial drones.  As the threat grows and the number of defense 
layers grows, so too does the complexity of the command and 
control system.  The necessary level of complexity may require an 
expert software solution embedded with artificial intelligence to 
help guide the attack and response phases.  C-UAS will continue 
to change and adapt as the technology improves, and the drone/
counter-drone issues are more constrained by human innovation 
than the science that empowers the machines. 
 
 
Questions 
1. Name three factors that must be taken into consideration 
when building the framework for C- 
UAS? 
2. What are the limitations of a C-UAS solution? 
3. Can C-UAS be countered? If yes, how? 
4. Why would a non-kinetic kill be chosen over a kinetic kill in C-
UAS around populated areas? 
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Chapter 4:  Planning for 
Resiliency and Robustness 
J.J.C.H. RYAN 
Student Learning Objectives: 
After completing this block, the student will be able to: 
— describe the difference between resiliency and robustness 
— describe different ways that resiliency might be enhanced 
— explore ways in which resiliency can be measured or estimated 
— describe difference ways that robustness might be enhanced 
— describe how robustness can be measured 
— conceptualize attacks on resiliency and explain cascading 
effects of successful attacks 
— conceptualize attacks on robustness and explain cascading 
effects of successful attacks 
— describe the cost-benefit trade space associated with resiliency 
and robustness 
— explain how operational secrecy can be used as part of 
resiliency and robustness 
— conceptualize protections to systems than can shore up 
resiliency 
 
Understanding the Difference between Resiliency and Robustness 
A stone aqueduct built by the Romans to carry water over 
hundreds of miles exists to this day.  It is robust.  An aspen tree 
quivers in the winds, perhaps loses a few leaves, but continues to 
live after the storm has passed.  It is resilient. 
Both of these attributes are important.  But they can be the 
subject of choices in design: the aspen tree is both resilient and 
robust while the aqueduct is only robust and not resilient.  Should 
assault or insult cause an aqueduct to break and fall to the ground, 
it would take a great deal of effort to rebuild and mend the 
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structure (World Monuments Fund, 2016).  Were the aspen tree to 
be subjected to an axe, the individual tree would be felled quickly 
enough, but the organism would continue: the vast majority of the 
“tree” is a large underground root system (Featherman, 2014).  Soon 
a new shoot would emerge to replace the aspen that had been cut 
down. 
The concepts of robustness and resiliency seem simple enough, 
so it is striking that they are so difficult to define and measure. 
The New Webster’s Dictionary simply defines robust as “strong, 
healthy.”  It defines resilient as “springing back; buoyant.” (Bolander 
(ed.) & Stodden, 1986) These definitions are not useful for 
engineering purposes.  In this chapter, the concepts of resiliency 
and robustness will be explored through the lens of security, 
focusing on how C-UAS operations can exploit the various aspects 
of both attributes for compromise.  To start, baseline operational 
definitions are offered so that a common language is possible for the 
subsequent analyses. 
Resiliency 
In exploring the literature, the varying definitions of resiliency do 
not stray far from the definition quoted above.  Two ideas permeate 
the definitions: first, the ability to return to a previous state; and 
second, the amount of time needed to return to that state.  Systems 
that are able to return to the previous state in a short period of time 
are said to have high resilience while those that take a longer period 
of time are said to have low resilience. (Hollnagel, 2016) (National 
Academy of Engineering, 1996) 
There are several design features that enable or increase 
resiliency.  First, a system must have an ability to respond to 
anything that changes its state.  Next, the system needs to be able 
to monitor its state, being alert to internal or external changes that 
could affect it.  Third, the ability to “learn” is useful: keeping track 
of previous experiences, responses to those experiences, and the 
results of those responses can provide the ability to more quickly 
respond appropriately.  Finally, the ability to anticipate challenges 
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or changes can accelerate the detection of issues and subsequent 
responses. (Hollnagel, 2016) 
For the aspen tree, the ability to bend in the wind allows it to 
return to its previous state quickly, once the wind has calmed. 
Evolution has provided the aspen with that ability, having “learned” 
over millennia that wind exists and how to respond appropriately. 
These functions are internal to the aspen ‘system’ and are 
reproduced for each instantiation of aspen.  Thus, it is possible to 
characterize the aspen as having high resilience. 
The aqueduct, on the other hand, is entirely dependent on 
external forces to return to its functioning state: people to identify a 
problem, care enough to respond, and commence the labor needed 
to repair the structure.  In the context of an aqueduct system that 
includes the architects, laborers, and tax payers, it has many of the 
design features, such as learning and anticipating, but the time to 
respond and repair is very long.  The aqueduct has low resilience. 
Robustness 
The definitions in the literature regard robust design as a concept 
separate from robustness.  There is some suggestion that following 
robust design processes will result in robustness, where the 
definition of robustness is a system that is insensitive to variations, 
both internally and externally.  There is no time component noted 
in these definitions although time does seem to lurk in the 
background: a system that fails soon is not robust whereas a system 
that lasts a long time is robust. 
Robust design is a process that focuses on quality in order to 
reduce the vulnerability of the system as a whole to problems that 
it may encounter.  There are three components of robust design: 
system, parameter, and tolerance, with a focus on increasing quality 
during manufacturing rather than trying to “inspect in quality” after 
manufacturing. (Wysk, Niebel, Cohen, & Simpson, 2000) (Maurer & 
Lau, 2000) 
The aqueduct design and build process used by the Romans 
focuses on product improvement at every step, including research 
and development of better materials to increase the effectiveness of 
90  |  Chapter 4:  Planning for Resiliency and Robustness
the system.  Continual maintenance was performed regularly until 
the organizing structure of the Roman Empire collapsed.  The 
aqueducts continued to exist for a long time after the end of regular 
maintenance. (World Monuments Fund, 2016)  They were highly 
resistant to variations and, as a result, very robust. 
The aspen is a wonder of nature: most of it is underground and 
hence able to withstand the insults and challenges associated with 
environment and technical changes.  The oldest aspen stand is 
estimated to be more than 80,000 years old (Featherman, 2014).  It 
is highly resistant to variations, has great lasting power, and is, as a 
result, very robust. 
Comparing Resiliency and Robustness 
The following Table 4-1 summarizes the above discussed 
differences between resiliency and robustness: 
Table 4-1: Summary of Resiliency and Robustness 
 
 Attributes Time Component 
Resiliency 
Ability to respond to undesired 
changes 
Ability to monitor current state 
Ability to learn from 
experiences 
Ability to anticipate 
challenges 
Quick to recover to 
desired state 
 
∂t ~ 0 
Robustness 
Insensitive to component 
variation 
Insensitive to parameter 
variation 
Tolerant of environmental 
variation 
Lasts a relatively long 
time 
 
T >> 0 
Source: Ryan, J.J.C.H Notes (2020) 
Operational Aspects of Resiliency and Robustness 
Resiliency and robustness aspects are important considerations 
in system design and operations.  Integrating the components into 
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a system that enhance these two attributes can be costly, which 
means that design trade-offs may have to be made.  On the other 
hand, sometimes neither resiliency nor robustness are desirable 
attributes.  For example, single use plastic kitchen waste bags are 
intended to be flimsy and easily degraded environmentally, although 
the nature of the material renders a level of robustness that is 
undesired (United Nations, 2018).  On the other hand, material 
scientists have recently created a type of plastic that can self-
destruct when exposed to sunlight: 
Engineers at the Georgia Institute of Technology have developed 
a new type of plastic that can form flexible sheets and tough 
mechanical parts—then disappear in minutes to hours when hit by 
ultraviolet light or temperatures above 176 degrees Fahrenheit. … 
DARPA has already used the plastic to make light, strong gliders 
and parachutes. Last October the agency field-tested one of these 
vehicles: dropped from a high-altitude balloon at night, a glider 
successfully delivered a three-pound package to a spot 100 miles 
away. After four hours in the sun, it vanished, leaving behind nothing 
but an oily smudge on the ground. (Patel, 2019) 
The example given in the story illustrates an obvious use for 
disappearing plastic: short term mission execution with very little 
forensics residue.  Adversaries planning attacks on distant targets 
could use these types of materials to launch their attacks without 
leaving much behind for investigators to find.  C-UAS planners 
might use this type of design feature as a focus for attack. 
Deciding how much resiliency and how much robustness is 
needed for a given system is a design choice and must be made in 
consideration of the overall mission goals. 
 
Measuring Resiliency and Robustness 
As noted in the discussion regarding the definitions of robustness 
and resiliency, measurement of such attributes is only possible in 
relation to the system mission goals.  If a system is designed for 
preplanned product obsolescence (Buck, 2017) (Patel, 2019), then it 
is right and appropriate to design it with a planned lifetime.  In 
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fact, the robustness of that product is appropriately measured in its 
ability to last the planned lifetime.  If it does, reliably, then it can 
be considered robust.  If there is a non-trivial chance of it failing 
prior to planned end of life, then it can be considered not robust. 
Similarly, resilience must be measured relative to the mission goals. 
  If the mission has a goal to linger over a territory for a period of 
time, then resiliency can be measured in the determination of the 
system to react to and recover from expected problems during that 
period of time.  These attributes must be carefully considered and 
designed into the system from the beginning. 
 
How Processes can Boost Resiliency and Robustness 
Resiliency and robustness do not need to be cares borne solely 
by single components or even single systems.  Having redundant 
systems can boost both resiliency and robustness, if those 
redundant are integrated appropriately.  It does no good to have 
redundant systems or elements if such components are equally 
vulnerable to expected attacks or insults.  Redundant processes can 
additionally assist in delivering resiliency through the augmentation 
of learning and detection capabilities.  Having redundant processing 
channels that double check the precision and appropriateness of 
the primary processing channel is a very valuable method of 
monitoring the state of the system and ensuring that it is operating 
correctly. 
When Resiliency and Robustness is More Costly than Optimal 
Engineering for increased resiliency and/or robustness costs 
resources: money, labor, energy, and space.  As such, the decisions 
must be carefully made.  In some cases, it is not possible to have 
precise data on the operational environment, in which case guesses 
must be made.  For example, the scientists and engineers 
developing the first-generation space systems had little empirical 
data to work with when trying to design the desired resiliency and 
robustness.  One thing they did know is that once the system was 
launched, it was going to very difficult indeed to send a repair 
Chapter 4:  Planning for Resiliency and Robustness  |  93
person after it.  As a result, the early systems lasted much longer 
than expected (Gruss, 2014). 
Those satellites were very expensive, but data to inform the 
decision space was for all practical purposes non-existent.  For 
most of the systems that are being designed for terrestrial purposes, 
ample data exists, and significantly more computing power exists 
to support modeling and simulation.  Costs can be extrapolated 
for both design improvements and marginal returns on investment, 
giving the product manager the ability to make rational decisions on 
how to make the hard decisions about expenditures for resiliency 
and robustness.  But these decisions can not be made as cookie 
cutter decisions: just as robustness and resiliency are only 
measurable relative to mission goals, so are the costs associated 
with providing these attributes. 
When Resiliency and Robustness are Attacked 
Both the presence and absence of robustness and resiliency can 
be used as vectors for attack.  When robustness or resiliency is 
absent, the attacks are much more obvious.  It is when the systems 
have been designed with robustness or resiliency in mind that the 
attack challenge becomes interesting. 
Candidate targets to be considered include (Ryan J. J., Information 
Warfare: A Conceptual Framework, 1997): 
• Autonomous Sensor Systems, which can be exploited to send 
false data back to the controlling system or used as conduits 
for other weapons such as viruses, logic torpedoes, and worms 
• The C2 Infrastructure, which includes Civilian and Strategic 
Leadership, the Decision Process, Societal Support Structures 
such as the police, and other governmental entities like the 
Bureau of Land Management and the Strategic Oil Reserves. 
Attacking these targets can sow discord in an opponent’s 
society, thereby fracturing the decision-making process or any 
consensus, deny an opponent the ability to marshal needed 
resources to rebuff an attack, or divert attention from other 
activities. 
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• The Communications Infrastructure, including the physical 
part of a communications infrastructure which includes 
microwave antenna towers, switching stations, telephones, 
radios, computers, and modems. Non-physical portions 
include the data, electrical systems, and management support 
systems. 
• Logistics, including the computerized backbone that identifies 
supply requirements, positions materials, tracks deliveries, and 
schedules resources. Attacks on that backbone can severely 
impact the ability of the dependent forces to deploy or 
maintain a deployment. 
There are many other targets, including the sensors and individual 
UAS systems, but it pays to think broadly about targets. 
Types of Attacks 
A system that is designed to be very robust is one that is expected 
to last for a long period of time, relative to its mission. The designers 
made the decision that it was necessary for the mission to engineer 
the components for enhanced robustness, which was a resource 
decision: simply stated, they decided it was worth the extra money, 
energy expenditures, labor, and time to make the system more 
robust.  The mission needs are for it to last, to persist.  Destroying 
or damaging such a system, then, is an obvious priority for an 
adversary. Discovering the relative robustness of each system is also 
an adversary priority, since it informs targeting decisions. 
Similarly, a system that is designed to be resilient is one that has 
been imbued with the ability to recover quickly from challenges. 
For such a system, a single attack is not likely to be (very) effective. 
Instead, a series of attacks in intervals at a rate that overwhelms the 
recovery process may be appropriate.  For example, the distributed 
denial at service (DDOS) attack concept was developed when 
targets began designing interfaces that were resilient to normal 
denial of service (DOS) attacks (Cloudflare, 2020). 
Revisiting the definitions of resiliency and robustness, the very 
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attributes provide clues as to how to craft effective attacks (see 
Table 4-2): 
 
Table 4-2 Attributes v Time 
 
 Attributes Time Component 
Resiliency 
Ability to respond to undesired 
changes 
Ability to monitor current state 
Ability to learn from 
experiences 
Ability to anticipate 
challenges 
Quick to recover to 
desired state 
 
∂t ~ 0 
Robustness 
Insensitive to component 
variation 
Insensitive to parameter 
variation 
Tolerant of environmental 
variation 
Lasts a relatively long 
time 
 
T >> 0 
Source: Ryan, J.J.C.H (2020) 
 
Attacking resiliency should focus on slowing down or 
compromising entirely the ability to recognize and recover from 
state changes.  Attacking robustness may be best accomplished 
through sabotage in the manufacturing process.  Focusing on each 
of these attributes provides the C-UAS planner options for 
consideration. 
In designing appropriate attacks, the C-UAS planner needs to 
consider system design and system operation.  Individual 
components of systems can prove to be the Achilles’ heels of larger 
systems.  Getting to this level of knowledge requires significant 
intelligence data support and analytical capability. 
Cascading Effect Potential 
One of the challenges associated with automated systems, such as 
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UASs, is that there is a huge potential for them to be used in multiple 
system configurations, including swarms.  While the offensive 
potential of such swarms is large, it also provides a potential for 
cascading C-UAS effects.  For example, if a swarm has a single 
controlling entity, the jamming or destruction of that single entity 
makes the entire swarm vulnerable.  Analysis of the C-UAS potential 
should always consider the potential for creating effects that 
cascade from one system to another (Ryan, Woloschek, & Leven, 
Complexities in Conducting Information Warfare, 1996). 
The Role of Secrecy 
Because of the obvious implications of the preceding discussion, 
secrecy associated with all aspects of UAS operations can be a 
paramount consideration.  UAS operators should be mindful of 
adversaries attempting to discover information useful to the 
adversaries C-UAS activities.  C-UAS planners should be careful of 
adversaries trying to discover intent and capabilities of the C-UAS 
efforts.  The types of secrecy considerations span operations, 
capability and resiliency/robustness attributes. 
Operational Secrecy 
Normal operations can provide hints to how resiliency and 
robustness are engineered into a system.  When conducting UAS 
operations, caution might be warranted to disguise or hide 
operational patterns or capabilities.  Obviously, the longer a system 
is in use, the harder this becomes and the potential for secrecy 
dwindles to simply secrecy regarding current operations.  But even 
this can be valuable. 
From a C-UAS perspective, observing adversary training and 
operational patterns can provide a great deal of information 
regarding capabilities and intentions.  Even such apparently minor 
things as the types of personnel expertise being acquired or the 
amount of energy being used can provide clues.  Clues provide 
lines of inquiry for potential targeting and C-UAS mission planning. 
Granted a huge part of the C-UAS problem is when the adversary 
fleet is inbound, but don’t overlook the opportunity to subvert it 
before it is launched. 
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Capability Secrecy 
Hiding or disguising capabilities is always a popular choice.  For 
C-UAS planners, care should be taken to test hypotheses thoroughly 
to ensure that the adversary has not managed to confound the 
intelligence gathering and analysis process regarding the UAS 
missions and capabilities. 
Resiliency and Robustness Secrecy 
Adversaries may go to some lengths to hide the actual nature 
of how robust or resilient their systems might be.  In some cases, 
the systems may be quite frail, contrary to the data revealed by 
the adversary.  In other cases, the systems may be much more 
capable and resilient than expected.  In either case, the potential for 
a target-weapon-effects match might be affected, to the detriment 
of both the nature of the conflict and the geo-political stability. 
Getting it right is important and no information should be taken at 
face value. 
Questions for Reflection 
1. You are planning a C-UAS operation against an adversary that 
has very robust UASs. Your intelligence support activity has 
verified this level of robustness.  Is your best option to try to 
sabotage the systems while they are in production, in the field 
awaiting launch, or while in flight?  What are the trade-offs 
associated with each choice? 
2. A spy has revealed that an adversary has been outfitting 
recreational UASs with secret surveillance capabilities. These 
UAS systems have been advertised during the recent holiday 
season at deep discounts and, as a result, the sales of the 
systems have sky rocketed.  Part of the secret surveillance 
system is an AI system that detects unauthorized activity and 
self-destructs to avoid any information being extracted.  You 
have been charged with coming up with a way to subvert these 
capabilities.  What are your alternatives? 
3. You are on guard duty and the alarm has just been raised that a 
swarm of very resilient UASs are inbound on an intelligence 
98  |  Chapter 4:  Planning for Resiliency and Robustness
collection mission. What are your options? 
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Chapter 5: Surveillance and 
Reconnaissance 
H.C. MUMM 
Student Learning Objectives – The student will gain knowledge 
of the concepts and framework as it relates to the surveillance 
and reconnaissance aspects of C-UAS (Counter-unmanned aerial 
systems). The student will be able to: 
• Describe the importance of surveillance to C-UAS activities, 
differentiating it from reconnaissance 
• Describe the importance of reconnaissance to C-UAS 
activities, differentiating it from surveillance 
• Develop a surveillance plan for a notional C-UAS scenario, 
identifying processes, systems, and technologies needed, as 
well as mission goals and metrics 
• Explain how detection of UAS is different from detection 
and interpretation of adversarial intent 
• Explain the need for operational secrecy for C-UAS 
surveillance and reconnaissance activities 
History-What is it, and Why Does it Matter? 
This chapter explores the differences and similarities of how 
technology is used to find manned and unmanned aircraft in the 
sky. The history of surveillance and reconnaissance has its roots 
in military uses with only a small operation with its civilian 
counterparts. “The tactics and techniques that are applied to today’s 
technology stem from the field of remote sensing. Remote sensing 
has a long history as it began with humans attempting to see and 
sense phenomena from a distance and (we have now) taken a long 
journey from using pigeons to balloons to aircraft, then to satellites, 
to UAS [unmanned aerial systems]” (Nichols & Mumm, 2018) 
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The use of UAS or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance is one of the most 
well-known applications of the technology. “The vast majority of 
UAVs are used purely for intelligence, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance (ISR) missions. In current military usage, they 
range from the Global Hawk, with a wingspan greater than a Boeing 
737 airliner, to nano-helicopters that weigh a few grams, and all 
points in between” (Lambeth, 2006).  This field of study has allowed 
advances in military movement, attack, and defend, as well as 
civilian surveying and developing, freedom of movement 
throughout our world. (Nichols & Mumm, 2018) 
However, the tactics this chapter will discuss are almost 180 
degrees from the normal thought process in surveillance and 
reconnaissance, as the “target” is up in the expansive sky and is 
not always bound by the rules of conventional manned aircraft, and 
sometimes UAS technologies evolve so quickly that counter-UAS (C-
UAS) systems just cannot adapt quickly enough. “The proliferation 
of C-UAS technology might even accelerate the development of 
technologies that will render C-UAS systems ineffective, 
particularly in military environments” (“The new world of counter-
drone technology,” 2018). C-UAS technology has two primary 
functions “the first is to identify or detect drone activity. The 
second function is to intercept the airspace threat or defeat the 
drone” (Friedberg, 2019) 
 
 Figure 5-1: Drone Capability Diversity 
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 Source: (Snow, 2014) 
 
According to Merriam-Webster, the definition of reconnaissance 
is “a preliminary survey to gain information; especially an 
exploratory military survey of enemy territory. (Dictionary, 2019) 
In historical terms, it is French and means “recognition” or from 
Old French reconoistre or to “recognize” (Surveillance, 2019). This 
idea of a quick look or survey is in contrast with the meaning of 
surveillance which is “continuous observation of a place, person, 
group, or ongoing activity in order to gather information: attentive 
observation, as to oversee and direct someone or something” 
(Surveillance, 2019). This continuous observation does not always 
need to be carried out with the knowledge or consent of the 
surveilled as we can use electronic surveillance methods which 
allow for “surveillance or the gathering of information by 
surreptitious use of electronic devices, as in crime detection or 
espionage”  (Surveillance, 2019) 
.Furthering this idea in the C-UAS arena, one must look at not 
only finding an object in the vastness of the open sky but the ability 
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to detect, classify, identify and dispatch countermeasures for not 
only the flying vehicle but also for the operator or base station on 
the ground. Detection means the technology can discover UAS in a 
given area.  Classification of UAS will usually be able to separate UAS 
(drones) from other types of objects – such as manned aircraft. 
“One step further is identification. Some equipment can identify a 
particular model of drone or even identify the drone’s or controller’s 
digital fingerprint, like a MAC address for example. This level of 
identification can be handy for (tracking and) prosecution purposes. 
Being alerted that a drone is present…is already useful. But your 
situational awareness, and ability to deploy countermeasures is 
greatly enhanced if you know the drone’s (and/or the controller’s) 
exact location. Some equipment will even allow you to track the 
drone location in real-time” (9 Counter-Drone Technologies To 
Detect And Stop Drones Today, 2019). 
Table 5‑2: Threat Detection Tools 
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Technology Method 
Radar 
Detects the presence of small unmanned aircraft by their radar signatur
encounters RF pulses emitted by the detection element. These systems o
between drones and other small, low-flying objects, such as birds. 
Radio 
Frequency (RF) 
Identifies the presence of drones by scanning for the frequencies on which most dr
Algorithms pick out and geo-locate RF-emitting devices in the area that ar
Electro-Optical 
(EO) Detects drones based on their visual signature. 
Infrared (IR) Detects drones based on their heat signature. 
Acoustic 
Detects drones by recognizing the unique sounds produced by their motors. Ac
of sounds produced by known drones, which are then matched to sounds de
environment. 
Combined 
Sensors 
Many systems integrate a variety of different sensor types in order to pr
capability. For example, a system might include an acoustic sensor that cues an optic
a potential drone in the vicinity. The use of multiple detection elements ma
probability of successful detection, given that no individual detection me
Source: (Michel, 2018) 
Threat Identification-How and Why 
The traditional ways of looking for human-made objects in the 
sky are radar signatures, heat signatures, visually seeing the object 
with the human eye, or through an optical assist mechanism. There 
are also acoustic signatures as well as an array of electronic signals 
sweeping technologies used for detection as “C-UAS systems can 
be ground- or air-based or even handheld. Most systems on the 
market today are designed only for detection or for interdiction, and 
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the clear majority are ground-based, although a few comprise air 
and ground components” (Wilson, 2018). Table 5 -1 lists the main 
techniques for the detection and tracking of UAS. 
 
The ability to find an object in the sky is a combination of the 
mechanism chosen as well as the size, speed, trajectory, weather 
conditions and possible stealth capabilities the object may employ 
to avoid detection. Surveillance and reconnaissance in the C-UAS 
arena 
includes radar, radio frequency (RF), electro-optical (EO), infrared 
(IR), acoustic, and combined sensors. There are no perfect detection 
methods. Many affordable electro-optical sensors are limited to 
daylight operations and a direct line-of-sight to the target (also 
true for IR and many RF systems). RF and acoustic sensors use a 
library of known sounds and frequencies to detect UAVs, but the 
rapid development of new platforms makes it impossible for those 
to be fully up to date. Sensor sensitivity also is an issue; too sensitive 
generates many false positives, while reduced sensitivity leads to 
false negatives (Wilson, 2018). 
Adding to this equation is the atmospheric effects of temperature, 
weather conditions, and location of the object be it over an open 
desert, the vastness of the ocean, or mixed within the many 
buildings and signals within a city or urban terrain. Tracking an 
object in the sky is more difficult than tracking an object on land as 
the vastness of the sky creates the difficulty of a three dimensional 
environment where the object could move up, down, laterally side 
to side or a combination of all three dimensions as individuals and 
sensors attempt to find and track the object. The most common way 
to find and track an aircraft is through the use of radar. RADAR is 
an acronym for Radio Detection and Ranging. A simple explanation 
how radar works is: 
A beam of energy, called radio waves, is emitted from an antenna. 
As they strike objects in the atmosphere, the energy is scattered in 
all directions, with some of the energy reflected directly back to the 
radar. The larger the object, the greater the amount of energy that 
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is returned to the radar. In addition, the time it takes for the beam 
of energy to be transmitted and returned to the radar also provides 
is with the distance to that object. (How Radar Works., 2019) 
 
Figure 5-2: Example of RADAR Signal 
Source: (Goyal, 2019) 
 
A radar signal has a pulse width (pulse duration), which can be 
increased or decreased to “see” further out or to get a better image 
of the object in question. The “Pulse width determines the spatial 
resolution of the radar… decreasing the pulse width increases signal 
bandwidth. A wider system bandwidth results in higher receiver 
noise for a given amount of power, which reduces sensitivity” 
(Encyclopedia Britannica, 2019). As we are working with the position 
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of time and space of an aircraft a “Doppler radar systems can 
provide information regarding the movement of targets as well as 
their position by measuring the shift (or change) in phase between 
a transmitted pulse and a received echo, the target’s movement 
directly toward or away from the radar is calculated” (How Radar 
Works., 2019). 
Several factors affect the performance of a given radar system, 
these factors include 
• (1) the maximum range at which it can see a target of a 
specified size, (2) the accuracy of its measurement of target 
location in range and angle, (3) its ability to distinguish one 
target from another, (4) its ability to detect the desired target 
echo when masked by large clutter echoes, unintentional 
interfering signals from other “friendly” transmitters, or 
intentional radiation from hostile jamming (if a military radar), 
(5) its ability to recognize the type of target, and (6) its 
availability (ability to operate when needed), reliability, and 
maintainability (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2019). 
These and many other factors create issues when attempting to use 
radar to find and track UAS as “Echoes from land, sea, rain, snow, 
hail, birds, …but they are a nuisance to those who want to detect 
aircraft, ships, missiles, or other similar targets. Clutter echoes can 
seriously limit the capability of a radar system… (we must) 
minimizing the effects of clutter without reducing the echoes from 
desired targets” (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2019) 
UAS tend to be small in size and have a low electromagnetic 
signature, which can be missed by most traditional detection 
measures such as an airport radar system; however, a 
micro–doppler radar “is able to detect movement – specifically, 
speed differences – within moving objects. And drones tend to have 
propellers that create a large spectrum of speed differences. Part 
of the propeller is moving towards you, and part is moving away 
(9 Counter-Drone Technologies To Detect And Stop Drones Today, 
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2019). This micro-doppler technique can identify drones and even 
distinguish drones from birds. UAS can also be detected by using the 
millimeter-wave range as this range is “ideal for surveillance tasks in 
the immediate environment, particularly when visibility is poor. In 
comparison to the optical and IR spectrum, millimeter waves have 
good penetration characteristics in the presence of fog, smoke, or 
dust.” (Caris, 2019) 
 
Radio Frequency (RF) 
Radio Frequency (RF) sensors can detect the UAS and the 
operator or ground station location from which the control signal or 
payload exploitation signal is being sent and received. Commercial 
drones are usually operated via a radio control signal and often 
have onboard data link transmitters for real-time sensor download 
(typically in the 2.4 GHz ISM band). These upload and download 
frequency signals can be detected and geolocated (Drone Detection 
, 2019).  RF sensors are passive and do not require legal 
authorization for use, so they will not emit signals that can cause 
issues with other signal emitters in a given area. RF sensors are 
one of the first lines of defense in C-UAS as they can “detect 
commercial, consumer, and DIY or prototype drones, flight paths, 
and the location of drones. RF sensors are capable of identifying 
a drone’s type and model based on the protocol or frequency the 
drone is operating” (Friedberg, 2019). 
 
Electro-Optical (EO) Sensors-Full Motion Video Cameras 
Full motion video or digitally enhanced cameras can “provide vital 
visual confirmation of a drone, help identify payloads, and record 
forensic evidence of drone intrusions. This sensor is important for 
times when human verification is necessary, or when security teams 
need visual evidence of an intrusion” (Friedberg, 2019). 
Video and camera sensors are limited in their ability to find a 
UAS and generally need to be cued to a UAS through other sensors. 
Cameras are limited in a C-UAS system due to limitations of weather 
conditions, low visibility environments, line of sight, range, smoke 
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environments, and nighttime operations. EO sensors are normally 
combined with an infrared sensor (IR) device and sold as one unit, 
as an EO/IR sensor. 
 
Infrared Sensors (IR) 
Infrared sensors are based on the science that “all objects emit 
infrared energy, known as a heat signature. An infrared camera 
(thermal imager) detects and measures the infrared energy of 
objects. The camera converts that infrared data into an electronic 
image that shows the apparent surface temperature of the object 
being measured” (Thermography Fundamentals, 2016). 
 
Figure 5-3: Infrared Heat Signature 
Source: (Thermography Fundamentals, 2016) 
 
This temperature difference offers the ability for the sensors to 
surveil the aircraft in the sky as the “camera processor takes the 
signal from each pixel and applies a mathematical calculation to it 
to create a color map of the apparent temperature of the object 
(Thermography Fundamentals, 2016). 
Acoustic Sensors for C-UAS 
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The concept behind acoustic sensors is based on the idea that 
the distinct sounds created by different aircraft can be identified 
and distinguished from all other sounds in a given area as  “acoustic 
sensors use a library of known sounds and frequencies to detect 
UAVs, but the rapid development of new platforms makes it 
impossible for those to be fully up-to-date. Sensor sensitivity also 
is an issue; too sensitive generates many false positives” (The new 
world of counter-drone technology). 
 
It’s a Big Sky-How Can We Discern the Clutter from the UAS? 
Another issue of tracking airborne objects is one or more of the 
objects in the sky making contact or colliding into each other; 
however, this is rare and is known as the Big Sky Theory. The Big 
Sky theory states “that two randomly flying bodies are very unlikely 
to collide, as the three-dimensional space is so large relative to the 
bodies. Some aviation safety rules involving altimetry and navigation 
standards are based on this concept” (Big Sky Theory, 2019). 
With the “advent of radar, two aircraft could be “seen” and 
maneuvered clear of each other’s flight paths. The advent of Traffic 
Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) equipment allowed equipped 
aircraft to resolve conflicts. Now we have technology that allows 
space-based positioning of two aircraft” (Big Sky Theory, 2019). 
One of the techniques to control the Big Sky Theory is assigning 
different types of airspace rules to control certain areas of time and 
space. This use of airspace allows different rules to be assigned to 
different environments. As an example, if an aircraft, manned or 
unmanned is not following the agreed-upon rules it is considered 
to be hazardous. Predetermined responses are employed depending 
on which airspace the vehicle is operating in and to what degree the 
vehicle is not following the agreed-upon rules. 
Figure 5-4 depicts the different types of airspace and control 
within each of these airspace corridors. Depending upon which 
airspace corridor a vehicle is operating in, a series of positive 
controls are in place including radar tracking, mode “C” altitude 
encoders (allows for a unique code to be assigned to each aircraft in 
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an area), self-reporting by operators, visual indicators and radio call 
signs. This concept has worked well in the manned aircraft arena 
as all aircraft in controlled airspace must have an altitude encoder, 
and “up until now means planes moving between Europe and North 
America have had to use regimented tracks in the sky. The rigid 
structure maintains large areas of clear space around planes to 
remove the possibility of a collision” (Amos, 2019). This concept 
must now become more flexible as unmanned and optionally 
manned technology proliferates around the world. The system is 
slowly evolving with the invention of Automatic Dependent 
Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) transponders. These 
transponders push out information from a particular aircraft – 
including its identity, GPS-determined altitude, and ground speed. 
ADS-B was introduced to enhance surveillance and safety over land, 
but the messages can also be picked up by satellites (Amos, 2019). 
  
Figure 5-4: Air Space Classification 
Source: (FAA, 2019). 
 
Table 5-3: Airspace and Altitude Definitions 
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Airspace Altitude Definition 
Class A 
Generally, airspace from 18,000 feet mean sea level (MSL) up 
to and including FL600. 
Includes airspace overlying the waters within 12 nautical miles 
(NM) off the coast of the 48 contiguous United States and 
Alaska. 
Class B 
Generally, from the surface to 10,000 feet MSL including the 
airspace from portions of Class Bravo that extends beyond the 
Mode C Veil up to 10,000 feet MSL (e.g. SEA, CLE, PHX). 
Class C 
Generally, from the surface up to 4,000 feet MSL including 
the airspace above the horizontal boundary up to 10,000 feet 
MSL. 
Class D 
Generally, airspace from the surface up to 2,500 feet above 
the airport elevation.  The configuration of each Class D 
airspace is individually tailored. 
Class E 
Above 14,500 feet MSL over the 48 United States and Alaska, 
excluding airspace at and below 2,500 feet AGL and excludes 
airspace 18,000 MSL or above. 
Includes airspace overlying the waters within 12 nautical miles 
(NM) off the coast of the 48 contiguous United States and 
Alaska. 
Class G Uncontrolled airspace – not designated as Class A, B, C, D, or E. 
Source: (-Handbooks, 2019) [1] 
 
Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B)-Helping 
to Eliminate the “Good Guy” from C-UAS Surveillance and 
Reconnaissance Challenge 
The introduction of the Automatic Dependent Surveillance-
Broadcast (ADS-B) will help transform surveillance and 
reconnaissance of manned aircraft, yet how this new technology 
can fit into the unmanned arena and possibly assist C-UAS is still 
being determined. The U.S. firm, Aireon, says “its new satellite 
surveillance network is now fully live and being trialed over the 
North Atlantic. The system employs a constellation of 66 spacecraft, 
which monitors the situational messages pumped out by aircraft 
transponders. These report a plane’s position, altitude, direction 
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and speed every eight seconds. The more detailed information they 
now have about the behavior of airplanes means more efficient 
routing can be introduced” (Amos, 2019). 
ADS-B is a system of systems and rides “piggyback on all 66 
spacecraft of the Iridium sat-phone service provider. These sensors 
make it possible now to track planes even out over the ocean, 
beyond the visibility of radar – and ocean waters cover 70% of 
the globe” (Amos, 2019). If we know where the manned “friendly” 
aircraft are in time and space, this may assist in the surveillance 
and reconnaissance of potentially harmful UAS and allow for the 
tracking and neutralizing of this threat. Figure 5-5 illustrates how 
ADS-B will operate in the next few months as the FAA (Federal 
Aviation Administration) has mandated that all aircraft are required 
to comply by January 1, 2020. This includes any aircraft operating 
in Class A, B, or C airspaces. Additionally, any aircraft operating in 
Class E airspace (above FL100 MSL but not below 2,500 ft AGL) must 
also comply (“The “No-BS” PDQ ABC’s of ADS-B,” 2019). 
 
Figure 5-5: ADS-B Signal Broadcast 
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 Source: (The “No-BS” PDQ ABC’s of ADS-B, 2019) 
 
With ADS-B technology offering near-real-time surveillance from 
satellites, the ability to “introduce greater flexibility into the 
management of the airspace (become[s] possible). For example, in 
the North Atlantic, traditional in-line safe separation distances will 
eventually be reduced from 40 nautical miles (80km) down to as 
little as 14 nautical miles (25km)” (Amos, 2019). This flexibility offers 
great promise for the airline industry; however, it also complicates 
C-UAS, as aircraft are no longer on a known, predictable flight 
path. Attempting to mandate that all UAS incorporate ADS-B 
transponders may prove to be difficult as the technology can cost 
thousands of dollars, and integration into current UAS designs may 
not be completely successful. 
 
The Difficulty of Differentiating Harmless Aircraft from Threat 
Aircraft in the C-UAS Space 
How do you determine what is flying in the area-is it a bird, small 
plane, UAS, and is it a threat? The standard airport radar does not 
work well for finding and tracking most UAS.  There are several 
reasons for this, including the size of the aircraft, the material it is 
made from, and the general lack of a heat signature in most of the 
Group 1 and Group 2 weight classes. (See also Figures 5-6, and 5-7) 
 
Table 5-4: UAVs Classification According to U.S. DoD 
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UAVs Classification According to the U.S. 
Department of Defense (DoD) 
Category Size Maximum Gross TakWeight (MGTW) (lbs
Group 1 Small 0-20 
Group 2 Medium 21-55 
Group 3 Large <1320 
Group 4 Larger >1320 
Group 5 Largest >1320 
*AGL = Above Ground Level **MSL = Mean Sea Level 
Note: If the UAS has even one characteristic of the 
next level, it is classified at that level. 
Sources: (U.S. Army Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 
2010-2035, 2010) 
 
 
Complicating the matter of discerning manned from unmanned 
systems is a multitude of ontologies and taxonomies used to discuss 
different sizes, weight, and mission classes of aircraft as illustrated 
in Tables 5-3 and 5-4. The fact that most UAS blur the line between 
civilian and military use (dual-use technology) compound these 
issues. Cohesive agreed to classifications for UAS, and manned 
aircraft is a worldwide issue. There is a real challenge in verifying 
if an aircraft is manned, definitely unmanned, or maybe optionally 
manned when a human must make a judgment call of life or death 
when determining if a UAS has nefarious intent or is simply an 
innocent aircraft flying in a given airspace. 
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 Table 5-5: NATO UAS Classification 
 
NATO UAS 
Classification 
Class Category Normal Employment 
Normal Operating 
Altitude 
Class III      (> 600 
kg) Strike/ Combat* Strategic/ National Up to 65,000 ft 
HALE Strategic/ National Up to 65,000 ft Unlimited (BLOS) 
MALE Operational/ Theatre Up to 45,000 ft MSL Unlimited (BLOS) 
Class II Tactical Tactical Formation Up to 18,000 ft AGL 
Class I Small (>15 kg) Tactical Unit Up to 5,000 ft A
Mini (<15 kg) Tactical Subunit (Manual or hand launch) Up to 3,000 ft AGL Up to 25 km (LOS) 
Micro** 
(<66 J) 
Tactical Subunit (manual or 
hand launch) Up to 200 ft AGL Up to 5 km (LOS) 
 
Source: (Szabolcsi, 2016) 
 
An airport radar normally detects aircraft as small as helicopters 
and single-engine land aircraft, and as large as jumbo jets, however, 
these all of these aircraft are generally made out of metal, have 
a recognizable heat signature, and a pilot that can communicate 
location and intent. UAS tend to have none of these attributes. 
Additionally, most UAS are made from plastics, balsa wood, 
composite materials, or combinations of all of these materials, with 
metal tending to be used less than any other material. Group 1 and 2 
UAS tend to be battery-powered and therefore offer no discernable 
or trackable heat source. UAS that uses a combustible fuel engine 
will still not have enough of a heat signature or radar return 
signature to make surveillance and reconnaissance an easy task. 
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Figure 5-6: Size Comparison  Drone to Commercial  Aircraft -A 
 
Figure 5-7: Size Comparison  Drone to Commercial  Aircraft -B 
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Sources: (Aviation-Design of UAV Systems, 2014)  (Eggers) 
 
These composite built UASs do not reflect radar energy the way 
denser materials such as metal does. UAVs can further reduce any 
energy by using composites made with radar absorbing materials 
(RAM) or be constructed to include a radar-absorbing structure 
(RAS) into the superstructure using reinforced plastics or other 
unique non-traditional materials. Most UAS are small enough that 
finding a radar signature is sufficiently difficult; however there is 
now “a plethora of foams and coatings that can reduce radar 
signature now make up a highly active sector of the microwave 
materials market” (Marsh, 2010). 
The use of composites is not unusual in UAS as reinforced plastic 
materials are known for their unique combination of low weight 
with high strength, stiffness and fatigue resistance, but their 
electromagnetic (EM) characteristics are important too; witness, for 
example, glass fiber reinforced plastic (GRP)-based printed circuit 
boards and carbon composite electromagnetic interference (EMI) 
shielding enclosures for sensitive electronic equipment. Low-
weight RAS can be made from glass and carbon fiber composite 
lattices in which the voids are occupied by microwave absorbent 
foams. Absorption effectiveness would be related to the volume 
fraction of the grid cell structure and the distance between 
elements (Marsh, 2010). 
 
New Challenges Require New Thinking-Combined Sensors 
The most successful C-UAS initiatives incorporate a multi-sensor 
approach to ensure the accurate identification of a UAS as 
relying on just one detection method; it can be possible for a 
drone to be missed. For example, when using conventional radar, 
it can be difficult to detect low-flying drones or distinguish drones 
from birds. Or if the drone is obscured by buildings or trees, an 
optical sensor will struggle to pick it up. By augmenting the radar 
and optical sensors with spectrum monitoring, the security team 
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(will) have a much clearer picture of any potential drone activity 
(Drone Detection , 2019). 
The discussion presented here is a sampling of the technical 
challenges of finding and tracking UAS. The tasks of identifying the 
specific UAS type, aircraft owner, what the UAS is generally used 
for (normal payloads) and the aircraft operator become an even 
greater challenge as “C-UAS systems, employing combined data 
from several sensors, also must be able to differentiate between 
legitimate and hostile, allied, and enemy UASs — something no 
known system can do. This is where a human operator must 
intervene to make what often is a split-second assessment” (Wilson, 
2018). 
Since the early years of the FAA, the agency has mandated that 
manned aircraft must be registered and assigned a tail number, 
which must be displayed permanently on the aircraft. Information 
on manned aircraft is easily found in databases around the world. As 
a newer technology that is evolving faster than policies, laws, and 
governance can keep pace with, there is no comprehensive database 
that offers an easy UAS identification look up and even if there 
were such databases, the varying laws for registering the UAS (along 
with limited compliance) would render most of the information 
incomplete and unusable. New UAS are evolving at a rapid pace, and 
their missions are far beyond the once normal camera sensor work 
as UAS are taking over many traditional manned aircraft missions. 
This is illustrated with Boeing’s aircraft refueling drone which is 
an “advanced unmanned aircraft designed to refuel the US Navy’s 
fighter jets in mid-air has taken to the skies operating under the 
name T1, the prototype MQ-25 performed an autonomous flight 
over the course of two hours at MidAmerica St. Louis Airport” 
(Lavars, 2019).  The FAA is continuing to struggle with these issues. 
In July 2019, many US lawmakers sent a letter to the Secretary of 
Transportation stating that 
“We write to register our ongoing concerns regarding the 
continuing delay in the issuing of the Federal Aviation 
Administration’s (FAA) rule requiring remote identification for 
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unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) and urge you to dedicate the 
necessary staff and resources for the rapid publication of a notice 
of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) on this subject…the failure to 
complete Remote ID poses “serious risks” to the airspace and also 
“stifle innovation” in the drone industry. There are many reasons for 
this – the technology isn’t simple, there are multiple methods and 
discussions over which is best, and many stakeholders in the mix” 
 (McNabb, 2019). 
This section of the chapter offers a glimpse of new technologies, 
tactics, techniques, and policies that are being explored to assist the 
difficulties in the C-UAS surveillance and reconnaissance mission 
areas. Technologies that were originally designed to protect military 
installation are being modified for C-UAS missions. The Scanning 
Surveillance Radar System (SSRS) is an example and is “ideally 
suitable for the detection and precise location of several drones 
of both classes (micro and mini UAS) at close range. In addition, 
the SSRS system offers live tracking for up to four UAS in a 
measurement range of 50 to 150 meters”(Caris, 2019). This 
technology is effective for smaller UAS; additional combined sensor 
technology must be used to create a full C-UAS spectrum of 
protection. 
Many C-UAS directories exist; however, a good amount of the 
information is not vetted correctly or is more in an advertising 
format than an informative format. The Counter UAS Directory from 
www.unmannedairspace.info is one of the more comprehensive 
lists. The latest edition had 83 technologies discussed within a 
54-page document. The directory is free to the public and tends to 
be vetted with only verifiable information listing “available counter-
UAS systems, networks, and components and is supplied free of 
charge…Information is supplied directly by suppliers, with data 
edited to remove unverifiable claims” (FAA, 2019). 
One of the issues that have proven to be difficult in the C-UAS 
arena is attempting to not only find and track a vehicle; it is 
attempting to find where the vehicle is being controlled from and 
who is controlling the vehicle. New technology is being developed 
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to cope with this issue as “CACI’s SkyTracker® Technology Suite is 
a counter-small unmanned aircraft system (C-sUAS) capability 
comprised of different form factors designed to exploit the radio 
communication between small unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS) 
and their controller”  (CACI, 2019). 
The SkyTracker® has three different form factors depending on 
C-UAS requirements; they include the: 
CORIAN system provides fixed facility protection against 
unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) threats to warfighters and critical 
infrastructure. CORIAN detects, identifies, tracks, and mitigates 
sUAS threats using precision neutralization techniques to ensure 
little to no collateral damage to the surrounding radio frequency 
(RF) spectrum and existing communications. 
AWAIR® system provides on-the-move force or facility 
protection against hostile sUAS. The ruggedized mobile platform 
leverages the CORIAN software baseline to precisely detect, 
identify, and mitigate sUAS threats. The system can be easily 
deployed on a vehicle or marine vessel, providing both ground and 
maritime convoy protection. 
CACI’s man-packable advanced attack system can defeat small, 
complex UAS. The system surveys the environment to enable 
deployed units to counter sUAS and analog video signals. The 
system can operate autonomously to deliver precision distributed 
attacks and provide rapid, responsive force protection capability in 
hostile environments (CACI, 2019). 
A U.S. applied research not-for-profit company known as SRC 
“is applying its extensive background in electronic warfare, air 
surveillance, and target detection, tracking and classification 
algorithms to help detect, track and defend against low, slow and 
small unmanned aircraft system (UAS) threats”  (Counter-UAS 
Systems, 2016). 
SRC has taken this knowledge and create C-UAS technology for 
both the military and civilian market places. 
Silent Archer® counter-UAS technology detects, tracks, 
identifies, and defeats hostile UAS. The technology comprises 
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proven, radar and electronic warfare systems, a camera for visual 
identification of targets, and a 3-D user display to provide the 
warfighter with advanced situational awareness. 
Small, slow, low-flying drones can easily slip through current 
security measures, posing an undetected threat to personnel and 
property. SRC’s Gryphon Skylight® drone security solution relies 
on radar and spectrum sensing to detect and identify UAS, 
commercial aircraft, and even birds to give you a clear picture of 
your secure airspace (Counter-UAS Systems, 2016). 
 
Mission Planning Secrecy – Protecting the Data 
The first question in protecting the data is, does it matter if 
the data is seen by others? This may seem counterintuitive to this 
conversation; however, encrypting data carries costs that may not 
be needed in most C-UAS scenarios. The art of surveillance and 
reconnaissance tends to be done in the shadows. In the C-UAS 
arena it might be more advantageous to allow the information to be 
known by all who have access, allowing for additional informational 
inputs and more “eyes” on the subject aircraft. Now, the response 
to the subject aircraft is another matter, as individual companies 
and governments may not want to disclose the exact methods being 
employed and the effect these methods will have on the subject 
aircraft. Information such as acoustics signatures is important to 
mask and not be disclosed as today’s sensor includes 
a range of tracking and data collection capabilities and 
visualizations, including early warning alerts with target bearings, 
multiple simultaneous threat detection, and tracking, and 3D-track 
of targets.  The system can be configured with multiple networked 
sensors to support a wide area of coverage, from remote field 
operations to congested urban environments. Captured data can be 
integrated into existing command and control software programs to 
support Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, operations, 
and decision-support applications (General Atomics demonstrates 
acoustic drone-detector to US Army, 2019). 
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The nature of most UAS platforms are inexpensive and openly 
available components, yet these components are often: 
built independently without cyber protection standards built-in 
leaving the systems vulnerable, and the very nature of “plug and 
play” tends to create incompatibility in cyber protection with very 
few if any true data standards. 
Analysis of the configuration and flight controllers/
microprocessors of several popular UAV models having multiple 
rotors revealed weaknesses associated with both the telemetry links 
streaming data to and from a drone via serial port connections (in 
which information could be captured, modified, or injected), and the 
UAVs’ connections to their ground station interface (whose data link 
could be spoofed, enabling hackers to assume complete control of 
the vehicle).” (Nichols & et.al, 2019) 
Sensor data security and the threat of attacks within the cyber 
domain must be a part of all aspects of mission planning. Mission 
planning will require tradeoffs between target area access, sensor 
capability and availability, information time dominance, and cyber/
data security requirements. 
 
Mission Planning for C-UAS for Perimeter Protection 
Now that the foundation of combined for C-UAS has been 
discussed, the placement and interconnection of these sensors 
systems are required for triangulation of the UAS. As seen in Figure 
5-8, the interlocking nature and overlap of sensors will create a 
triangulation of the UAS target. 
 
Figure 5-8: Overlapping Sensor Example 
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Source: (Perimeter Protection & Defense, 2019). 
In protecting the perimeter of a given facility, an in-depth analysis 
must take place to understand the ability to obtain the security level 
required before surveillance and renaissance of the area can begin. 
Once the reconnaissance of the area is complete the surveillance of 
any unauthorized UAS can occur and will be digitally documented 
and the appropriate countermeasures taken against the offending 
UAS. 
Combining the correct sensors (discussed earlier) will depend on 
many factors including: 
• Topography (line of sight) 
• Amount and height of buildings and human-made objects in 
the area 
• Protection level- Provide for 24/7 operations, all-weather (or 
just during occupied times) 
• Frequency noise level-electromagnetic interference 
• Applicable laws for the area/country 
• Threat level-is there known threats in the area-critical 
infrastructure or protecting the family business 
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• Most likely type of threat (quad-rotor with EO/IR sensor or 
fixed-wing suicide UAS) 
• What are the likely responses to the threat? How does the 
combined sensors system verify the threat has been 
neutralized or has left the area and is no longer a threat? 
• What is the budget for C-UAS? How much of this budget can 
be allocated to surveillance and reconnaissance? 
• Can the sensors cover hidden areas or pockets without 
overlapping coverage? 
Each of these factors will affect the type and number of sensors 
placed and how these sensors report back, store information, and 
are utilized during the normal course of time, or during a C-UAS 
threat event and the threat de-escalation and neutralization phase. 
Additionally, technology refresh schedules should be considered as 
the UAS market continues to evolve, and the tactics and techniques 
from threat actors get more sophisticated. The planning for C-UAS 
perimeter protection must be updated to match the new threats. 
 
Conclusions 
Reviewing the difference between surveillance and 
reconnaissance in the context of C-UAS offers distinctions between 
the typical thought process of sensors looking down on a target and 
the reality of the difficulty in attempting to find UAS targets in the 
vastness of the sky. The sensors that track manned aircraft are often 
not good at finding and tracking UAS as the size, materials, heat 
signatures, and overall UAS radar profiles are vastly different than of 
manned aircraft. The ability to discern this difference, catalog it and 
maintain the accuracy of the database information is imperative to 
avoid loss of life from an accidental mischaracterization of manned 
aircraft versus from a hostile UAS. The introduction of ADS-B will 
assist in identifying manned aircraft in controlled airspace. The 
transponder will also make the task of determining a threatening 
UAS in this airspace easier to detect and mitigate. The use of 
multiple sensor suites and continued innovation in this space is 
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required to have the best chance of allowing surveillance and 
reconnaissance to occur in this ever-changing and growing field of 
UAS. The overall identification mechanisms, be it administrative or 
technical for UAS are issues that are still being developed through 
the creation or adaptation of policies, laws, and governances by 
aviation authorities across the globe. The ability for all aviation 
authorities to agree upon identification mechanisms, ontologies and 
taxonomies of the UAS arena along with national and international 
cooperation agreements offers an opportunity to positively impact 
the safety of the aviation community. 
 
Questions 
1. What is the difference between reconnaissance and 
surveillance in the context of C-UAS? 
2. What airspace can UAS operate in? (Hint below 400AGL) 
3. For C-UAS surveillance and reconnaissance, does the UAS size 
and composition matter? Why or why not? 
4. How would you position multiple sensors to surveil a given 
area for C-UAS? 
5. What is the correct sensor placement for triangulating UAS? 
 
References 
9 Counter-Drone Technologies To Detect And Stop Drones Today. 
(2019). Retrieved from www.robinradar.com: 
https://www.robinradar.com/9-counter-drone-technologies-to-
detect-and-stop-drones-today 
Amos, J. (2019). Satellite plane-tracking goes global. . Retrieved 
from www.bbc.com/news/: https://www.bbc.com/news/science-
environment-47793983 
Aviation-Design of UAV Systems. (2014). Retrieved from 
aviation.stackexchange.com: https://aviation.stackexchange.com/
questions/43780/why-arent-there-any-single-turbofan-airliner 
Big Sky Theory. (2019). Retrieved from www.apstraining.com: 
Chapter 5: Surveillance and Reconnaissance  |  133
https://www.apstraining.com/resource/the-big-sky-theory-luck-
and-loss-of-control-in-flight/ 
CACI. (2019). SkyTracker® Technology Suite. Retrieved from 
www.caci.com/skytracker/: http://www.caci.com/skytracker/ 
Caris, M. (2019). Detection of Small Drones With Millimeter Wave 
Radar . Retrieved from www.fhr.fraunhofer.de/en/businessunits/
security/: https://www.fhr.fraunhofer.de/en/businessunits/
security/Detection-of-small-drones-with-millimeter-wave-
radar.html 
Counter-UAS Systems. (2016). Retrieved from www.srcinc.com: 
https://www.srcinc.com/about/index.html 
Dictionary, M.-W. (2019). Definition of Reconnaissance. 
Springfield, MA: Merriam-Webster, Inc. 
Drone Detection . (2019). Retrieved from www.crfs.com/drone-
detection/: https://www.crfs.com/drone-detection/ 
Eggers, J. (n.d.). MQ-1 Predator/MQ-9 Reaper Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems. Retrieved from slideplayer.com/: https://slideplayer.com/
slide/5070244/ 
Encyclopedia Britannica. (2019). Factors Affecting Radar 
Performance. Chicago IL: Britannica Group. 
FAA. (2019). Airspace 101 – Rules of the Sky. Retrieved from 
www.faa.gov/uas/: https://www.faa.gov/uas/recreational_fliers/
where_can_i_fly/airspace_101/ 
Friedberg, S. (2019). CUAS Technology Series: Detection Hardware. 
. Retrieved from www.dedrone.com/blog/: 
https://www.dedrone.com/blog/cuas-technology-series-
detection-hardware 
General Atomics demonstrates acoustic drone-detector to US Army. 
(2019). Retrieved from www.unmannedairspace.info/: 
https://www.unmannedairspace.info/counter-uas-systems-and-
policies/general-atomics-demonstrates-acoustic-drone-detector-
us-army/ 
Goyal, S. (2019). airport-surveillance-radar. Retrieved from 
www.jagranjosh.com/: https://www.jagranjosh.com/general-
knowledge/airport-surveillance-radar-1551178752-1 
134  |  Chapter 5: Surveillance and Reconnaissance
-Handbooks, F. (2019). Airspace. Retrieved from www.faa.gov/
regulations_policies/handbooks_manuals/aviation: 
https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/handbooks_manuals/
aviation/phak/media/17_phak_ch15.pdf 
How Radar Works. (2019). Retrieved from www.weather.gov/
jetstream/how: https://www.weather.gov/jetstream/how 
Lambeth, B. S. (2006). Air Power Against Terror: America’s Conduct 
of Operation Enduring Freedom. Santa Monica, CA: RAND 
Corporation. 
Lavars, N. (2019). Boeing’s aircraft refueling drone flies for the first 
time. Retrieved from newatlas.com/military/: 
https://newatlas.com/military/boeings-aircraft-refueling-drone-
first-flight/ 
Marsh, G. (2010, Volume 54, Issue 6, November–December). Going 
Stealthy with Composities. Reinforced Plastics, pp. Pages 30-33. 
McNabb, M. (2019, July 10). U.S. Lawmakers Express Frustration 
With Drone Remote ID Delay, “This Summer” Says Standards 
Committee Chair. Retrieved from dronelife.com: 
https://dronelife.com/2019/07/10/u-s-lawmakers-express-
frustration-with-drone-remote-id-delay-this-summer-says-s 
Michel, A. (2018, February). CSD-Counter-Drone-Systems-Report. 
Retrieved from dronecenter.bard.edu/: 
https://dronecenter.bard.edu/files/2018/02/CSD-Counter-
Drone-Systems-Report.pdf 
Nichols, R. K., & Mumm, H. C. (2018). Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
(UAS) in the Cyber Domain: Protecting USA’s Advanced Air Assets. 
Manhattan, KS: New Prairie Press /21/. 
Nichols, R., & et.al. (2019). Unmanned Aircraft Systems in Cyber 
Domain: Protecting USA’s Advanced Air Assets, 2nd Edition. 
Manhattan, KS: NPP Press /27. 
Perimeter Protection & Defense. (2019). Retrieved from 
www.sqhead.com/drone-detection/: https://www.sqhead.com/
drone-detection/#1533491859389-4d070f8f-97fb 
Snow, C. (2014, February 6). Making Sense of Drones. Retrieved 
Chapter 5: Surveillance and Reconnaissance  |  135
from droneanalyst.com: http://droneanalyst.com/2014/02/06/
making-sense-of-drones 
Surveillance, D. o. (2019). Definition of Electronic Surveillance. 
Detroit, MI: Rock Holdings, Inc. 
Szabolcsi, R. (2016). Beyond Training Minimums – A New Concept 
of the UAV Operator Training Program. International conference 
KNOWLEDGE-BASED ORGANIZATION, 22. doi:doi:10.1515/
kbo-2016-0096 
The “No-BS” PDQ ABC’s of ADS-B. (2019). Retrieved from 
murfreesboroaviation.com/: https://murfreesboroaviation.com/
no-bs-pdq-abcs-ads-b/ 
The new world of counter-drone technology. (n.d.). Retrieved from 
www.militaryaerospace.com/unmanned/: 
https://www.militaryaerospace.com/unmanned/article/16707131/
the-new-world-of-counterdrone-technology 
Thermography Fundamentals. (2016). Retrieved from 
www.fluke.com/en-us/: https://www.fluke.com/en-us/learn/
best-practices/measurement-basics/thermography 
U.S. Army Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2010-2035. (2010). 
Fort Rucker, AL: US : U.S. Army. 
Wilson, J. (2018, November 1). the-new-world-of-counterdrone-
technology. Retrieved from www.militaryaerospace.com: 
https://www.militaryaerospace.com/unmanned/article/16707131/
the-new-world-of-counterdrone-technology 
 
 
[1] ** Starting January 1, 2020, aircraft must be equipped with ADS-
B Out to fly in most controlled airspace. (“Airspace,” 2019) See 
http://www.asy.faa.gov/safety_products/airspaceclass.htm for 
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Chapter 6: C-UAS Evolving 
Methods of Interdiction 
CANDICE CARTER 
Student Learning Objectives 
 There are several goals for student learning in this chapter: 
1. To understand the need for Interdiction in C-UAS, 
2. To see the need to increase security UAS Supply chain 
management potentially using Blockchain, 
3. To dig into the Blockchain process and understand its 
strengths and vulnerabilities and its relationship to aircraft 
communications, 
4. To recognize the hurdles that Blockchain may face like 5G and 
public acceptance. 
 
Why is Interdiction Needed?[1] 
Unmanned aircraft receives external communication through 
radar. There are four different types of radar: active (using the 
drone’s transmitter or illuminator), passive (using another drone’s 
transmitter), basic (from one location) and multistatic (when the 
radar transmitter and receiver are at different locations) (Chantz, 
2016). In addition, radar is used with a measure of signals and 
patterns to direct the drone out of harm’s way. This communication 
process is based on a network of trust. GNSS/GPS jamming, and 
spoofing are methods that compromise the blind aviation trust of 
the external communications the unmanned aircraft receives. Other 
methods of electronic compromise have created a challenge when 
addressing C-UAS. 
Methods of interdiction should be one step ahead of the 
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unmanned aircraft industry to become an effective offensive 
security measure. 
 
What is a Blockchain? 
Most people associate blockchain with cryptocurrency, not all 
blockchains are created with the same product in mind. At the most 
basic level, every blockchain is a digital ledger of transactions that 
take place on a peer-to-peer network with the ability to control 
visibility — who has permission to see which data (Marx, Sealy, 
& Thompson, 2019). Each step the transaction makes through the 
supply chain it is assigned an encrypted block. Each block contains 
information about a certain number of transactions, a reference to 
the preceding block in the blockchain, and an answer to a complex 
mathematical challenge known as the “proof of work”. The concept 
of proof of work is used to validate the data associated with that 
particular block as well as to make the creation of blocks 
computationally “hard”, thereby preventing attackers from altering 
the blockchain in their favor (Ferrer, 2017) 
The blockchain network has four main components viz, 
asymmetric cryptography and node applications, transactions and 
blocks, the distributed ledger, and the consensus mechanism 
Blockchain is can be considered trustless, since the transaction 
participates do not require trust. Inversely to digital certificates, 
which a client trusts the certificate presented by a certificate 
authority on behalf of a website, to conduct secure transactions. 
 
Figure 6-1: Blockchain in Supply Chain Management 
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Source: (3i Infotech, 2019) 
 
The Process of Blockchain Synchronization 
The advantage of decentralization and the distribution of 
information in the blockchain is also a vulnerability. Depending on 
the implemented framework of blockchain, the scalability and 
consensus becomes more challenging to guarantee performance of 
the blockchain process. Below is a list of parameters that determine 
synchronization mechanism between nodes in a distributed system 
(consensus mechanism) (Bogdanov, et al., 2018): 
• Decentralized governance: a single central authority cannot 
ensure the completion of a transaction. 
• Quorum structure: Nodes exchange messages in 
predestination (paths that may include steps or levels). 
• Authentication: this process provides the means to verify the 
identity of participants. 
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• Integrity: it provides verification of the integrity of a 
transaction (for example, mathematically by means of 
cryptography). 
• Non-repudiation: provides a means to verify that the intended 
sender actually sent the message. 
• Privacy: this helps ensure that only the intended recipient can 
read the message. 
• Fault tolerance: The network works efficiently and quickly, 
even if some nodes or servers do not work or are slow. 
• Performance: considers bandwidth, survivability, scalability 
and latency. 
 
The blockchain is not full proof from attacks. Established chains 
of reliable users can be used to carry out a third-party attack 
(Bogdanov, et al., 2018). Also, there is the possibility of including 
third parties as an additional node of the Blockchain system with 
the participation of an unscrupulous partner of a streamlined chain 
(Bogdanov, et al., 2018). 
 
Blockchain Aircraft Communication 
Announced in 2018, as of January 1, 2020, the FAA will now enforce 
the mandatory installation of Version 2 ADS-B Out system to fly in 
most controlled U.S. airspace. The ADS-B system uses GPS satellites 
verses the traditional ground-based radar. The advantage of GPS 
based system, FAA will be able to see information such as 
registration number, precise location, aircraft dimensions, etc. 
However, the rules were published May 27, 2010 and the DOD 
submitted comments to the FAA of ADS-B compromising the safety 
of special flights and missions. This lag in time is significant in 
understanding the threat that emerged over the past ten years, 
before implementation the ADS-B out system can be considered 
already out of date. 
 
On January 12, 2020, Ronald J. Reisman (NASA Ames Research 
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Center) published research entitled,” Air Traffic Management 
Blockchain Infrastructure for Security, Authentication, and Privacy 
“. Mr. Reisman outlines the vulnerabilities of ADS-B for civil and 
military aviation and provides the solution of blockchain. “The 
design innovation is the use of an open source permissioned 
blockchain framework to enable aircraft privacy and anonymity 
while providing a secure and efficient method for communication 
with air traffic services, operations support, or other authorized 
entities,” Notes Mr. Reisman (Global Business Outlook, 2020). Mr. 
Reisman’s scalable framework will include certificate authority, 
smart contract support, and higher-bandwidth communication 
channels for private information that may be used for secure 
communication between any specific aircraft and any particular 
authorized member (Global Business Outlook, 2020) The blockchain 
would essential provide a method to encrypting the ADS-B 
transmissions. Aviation Blockchain Infrastructure (ABI) design that 
enables aircraft to communicate effectively, securely, and privately 
with air traffic management and other properly authorized entities 
(Reisman, 2019). In the case of unmanned aircrafts, blockchain 
brings security to Radio Frequency by keeping a high-speed, 
assured ledger of airspace activity and information regarding the 
drone and its operator, and distributing it to all appropriate parties 
(Chantz, 2016). 
 
Figure 6-2: Notional Design of Blockchain-Mitigated Channels 
of Communication 
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Source: (Reisman, 2019) 
 
Figure 6-2 shows the Notional design of blockchain-mitigated 
channels of communication. Chain code (aka ‘Smart Contracts’) 
routes the information appropriately between aircraft and the 
ground-based ATM and other support services (Reisman, 2019). 
ABI proposed by Mr. Reisman is based on Hyperledger Fabric, a 
Linux based opensource tools and blockchains with contributions 
from Intel, IBM, and SAP.  Hyperledger Fabric allows for the creation 
of a private and permissioned blockchain.  Through services called 
“private channels” as a means to communicate private information 
at a comparatively high bandwidth. These private channels may be 
used to pass a private key (or time-key data structure) suitable for 
encrypting ADS-B Out transmissions between any specific aircraft 
and any particular authorized member in accordance with the 
terms of the smart contracts associated with the particular private 
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channel (and subnet). The use of ciphertext enables ADS-B users 
to maintain privacy and anonymity from general public while also 
providing a secure and efficient method for communication with 
authorized entities, such as Air Traffic Services or Airline 
Operations Services (Reisman, 2019). 
Blockchain to encrypt ADS-B transmissions is in the testing 
phases. While this is a solution for right now, we need to look ahead 
to understand how blockchain, as ADS-B could become present new 
risks verses a solution in particular verticals of aviation. 
 
Blockchain Vulnerabilities 
First document blockchain successful hack occurred in 2011. A 
simple case of compromised credentials. Victorious hacks of 
blockchains have continued along with the sophistication of attacks. 
Manipulation of signatures, overwriting transactions, etc. 
Prominently the attacks on blockchains come back to one of the 
basic security issues that no vertical has solved, compromise of 
the company employees and systems. It is amazing to see social 
engineering techniques that can date back to the days of Frank 
Abagnale Jr. are still just as effective as they were in 1960’s. A simple 
act of piggybacking through a secure door, picking up items that 
were left on the printer, and photographic diagrams with IP 
addresses can lead to a system’s compromise. Below are additional 
blockchain attacks that could lead to breaking the blockchain: 
 
Blockchain Attack Scenarios (Anwar, 2019) 
• A 51% Attack 
The majority of Blockchains use the prove of work to 
communicate the verified transactions in the block. The 
mining for the prove of work entails the nodes spend large 
amounts of computing power to prove themselves 
trustworthy enough to add information about new 
transactions to the database (Orcutt, February) 
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• Blockchain Protocol Code Bugs 
Bad actors exploit those loopholes 
• Routing Attacks 
Bad Actors can intercept communication channels with a 
compromise of ISP 
• Smart Contract Bugs/Compromise 
If a smart contract is changed it the blockchain is gravely 
impacted. Since transactions cannot be undone, a “fork” in 
the blockchain (a new branch of the blockchain) will need to 
occur to bring the process back up. 
• Sybil Attack 
The attacker is running multiple fake nodes on a blockchain 
network that can block receiving and transmission of blocks. 
• Direct Denial of Service (DDoS) 
Flooding the network with requests to stop all functions. 
There are critics that claim the decentralization of the 
blockchain reduces the risk of DDoS. However, several 
successful attacks DD0S on blockchains have taken place. 
  
Blockchain Unmanned Aircrafts 
Blockchain brings new functionality to the unmanned aircraft 
industry. The UAS vertical has struggled with air traffic control, 
identity management, insurance, and security. In march 2017, IBM 
patent filing outlines using distributed ledger technology 
(blockchain) can provide effective techniques for managing data 
related to commercial and recreational drones, particularly when a 
security risk level is considered to be relatively high (Cant, 2019). 
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IBM was not alone, Intel, Accenture, and numerous individuals 
applied for unmanned aircraft technology patents. Walmart out 
applied all organizations with their unmanned aircraft technology 
patents. From pizza cooking delivery to compromise of 
communication while delivery is in progress. 
 
U.S. Unmanned Aircraft Patents 
The patents filed over the past seven years referencing unmanned 
aircrafts and blockchain give an indication of the direction of the 
technology. China globally leads the way with 62% of the blockchain 
patents applications (IAM, 2019). The United States is at a mere 22% 
globally with blockchain patents applications (IAM, 2019). However, 
Korea grants 54 % of the blockchain patents filed (IAM, 2019). These 
numbers are concerning for the United States, blockchain security 
and process will be the future of all verticals not just in the drone 
industry. Highlighted below are a few of the newsworthy United 
States patents. 
IBM patent application for Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Date 
Management highlights the use of blockchain securing the 
unmanned aerial data.  “The chain can be considered a chronicle 
of a UAV’s path through time. When a transaction is conducted, 
the corresponding UAV parameters are sent to one or more of the 
computing nodes in the system for validation. The one or more 
computing nodes establish a validity of the transaction and generate 
a new block. Once the new block has been calculated, it can be 
appended to the stakeholder’s UAV blockchain. Among many other 
advantages, the use of a blockchain infrastructure helps in 
identifying misbehaving UAVs by multiple parties and such activities 
are recorded in an immutable ledger.”  (United States of America 
Patent No. US2018/027024A, 2019) 
One of Walmart’s patents outlines security for electronic 
communications in connection with a package delivery. 
“Authentication can be performed at the delivery communication 
and control system and/or other security systems by visual 
recognition such as facial recognition, biometric fingerprint 
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analysis, and so on, audio recognition such as voice signatures, 
biometric recognition via a fingerprint or retinal scanning device 
(not shown) at the unmanned vehicle, blockchain recognition for 
scanning a blockchain signature or key for authentication, and so 
on.” (United States of America Patent No. US2018/0205682A, 2018). 
In 2019, Walmart filed a patent application for Cloning Drones Using 
Blockchain. This Walmart patent application focuses on data 
integrity, “A blockchain ledger may store any kind of information 
that may be stored in any other format or medium, for example, a 
large list of instructions of different types, navigational information, 
and maps. In such a way, a same software profile may be deployed 
across the cloned drone” (Foxley, 2019) 
 
Countering a Blockchain Unmanned Aircraft Attack 
Published research of countering a blockchain unmanned aircraft 
attack is a sparse. However, a counter technique can be developed 
by applying known flaws of blockchain technology. A successful 
attack involves multiply vectors. Using the following vectors an 
affective counterattack can be formulated: 
 
• If blockchain is used for synchronized unmanned aircraft 
attack by a bad actor, it can be determined the decentralized 
algorithm requires will require significantly lower 
communications bandwidth. Therefore, sharing intel on 
obstacle-free regions in their immediate vicinity (Ferrer, 2017). 
 
• As referenced in the beginning of the chapter, SSL certificates 
are used encrypt the blockchain. When a flaw in the 
encryption algorithm arises, or as computing power continues 
to become stronger, the encrypted data may then be 
decrypted to reveal private details (Fitzpatrick, 2019). In 2017, 
industry drone manufacture DJI had an incident of SSL 
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certificate leak. Leading cloud security systems, for example 
Imperva’s Incapsula, compromised undisclosed amount of 
customer SSL certificates. Imperva has seven out of 10 global 
telecom providers, half of the top ten United States 
commercial banks, along with other prominent industries 
(Imperva, 2018). 
 
• The UAV sensor system consists of the sensory equipment of 
the UAV together with integrated pre-processing 
functionalities. For common military UAVs these sensors are 
often cameras with different capabilities. UAVs may be 
equipped with further sensors, such as INS, GPS and radar 
(Hartmann & Steup, 2018). Sensors with external references are 
more susceptible to jamming and spoofing than sensors with 
internal references. External references generally impose a risk 
to the integrity of the system (Hartmann & Steup, 2018). 
 
Taking these vulnerabilities into consideration the following steps 
can be used to counter a blockchain unmanned aircraft attack. The 
methods below are homegrown hacking methods and purchased 
commercial solutions. 
 
• Skyjack Drone Hack, developed by hacker and researcher Samy 
Kamkar. Drone that flies around seeking Seeks wireless signal 
of any other drone in area. Forcefully disconnects wireless 
connection of true owner of target drone. Authenticates with 
target drone pretending to be its owner (O’Malley, 2019) 
• SSL interception proxy using Burp Suite, using the steps below 
(Vanunu, Barda, & Zaikin, 2018): 
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1. Open our Burp Suit Certificate and cast it to X509Certificate. 
2. Load a KeyStore and put the certificate inside. 
3. Create TrustManagerFactory and initialize it with the KeyStore 
we just created that contains our Burp Suit certificate. 
4. Overload the SSLContext and hook the TrustManager with our 
TrustManager. 
 
• Sensor Jamming: disruption to inter–drone communications by 
manipulating UAS onboard sensors can be archived by Sensor 
Jamming. Jamming sensors can impact GPS signals by giving 
false GPS information (camera/gimbal dislocation, heading 
sensor demagnetization, etc.). “High intensity light directed at 
an optical sensor can blind it. GPS receivers can be cyber-
spoofed, which consists of transmitting a stronger, but false, 
GPS signal to a receiver, resulting in inaccurate navigation. 
Influencing the local magnetic field can have adverse effects 
on both onboard hard drives and sensors that require 
magnetic orientation to operate correctly.” (Boutros, 
2015)(Humphreys, 2012) 
 
Using proven techniques of signal jamming, SSL interception 
proxy, and sensor jamming potentially counter a blockchain 
unmanned aircraft attack. Evolving technology will continue to 
change the characteristics of blockchain but the basic concept gives 
the layout of the process. 
 
Next Counter-UAS Hurdle – 5G Communication, Blockchain, 
Unmanned Aircrafts 
 
What will the combination of 5G Communication and Blockchain 
bring to UAS? Counter-UAS? 5G is the fifth-generation mobile 
network (Qualcomm, 2020). 5G is a unified platform that will 
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support a larger range of bands (1GHz to millimeter-wave) and 100% 
more traffic with latency of 1ms, along with other improvements. 
The combination of 5G and blockchain will enable traffic 
management to geofence unmanned aircrafts. “…envision the use 
of the emerging 5G networking technology for that. 5G networking 
technology is the next generation of cellular networks. It is designed 
to provide much higher speed—larger bandwidth and smaller 
latency—higher reliability and the ability to serve a larger number 
of users, in comparison to 4G. To do that, the radio spectrum is 
partitioned into bands, with different frequencies—from low to 
extremely high.” (Tasevski, 2018). Blockchain will be used to reach 
the consensus in the environment. 5G integrated at all levels of UAS 
(physical, network, and joint communication) and blockchain will 
bring greater control to air traffic management. China based studies 
have researched the creation of UAS-based antenna array system 
with high data rate and low service time can be created using 5G. 
The UAS-based antenna data will be protected by blockchain (Bin 
Li & Zhang, 2019). In the publication of Unmanned Aircrafts in the 
Cyber Domain, (by the authors of this publication) gives the use case 
of a cyber weapon deployed from a small UAS. The research points 
to the use of this UAS cyber weapon to cause the 2017 collusions 
of U.S. Navy Warships with commercial vessels. When reviewing the 
research of that incident combined with the creation of UAS-based 
antenna with 5G and blockchain, the threat level of advanced attack 
of vessels increases. Just this incident alone justifies the need for 
offensive security to be a priority for UAS commercial, military, and 
hobbyist. 
 
Figure 6-3: 5g Communications/ Blockchain Geofence for the 
Financial District of Manhattan NYC 
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Source: (Tasevski, 2018) 
 
Challenges Facing Interdiction Methods for C-UAS 
Unmanned aircrafts hobby, military and commercial have their 
own unique attack methods, impacts, and risks. Geographic 
location, event, and intention can determine the method of 
prohibiting a drone attack. From a nation-state conflict to an 
outdoor concert, reviewing the scenarios and using a risk model can 
highlight the efficacy between C-UAS methods. With the addition 
of blockchain, 5G communication, and the evolution of UAS 
technology the risks/threats increase. Per contra, blockchain and 
5G communication presents a substantial threat for the creation of 
an effective C-UAS. 
 
Conclusions 
Blockchain represents a disruptive security technology that may 
significantly improve the C-UAS supply chain management.  It also 
faces some stiff challenges because of inherent vulnerabilities. 
Blockchain and 5 G communications are a mixed blessing and with 
increased UAS technology, comes increased threats. 
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[1] prohibiting or forbidding intercepting and preventing the 
movement of something. 
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Chapter 7: UAS Area / 
Airspace Denial 
J.P. HOOD 
Student Learning Objectives:  The student will obtain an 
understanding of how state entities deny potential known and 
unknown adversaries from gaining access via UAS and air assets 
into a protected area, resource or installation. Through the use of 
real-world examples and case studies, the student will be able to 
visualize and understand the intricacies and planning required for 
state and local actors to adequately protect an area from possible 
intrusion, exploitation and attack. 
Key Concepts: 
A2 / AD (Anti-Access / Area Denial) is primarily designed to 
prevent or constrain the deployment of opposing forces into an 
area of operations 
 Anti-Access: Denying an adversary the ability to enter and 
operate military forces near, into or within a contested region. 
 Area-Denial: Used to reduce freedom of maneuver once an 
adversary is within an area of operations. 
 IADS (Integrated Air Defense Systems) 
 
Simply put, the act of an adversary to work against the actions 
of another defines what anti-access or area denial environments 
are. More formally, the U.S Department of Defense (DoD) Joint 
Operational Access Concept (JOAC) defines these terms: “Anti-
access (A2) refers to those actions and capabilities, usually long-
range, designed to prevent an opposing force from entering an 
operational area. Area denial (AD) refers to those actions and 
capabilities, usually of shorter range, designed not to keep an 
opposing force out, but to limit its freedom of action within the 
operational area.” (Cuddington, 2015 ) 
Chapter 7: UAS Area / Airspace
Denial  |  155
 Figure 7-1 The Premise of Anti-Access / Area Denial 
Source:  (Stratfor, 2019) 
 
 
Some examples of existing and emerging A2AD capabilities: 
 
• Multi-layered integrated air defense systems (IADS), consisting 
of modern fighter/attack aircraft, and fixed and mobile 
surface-to-air missiles, coastal defense systems, 
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• Cruise and ballistic missiles that can be launched from multiple 
air, naval, and land-based platforms against land-based and 
maritime targets, 
• Long range artillery (LRA) and multi launch rocket systems 
(MLRS), 
• Diesel and nuclear submarines armed with supersonic sea-
skimming anti-ship cruise missiles and advanced torpedoes; 
• Ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) force, 
• Advanced sea mines 
• Kinetic and non-kinetic anti-satellite weapons and supporting 
space launch and space surveillance infrastructure, 
• Sophisticated cyber warfare capabilities, 
• Electronic warfare capabilities, 
• Various range ISR systems, 
• Comprehensive reconnaissance-strike battle networks 
covering the air, surface and undersea domains; and 
• Hardened and buried closed fiber-optic command and control 
(C2) networks tying together various systems of the battle 
network, 
• Special Forces 
(Erdogan, behorizon.com) 
 
Recent Rise in A2-AD Ideologies and Challenges 
As potential near peer adversaries to the US such as China, Russia, 
Iran and North Korea continue to gain technological ground and 
modernize multi layered defense networks, the US DoD and State 
Department have realized that control of the commons will soon 
be challenged and an increased understanding of A2-AD concepts 
is necessary in order to develop ways to mitigate, penetrate and 
exploit adversarial defense networks.  The US’s continued reliance 
on UAS as platforms to act as ISR and communications relays as 
well as deliver precision guided munitions has proven to be a more 
realistic way to counter the growing security threats posed by ever 
more robust adversarial A2-AD systems. Nathan Freier from the 
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Centers for Strategic and International Studies effectively codified 
through a series of question and answers why A2-AD concepts 
continue to remain a major theme at the forefront of military 
operational planning. 
From the widest strategic perspective, U.S. access challenges 
manifest across traditional instruments of power. To the extent that 
these challenges adversely affect the security and prosperity of the 
United States and its allies, an open and stable international system, 
and/or freedom to transit the global commons, they will require 
coordinated U.S. government/allied responses to restore access. By 
definition, this will routinely involve military forces. (Freier, 2012) 
This is not meant to suggest that all access challenges are military 
in origin and character. In the Asia-Pacific region, for example, 
China is as much or more an active political and economic 
challenger—seeking to raise myriad barriers to U.S. influence—as 
it is a military competitor. Likewise, in the Middle East, Iran has 
some dangerous military capabilities but successfully avoids direct 
military confrontation with the United States, advances its interests, 
and limits U.S. freedom of action most often through cost-imposing 
political subterfuge. What is certain, however, is that when 
adversaries effectively combine political, economic, and 
informational tools with important military capabilities, the access 
challenge becomes more acute and potent. (Freier, 2012) 
U.S. military forces have a unique responsibility in helping secure 
access during times of peace, increased hostilities, and open 
conflict. The latter is the most demanding and, as of late, the subject 
of the greatest body of conceptual work. Under routine 
circumstances, maintenance of credible deterrent capabilities 
forward in key regions provides a stabilizing influence, actively 
underwrites the security of U.S./partner interests, and secures a 
concrete platform from which to expand presence and conduct 
operations in the event of heightened tensions or hostilities. (Freier, 
2012) 
In the event of war or major violent conflict, U.S. forces will face 
a variety of A2/AD challenges that will originate both from the 
158  |  Chapter 7: UAS Area / Airspace Denial
hostile designs of thinking adversaries and from the “unstructured” 
lethality of contagious instability. In virtually every instance, 
forward-stationed U.S. forces will be insufficient to overcome lethal 
or fundamentally disruptive A2/AD challenges and effectively 
resolve the crisis by themselves. Therefore, future combat 
operations—whether coercive air and sea campaigns or more wide-
ranging joint interventions—will require the United States and its 
partners to project substantial military capability over considerable 
strategic and operational distances. A2/AD challenges frustrate our 
ability to do so. (Freier, 2012) 
Thus, at the “business end” of opposed operations, U.S. forces 
will increasingly compete with a diverse collection of adversaries 
for dominance across multiple domains—air, sea, land, space, and 
cyberspace. This will often occur without the benefit of extensive 
fixed U.S. regional basing and with “local” U.S. infrastructure under 
substantial pressure from hostile action. As a consequence, the 
character of specific lethal access challenges, their diversity, and 
their sophistication will differ significantly. In combination, the real 
constraints of finite military capability, the increasing lethality of 
virtually every conceivable contingency environment from peace 
operations to regional war, and lower U.S. risk tolerance make deep 
thought about lethal or fundamentally disruptive A2/AD challenges 
an urgent strategic priority. (Freier, 2012) 
 
Anti-Access Challenges 
To U.S. strategists, A2 challenges are intended to exclude our 
forces from a foreign theater or deny effective use and transit of 
the global commons. More broadly, A2 challenges might first involve 
political and economic exclusion, where competitor states actively 
attempt to deny the United States the broad political and economic 
influence it has long enjoyed. In military terms, this may translate 
into blanket denial of basing, staging, transit, or over-flight rights. 
(Freier, 2012) 
Under more hostile circumstances, lethal A2 instruments include 
sophisticated longer-range adversary capabilities and methods like 
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ballistic missiles, submarines, weapons of mass destruction, and 
offensive space and cyberspace assets. Equally dangerous but less 
technical A2 methods might include terrorism or proxy warfare 
employed by U.S. opponents to open alternative “fronts,” distract 
attention, and impose excessive costs politically. (Freier, 2012) 
Hostile A2 capabilities and methods are intended first to see U.S. 
risk calculations breach “high” or “unacceptable” levels during 
planning in order to prevent U.S. regional intervention altogether. 
But, in the event of active hostilities, adversaries would employ their 
lethal A2 assets from a distance to keep the United States at arm’s 
length, perhaps deny introduction of U.S. forces and capabilities 
in substantial numbers, and barring either outcome, exact 
prohibitively high costs on the United States when and if U.S. forces 
attempt to breach an opponent’s A2 defenses. Given China’s 
increased assertiveness, current military capability, and raw 
potential, an acute, sophisticated, and comprehensive A2 challenge 
is emerging in Asia. There is clearly some grand strategic risk 
associated with excessively militarizing the nature of the 
competition between the United States and China, as the locus of 
real competition may lie substantially outside the reach of DoD and 
the military instrument. (Freier, 2012) 
 
Area Denial Challenges 
Over the near to mid-term, lethal area denial (AD) challenges 
present U.S. strategists with the most prolific barriers to effective 
theater entry and operation. Every conceivable contingency 
employment of air, sea, or ground forces will need to overcome 
significant AD obstacles. Lethal AD threats manifest at close range. 
Their effects begin accruing as U.S. forces enter a hostile or 
uncertain theater to conduct joint operations, and in the end, they 
complicate our attempts to establish an effective presence in, over, 
or in range of an adversary’s territory or interests. Lethal or 
disruptive AD challenges are present and can attack U.S. 
vulnerabilities in all five key domains—air, sea, land, space, and 
cyberspace. 
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They do so first by providing the means to physically resist U.S. 
entry into theater. Subsequently, they limit freedom of action once 
U.S. forces have arrived. Then, they frustrate our efforts to rapidly 
achieve favorable strategic and operational outcomes. And, finally, 
they threaten to impose very high costs on U.S. forces should 
extended military operations become unavoidable. Like A2 
challenges, AD threats can poison U.S. risk calculations well before 
the initiation of an operation by increasing the mission’s perceived 
degree of difficulty. After entry, AD challenges force U.S. 
decisionmakers to persistently question the mounting costs 
associated with continued operations. (Freier, 2012) 
Lethal AD capabilities range from the sophisticated to the crude 
but effective. They include cruise and ballistic missiles; weapons 
of mass destruction; mines; guided rockets, mortars, and artillery; 
electronic warfare; and short-range/man-portable air defense and 
anti-armor systems. Revolutions in information; personal 
computing, communications, and networking; and irregular and 
hybrid forms of warfare—combined with the proliferation of 
precision weapons and improvised battlefield 
lethality—substantially widen the universe of effective AD 
adversaries from individuals and loosely organized groups to 
sophisticated regional powers. Likewise, the networked 
mobilization of foreign popular, nonviolent resistance may also 
prove to be a significant challenge to freedom of action in the 
future as well. To the extent U.S. opponents can leverage all of these 
capabilities and methods both directly and through proxies, the 
more the AD challenge will expand geometrically. As noted above, 
an effective combination of political, economic, and informational 
methods with sophisticated lethal and/or disruptive AD capabilities 
will make any specific challenge more resilient and potent. (Freier, 
2012) 
Whereas lethal A2 challenges are virtually always the product of 
deliberate enemy design, AD challenges don’t have to be. They can 
be “structured” or “unstructured.” Iran’s hybrid “mosaic defense,” 
for example, is structured. Though highly unconventional, it is part 
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of a coherent cost-imposing strategy. Its combination of ballistic 
and cruise missiles, unconventional naval forces, and hybrid ground 
defenses—matched with tight Persian Gulf geography, Iran’s 
physical depth, and its deep ties to regional proxies—offer a complex 
structured AD challenge that strategic and operational planners 
would have to account for in the event of hostilities. (Freier, 2012) 
U.S. forces are likely to face unstructured AD challenges in the 
course of interventions conducted under conditions of widespread 
disorder, where local authorities have little or no control over 
outcomes. Imagine military operations conducted in the same Iran 
described above; this time, however, after failure of the regime and 
in the midst of an ongoing civil war. U.S. forces might face multiple 
competing adversaries all boasting some relatively sophisticated, 
disruptive, and lethal AD capability but employing it all haphazardly 
under no discernible centralized command and control, making 
comprehensive defeat more problematic. (Freier, 2012) 
 
Figure 7-2 Overcoming Adversarial Defenses 
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Source:  Image Attribute: Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) 
in an Anti-Access, Area Denial Theatre/ Source: McNeal & 
Associates (Associates, 2019) 
 
According to the “Air-Sea Battle” concept, the general U.S. 
solution to the A2/AD issue is to develop a network of integrated 
forces capable of defeating the enemy across all modern war 
fighting domains: air, sea, land, space, and cyberspace. (US 
Department of Defense, 2013) This concept recognizes that 
adversary forces will likely attack without warning and forward 
friendly forces will be in the A2/AD environment from the outset of 
hostilities and must provide an immediate and effective response. 
(Cuddington, 2015 ) 
 
Case Study: Countering Growing Chinese A2/AD in the Indo 
Pacific Region 
The United States has long enjoyed “command of the commons”: 
worldwide freedom of movement on and under the seas and in the 
air above 15,000 feet, with the ability to deny this same freedom 
to enemies. This command has contributed to a remarkable era 
of military primacy for U.S. arms against potential state rivals. 
(Cuddington, 2015 ) 
Over the past few decades, state actors such as China have begun 
to establish themselves in the pacific region, challenging the US’s 
ability to project power in the region. China is one of the most 
significant A2/AD threats at this time. China not only deters the 
United States from deploying into the Western Pacific, but also 
threatens to disrupt nearby operations such as around Taiwan or 
the South China Sea. (Cuddington, Jeff, 2016) 
While U.S. advanced fighters and bombers have inherent 
advantages against China’s defenses, these aircraft are not immune 
and are very limited in availability. A majority of American fighters, 
bombers, reconnaissance aircraft, and cruise missiles remain 
extremely vulnerable. China’s integrated air defense system is 
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virtually impossible to penetrate with current U.S. fourth-
generation aircraft. (Posen, 2003) 
Furthermore, China is expected to increase its threat range with 
the development of the S-400 (currently operational) missile 
system, extending their air defense coverage out to over 200 
nautical miles. (Cuddington, Jeff, 2016) 
Many observers now fear that this era may be coming to an end 
in the Western Pacific. For more than a generation, China has been 
deploying a series of interrelated missile, sensor, guidance, and 
other technologies designed to deny freedom of movement to 
hostile powers in the air and waters off its coast. As this program has 
matured, China’s ability to restrict hostile access has improved, and 
its military reach has expanded. Many now believe that this “A2/
AD” (anti-access, area denial) capability will eventually be highly 
effective in excluding the United States from parts of the Western 
Pacific that it has traditionally controlled. Some even fear that China 
will ultimately be able to extend a zone of exclusion out to, or 
beyond, what is often called the “Second Island Chain”—a line that 
connects Japan, Guam, and Papua-New Guinea at distances of up to 
3,000 kilometers from China. A Chinese A2/AD capability reaching 
anywhere near this far would pose major challenges for US security 
policy. (Defense, 2006) 
To avert this outcome, the United States has embarked on an 
approach often called AirSea Battle (ASB). Named to suggest the 
Cold War continental doctrine of “Air-Land Battle” (ALB), AirSea 
Battle is designed to preserve U.S. access to the Western Pacific by 
combining passive defenses against Chinese missile attack with an 
emphasis on offensive action to destroy or disable the forces that 
China would use to establish A2/AD. This offensive action would use 
“cross-domain synergy” among U.S. space, cyber, air, and maritime 
forces (hence the moniker “AirSea”) to blind or suppress Chinese 
sensors. The heart of the concept, however, lies in physically 
destroying the Chinese weapons and infrastructure that underpin 
A2/AD. As Chinese programs mature, achieving this objective will 
require U.S. air strikes against potentially thou- sands of Chinese 
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missile launchers, command posts, sensors, supply net- works, and 
communication systems deployed across the heart of mainland 
China—some as many as 2,000 kilometers inland. Accomplishing this 
mission will require a major improvement in the U.S. Air Force’s and 
Navy’s ability to and distant targets and penetrate heavily defended 
airspace from bases that are either hard enough or distant enough 
to survive Chinese attack, while hunting down mobile missile 
launchers and command posts spread over mil- lions of square 
kilometers of the Chinese interior. The requirements for this 
mission are typically assumed to include a major restructuring of 
the Air Force to de-emphasize short-range fighters such as the 
F-35 or F-22 in favor of longer-range strike bombers; development 
of a follow-on stealthy long-range bomber to replace the B-2, and 
its procurement in far greater numbers than its predecessor; the 
development of unmanned long-range carrier strike aircraft; and 
heavy investment in missile defenses and information 
infrastructure. The result would be an ambitious modernization 
agenda in service of an extremely demanding military campaign to 
batter down A2/AD by striking targets deep in mainland China, far 
afield from the maritime domains to which the United States seeks 
access. (US Department of Defense, 2013) 
 
Figure 7-3 Air Space Denial: Russian A2AD Strategy and Its 
Implications for NATO 
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Source:  (behorizon.org, russian-a2ad-strategy-and-its-
implications-for-nato/ , 2019) 
 
Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) 
The integrated air defense system (IADS) threat today remains 
a formidable challenge to air operations in nearly any foreseeable 
major conflict. IADS modernization, coupled with significant 
advancements in multi- domain military operations (Cyber, Global 
C4ISR, Offensive Strike, Threats to Coalition Basing, etc.), poses a 
significant area denial threat to U.S. air dominance that was virtually 
guaranteed in past military operations. Fundamentally, the 
foundational pillars of the IADS kill chain have remained unchanged 
for decades; with mature processes and equipment widely fielded to 
perform indications and warning (I&W), find/fix, track, engage, and 
assessment functions. ((NASIC), 2019) 
Battle Management Advancements: for the past 10+ years there 
has been significant advancement with adversary global C4ISR 
capabilities and their overall holistic approach to integrating 
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disparate sources into a common, fused C4ISR infrastructure 
supporting IADS. While many advanced C4ISR concepts remain in 
their infancy, adversary current capabilities to process data globally 
in a timely, actionable manner poses a significant obstacle to U.S. 
global airpower and air operations. ((NASIC), 2019) 
Weapons Control Advancements: since 2010, adversary IADS 
modernization has included deployment of long-range anti-access/
area denial (A2/AD) weaponry, supported by a vast deployment of 
layered tactical systems to augment long-range capabilities. These 
modern weapon systems threaten nearly every aspect of our 
counter-IADS / suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) 
capabilities. Many of the emerging capabilities focus on the denial 
of airborne ISR and increasing the threat to 4th /5th  Generation 
aircraft, cruise missiles, precision guided munitions, and UAVs. 
((NASIC), 2019) 
 
Understanding Emerging Vulnerable Gap 
The potential exists for significant future developments to occur 
in the following technologies and concepts that are emerging but 
are not yet fully integrated and or operational: 
• (U) Hypersonic defense 
• (U) Cyber-enabled IADS 
• Roll-out of modern directed energy weapons; combating 
airborne platforms at tactical ranges 
• Full integration of “Big Data,” artificial intelligence, and mature 
net centric IADS operations 
While adversary IADS capabilities continue to advance and pose 
a significant threat to U.S. air dominance, there are still critical 
vulnerabilities at nearly every echelon. C4I dependencies and 
centralized processes permeate these systems – and create 
opportunities for exploitation. ((NASIC), 2019) 
 
Russian A2AD Case Study 
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Russia’s recently deployed advanced A2AD capabilities such as; 
long range precision air defense systems, fighters and bombers, 
littoral anti-ship capabilities and ASW (Anti-Submarine Warfare), 
mid-range mobile missile systems, new classes of quieter 
submarines equipped with long range land attack missiles, counter-
space, cyberspace, & EW weapons; and WMD assets in Kaliningrad 
in Black Sea and partly in Syria have changed the military 
environment. With additional deployments -thanks to 
modernization expected by 2020s- battlefield will be more 
complicated than ever. These A2AD capabilities allow Russia to have 
a new strategic buffer zone between NATO and Russia, but this 
time within Alliance` own territory. They provide the ability to target 
a large part of the Europe to influence, deter and deny NATO’s 
potential operations in the High North, Baltic, Black Sea and East 
Mediterranean regions. (Busch, 2016) 
 
The figure below depicts only a part of the Russian A2AD 
capabilities. 
  
Figure 7-4 Russian A2AD Strategy Against NATO 
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 Source: HIS Janes; IISS Military Balance 2015 &  (behorizon.org, 
russian-a2ad-strategy-and-its-implications-for-nato/ , 2019) 
 
Current C-UAS A2AD Civil Applications 
As the need for more complex area defense for countering illicit 
drone operations continues to grow, private industry has not 
forgotten the needs for companies and individual consumers to 
protect their personal and intellectual properties. Companies such 
as DeDrone and Drone Shield currently offer a range of integrable 
systems that are able to detect, track and deter commercial drones 
from entering private or localized airspace. The greatest risks to 
the public remain large open-air sporting venues / gatherings as 
well as domestic infrastructure / open to the air resources. The 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and US Customs and 
Border Protection will benefit greatly from using such 
technologies.  Local integrated systems will be able to stop 
intruding drones from entering the US. These UAS have been 
reported carrying payloads containing contraband and narcotics. 
Drone Shield has developed Drone Sentry X that can intercept 
incurring drones. Federal prisons have also implemented similar 
systems from DeDrone in order to intercept and halt drone 
deliverables from entering a prison yard. 
Figure 7-5 Drone Shield Drone Sentry 
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Source:  (droneshield, droneshield.com/sentry, 2020) 
 
 Figure 7-6 Drone Sentry X 
Source: (droneshield, dronesentry-x , 2020) 
 
Conclusions 
A2-AD and IADS are now center stage during all levels of 
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operational planning conducted by the DoD. C-UAS considerations 
/ technologies are the latest addition to planning and coordinating 
an effective area defense from aerial intrusions.  While drones 
continue to operate in political grey areas focused on gaining access 
and intelligence, governments and military forces are continuing 
to seek non-kinetic technological means of tracking, denying and 
engaging these systems. Experts in C-UAS must be able to 
understand the unique challenges posed by fast moving systems 
with ever increasing standoff ranges.  They must be able to 
recommend and employ systems that effectively counter these 
threats while at the same time adhere to international and domestic 
laws regarding vehicles in flight keeping the public safe from harm. 
Innovative thinking at longer ranges will become more and more 
crucial. Advances in emerging technologies such as hypersonic 
vehicles that could potentially be delivered via UAS will continue 
to drive the need for a more dynamically integrated defense 
network(s). Decision processes will be forced to become that much 
faster in order to effectively defend against these new threats. 
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Chapter 8: Emerging 
Interdiction Technologies 
J.P. HOOD 
Student Learning Objectives 
The student will obtain an understanding of how the technologies 
affecting C-UAS trends are changing and advancing at a rapid pace. 
Everything from crude yet refined kinetic systems, hypersonic 
vehicle deliverables and cyber enhanced technologies are being 
developed to counter UAS incursion into protected air space.  The 
student must be able to grasp new ideas, understand and maintain 
current doctrine and ideologies while thinking dynamically in order 
to remain relevant in the C-UAS realm. 
 
Hypersonic Threats 
A hypersonic missile travels at speeds of Mach 5 and higher – five 
times faster than the speed of sound (3836 mph), which is around 
1 mile per second. Some missiles, such as Russia’s Kh-47M2 Kinzhal 
air-launched ballistic missile, are allegedly capable of reaching 
Mach 10 speeds (7672 mph) and distances up to 1200 
miles. (Bosbotinis, 2018) 
A Hypersonic Cruise missile is a type of missile that reaches its 
target with the help of a high-speed jet engine that allows it to 
travel at extreme speeds, in excess of Mach-5. It is non-ballistic – 
the opposite of traditional Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) 
which utilizes gravitational forces to reach its target. (Bosbotinis, 
2018) 
When hypersonic missiles become operational, the gap between 
missile defense systems and missile offence will be huge. Simply 
put, there is no single operational missile defense system that is 
capable of intercepting a hypersonic missile. Hypersonic missile 
research and development remains at the classified level, however 
Chapter 8: Emerging Interdiction
Technologies  |  175
in recent months many governments have announced successful 
tests and future projects. (Bosbotinis, 2018) 
Hypersonic missiles offer a number of advantages over subsonic 
and supersonic weapons, particularly with regard to the 
prosecution of time-critical targets (for example, mobile ballistic 
missile launchers), where the additional speed of a hypersonic 
weapon is valuable. It can also overcome the defenses of heavily 
defended targets (such as an aircraft carrier). The development and 
deployment of hypersonic weapon systems will provide states with 
significantly enhanced strike capabilities and potentially, the means 
to coerce. This will be the case where a major regional power, such 
as Russia, may seek to coerce a neighbor, leveraging the threat of 
hypersonic strikes against critical targets. As such, the proliferation 
of hypersonic capabilities to regional states could also be 
destabilizing, upsetting local balances of power. However, it could 
also strengthen deterrence. (Bosbotinis, 2018) 
 
Figure 8-1: Boeing X-51 Hypersonic 
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Source: (Boyd, 2019) 
 
Hypersonic technology comes from using a scramjet (supersonic 
combustion ramjet) which is a variant of a ramjet airbreathing jet 
engine in which combustion takes place in supersonic airflow. As in 
ramjets, a scramjet relies on high vehicle speed to compress the 
incoming air forcefully before combustion (hence ramjet), but 
whereas a ramjet decelerates the air to subsonic velocities before 
combustion, the airflow in a scramjet is supersonic throughout the 
entire engine. That allows the scramjet to operate efficiently at 
extremely high speeds. (Urzay, 2018) 
 
Figure 8-2 Scramjet Engine Principles 
 
Source: (Urzay, 2018) 
 
Hypersonic Countermeasures 
Although there are no current countermeasures in place, 
technologies such as directed energy weapons, particle beams and 
other non-kinetic weapons will be likely candidates for an effective 
defense against hypersonic missiles. “Hypersonic weapons reduce 
the time required to prosecute a target (especially compared to 
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current subsonic cruise missiles), the warning time available to an 
adversary, and the time available for defensive systems to engage 
the incoming threat,” says Bosbotinis. Although hypersonic threats 
would pose a significant challenge to current surface-to-air and 
air-to-air missile systems, such systems would, particularly in the 
conventional precision strike role, require a robust intelligence, 
surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR) 
network. (Bosbotinis, 2018) 
 
Directed Energy Weapons 
As UAS systems continue to advance in speed and 
maneuverability, enabling to remain outside of the engagement 
envelopes of traditional air defense systems, directed energy 
weapons have become the go to for low, slow and small UAS 
defense. These systems range in size from man portable equipment 
sets to permanent fixed sites.  These systems typically offer a more 
cost effective and much safer way to deter, deny and destroy small 
tactical UAS with in a protected area of operations / facility. 
In the fall of 2019, The US Air Force (USAF) has received the 
first anti-unmanned aerial system (UAS) laser weapon system from 
Raytheon to tackle the threat of enemy drones. The high-energy 
laser weapon system features an advanced variant of Raytheon’s 
Multi-spectral Targeting System (MTS). It uses electro-optical / 
infrared sensors to detect and track enemy drones. Once the UAS 
is identified and targeted, the laser weapon system can engage 
the threat and neutralize it instantly. The technology involves a 
high-energy laser weapon system (HELWS) mounted on a small all-
terrain vehicle. A single charge is enough for the HELWS to provide 
dozens of precise laser shots. Furthermore, the weapon system 
supports pairing with a generator on the field to provide a nearly 
infinite number of shots. (Media, 2019) 
  
Figure 8-3: Raytheon Mobile High Energy Laser System 
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Source: (Raytheon, 2019) 
 
The Raytheon company’s advanced high-power microwave and 
high-energy laser defeated dozens of drone targets in a U.S. Air 
Force demonstration at the White Sands Missile Range in New 
Mexico in the Spring of 2019. Airmen took control of both the 
microwave and laser systems after just one day’s training. They used 
an Xbox-style controller to direct the laser and a joystick to operate 
the high-power microwave in real-world scenarios at the U.S. Army 
White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico. The HEL system, paired 
with Raytheon’s Multi-spectral Targeting System of sensors, uses 
invisible beams of light. Mounted on a small, all-terrain, militarized 
vehicle, the system detects, identifies, tracks and engages 
drones. Raytheon’s HPM uses microwave energy to disrupt drone 
guidance systems. High-power microwave operators can focus the 
beam to bring down drone swarms. With a consistent power supply, 
an HPM system can provide virtually unlimited 
protection. (Raytheon, 2019) 
On July 17th, 2019 a variant of the Marine Air Defense Integrated 
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System (MADIS) family of counter drone systems, the Light Marine 
Air Defense Integrated System (LMADIS), in use by the 
USMC, downed an Iranian drone in the Persian Gulf, which flew 
within 1,000 yards of a US Navy Vessel. The LMADIS is the product 
of a rapid development effort by Ascent Vision Technologies (AVT), 
the USMC Ground Based Air Defense team, and other partner 
suppliers. (BiancaV, 2019) 
 
Figure 8-4: Ascent Vision Technologies Marine Air Defense 
Integrated System (MADIS) 
Source: (BiancaV, 2019) 
 
The Drone Gun MkIII is a compact, lightweight drone 
countermeasure designed for one hand operation. The product 
provides a safe countermeasure against a wide range of drone 
models. It allows for a controlled management of drone payload 
such as explosives, with no damage to common drones models or 
surrounding environment due to the drones generally responding 
via a vertical controlled landing on the spot, or returning back to the 
starting point (assisting to track the operator), with an immediate 
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cease of video back to the drone pilot. RF disruption activation will 
also interfere with any live video streaming, first person view (FPV), 
back to the remote controller halting the collection of video footage 
and intelligence by the drone operator. (Shield, 2019) 
 
Figure 8-5: Drone Gun MKIII 
 
Source: (Shield, 2019) 
  
Extreme Long-Range Cannon 
In 2017, the US Army established a collection of cross-functional 
teams (CFTs) aimed at rapidly pushing forward key technologies to 
advance the services’ next generation of capabilities. One of those 
teams was the Long-Range Precision Fires “pilot,” an effort to 
develop the next generation of Army artillery—including “deep fires,” 
an artillery capability that can strike at strategic targets well within 
an adversary’s defenses. These systems seek to achieve a range of 
1,000 nautical miles or more. There’s strong incentive for the Army 
to succeed because an extreme-long-range gun could help deal 
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with the difficulty posed by adversaries with advanced over-the-
horizon radar, shore defenses, and air defense systems—such as the 
kind being put in place by China in the South China Sea. (Gallagher, 
2019) 
 
Cyber-Enabled IADS 
 
Figure 8-6: Typical Layered Russian Air IADS 
Source: (Col Joseph Speed, 2019) 
 
In order to allow friendly aircraft to conduct missions and support 
joint air power operations across the spectrum of warfare – from 
peacekeeping to high-intensity conflicts – NATO has nurtured 
developments in the Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) 
mission. However, the newest generation of complex and capable 
enemy air defense assets threatens to overwhelm NATO’s current 
SEAD abilities. (COL Speed USAF, 2018). 
Over the last 20 years, potential adversaries of the Alliance have 
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studied western military capabilities and have developed robust A2/
AD capabilities in response. Examples are abundant and include 
threats such as the Russian SA-20 ‘Gargoyle’ and SA-21 ‘Growler’, the 
Chinese – built HQ-9, and the Dong-Feng 21. These capabilities are 
tailored to deny the ‘western way of war’ by precluding access to 
what is arguably the west’s most potent influencer – air power. (COL 
Speed USAF, 2018) 
Additionally, many state and non-state actors have been 
creatively employing military and commercial technologies to 
develop a range of capabilities for symmetric, asymmetric, and 
hybrid military activities, including AD. The technological trends 
include the following: anti-stealth technology, hypersonic weapons, 
cyber warfare, and access to and/or denial of space capabilities, to 
name a few. For example, Russian long-range surface to air systems 
now employ radar with anti-stealth technologies such as the 
‘NNIIRT 1L119 Nebo SVU/RLM-M Nebo M’ mobile VHF active 
electronically scanned array (AESA) radar. In the realm of 
hypersonic, the Russians have an air-launched missile, the ‘Dagger’, 
which can reach and maintain Mach 10. In addition, China is 
developing anti-satellite capabilities such as the ‘Dong Neng 2 & 
3’ exo-atmospheric vehicles. Primarily, these are direct-ascent 
missiles designed to ram and destroy satellites. (COL Speed USAF, 
2018) 
Advances in computing power and digital signal processing are 
allowing for more capable AD radars. These systems employ 
advanced techniques to improve acquisition range and target size 
detection and possess increased resistance to electronic attack or 
deception. In addition, new ideas in electromagnetic spectrum 
management are allowing radar technology to become more passive 
than active, which significantly complicates locating and targeting 
such sites. For instance, Russia is developing passive coherent radar 
designed for stealthy detection of moving aerial, ground and above-
water targets in the protected area of important facilities. While 
passive radar systems are already being employed in both ground 
and air platforms, they are normally used to locate platforms vice 
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engage them. That being said, passive radars will likely be able 
to target and guide weapons against air threats soon, significantly 
complicating the SEAD mission. 
Adversaries’ legacy systems of hierarchical data management and 
links are being replaced with multi-node, high-capacity, efficacy 
networks, contributing to highly resilient, redundant, and robust 
Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, 
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems. The resiliency of 
future C4ISR may be augmented by space-based technologies – 
such as micro-satellite constellations – making an Integrated Air 
Defense System (IADS) even more effective and agile. In addition, 
it is quite possible that a nodular system might enable air defense 
systems to continue to support operations through ‘remote’ 
operations, even if some parts of the IADS are damaged or 
destroyed. A current example of this is Russia’s experimentation 
with multi-node quantum networks. In effect, suppressing or 
destroying local air defense assets, which are linked into a multi-
node network, may not provide effective suppression of the enemy 
IADS. (COL Speed USAF, 2018) 
The growing ability to operate systems remotely will not only 
increase range of detection but will also increase remote crew 
survivability. ‘Remoting’ operations and unmanned technologies 
may not only increase the survivability of an IADS, but they will 
likely extend its detection and targeting capabilities by hundreds 
of miles. For example, the advancements in space technology may 
extend the ‘remoting’ capabilities of an IADS to altitudes extending 
into space. The combination of the aforementioned activities may 
increase the passiveness of an IADS, deny its detection and 
targeting, and make it resilient to most SEAD activities. (COL Speed 
USAF, 2018) 
Lastly, over the next twenty years very long-range surface-to-air 
weapons, with advanced seeker guidance, smart warheads, and new 
propulsion technologies, may be employed in enemy AD missions. In 
particular, Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) engagement zones may be 
extended up to 500 km. One need look no further than the Russian 
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S-500 next-generation SAM system to see the lethality of future 
AD. Disturbingly, this particular missile system could enter service 
as early as 2020. These new long-range weapons’ technologies may 
contribute to a highly mobile, flexible IADS when combined with 
increases in computing power and decreasing size of hardware and 
processors. (COL Speed USAF, 2018) 
IADS of the future are becoming even more lethal, agile whole 
remaining difficult to detect on the battlefield. While the US will 
continue to remain the dominate force through the air and space, 
potential adversaries will most likely continue to heavily invest in 
ways to undermine advances in aerial capabilities.  These AD 
systems have already become so advanced that the US military and 
other nations are re-looking long range kinetic means to counter 
them. Maintaining an adaptive and dynamic frame of mind will be 
crucial in identifying and ultimately defeating these emerging 
threats, ensuring continued success on the battlefields of the 
future. 
 
Big Data and Artificial Intelligence Integration 
Artificial Intelligence (AI) is the theory and development of 
computer systems able to perform tasks that normally require 
human intelligence, such as visual perception, speech recognition, 
decision-making, and translation between languages. Big data is the 
field that treats ways to analyze, systematically extract information 
from, or otherwise deal with data sets that are too large or complex 
to be dealt with by traditional data-processing applications. 
The incorporation of Artificial Intelligence into defense strategies 
has already begun to transform NATO’s ISR and defense capabilities 
in regard to the assimilation and processing of data in order to 
effectively identify targets. Science and technology advancements 
are helping to shape both the requirements and solutions for new 
approaches in order to meet NATO capability needs. 
These capabilities will ultimately enhance military decision-
making and accelerate the acquisition of actionable 
intelligence. The focus was on the impact on the OODA (observe, 
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orient, decide, act) loop. We can see major impacts from AI, machine 
learning and big data in the observe function in terms of being able 
collect and assimilate large amounts of data and then process that 
efficiently and effectively to identify potential targets. This then 
helps orient towards specific areas of interest or targets of interest 
that you are looking for through your ISR capabilities. (Bayley, 2018) 
 
These techniques can also be used in a defensive manner as well. 
Enhanced systems can potentially be used to detect, track and 
decide whether or not to engage a threat based on stored data 
sets and pre-determined patterns. This could potentially remove 
humans from the decision-making process but at the same time 
could reduce the time required to engage faster moving, more 
technologically advanced threats. 
 
 
Conclusions 
C-UAS technologies are changing and advancing. Hypersonic 
missiles, Directed Energy weapons (also covered in Chapter 10), 
long- range cannons, mobile drone guns and Cyber -enabled IADS 
represent steps in the future of Counter-UAS countermeasures. 
Much of the research work on these fine weapons is classified, 
necessitating only a brief open source treatment by the authors 
about this subject. 
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Chapter 9: Non- Kinetic: 
Military Avionics, 
EW,CW,DE,SCADA Defenses 
R. K. NICHOLS 
Student Objectives 
Chapter 9 is a potpourri of non-kinetic technologies for C-UAS. 
The student will be introduced to military avionics systems and 
the roles they play in the defense matrix. Avionics are the primary 
target of C-UAS efforts. A side-theme throughout this chapter is 
that most military manned aviation roles can be filled with the 
less costly unmanned option at reduced human liability. One of the 
most interesting roles is the maritime patrol aviation (MPA) and is 
singled out for coverage.   Four areas will be explored in more detail: 
electronic warfare (EW),  cyber warfare (CW), directed energy (DE) 
weapons and acoustic defenses. SWARMs continue to be a concern 
and are addressed. (Osborn, 2019) 
 
What Is the Counter -UAS Problem?                                                 
                                  
The risk of successful terrorist attacks on USA Air Defense 
Systems (ADS) via sUAS/UASs is greater because of improving 
commercial capabilities and accessibility. Advanced small drones, 
capable of carrying sophisticated imaging equipment and 
significant payloads, are readily available to the public.  A range of 
terrorist, insurgent, criminal, corporate, and activist threat groups 
have demonstrated their ability to use civilian drones and gather 
intelligence. How does the country defend against a growing UAS 
threat? This is also known as the counter – UAS Problem. General 
James D Mattis, SECDEF summed up the Problem 
succinctly: (Nichols, et al., 2019) 
Chapter 9: Non- Kinetic: Military
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“Unmanned Aircraft are being developed with more 
technologically systems and capabilities. They can duplicate some 
of the capabilities of manned aircraft for both surveillance/ 
reconnaissance and attack missions. They can be small enough and 
/ or slow enough to elude detection by standard early warning 
sensor systems and could pose a formidable threat to friendly 
forces.” (Chairman, 2012) 
 
Operational Protection from Hostile UAS Attacks – A Helicopter 
View 
 “According to LCDR Boutros of the Navy War College, developing 
technologies do not paint a pleasant picture of counter – UAS 
problem (Boutros, Operational Protection 2015). UAS has seen a 
widespread proliferation among both state and non-state actors. 
This is a cause for concern to US Operational Commanders.” 
(Boutros, 2015) General James D Mattis, SECDEF concluded: 
“The proliferation of low cost, tactical unmanned aerial systems 
demand we think about this potential threat now… we must 
understand the threat these systems present to our joint force and 
develop the tactics, techniques and procedures to counter the 
problem.” (Chairman, 2012) (Myer, 2013) 
Joint Publication (JP) 3-01 identifies friendly assets that an 
adversary may attack during a campaign using UAS. A Theater 
Commander must plan for counter – UAS actions against air defense 
sites, logistics centers, and national critical infrastructure. 
(Boutros, 2015) “Due to their small size and unique flying signatures, 
many UAS are difficult to detect, identify, track, and engage with 
current joint air defense systems. The increasing proliferation of 
global UAS has exposed a critical vulnerability in the protection 
function of operational commanders, requiring joint efforts to 
include intelligence, Electronic Warfare (EW), cyber warfare, (CW) 
and FIRES.” (Boutros, 2015) 
But UAS are not invincible. Neutralizing threats or mitigating risk 
includes active and passive defense methods with kinetic and non-
kinetic FIRES.[1] (US DoD – JP 3-0, 2012) 
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 Countering UAS Air Threats 
 Advanced UAS can carry large payloads great distances. US 
Predator and Global Hawk UAS, [See Figure 9-1] “Chinese 
Pterodactyl [See Figure 9-2] and Soring Dragon counterparts, and 
Iranian Ababil can carry at least 500 Kg payloads greater than 300 
km.” (Boutros, 2015) “They can be armed or unarmed, with ISR 
payloads, communications relays, Over-The-Horizon (OTH) target 
acquisition, and precision strike capabilities.” (Boutros, 2015) 
“Shorter range, tactical, small/micro UAS may not have the 
distance or payload capacity of more advanced systems, but they 
can impact a campaign (or US Homeland Defense) in equally serious 
ways. Because of their size, their heat signatures are almost 
nonexistent. They easily evade detection. They offer more freedom 
of action. They can be launched from within US air defense zones 
and fly to their targets in less time than it takes for a coordinated 
response.” (Boutros, 2015) [Nightmare alert:  Imagine a SWARM of 
UAS carrying small potent binary bomb payloads attacking a US 
Carrier at port less than one mile away from the UAS launch point.] 
The enemy can effectively balance space, time, and force (arguably 
frequency too). (Beaudoin, 2011) “Small UAS (sUAS) can perform 
short-range ISR, be outfitted with explosive charges or chemical 
and biological agents for aerial dispersion, or simply fly over troops 
or civilians to demoralize.” (Boutros, 2015) [Nightmare alert: Given 
the effectiveness of enemy use of IEDs in Iraq and Afghanistan, a 
mobile, airborne version would take the Problem to an entirely new 
level!] (Nichols R.-0. , 2016) 
 
Vulnerabilities Perspective 
 “sUAS are vulnerable to kinetic and non-kinetic outside influence 
in six different areas; their link to a ground station, the ground 
station itself, the aircrafts various sensors, avionics, cyber weapons, 
directed energy weapons  (DE) and acoustical weapons (AW).” The 
military recognizes the first three factors, the authors concentrate 
on the latter group. 
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“In 2009 Iraqi insurgents successfully hacked into US Reaper 
drones, crashing them.”  (Boutros, 2015) (Horowitz, 2014). “In 
September of 2011, ground control stations at Creech AFB were 
infected by a virus, temporarily grounding the entire UAS fleet.” 
(Boutros, 2015) (Hartman, 2013) UAS onboard sensors can be 
manipulated in many ways. “High intensity light directed at an 
optical sensor can blind it. GPS receivers can be cyber-spoofed, 
which consists of transmitting a stronger, but false, GPS signal to 
a receiver, resulting in inaccurate navigation. Influencing the local 
magnetic field can have adverse effects on both onboard hard drives 
and sensors that require magnetic orientation to operate correctly.” 
(Boutros, 2015) (Hartman, 2013)  The object is to better understand 
UAS subsystems, to facilitate exploiting their weaknesses. 
 
Figure 9-1 Global Hawk 
 Source: (Rogoway, 2018) 
 
Figure 9-2 Chinese Pterodactyl 
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Source: (Defence, 2014) 
 
The author’s research suggests that: The hostile technology of 
remote-controlled warfare is difficult to control or abort; the best 
defense (counter – UAS) is to address the root drivers of these 
threats. The threat-roots are SAA, SCADA and avionics. SAA and 
SCADA are vulnerable to both cyber and EW weapons. An EMS 
subset of special interest are acoustical countermeasures as 
research has confirmed their effectiveness against 
SWARMS. (Nichols, et al., 2019) 
 
Conventional Vulnerabilities of Air Defense Systems (ADS), 
Attacks By sUAS and Countermeasures 
A simplified, non-classified view of the US Air Defense System 
(ADS) against a hostile UAS attack occurs in two stages: 
1. Early Detection and Identification of “Danger Close” (Myer, 
2013) [2] 
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2. Applied appropriate countermeasures with secondary goal of 
restricted collateral damage. 
The traditional ADS family of tools for Detection include: 
1. Active Radar Surveillance – generate waves, use rebound 
echoes on UAS to locate, estimate distance, approach speed, 
size, penetration vector and short-term trajectory, and 
2. Passive Monitoring – covers electromagnetic spectrum via 
visible, thermal infrared, radio waves on common 
communications channels. 
When considering hostile UAS defense planners need to consider 
several issues. The US ADS is optimized for missiles and aircraft 
deployed at high altitude and speeds. ADS data fusion (detection, 
identification, weapon lock-on, execute countermeasures) works 
better with larger targets, not very small ones like UAS / sUAS. 
US ADS is effectively reactive for longer ranges. Close reactive 
engagements are sub-optimal. US ADS are not optimal for sUAS 
/UAS. (Nichols R.-0. , 2016) Neither were Saudi Arabian ADS against 
the Iranian attack on oilfields. (Gallagher, 2019) 
“There are clear vulnerabilities of the US ADS to UAS: 
• sUAS can be launched into action close to target(s), less than 1 
mile. 
• sUAS exhibit a small Radar signature. The detection phase is 
hindered. 
• Reactive dictates quick response near target. This is not always 
possible. 
• sUAS / UAS are designed for slow, low flight. Low flying sUAS 
avoids Radar identification. 
• sUAS / UAS electric motors are both quiet and have limited 
thermal signature. This makes for difficult detection for noise. 
• sUAS /UAS operate in urban areas. Urban sphere presents 
additional problems and potential collateral damage.” (Nichols 
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Conventional Countermeasures Against sUAS /UAS 
 There are two families of conventional countermeasures used to 
disrupt /destroy hostile UAS/sUAS systems (Regulatory ~ locked in 
firmware GPS No-Fly Zones, Registration, FAA rules excluded). 
Active Measures – Designed to incapacitate, destroy the sUAS/
UAS threat in a direct way (Ground-to- Air Defense (GTA), missiles 
or, acoustical gun, or simple cyber rifle or DE weapon ) 
However, there are some defensive issues to be considered: 
• GTA efficiency against sUAS, reactive targets are reduced, even 
less efficient in urban zones where public at risk. 
• Simultaneous attacks on multiple fronts very difficult to apply 
and defense measures are mitigated. [3] 
 
UAS countermeasures research is improving. The goal is to 
increase ability of GTA to react and improve capabilities to a defined 
to a saturation limit. Team formation allows decoys and shields. 
SWARM formation is easier to detect. Arrival of a cloud of robot 
drones is hard to mask, but tough to neutralize. Commercial 
company Liteye has developed an Anti-UAV Defense System (AUDS) 
which are able to detect, track, and disrupt sUAS operation by 
pulsed, brief focused broadcast of direction frequency jamming. 
Liteye has also developed a mobile version call M-AUDS. (Liteye, 
2018) China has developed a “5-sec” laser weapon to shoot down 
sUAS at low altitude (500 m) with a 10KW high energy laser beam. 
Its range is 1.2 mi and handles sUAS speeds up to 112 mph. (Nichols 
R.-0. , 2016) 
 
Passive – Designed to protect indirectly; physical protections 
around target, decoys, shields, organized roadblocks, nets, jamming 
of sensors of the aggressor, GPS total or partial cyber-Spoof of 
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signals. Passive countermeasures have some positive outcomes. 
Decoys can be effective if the ADS know what the sensors employed 
for sUAS Kamikaze attack and how they are used in the SAA 
subsystem. Communication jamming is effective against level 1 & 2 
drones  which require pilot interaction. It can disrupt inter–drone 
communications required for either team or SWARM formations. 
Sensor Jamming – especially GPS signals – giving false GPS 
information, camera/gimbal dislocation, and heading sensor 
demagnetization is effective regardless of automation. 
The 2011 Iranian incident taught US ADS planner’s lessons about 
passive spoofing waypoints and Loss of Signal (LOS) via GPS.  LOS 
is an emergency condition. sUAS/UAS have programmed responses. 
One of those responses may be,” return to waypoint”. Two types of 
spoofs were executed. A complete spoof uses the friendly SAA to 
estimate course, groundspeed, time to target to force a LOS and 
final waypoint change. A partial spoof reports false positions, during 
LOS and changes waypoints for perceived emergency conditions. 
Both spoofs are difficult to detect & effective (Editor, 2012) 
 
Aggressor Counter-Countermeasures Specific to UAS 
Deployment – SWARM 
 The authors contend that a UAS SWARM attack is practically 
unstoppable unless the defender (US ADS) exhibits strong 
collaboration and ability to match/identify the SWARM locations 
in a timely matter. This requires combined active and passive 
measures. This portends the ADS computer networks must process, 
detect, identify, and target information (and make critical decisions) 
significantly faster and more effectively than their enemies.  Cost 
is an additional vulnerability factor. SWARMS can be assembled, 
delivered, and targeted in a relatively inexpensive weapons package. 
A SWARM can use local counter jamming on target nets.  (Nichols 
R.-0. , 2016) 
 
Implications from Attack by Iran on Saudi Arabian Oil Fields 
 On 14 September 2019, Houthi rebels in Yemen claimed their 
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attack on the Abqaiq and Khurais oilfields in Saudi 
Arabia. (Gallagher, 2019) The effect was to temporarily take out 5% 
of the global oil production capacity. (Gallagher, 2019) Houthi rebels 
claimed responsibility for the attack, saying that 10 drones (mixed 
origins) and 17 missiles were deployed. (Lister, 2019) See Figure 9-3. 
Ballistic missile attacks by the Houthis have been previously 
deployed using old Soviet and Iranian “Scud” SRBMs. No prior 
attack, since the Yemen conflict began four years ago, has 
interrupted oil supplies. 
The Houthis have sent dozens of drones and short-range ballistic 
missiles against Saudi Arabia in the past two years. Many have been 
intercepted by Saudi Air Defenses; others have fallen harmlessly. 
Very few have caused limited damage and casualties. (Lister, 2019) 
The Abqaiq oilfield is 800 miles from Houthi-held parts of Yemen. 
The drones used were from North Korean  Iranian and Chinese 
origins. (Lister, 2019) The Iranian drones were dubbed the UAV-
X and have a range of 740 – 930 miles. This is a step up from 
the SRBMs that were based on North Korean technology with a 
maximum range of  186 miles. (Lister, 2019) The Chinese drones 
have several names: “Qaseth-1” (“Striker-1”), a rebrand of the Iranian 
Ababil-2 UAV and the “Mirsad-1” used by Hezbollah until 
2018. (Gallagher, 2019) The step-up in the conflict game is the Iranian 
clone, KH-55 with a range of 1,550 miles. These were reportedly used 
in the Saudi Arabian oil field attacks. (Gallagher, 2019) 
The take-away from this attack is not just the loss of global oil 
processing capacity but the vulnerability and exposure of the Saudi 
Arabian Advanced Air defenses. Most of the Saudi Arabian ADS are 
designed to defend against traditional threats and are ill-equipped 
to tackle the asymmetrical aerial threats such as drones.  The 
vulnerability is enhanced when so many essential oil-related 
infrastructure parts are concentrated in a small area: storage, 
processing, compressor trains and distribution. (Lister, 2019) 
Think of this problem more globally. China, North Korea and Iran 
[refer to as CNKI cooperation] are aggressively  cooperating on 
drone technologies for use against a major oil production region. 
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The technology is cost-effective as well as human capital efficient. 
Drones substituting for manned aircraft. 
 
Figure 9-3 shows A haze of smoke is seen from the attacked oil 
plant in Saudi Arabia 
Source: (Sheena McKenzie, 2019)  https://www.cnn.com/
middleeast/live-news/saudi-oil-attack-dle-intl/
h_1ab7e8469e98525f887c3a4e588dde8a 
 
Let’s expand the threat. Refer to Figure 9-4. Note that the Strait 
of Hormuz lies between Iran and Saudi Arabia, with Bahrain, Qatar, 
UAE and Oman in the sandwich. Between the Gulf of Oran and 
the Persian Gulf, about 20% of the global oil movement / supply 
travels through the Strait of Hormuz. (EIA, 2019) The US 5th Fleet 
currently protects this oil flow. There have been several clashes 
between Iranian vessels and US Vessels. Drones cross over the US 
Fleet every day and test its patience. 
 
The key theme for this chapter is non – kinetic C-UAS 
technologies.  Remember, payloads can be anything: CBRN 
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deployment devices, drugs, surveillance packages, shaped charges, 
lasers, super resolution cameras, weather instruments, GPS/GNSS 
cyber weapons, missiles, etc. 
The problem is twofold: what is the risk assessment for CNKI 
drone technologies cooperation acted on either target (US 5th Fleet 
or Saudi Oil Fields -both in range of  KH-55’s) and what 
countermeasure technologies are available to counter the threats 
presented and to mitigate those risks and system vulnerabilities? 
 
Military Avionics 
Avionics is a generic name for a diverse set of functions being 
provided by AVIation electrONICS. Moir and Seabridge provide a 
fair history of the Avionics since the word was coined in 1930s. 
(Moir I. &., 2006) As avionics systems have evolved, the level of 
functional integration has increased dramatically. Technology has 
actually blurred functional boundaries. The outcome of this 
evolution has been to increase performance; sensor types; 
functionality; cost; integration; complexity; supportability and 
reuse; software / executable programs; memory; throughput; 
reliability; data handling; data links; and obsolescence. (Moir I. &., 
2006) 
The result has been to decrease size; weight; power consumption; 
and technology windows. (Moir I. &., 2006) The basic military 
avionics system according to the DoD standards is shown in Figure 
9-5. 
 
Military Aviation Roles 
The authors contend with all due respect to USAF, USN, USMC, 
USA that most manned (piloted) military aircraft roles can be 
replaced by unmanned aircraft systems. The military was quick to 
understand the opportunities offered to them by the ability to leave 
the ground and gain the advantage of height in the battlefield. 
Military aircraft perform a variety of aviation roles using fixed-
wing and rotary-wing aircraft. The roles define the type of aircraft 
because of the specialist nature of the tasks. Several aircraft types 
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are designed for multi-roles or to change roles during the mission 
(aka swing-roles). Military aviation roles are driven by advances in 
the technology of sensors and avionics not by pilot abilities. (Moir 
I. &., 2006) More sensitive and effective sensor systems are capable 
of detecting targets, the use of stealth techniques increases the 
effectiveness of delivery platforms and increased capability of on-
board computing systems. 
Drones compact these sensor technologies. They eliminate 
wasted space. They can process on-board data close to their 
manned counterparts. Clearly cheaper to produce, they are 
expendable in battle. 
 
In a military defense environment, a variety of military avionics 
systems exist[4]: 
1) Air Superiority – Deny the enemy the airspace over the 
battlefield, thus allowing ground forces to rein freely in destroying 
ground targets. 
2) Ground Attack – Assist tactical situation on the battlefield 
[close air support (CAS)]. This role includes the ability of designating 
targets by laser and precision bombing. 
3) Strategic Bomber -The mission is to penetrate deep into enemy 
territory and to carry out strikes to weaken defenses. 
4) Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) – The mission is huge, to cover 
60% of the earth’s surface ( water). The MPA is the most complex 
of systems aircraft with the demanding role embracing a broad 
spectrum of tactical and strategic tasks / tools, as well as, support 
for civilian and humanitarian activities. (Moir I. &., 2006) It includes 
sub-roles of Anti-surface unit warfare (ASuW); and Anti-submarine 
Warfare (ASW); Search and Rescue (SAR); Exclusive Economic Zone 
Protection (EEZP); and Customs and Excise Cooperation (C&EC). 
Each of these are broken down further into associated tasks / 
architectures as shown in Table 9-1 & 9-2. Figures 9-6 & 9-7 show 
two examples (P-3 Orion and Saab Swordfish) MPAs. 
 
MPA interests the author because of his work on UAVs and 
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intelligence gathering by Chinese  in the Spratly Islands and his 
research into acoustic defenses / countermeasures against hostile 
SWARMS. Even with all of its complexity a good portion of MPA 
missions can be accomplished by unmanned aircraft systems.[5] 
Table 9-2 shows typical MPA platform architecture. Figure 9-8 
shows the MQ-4C Triton BAMS MPA (unmanned). Note how 
powerful the UAS is and how well it meets the requirements of the 
MPA role. 
 
Figure 9-4 Strait of Hormuz 
Source: (Stratfor, 2019) 
 
5) Battlefield Surveillance -The mission is providing detailed 
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knowledge if the tactical scenario on the battlefield with real-time 
intelligence of enemy and friendly forces. 
6) Airborne Early Warning – Early detection and warning of 
airborne attack is critical to give air superiority and defensive forces 
sufficient time to prepare a sound defense. (Moir I. &., 2006) 
7) Electronic Warfare (EW) – The role is composed of four 
subgroups: Electronic countermeasures (ECM) or jamming are 
common forms of EW used to disrupt communications or enemy 
radars. Electronic support measures (ESM) – actions taken to 
intercept, locate, record and analyze radiated electromagnetic 
energy for the purpose of gaining tactical advantage. Signals 
Intelligence (SIGINT) consists of Communications Intelligence 
(COMINT), Radar Intelligence (RADINT), Electronic Intelligence 
(ELINT) and Measurement and Signal Intelligence (MASINT).[6] 
8) Photographic Reconnaissance – This role includes 
photographic imagery (IMINT) used to confirm SIGINT intelligence. 
9) Air-to-air refueling – This role is required to extend range 
or endurance. This role is not easily replaced by UAS -to- UAS 
refueling. In 2018, Dr Saeed Kahn, Kansas State University, 
developed a method of drone-to-drone transfer of energy to 
replenish a UAV battery in flight. 
10) Troop / material Transport – Logistics is the primary goal for 
this role . There is significant initial work on UAMs but as of this 
writing, this role is not replaceable (safely) by unmanned A/C. 
11) Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)  – Many UAS have evolved 
to perform roles described in the previous list with ever-increasing 
performance and intelligence. (Nichols, et al., 2019) 
 
The basic avionics system has the following major systems: 
Navigation, Communications, Sensors, Mission System and Displays 
and Control. Each major has several subsystems, for example, 
Sensors include Radar, ESM, Electro-Optical, Defensive Aids, and 
the author adds Acoustical. (Moir I. &., 2006) 
 
Figure 9-5 A Military Avionics System 
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Source: p27, https://www.slideshare.net/solohermelin/8-fighter-
aircraft-avionicspart-i 
 
 Table 9-1 MPA Roles and Tasks 
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ASuW ASW SAR EEZP C&EC 
Reconnaissance 
CAS to task 
forces & 
convoys 
Location of 
survivors 
Oil rig 
surveillance 
Anti-illegal 
immigration 
Shadowing Open ocean search 
Dropping of 
survival 
equipment 
Fishery 
protection 
Anti-gun 
running 
Strike against 
surface vessels 
Extended 
tracking of 
submerged 
targets 
Scene-of-action 
commander for 
rescue 
operations 
Pollution 
detection & 
dispersal 
Anti-terrorist 
operations 
Tactical support 
of maritime strike 
aircraft 
Deterrence 
of hostile 
submarines 
Escort to 
rescue 
helicopters 
Anti-drug 
smuggling 
Over-the-horizon 
targeting for 
friendly vessels 
Cooperation 
with 
friendly 
submarines 
Cooperation 
with rescue 
services 
Intelligence 
collection 
Intelligence 
collection 
Escort of 
aircraft in 
difficulties 
Communications 
relay 
Limited airborne 
early warning 
capability 
Source: (Moir I. &., 2006), pp.16-17 
 
 
Table 9-2 Typical Maritime Patrol Aircraft Platform 
Architecture[7] 
Source: (Moir I. &., 2006), p23 
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Avionics Communications Mission System 
Navigation GPS /GNSS VHF Maritime Radar 
FMS UHF Electro-optics turret 
Autopilot HF ESM 
ADF SHF SatCom DASS 
DME Link 16- MAD 
TACAN Link 11 Acoustic Systems 
TCAS Marine Band Mission Recording 
Landing Aids Shortwave Data loader 
GPWS Cameras 
LPI RadAlt Oceanographic database 
Air data Mission computing 
Digital Map Mission crew workstations 
Homing Intelligence databases 
Direction Finding (DF) 
MDP 
Displays & Controls 
IFF /SSR 
Avionics data bus 
 
 
Figure 9-6 P-3 Orion MPA 
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Source: https://www.naval-technology.com/features/feature-the-
top-10-maritime-patrol-aircraft/ 
 
P-3 Orion MPA Example 
The P-3 Orion is a long-range maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) with 
multi-mission capabilities. Its 16-hour fly-time and high ferry range 
of 8,944 km make it the top MPA in the world. The aircraft was 
developed by Lockheed Martin principally for the US Navy. The 
aircraft entered service in 1962 and is currently in service with 21 
operators in 17 countries worldwide. 
The aircraft can conduct a variety of missions such as maritime 
/ over-land patrol, anti-submarine warfare, anti-piracy, anti-
terrorism, drug interdiction and the prevention of illegal 
immigration. Lockheed Martin offers a P-3 Mid-Life Upgrade (MLU) 
program to extend the aircraft’s service life by 20 to 25 years. 
The aircraft can be equipped with infrared and electro-optical 
(EO) sensors, as well as special imaging radar to detect objects 
at long ranges. Its large internal weapons bay and ten external 
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hardpoints can house a range of weapons. Four Allison T56-A-14 
engines provide the P-3 Orion with a long-range cruise speed of 
350k at 25,000ft. (Naval Technology Team, 2019) 
 
Figure 9-7 MPA Example – Swordfish 
Source: https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/boeing-saab-in-race-
for-s-koreas-maritime-patrol-aircraft-order.524698/ 
 
 
Saab Swordfish MPA 
The Saab Swordfish MPA is a multi-mission maritime patrol 
aircraft that is capable of conducting maritime ISR, maritime 
counterterrorism, anti-piracy, anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and 
anti-surface warfare (ASuW) missions. High dash speed and long 
endurance make the Saab Swordfish MPA an ideal maritime patrol 
aircraft. 
The Saab Swordfish MPA comes with an advanced sensor and 
C4I package comprising 360° rotating multi-mode maritime 
surveillance radar, electro-optical sensors with laser payload, 
automatic identification system (AIS), identification friend or foe 
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(IFF), electronic warfare and self-protection system, SATCOM, and 
tactical data links. It also features four weapon hardpoints to carry 
weaponry load. 
Based on the Global 6000 business jet, the Swordfish MPA has 
a maximum cruise speed of 450k and a long-range cruise speed 
of 360k. It can remain airborne for 11.5 hours and conduct 
patrols. (Naval Technology Team, 2019) 
  
Figure 9-8 MQ-4C Triton BAMS MPA (unmanned) 
Source: (Naval Technology Team, 2019) 
 
MQ-4C Triton BAMS MPA UAS 
MQ-4C Triton is a new broad area maritime surveillance (BAMS) 
unmanned aircraft system (UAS) unveiled by Northrop Grumman 
for the US Navy. The UAS will complement the navy’s Maritime 
Patrol and Reconnaissance Force family of systems, delivering 
SIGNIT (signals intelligence), C4ISR and maritime strike capabilities. 
The US Navy intends to procure 68 MQ-4C Triton UAS to carry 
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out surveillance missions, along with the manned P-8 Poseidon 
maritime patrol aircraft. Appendix  9-2 details the MQ-4C design 
features. 
  
C-UAS Premise [8] 
 Let’s restate the major premise that almost all manned and 
unmanned systems used in military aviation are vulnerable to 
attack. (DTRA, 2019) Hostile actions are both kinetic and non-
kinetic against the avionics systems. The following sections are 
concerned with the latter sphere which includes directed energy 
(DE), cyber warfare, (CW), electronic warfare, (EW), and a specialized 
EMS subset acoustical countermeasure (AC)s. [9] All these may 
defensively apply to hostile unmanned aircraft systems.[10] 
  
Figure 9-9 High-Power Microwave Weapon to Destroy or 
Disable Swarms of Unmanned Aircraft 
Source: (Military & Aerospace Electronics, 2019) 
 
Effects of Directed Energy (DE) Weapons (EDEW) 
Directed energy weapons make up diverse types of weapons such 
as lasers, particle beams, microwaves and even bullets. All DE 
weapons are just devices that deposit energy in targets, and that 
energy which must be deposited to achieve a given level of damage 
is relatively insensitive to the type of weapon employed. (Nielsen, 
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2012)[11] American DE weapons may, in fact, change the way future 
wars will be fought. (Beason, 2005) 
Energy cannot be deposited in a target unless it is first delivered 
to the target. This is called propagation of energy. This subject was 
covered in: (Adamy D. , 2001), (Adamy D. , 2009), and (Nichols, et al., 
2019) There is always some loss of energy during propagation. The 
DE must deliver more energy than needed to damage the target, to 
compensate for the loss along the way.  DE weapon design depends 
on two factors: First, the anticipated target, which determines the 
energy required for damage. Second, the anticipated scenario 
(range, environment, time, etc. See Table 9-3) which determines 
how much energy must be produced to ensure that an adequate 
amount energy is delivered in the time available. (Nielsen, 2012) 
 
Table 9-3 Battlespace Dimensions 
Dimension Function Action 
Latitude Friendly Force Location 
Direction of Weapons 
 
Longitude Enemy Force Location Maneuver of Forces 
Elevation 
 
Time Speed of Maneuver Timeliness of Attack 
Timing of Weapon Release Enemy Vulnerability 
Frequency Bandwidth Required Rate of Information Flow 
Bandwidth Available Interference 
Frequency of Transmissions 
Vulnerability to Jamming 
 
Vulnerability to Intercept 
 
Source: (Adamy D. -0., 2015) 
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Energy required for damage 
Damage may be defined as Soft damage which is an upset to the 
UAS computers to hard damage meaning the complete vaporization 
of the UAS in the air. The former is sensitive to the details of the 
attack, the hardness of chips, the computer(s) details, 
communications, circuits and sub circuits. Vaporization produces 
immediate feedback as to target status – catastrophic. Determining 
how much energy a weapon must produce to damage a target, two 
things must be known: how much energy it takes to damage the 
target, and what fraction of the energy generated will be lost in 
propagating to it. (Nielsen, 2012) 
 
Ice Cube 
Consider the energy required (damage level)  to vaporize an ice 
cube. [12] Pull an ice cube from the refrigerator. Its temperature 
is below the temperature it will melt. First, we must raise the 
temperature to melting temperature. The energy required is 
proportional to both the necessary ΔT rise and the amount of ice in 
the cube. From thermodynamics, the expression covering this is: 
E = mC (Tm-Ti), where E is energy required in Joules, m = mass 
of ice cube in grams, Ti = the initial temperature in Celsius, Tm= 
melting temperature, C is the heat capacity constant of 
proportionality (J/gm x o C).[13] So, E = 2100 Joules of energy 
required to raise it to the melting point. This is not enough. We 
must melt the ice cube. Heat of fusion (Lm) is the amount of energy 
required to convert 1 gm of solid to 1 gm of liquid. With an additional 
16,700 Joules, we now have a small water puddle. But our object 
is to vaporize the ice cube – hard damage. Using the specific heat 
equation again, E = mC (Tv-Tm), we require an additional 21,000 
Joules to raise the ice cube as molten water to vapor at the same 
temperature by supplying the heat of vaporization, Lv = 2,440 Joules 
per gm of water. This means an additional 122,000 Joules of energy 
are required. The total amount of energy needed to vaporize an ice 
cube of 50 gm is 161,000 Joules. Lv accounts for about 75% of the 
required energy. 
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10,000 Joules 
(Nielsen, 2012) gives a table of thermal properties of Aluminum, 
Copper, Magnesium, Iron and Titanium. It shows that most solid 
materials (See Table 9-4) have density on the order of 1 – 10 gm 
/cubic centimeter and that 10,000 Joules is sufficient energy to 
vaporize about one cubic centimeter of anything! 10,000 Joules is a 
magic number because it is close to the energy delivered by a wide 
range of DEs. (Nielsen, 2012)  A typical rifle round has about 10 gm 
and is fired at a muzzle velocity of 1000 m/s. (Halsam, 1982) This 
corresponds to a kinetic energy (KE)  of (mv 2 /2) of 5,000 Joules. 
A roman Catapult could throw a 20 Kg stone over 200 meters. The 
KE required for this use is about 40,000 Joules. (Foley, March, 1979) 
A medieval crossbow could launch an 85-gm bolt over 275 meters. 
This required 13,000 Joules. (Vernard Foley, January, 1985) 
 
Table 9-4 Thermal Properties of Common Materials 
 
Material 
Density 
Gm/
cm3 
Melting 
Point, 
Tm 
0C 
Vaporization 
Point, Tv 
0C 
Heat 
Capacity 
(J/
gm0C) 
Heat 
of 
Fusion 
(J/gm) 
Heat of 
Vaporization 
(J/gm) 
Aluminum 2.7 660 2500 0.9 400 1100 
Copper 8.96 1100 2600 0.38 210 4700 
Magnesium 1.74 650 1100 1.0 370 5300 
Iron 7.9 1500 3000 0.46 250 6300 
Titanium 4.5 1700 3700 0.52 320 8800 
Source: Table 1-1 (Nielsen, 2012) 
 
Energy Alone Sufficient for Hard Damage? 
In a nutshell, no. A nuclear bomb releases a lot of energy. One 
Kiloton yields 4,000,000,000,000 Joules. Well above the 10,000 
Joule criterion, but at a distance of less than a mile from detonation, 
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a concrete structure is undamaged. Over the same range an artillery 
shell with only 10,000 Joules of energy could easily destroy such 
a structure. Consider also the sun. It delivers about 5,000 Joules 
of energy over every square centimeter of the earth’s surface, yet 
we see no cars melting or people fried. Clearly, the energy must 
be delivered over a small region and in a short time to the target. 
Energy is not the silver bullet for damage. We must consider also 
density of energy on the target (Joules per square centimeter),[14] 
the rate of energy delivery, or power (Joules/ sec or Watts).  The 
nuclear bomb is not a DE weapon like the artillery shell. Much of 
the energy released does not intersect with the concrete structure 
and is “wasted”. The artillery shell is a DE and concentrates all of 
its energy right to the target in question. If we spread the energy 
of the bomb over a surface of a sphere at a range of one mile, the 
energy density is only 13 Joules per square centimeter, far less that 
the DE artillery shell density of 10,000 Joules per square centimeter. 
With the spreading of blast energy accounted for, the nuclear bomb 
is consistent with other weapon types. (Nielsen, 2012)[15] 
 
Energy Delivery Rate 
If energy is delivered over too long a period, it is not effective in 
damaging the target UAS. The target can shed energy as rapidly as it 
is deposited. Cars in a parking lot, (unfortunately fatal to youngsters 
or animals left in the car) until they become so hot that they radiate 
energy away as rapidly as its deposited, so they don’t heat up to a 
point of sustained damage. After that they heat up to a constant 
temperature. Only if energy is delivered more rapidly than the 
target can handle it will damage ensue. (Nielsen, 2012) 
From thermodynamics, we know that energy can be transferred 
away (lost in propagation) from a target by conduction, convection 
and radiation. 
Thermal conduction losses (energy flow or “downhill” 
temperature gradient (slope of curve of temperature v distance) 
from hot regions to cold regions moving the temperature to 
equilibrium in the system). The equation for thermal conduction is 
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 U = -k(dT / dx)                                      Equation 9-1 
 
Where U = rate of flow of energy across a surface, J/cm2 sec 
dT /dx =  the slope of the temperature curve, degrees / cm 
k =  constant of proportionality called thermal conductivity[16] in 
J/ sec cm deg 
 
Energy flows until the temperature is the same everywhere in the 
system. 
Convection (heat loss by macroscopic motion of molecules). Think 
of an attic fan moving hot air out of the attic, where motion is 
induced by the fan blades. The expression for wind induced 
convection for temperature v distance: 
 
dT /dt = – V dT/ dx                               Equation 9-2 
 
Where V = wind velocity 
T = temperature in time at point x 
dT /dx is the rate of change of Temperature in time at point x 
 
For a target to lose energy by conduction or convection, it must 
be immersed in the atmosphere, water or some fluid medium to 
supply the necessary molecules to carry the energy away. 
Black Body[17] radiation can occur in space or in a vacuum. 
Molecule movement is not just random, they vibrate, rotate and 
incorporate energy in their internal structure. 
The total intensity of radiation emerging from the surface of a 
Black Body, S (Watts/cm2) is: 
 
S = σ T4                                                 Equation 9-3 
 
Where σ = Stefan-Boltzmann constant = 5.67 x 10-12 (Watts/cm2 
K4), K= Kelvin temperature. 
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 Implications 
Damaging targets depends not only on delivering energy, but 
also concentrating the energy in both space and time. In space 
we deliver about 10,000 Joules per cm2 of target surface, either at 
a single point, (bullet) or over the whole surface, as in a nuclear 
weapon. In time, energy must be delivered more rapidly than the 
target can shed energy through conduction, convection and 
radiation loss mechanisms. The fluence (Joules / cm2) or Intensity 
(Watts /cm2) necessary to damage a target will vary with time or 
pulse width that the weapon engages the target.[18] 
 
Energy Losses in Propagation 
There are two types of energy losses in propagation: the 
spreading of energy  such that it does not interact with the target, 
and the wasting of energy in interactions with a physical medium, 
such as the atmosphere, through which it passes to destroy the 
target. Type one occurs whether the weapon or target is located on 
earth or in the vacuum of space. Type two occurs primarily when 
weapon or target lies within the atmosphere. Table 9-5 shows the 
Energy losses in propagation as a function of weapon type and loss 
mechanisms. 
 
Table 9-5 Energy losses in Propagation 
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Weapon Type Energy Loss Mechanism 
Kinetic Energy (bullets, rockets) Atmospheric Drag 
Lasers Absorption by molecules 
Scattering by molecules 
Absorption by aerosols (small particles) 
Scattering by aerosols 
Microwaves Absorption by molecules 
Scattering by molecules 
Absorption by water droplets 
Scattering by water droplets 
Particle Beams Energy losses to electrons 
Scattering from nuclei 
Scattering from electrons 
Radiation 
Source: (Nielsen, 2012) 
 
Advanced DE research is both fascinating and mostly classified. 
Below are examples of military systems that may be used for C-UAS 
defenses. 
 
Directed Energy (DE) Counter Weapons, High-Powered 
Microwave (HPM) Defenses, High-Power Lasers (HPL) 
The US Air Force Research Laboratory is investing US$16 million 
in further field assessment of Raytheon’s Phaser High Power 
Microwave System outside the continental U.S. [See Figure 9-9] 
The testing phase will span over 12 months in which the Phaser 
will engage simulated and real unmanned aerial systems threats. 
The evaluation will explore the effectiveness of Phaser’s counter-
drone engagement without disrupting the necessary installation 
operations. 
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The effectiveness of Phaser against drones has already been 
demonstrated at the Army MFIX exercise in 2018, when the system 
eliminated 33 drones, 2-3 at a time. Currently mounted on a 
shipping container-like box, Raytheon plans to significantly reduce 
the size in future versions. 
AFRL already evaluates two other HPM systems – the Tactical 
High-Power Operational Responder (THOR), [ See Figure 9-10] that 
deploys as a means to provide base defense against drones, and 
‘Counter-Electronic High-Power Microwave Extended-Range Air 
Base Air Defense’ system, or CHIMERA, designed to engage multiple 
targets over a larger area. 
The HPM contract follows a separate Air Force contract in which 
Raytheon will build two prototype high-energy laser systems, also 
to be deployed overseas. The HPM and HEL systems can be used 
independently or together to counter-unmanned aerial system 
threats. “There’s more than one way to defeat a drone,” said Dr. 
Thomas Bussing, Raytheon Advanced Missile Systems vice 
president. “We are delivering the world’s first defensive directed 
energy systems that can be used alone or in tandem to defeat 
enemy drones at the speed of light.” (Eshel, 2019) 
  
Figure 9-10 THOR 
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Source: (Eshel, 2019) 
 
Raytheon announces delivery of first laser counter-UAS system 
to U.S. Air Force 
U.S. defense contractor Raytheon Co announced that it 
successfully delivered the first high-energy laser counter-
unmanned aerial system to the U.S. Air Force earlier this month. 
In recent years, the Defense Department has assessed directed 
energy weapons—more commonly known as “lasers”—as an 
affordable alternative to traditional firepower to keep enemy drones 
from tracking and targeting troops on the ground. The system will 
be deployed overseas as part of a year-long Air Force experiment 
to train operators and test the system’s effectiveness in real-world 
conditions. See Figure 9-11. 
Raytheon’s high-energy laser weapon system uses an advanced 
variant of the company’s Multi-spectral Targeting System, an 
electro-optical/infrared sensor, to detect, identify and track rogue 
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drones. Once targeted, the system engages the threat, neutralizing 
the UAS in a matter of seconds. 
“Five years ago, few people worried about the drone threat,” said 
Roy Azevedo, president of Raytheon Space and Airborne Systems. 
“Now, we hear about attacks or incursions all the time. Our 
customers saw this coming and asked us to develop a ready-now 
counter-UAS capability. We did just that by going from the 
drawing board to delivery in less than 24 months.” 
Raytheon installed its high-energy laser weapon system on a 
small all-terrain vehicle. On a single charge from a standard 
220-volt outlet, the HELWS can deliver intelligence, surveillance 
and reconnaissance capability and dozens of precise laser shots. 
It can also be paired with a generator to provide a nearly infinite 
number of shots. 
Raytheon Company is integrating multiple proven technologies to 
counter the unmanned aerial system threat across a wide range of 
scenarios – from commercial airports to forward operating bases to 
crowded stadiums. Raytheon’s portfolio of sensors, command and 
control systems, and kinetic and non-kinetic effectors covers all 
aspects of the UAS threat. (Raytheon, 2019) 
 
Figure 9-11  Raytheon announces delivery of first laser counter-
UAS system to U.S. Air Force 
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Source: (Raytheon, 2019) 
 
Modern Communication Threats to UAS 
Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) are in widespread use for 
reconnaissance, EW, and weapons delivery. They are extremely 
dependent on interconnection with ground stations by command 
and data links. (Adamy D. , 2001) The increased use of Low 
Probability Intercept (LPI)  has become a significant challenge to 
electronic warfare (EW) communication links. (Adamy D. , 2001) 
This chapter explores LPI and Jamming. The student should then 
have enough background to understand the criticality of LPI and 
Jamming of UAS communication links.  Air defense missiles and 
associated radars make significant use of interconnecting links. 
(Adamy D. , 2001) SUAS sometimes use cellphones to command and 
control the UAVs. Cell phones are widely used for command and 
control function in nonsymmetrical warfare situations.  (Adamy D. 
, 2001) ISIS and other terrorist groups use cell phones to trigger 
improvised explosive devices. 
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Cybersecurity attacks on data communications links are highly 
classified. Similarly, modern radar threats to hostile installations are 
also generally classified.  Before examining LPI and communications 
signals/link- jamming, we first review the EW environment specific 
to UAS. Time for a few definitions of terms.[19] 
  
Information Operations (IO) and the part EW plays 
Figure 9-12 shows the global view of Information operations. Note 
how nicely all the prior definitions fit into the puzzle? Note that 
EW is a key component of IO, but not the singular dominant puzzle 
piece. [20] 
 
Figure 9-12 Information Operations 
Source: http://c4isys.blogspot.com/2013/11/basics-of-information-
operations-24.html also Source: JP 3-13 (Joint Publication) and 
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pertains to Information Operations (IO) in the United States. 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_13.pdf 
 
Autonomy vs. Automation 
Table 9-6 shows the normal five levels of automation that 
characterize UAS systems with examples of commercial vehicles. 
NASA presents a more detailed level of automation breakdown 
based on the OODA (Observe, Orient, Decide and Act) decision 
loops. (Barnhart, 2012) However, Table 9-6 should suffice to 
understand the cyber-purview.  Level 1 slave and Level 2 Automated 
(minimal) are commonly found on UAS sold at Amazon, Walmart, 
and similar outlets. The pilot makes all the decisions and has 
complete control of flying orders. Level 3 steps up the navigation 
capabilities using an a priori mission plan. 
Levels 4 and 5 add higher-level decision-making capabilities; 
collision avoidance without human intervention, complex mission 
planning in all weather conditions, expert systems intelligence 
without human intervention i.e. Artificial Intelligence (AI) and 
advanced Sense and Avoid systems (SAA). Level 5 is not 
commercially available; many designers are well on their way to a 
fully operational Level 5 UAS. 
 
Table 9-6 UAS Automation Scale 
Level 1:  Slave – assisting piloting, reaction to disturbance 
Level 2:  Automated – maintains its flying orders and receives 
higher level orders 
For Levels 1 and 2 are common, require pilot intervention and 
continuous communication link; 
reasonable prices < $1500 US, small, weight < 10lbs: Drone Parrot, 
Quad Flyer GAUI 
Level 3: Automated Navigation (a priori mission plan) 
For Level 3 micro-UAS premium (< $20,000 US): Dragonfly, 
Microdrone Gmbh, 
Fly-n-Sense, Mikrokopter 
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Level 4: Response from contextual data Collision Avoidance (CA) 
(w/o human intervention) 
For Level 4 minimum knowledge of surrounding environment, 
reacts to events, perform CA, 
uses active SAA, requires mission plan 
Level 5: Decision-Maker (expert system) from contextual data: 
navigation in unknown environment, 
complex missions, coordination and collaboration of signals 
For Level 5 AI, decision making with heavy networked computer 
support, perceptive sensors 
for space and time, complex mission in unknown environments, 
capable of intelligent adjustments 
including mission rescheduling, keyword- adaptive control Levels 
4 and 5 are confined 
to laboratories. (Nichols R.-0. , 2016) 
 
Table 9-7 UAS Collaboration shows four types of possible UAS 
collaboration. At the lower end of a threat scale is the isolated UAS 
or a small group of UAS. The advantages lie in a specific mission, 
which may be piloted or autonomous. They carry light payloads and 
are affordable. They are easy to assemble in the field. An example 
is the Raven used by US Special Forces. The disadvantage 
(countermeasure applied) is to identify the pilot or leader vehicle 
and destroy/disable it.  A UAS attack team is particularly effective 
against divided attack targets, Level 3 allows automatic navigation, 
synchronized actions, and limited updated mission information. 
With increased team members, synchronization is not guaranteed. 
Disabling part of the UAS Team does not guarantee that mission 
failure. The real vulnerability of the UAS team is the Chief. All 
synchronization and updates go through the Chief. Disable/destroy 
the Chief and the Team is rendered useless. Determining who the 
Chief is critical. 
Far more dangerous is the Swarm configuration especially in the 
higher levels of autonomous engagement.  Swarms have several 
advantages. They are efficient based on numbers; they demonstrate 
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emergent large group behaviors and reactions. Even not 
controllable or automated, they show a decentralized intelligence – 
think shoal of fish with evolving local rules. UAS Swarms are a highly 
resistant form, not changing based on survivability of members. 
There is no hierarchy like a team. Destroy part of the swarm and the 
rest will continue their mission without abatement. 
 
The two known countermeasures are: 1) Disrupt / Change the 
Strategic Global View of Swarm (its only real vulnerability) and 2) 
Force defender collaboration. (Nichols R.-0. , 2016) China appears 
to be the leader in innovative UAS swarm intelligence, through the 
efforts of the Chinese Electronics Technology Group Corporation 
(CETC). (Kania, 2017) This is not a threat to be underestimated. 
 
Table 9-7 UAS Collaboration 
 
Type 1:  Isolated Individual UAS 
Advantages: piloted or autonomous w/ specific mission to 
perform. Small, easy to assemble, affordable, light payloads. 
Countermeasures: Stop, Disable or Destroy Pilot, Threat removed. 
Type 2:  Group of Individual UASs (Isolated with own mission 
but not coordinated) 
Advantages: sphere of action may be different for each mission, 
increased numbers, and increases success of attacks by defenses 
saturation 
Countermeasures: Stop, Disable, Discover and Deter or Destroy 
Pilot(s), Threat(s) may be removed. 
Type 3: Team of UASs (All members assigned specialized tasks 
and coordinated by Chief) 
Advantages: Particularly effective against divided attack targets, 
Level 3 allows automatic navigation, synchronized actions, but no 
update to mission plans based on field activities. 
Disadvantages: Level 4 (w/o humans) yields surrounding 
reactions but may lose synchronization between team members. 
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Level 5 permits continuous updates, communications, commando 
style. 
Countermeasures: Stop, Disable or Destroy Team members. 
Determine behavior logic and intervene. Survival of team members 
is critical to defense actions. Threat mitigated. 
Type 4: UAS Swarm (Uniform mass of undifferentiated 
individual’s w/o Chief at level 4 or 5) 
Advantages: Efficient based on numbers, emergent large group 
behaviors and reactions, not controllable or automated, 
decentralized intelligence – think shoal of fish w/ evolving local 
rules; highly resistant form, not changing based on survivability of 
members, no hierarchy 
Countermeasures: Disrupt / Change the Strategic Global View of 
Swarm (its only real vulnerability). Defender collaboration. (Kania, 
2017) 
 
Commercial Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (sUAS) Overview 
There is a natural tendency to think that small unmanned aircraft 
systems present no threat, especially to US defenses. They are 
simply recreational or commercial toys. But they present a threat 
to National Airspace (NAS) – especially near airports. Figure 9-13 
shows the results of a sUAS crashing into a jetliner in 2016. 
 
Figure 9-13 Drone Crash into 737-700 passenger jet while 
landing at Mozambique 
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Source: UK Express, http://www.express.co.uk/travel/articles/
751165/drone-boeing-737-plane-crash-mozambique. Also See: 
https://youtu.be/2jzx8BpDuHE 
 
USA FAA Part 107 special rule forbids use of sUAS within a five-
mile radius of an airport. (FAA, 2018) 
Table 9-8 shows some of the available options and each year 
more capabilities are being added. Imaging, camera capabilities, 
weatherproofing, and payloads all can be used to gather 
intelligence, provide reconnaissance or deliver a lethal payload. 
They are radar resistant and deploy with a very small heat signature, 
so they can be in close target quickly, before defenders can activate 
countermeasures. 
 
Table 9-8 Commercial sUAS Parameters 
 
• “Flying Characteristics Available as RTF (off-the-shelf Ready 
to Fly); BNF (Bind and Fly –with custom transmitter); PNF (Plug 
and Fly with custom transmitter, receiver, battery, and 
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charger). RTF and BNF – no prior flight experience required. 
• Models most rotary multicopter – quad (4), hexa (6) octo (8) 
variants. Fixed wing used for deployments in agriculture, 
public safety, emergency response and ISR (Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) many fully customizable to 
achieve specific capabilities, flight time, payload capacity, 
programmable flight, maximum speed and weather hardening. 
• Average SUAS flight time 18 minutes, average range 
approximately one mile, cost $600 US, dry conditions” 
(Angelov, 2012) 
 
Specifications affecting hostile UAS operations 
• Payload capacity function (weight and size more than gimbal, 
camera, battery) LIDAR or infrared or experimental sensors 
require larger capacity and subject to easier detection. 
• Range function (signal transmission, LOS, image relay distance, 
battery and power constraints). 
• Weather Proofing function (limited operating conditions, 
mostly dry. Upgradable to near military grade to operate in 
extreme conditions) Retrofit to harden for weather is a trade-
off for weight, cost, flight time and payload capacity unless no 
of rotors increases. 
• Imaging function (available medium –high resolution cameras 
of > 12 megapixels, with still and video) Infrared and LIDAR 
installable. 
• Automated and Programmable Pilot / Follow Me settings 
function (predetermined flight mission path based on GPS 
coordinates (Fly-by-wire). Some with Follow Me autopilot 
settings enable the SUAS to automatically follow the operator. 
(Angelov, 2012) 
                                                 
Airborne Sensing Systems 
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 There are two technologies available for airborne sensing of 
other aircraft; cooperative and non-cooperative. Cooperative 
technologies receive radio signals from other aircraft’s onboard 
equipment. Two requirements for cooperative behavior. First ATC 
Transponder, which responds to ground-based secondary radar 
interrogations for air traffic control (ATC) usage. Traffic Alert 
Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) uses the same technology in FAA 
classes of airspace. Second is the Automatic Dependent Surveillance 
– Broadcast systems (ADS-B). ADS-B technology uses the Global 
Positioning System (GPS) or alternative navigational source to make 
broadcasts of its own aircraft position, velocity, and data required 
to avoid collisions.  (Angelov, 2012) Table 9-9 shows typical sensor 
coordinate systems. The first three cooperate with each other, the 
latter five are non-cooperative technologies. (Angelov, 2012) 
 
Table 9-9 Typical Sensor Coordinate Systems 
 
Sensor Technology                                                    Coordinate 
System 
Active interrogation of Mode A/C transponder    Relative range, 
altitude 
TCAS                                                                             Relative range, 
altitude 
ADS-B                                                                           Latitude, 
longitude, altitude, velocity 
Electro-Optical                                                           Bearing (azimuth 
and elevation) 
Laser /LIDAR                                                              Relative range 
Onboard radar                                                             Relative range, 
Bearing (azimuth & and elevation) 
Ground-based radar                                                   Range and 
bearing from ground-reference 
Acoustic                                                                         Bearing 
 
Sensor Parameters 
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Sensor technologies use standard parameters to provide a basis 
for comparison and ISR performance. Table 9-10 Standard Sensor 
Parameters shows the base set: 
 
Table 9-10 Standard Sensor Parameters 
 
Sensor                                     Function 
“Field of View    Describes angular sector within sensor making 
measurements. Outside this field of view, sensor is blind. 
Range                  Distance measured by sensor, within which some 
good probability of detection of targets 
Update Rate       Interval at which sensor provides measurements 
Accuracy            Uncertainty of position measurement – usually 
single dimension 
Integrity             Probability that measurement falls beyond some 
normal operation limit 
Data Elements    Cooperative sensors – specific data to enhance 
ISR platform, ex: trajectory, identity, intent” (Angelov, 2012) 
 
SAA Critical Control Systems include circuitry to affect UAS 
movement, landing, control of direction, detection, and correction 
of the aircraft. Many of these functions are incorporated into a UAS 
Autopilot, if capable. 
 
Autopilot 
Table 9-11 shows the common components found in UAS 
autopilots. These provide the means for UAS to affect movement, 
control, communications, detection, emergency operations, 
battery, waypoint delivery, and payloads. 
 
Table 9-11 Common components found in UAS autopilots 
 
• “Main Program/Processor: processing sensor data & 
implementation 
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of control of UAV 
• Magnetometer: measuring direction 
• GPS: determine global position 
• Airspeed/Altimeter: measure air speed & altitude 
• UAV Wireless Communication: communicating with ground 
station 
• Power System: provides power to UAV 
• Inertial Measurement Unit: measures movement of UAV 
• Boot Loader Reset Switch loads programs into main program 
board 
• Actuators: receives commands from main processing board & 
moves control surfaces 
• Manual Flight Control: overrides autopilot & gives control of 
UAV control surfaces to ground station”  (Clothier R. R., 2011) 
(Boutros, 2015) 
 
SCADA 
The security fault “low hanging fruit” in UAS systems is SCADA. 
 There are hundreds of millions of SCADA systems. They are used 
to control every practical machine you can imagine. SCADA stands 
for Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition. SCADA started in 
the 1940’s to control manufacturing processes such as flow rates, 
temperatures, valves, pressure, density, chemical, mechanical 
processes of all kinds. See Figure 9-14 for Legacy SCADA system for 
Chemical Plant. (Nichols R., Nov 28-30, 2006) 
SCADA systems have improved significantly over the decades in 
all areas except one – SECURITY. SCADA systems are a security 
sieve. Figures 9-15 & 9-16 show examples of SCADA Architectures. 
(Nichols R., Nov 28-30, 2006) An interesting example are the 
automated/computerized systems in modern cars. 
 
Figure 9-14 for Legacy SCADA system for Chemical Plant. 
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Source: (Nichols R. , Nov 28-30, 2006) 
 
Everything is controlled by SCADA; tires, engine, seat belts, safety 
bags, oil pressure, even door locks. However, cyber hackers can 
exploit SCADA to disable a car remotely, with the driver still in 
it!  Greenburg, Wired (2015). Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the 
Highway—With Me in It. (Greenburg, 2015) 
“UAS ARE JUST FLYING SCADA MACHINES!”  (Nichols R.-0. , 
2016) Table 9-12 SCADA shows the principle functions that apply to 
all SCADA systems, especially UAS. 
 
Table 9-12 SCADA Functions 
• Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems 
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facilitate management with remote access to real-time data 
• Channel to issue automated or operator-driven supervisory 
commands to remote station control devices 
• A human–machine interface (HMI) is responsible for data 
presentation to human operator 
•  Composed by a console that makes it possible to monitor & 
control process 
• Remote terminal units (RTUs) are microprocessor-controlled 
electronic devices that interface sensors to SCADA by 
transmitting telemetry data 
• Is a process control system for computerized real-time 
monitoring and control 
• Typically consists of: 
◦ Master Control Unit (MCU) 
◦ Remote Terminal Unit (s) (RTU) 
◦ Communication Links 
• Supervisory system is responsible for: 
◦ Data acquisition 
◦ Control activities on process 
• Programmable logic controllers (PLCs) are final actuators used 
as field devices 
• Communication infrastructure connecting supervisory system 
to RTUs 
• Various process & analytical instrumentation 
• RTU’s Alarm Systems 
◦ Doors 
◦ Battery Backup 
◦ Low Power/Loss of Power Alarm 
◦ Power Protection 
◦ Passwords for Keypads, PC ports 
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◦ Log Alarm (or Event) When Local User Plugs PC in or Signs 
On 
◦ Log Event when Local User Changes Values 
 Figure 9-15 UAS SCADA System Internals 
Source: (Nichols R. K., Hardening US Unmanned Systems Against 
Enemy Counter Measures, 2019) 
 
SCADA systems have plenty of cyber related vulnerabilities. Most 
are connected to computers. Those vulnerabilities multiply when 
connected to the Internet. SCADA systems differ from the IT 
structures. (Shapiro, 2006) Table 9-13 Sample SCADA Design 
Vulnerabilities apply to all systems including UAS.  (Nichols R. , Nov 
28-30, 2006)There are so many design flaws and vulnerabilities in 
SCADA systems that the US government has a special SCADA testing 
lab in Utah and has published copious recommendations to improve 
security. (NTSB, 2009) 
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 Table 9-13 Examples of SCADA Design Vulnerabilities 
 
• Ease of operation outweighs security 
• Commonly set up on operating systems with known 
vulnerabilities 
• Poor authentication systems in place 
• Remote access allowed for maintenance &/or IT support 
• Interconnectivity to vulnerable corporate networks 
• Weak access control lists on firewalls 
• Proper Network Access Control (NAC) is most crucial to 
prevent unauthorized connection within network 
• First target of compromise for an attacker 
• No use of standard IT defense software 
• Wireless technology common 
• System connect to unsecured remote processors 
• SCADA software not designed with robust security features 
• Public information often available on specific systems 
• Poor physical security on remote access points 
• No use of standard IT defense software 
• Wireless technology common 
• System connect to unsecured remote processors 
• SCADA software not designed with robust security features 
• Public information often available on specific systems 
• Poor physical security on remote access points. (Kilman, 2003) 
 
 
Attack Vectors 
 A brief overview of UAS Attack Vectors (by no means the 
exhaustive list) is demonstrated in Table 9-14.  (Nichols R.-0. , 2016) 
 
Table 9-14 Common Attack Vectors 
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“Common Vectors 
• Backdoors & holes in network perimeter 
• Protocol vulnerabilities 
• Attacks on field devices through cyber means Database attacks 
• Communications hijacking & Man-in-the-middle attacks 
• Cinderella attack on time provision & synchronization 
• Bogus input data to controller introduced by compromised 
sensors &/or exploited network link between controller & 
sensors 
• Manipulated & misleading output data to actuators/reactors 
from controller due to tempered actors/reactors or 
compromised network link between controller & actuators 
• Controller historian changes – feed forward control 
• Distributed Denial of Service – missing deadlines of needed 
task actions 
• Backdoors and holes in network perimeter 
• Vulnerabilities in common protocols 
• Attacks on field devices through cyber means 
• Database attacks 
• Communications hijacking and Man-in-the-middle attacks 
• Cinderella attack on time provision and synchronization 
• To a control engineer, possible attacks can be grouped into 
following categories: 
• Bogus input data to controller introduced by compromised 
sensors and/or exploited network link between controller and 
sensors 
• Manipulated and misleading output data to actuators/reactors 
from controller due to tempered actors/reactors or 
compromised network link between controller and actuators 
• Controller historian 
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• Denial of Service – missing deadlines of needed task actions 
Attacks on Software: 
• No Privilege Separation in Embedded Operating System 
• Buffer Overflow 
• Structured Query Language Injection 
Possible UAS Attack Hardware / Software 
• SkyJack© [21] 
• Aircrack-ng© [22] 
• Node-ar-drone© 
• Raspberry Pi© 
• Parrot AR. Drone -2© 
• Alfa© AWUS036H wireless adapter 
• Edimax© EW-7811Un wireless adapter 
• Snoopy© [23] 
Attacks on Communication Stack 
• Network Layer 
• Transport Layer 
• Application Layer 
Auxiliary tools: 
• Password Theft 
• Wireshark 
• Man-In-the-Middle Attacks 
• Trojan Horse Virus 
• Distributed Denial of Service Attacks” (Nichols R.-0. , 2016) 
 
Cyber – Attack Taxonomy 
UAS SCADA systems susceptible to a broad range of cyber and 
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network specific attacks on the SAA modules in the aircraft and 
communication structures from the ground or satellite links. These 
represent system threats and vulnerabilities of the UAS structure, 
increasing the risk of hostile use or takeover.  (Nichols R. , Nov 
28-30, 2006)A UAS Cyber Attack Taxonomy is an organized view 
of potential cyber threats to UAS assets. The Taxonomy is a list 
of agents that increase risk of a successful attack on US UAS ADS 
assets.  The risk of success of terrorist attacks on USA Air Defense 
Systems (ADS) via UASs is higher because of improving commercial 
capabilities and accessibility. 
 
A qualitative view of information risk (also a measure of cyber-
attack lethality) in a system such as SAA or computer network is 
expressed as: 
 
Risk = (Threats x Vulnerabilities x Impact / 
Countermeasures)           Equation  9-4 
 
And at time state 0, this equation can be reduced to 
 
Risk ~ function (Threats / Countermeasures)            
                          Equation  9-5 
(Nichols R.-0. , 2016)[24] 
 
At time state =0, where Vulnerabilities & Impact are constants and 
drop out of the equation. 
Threats are real, and if applied in the absence of appropriate 
countermeasures, will increase the likelihood of a successful cyber-
attack. Vulnerabilities are weaknesses in the system that a threat 
may or may not exploit. Vulnerabilities essentially in the system, ab 
initio. Threats can be mitigated or improved based on the attack 
circumstances. Impact is an after-the-fact accounting of the cyber-
attack. No matter what the magnitude, it is a constant. 
Countermeasures are a host of technologies that can be applied 
to mitigate threats and reduce Risk. Increased Threats means 
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increased Risk. Increased Countermeasures means decreased Risk. 
In practice, these equations require a qualitative legend to make 
comparable cases. Conversely, decreased threats means decreased 
Risk and decreased countermeasures means increased Risk. 
(Nichols R.-0. , 2016)Some authors use Vulnerabilities to assess Risk. 
(Garcia, 2006) Therefor our cyber-attack taxonomy must work for 
either Risk approach. There are many approaches to evaluating Risk. 
The authors choose the simplest approach to understand the attack 
vectors. 
 
Software – Based Vulnerabilities 
 “Military UAS defense systems deploy widely used software in 
their network devices: Operating systems, open source software, 
routers, radio frequency devices, Internet Connection Sharing (ICS) 
and SAA SCADA.”  (Sood A.K. & Enbody, 2014) UAS ground system 
network software may have the standard vulnerabilities; 
“hardcoded passwords, backdoors in firmware, insecure protocols, 
Remote Command Execution (RCE), default passwords for Human-
Machine Interfaces (HMIs), Insecure authentication and 
authorization, malicious hardware, critical infrastructure systems 
have hardcoded passwords embedded in firmware which may allow 
attackers to gain complete access to system.” (Sood A.K. & Enbody, 
2014) It doesn’t end there. 
Other software-based vulnerabilities: “Backdoors exist for 
support or remote access purposes, Hardcoded passwords easily 
obtained by: Reverse engineering firmware, analyzing functional 
components,” (Sood A.K. & Enbody, 2014) Remote Code Execution 
(RCE) which is an attacker’s ability to execute attacker’s commands 
on target machine or target process remotely. Another RCE 
vulnerability is a software bug that gives attacker way to execute 
arbitrary code or ability to trigger arbitrary code execution from 
one machine on another. (Nichols R.-0. , 2016) 
Unfortunately,” Remote Code Execution (RCE) can be triggered 
by exploiting security flaws in: Operating system components, 
browsers,” ICS, SCADA, routers, Microsoft Office, Adobe Reader, and 
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Java. Remote Code Execution (RCE) is a powerful threat to UAS and 
supporting computer systems. “Attackers exploit security issues; 
buffer overflows (stack, heap, integer), use-after free errors, race 
conditions, memory corruption, privilege escalations and dangling 
pointers.” 
 
Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerabilities keeps growing and 
RCE vulnerabilities allow “attackers to execute arbitrary code on 
compromised systems, drive-by downloads, spear phishing attacks.” 
(Sood A.K. & Enbody, 2014) 
ICS/SCADA is particularly vulnerable to remote code execution 
vulnerabilities.  Another form is SQL injections, “which exploits 
weaknesses in web applications to allow attackers’ queries to be 
executed directly in backend database” and allow attackers to 
extract sensitive information such as credentials, emails, critical 
documents, intelligence. “Data stolen using SQL injection can 
provide critical information for advanced UAS targeted attacks.” 
(Sood A.K. & Enbody, 2014) 
The final group in the software- based vulnerabilities set is 
“insecure authentication and file uploading flaws. These allow 
remote attackers to access critical systems by exploiting weak 
authentication design and uploading malicious code or firmware. 
This security issue persists due to inability of systems to implement 
granular control through proper authentication and authorization 
checks. File uploading attacks exploit a system’s inability to 
determine type of files being uploaded on server.” (Sood A.K. & 
Enbody, 2014) 
  
Hardware-based Vulnerabilities 
The US sometimes picks the wrong vendors to supply its UAS 
critical hardware. Hardware imported from China includes 
backdoor access to hardware after deployment.  “Exported Chinese 
manufacturing units compromised military-grade FPGA computer 
chips, circuits, and counterfeit devices, such as scanners.” “Zombie 
Zero malware has been implanted in software of scanner hardware 
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manufactured in China as part of attack targeting shipping and 
logistics industries, especially printers. When scanners are 
connected to networks, they provide platforms for compromising 
networks. Counterfeit devices and circuits developed in China for 
U.S. military and defense contractors to be used in warships, 
missiles, airplanes and UAS.” (Sood A.K. & Enbody, 2014) (Threat to all 
nations that receive hardware pre-installed with malware.) (Nichols 
R.-0. , 2016) 
 
“Hardware based vulnerabilities observed in actual attacks on 
military defense systems (Army) and applications include the 
following; backdoors and hardcoded passwords, compromised 
GPS Satellite Communication (SATCOM) systems,” SCADA 
systems vulnerable to buffer overflows, and compromised GPS 
SATCOM systems. The Navy had its share of hardware-based 
threats; Remote Code Execution – “XMLDOM Zero-day 
vulnerability was exploited to attack U.S. Veterans of Foreign Wars’ 
website, SQL injections, Royal Navy website hacked, U.S. Army 
website hacked, insecure protocols, spoofing and hijacking and 
attacks to spoof GPS communication to control U.S. drones.”  (Sood 
A.K. & Enbody, 2014) 
Wireless attacks are the most generic form of hacking. “Strategies 
to compromise a system’s ability to be controlled by rightful owner 
include: 
• Password Theft 
• Wireshark 
• Man-In-the-Middle Attacks 
• Trojan Horse Virus 
• Gain Scheduling Fuzzing, 
• Digital Update Rate, 
• Distributed Denial of Service, 
• Buffer Overflow.”(Rani, 2015) 
Forms of MIM attacks are: 
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• URL manipulation 
• Rogue Domain Name Server 
• Address Resolution Protocol poisoning 
• Duplication of Media Access Control 
• False Emails” (Rani, 2015) 
Gain Scheduling attack methods Sensor spoofing to cause mode 
confusion, 
• Overriding gains through hacking, 
• Infinite switching between gains, will cause loss of control, 
• Causing Denial of Service (DOS) between controller gain block, 
and UAS controller block by overloading the on-board 
processor.” (Kim, 2012) 
Other possible Attacks on UAS Systems 
• Autopilot Hardware Attack. (Kim, 2012) 
• Wireless Attack. (Nichols R.-0., 2016) 
• Control System Security. (Kim, 2012) 
• Application Logic Security. (Nichols R.-0. , 20 
 
Electronic Warfare (EW) – UAS Purview[25] 
 Warfare is conducted by adversaries who go to great pains to 
understand their enemy’s intentions, strengths, weaknesses, and to 
minimize the threats to their own forces and territory. 
The detection and interception of messages/data, combined with 
ground observations, provide an ability to observe troop 
movements and facilitate counteractions by opposing forces. UAS 
plays a significant role in these missions. 
 
Communication Links for UAS are critical and must be secured 
 Modern warfare is conducted in a rich electromagnetic 
environment with radio communications and radar signals from 
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many sources. Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) / UAV / UUV 
/ Drones are an integral part of modern warfare.  UAS 
communications networks and links to ground stations are critical 
to the successful military use of UAS. Securing UAS links from EW 
attacks is a fundamental concern to military planners and civilian 
authorities.  UAS BLOS communications require stable 
communications. Disrupting these communications links is a goal of 
hostile forces. 
The key role of EW is to search these radio-frequency bands to 
cull information that can be used for intelligence analysis or by 
front-line operators. The information gathered may affect a tactical 
advantage on the battlefield, or in any stage before or after. (Moir I. 
a., 2006) 
Adamy (2001) is correct when he suggests that the, “key to 
understanding EW principles (particularly the RF) part is to 
understand radio propagation theory. Understanding propagation 
leads logically to understanding how they are intercepted, jammed or 
protected.” [26] 
 
Main Contention 
 
It is the author’s contention that UAS communication links are 
vulnerable and must be evaluated to protect US Unmanned Aircraft 
in the cyber or electronic domain. Further, those links may be 
electronically jammed, cyber-spoofed (especially navigational), or 
made ineffective with electronic or cyber or directed energy or 
acoustic interference.[27] 
 
Communications Jamming -UAS 
 The purpose of communication is to move information from one 
location to another. All the following types of transmitted signals are 
communications: 
 
• “Voice or non-voice communications (video or digital format)”; 
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• “Command signals to control remotely located assets;” 
• “Data returned from remotely located equipment”; 
• “Location and motion of friendly or enemy assets (land, sea, or 
air);” 
• UAS communications links from it ground station for control of 
the aircraft; 
•  UAS communications links from another aircraft or satellite 
affecting its flying characteristics; 
• UAS communication signals (from any source) that affect the 
SAA / navigation / payload / waypoints; 
• Computer-to-computer communications; 
• Data links; 
• Weapon-firing links; 
• ISR data links; 
• Cell phones. 
 
Figure 9-16 High -Level C4 Operational Concept Incorporating 
UAS 
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Source:  (DoD-03, 2015) 
 
“The purpose of communications jamming is to prevent the 
transfer of information. Communications jamming requirements 
depend on the signal modulation (strength), the geometry of the 
link, and the transmitted power.”  (Adamy D. , 2009) Another way to 
think of jamming is a method to “interfere with the enemy’s use of 
the electromagnetic spectrum. Use of EMS involves the transmission 
of information from one point to another”. (Adamy D. , 2009) 
“The basic technique of jamming is to add an interfering signal,” 
along with the desired signal, into an enemy’s receiver. “Jamming 
becomes effective when the interfering signal is strong enough to 
overwhelm the desired signal.”  This prevents the enemy from 
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recovering the information from the desired signal. (Adamy D. , 
2009) There are two possible methods for a successful jam: either 
the jamming signal is stronger than the desired “signal or the 
combined signals received have characteristics that prevented the 
processor from properly extracting the desired information.” 
(Adamy D. , 2009)   A simple case of jamming unintentionally is when 
your AM news station (listening in the car) becomes overwhelmed 
by junk music. You can hear the beginning of the interference as 
noise, then the junk signal is strong, then as the car moves out of 
the area, the AM news station regains its status. (Adamy D. , 2009) 
The cardinal rule of jamming is that you jam the receiver, NOT the 
transmitter. (Adamy D. , 2001) 
“The primary difference between radar and communication 
jamming is in the geometry.  Whereas a typical radar has both the 
transmitter and the associated receiver at the same location, a 
communication link, because its job is to take information from one 
location to another, always has its receiver in a different location 
from that of the transmitter.” (Adamy D. L., 2004) 
Communication is often done using transceivers (each including 
both transmitter and receiver), but only the receiver at location B in 
the figure is jammed. If transceivers are in use and one desires to 
jam the link in the other direction, the jamming signal must reach 
location A.” (Adamy D. L., 2004) 
Another difference of radar jamming is that the radar signal 
makes a round trip to the target, so the received signal power is 
below the transmitted power by the fourth power of the distance 
(often stated as 40 log range). Since the jammer power is 
transmitted one way, it is only reduced by the square of distance.” 
(Adamy D. L., 2004) Table 9-15 shows the Types of Jamming. (Adamy 
D. , 2001) 
To be effective, the jammer must get its signal into the enemy’s 
receiver – through the associated antenna, input filters, and 
processing gates. This depends on the signal strength the jammer 
transmits in the direction of the receiver and the distance and 
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propagation conditions between the jammer and the receiver. 
(Adamy D. , 2009) 
  
Table 9-15 Types of Jamming 
 
Type of 
Jamming 
Purpose 
 
Communications 
jamming 
Interferes with enemy ability to pass information over 
a communication link 
 
Radar jamming 
Causes radar to fail to acquire its target, to stop 
tracking target, or to output false information 
 
Cover jamming 
Reduces the quality of the desired signal so that it 
cannot be properly processed, or the info is lost / 
unrecoverable 
Deceptive 
jamming 
Causes radar to improperly process its return signal 
to indicate the correct range or angle to target 
 
Decoy 
Looks like the target more than the actual target; 
causes a guided weapon to attack the decoy rather 
than intended target 
 
 Source: (Adamy D. , 2001) 
 
 
Jammer-to-Signal Ratio 
 The real test of jammer effectiveness is the effectiveness with 
which information flow is stopped. “A jammer interferes with 
communication by injecting an undesired signal into the target, 
receiver along with any desired signals that are being received.” 
(Adamy D. , 2009) “The obstructing signal must be strong enough 
that the receiver cannot recover the required information from the 
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desired signals.” The ratio of the jamming signal to the desired signal 
is known as the jamming–to-signal ratio (J/S), stated in dB.[28] 
Effective J/S depends on the transmitted modulation, but the 
Adamy formula works in general. (Adamy D. , 2001) 
The formula for communication J/S is: 
 
J / S = ERPJ  –  ERPS  –  LJ  +  LS  +  G RJ  –  G R           Equation 
9-6 
 
Where: J/S = the ratio of the jammer power to the desired signal 
power at the input to the receiver being jammed in dB 
 
ERPJ   the effective radiated power of the jammer in dBm 
ERPS  the effective radiated power of the desired signal 
transmitter, in dBm 
LJ         the propagation loss from jammer to receiver, in dBi[29] 
LS        The propagation loss from the desired signal transmitter, 
in dBm 
GRJ      the receiving antenna gain in the direction of the jammer, 
in dBi 
GR       The receiving antenna gain in the direction of the desired 
signal transmitter, in dBi.” (Adamy D. , 2001) 
 
Many UAS (especially UAV or sUAS ) have a target receiving 
antenna with a 360-degree azimuth coverage. They use whips or 
monopoles. They are inexpensive.  With a 360-degree antenna, the 
communications J/S equation simplifies to: 
 
J / S = ERPJ  –  ERPS  –  LJ  +  LS               Equation 9-7 
 
The receiving antenna has the same gain toward the jammer and 
the desired signal transmitter. The two gain terms cancel out. 
(Adamy D. , 2009) 
 
A J /S calculation would indicate a successful jam when the 
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desired signal fully compromised. (Adamy D. , 2001) The terminology 
is slightly different for the power terms (removing the “effective 
radiated” and using “power total” instead).  The principle is still 
the same. (Adamy D. , 2009) See Appendix 9-3 for example J/S 
calculation. 
US Army Field Manual FM 34-40-7 (23 Nov 1992) Communications 
Jamming Handbook, presents three alternative methods for 
calculating the jamming power required and distance to target. 
For the designer of an anti-UAS Drone gun, (Figure 9-17) which 
transmits a jammer signal to a UAS to overwhelm the desired 
ground station command signals, one needs the know the power 
and height of the drone. Since the drone is moving the jammer 
signal must radiate in such a manner that it covers a volume of space 
until target “UAS lock.” 
 
Drone gun – Chinese alternative 
A Chinese firm makes an anti-drone gun that costs about $35,000 
USD and operates on 5.8 GHz and 2.4 GHz.[30]  80% of consumer 
drones operate on these frequencies. “The gun tricks the drone into 
thinking it has lost connection with its controller.” “RC signal lost” 
is flashed on drone screen – aircraft returning to home point.” The 
drone can be recovered intact. This gun has an operational limit of 
about 700 meters (0.43496 miles). 
 
Figure 9-17 Drone Jammer Model KWT-FZQ. 
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 Source: Tri-band Anti Drone Rifle KWT-FZQ/DG10-A 
Manufacturer: Globaldroneuav.com 
https://globaldroneuav.com/Product/Police-drone-jammer-
effective-drone-controller.html  Appendix 9-1 details this anti-
drone gun.[31] 
Calculating the minimum of “amount of jammer power output 
required in watts” for this easy drone capture would be of interest. 
(Army, 1992) Appendix 9-4 of FM 34-70  (Army, 1992)gives a slightly 
different version of the Adamy equation 9-5: 
 
P j  =  P t   x   K  x  (H t / H j )2  x (D j / D t )N        
                  Equation 9-8 
Where: 
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P j  =  Minimum amount of jammer power output required , in 
watts 
P t  =  Power output of the enemy drone, in watts 
H j  = Elevation of the jammer location above sea level, feet 
H t   =  Elevation of enemy transmitter location above sea level, in 
feet 
D j =  Jammer location – to-target receiver location distance, in 
km 
D t =  Enemy transmitter location -to- target receiver location, in 
km 
K =  2 for jamming frequency modulated receivers (jamming tuner 
accuracy) 
N =  Terrain and ground conductivity factors 
5 = very rough terrain with poor ground conductivity 
4 = Moderately rough terrain with fair to good ground 
conductivity 
3 = Farmland terrain with good ground conductivity 
2 = Level terrain with good ground conductivity 
F = Frequency in MHz (Army, 1992) 
 
“Note: The elevation of the jammer location and the enemy 
transmitter location does not include the height or length of the 
antenna above the ground. (Army, 1992) It is the location deviation 
above sea level. 
Given the following parameters: 
P j  =  Minimum amount of jammer power output required , in 
watts = (SOLVE) 
P t  =  Power output of the enemy transmitter -to drone, in watts 
= 5 watts 
H j  = Elevation of the jammer location above sea level, feet, use 
385m =.385 km 
H t   =  Elevation of enemy transmitter location above sea level, in 
feet use 386m =.386 km 
D j =  Jammer location – to-target receiver location distance, in 
km = 700 m = 0.700 km 
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D t =  Enemy transmitter location -to- target receiver location, in 
km = 372m = 0.372 km 
K =  2 for jamming frequency modulated receivers (jamming tuner 
accuracy) = 2 
N =  Terrain and ground conductivity factor = Use 4 for moderate 
terrain with fair to good ground conductivity (Army, 1992) 
F = Frequency in MHz, use 37.5 MHz in the band 
Parameters were chosen so that the height ratio would drop-out 
and the distance would induce some ground conductivity effects 
consistent with the FM 34-40-7 examples. 
Plugging the numbers and solving for P: 
 
P j  =  5 x 2 x (1)2   x  (0.7 / 0.372)4   =   10  x  (1.88) 4     = 10  x 
12.46  = 125 watts 
 
So, under these hypothetical conditions the jammer gun requires 
125 watts (2 60-watt light bulbs) to take down the drone. 
Theoretically, if the jammer was using a log periodic array (LPA) 
the power could be cut in half to 62.5 watts (1 bulb). Now if this 
calculation is reasonable, the buyer is spending $35,000 USD to take 
down a small irritating drone (invasion of privacy) using a 60-watt 
bulb. A double-aught shotgun shell with a 12-gauge Remington and 
yellow shooter sunglasses will have the same effect (might even be 
more satisfying) for 1/100 the cost. The medium size drones present 
a more interesting case. More power is needed to lock on to the 
higher altitude UAS. The term of interest in the jamming equation 
from FM 34-40 -7 is the ratio of the distances to the fourth power 
(or second power for perfect terrain). That can have a major impact 
on jammer output power. (Army, 1992) 
 
Radar Range Equation 
Equation 9-9 is not the only place we see a term taken to the 
4th power. The famous “Radar Range Equation is dominated by the 
R4 factor in the denominator. There is no corresponding function 
in the numerator of equation 9-9, with an exponent greater than 
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unity. (Toomay, 1982) There is no magic bullet to achieve a high-
performance system. If low cross section targets are to be engaged, 
a combination of high-power, high gain, large aperture, and low 
noise needs to be dictated.” (Toomay, 1982) 
 
The standard Radar Range Equation (RRE) is: 
 
S / N = (P GTArσ ) / [(4π)2 R4 KTS LS ]                        Equation 
9-9 
 
Where: 
S / N = is one pulse received signal to noise ratio, dB 
P  = Isotropic source of an electromagnetic pulse of peak power, 
Mw 
GT   = Gain of the transmit antenna, dB 
Ar  =  Receive antenna effective area, m2 
σ  =  Radar Cross Sectional Area, m2 
R4   =  Energy density received at detected target range, R, nm 
K = Boltzmann’s constant (Noise component) 
TS = Measured noise temperature, Kelvin units above absolute 
zero 
LS =  Losses existing in the system (lumped together), dB 
 
Inherent in equation 9-9, is the fact that the range of the radar to 
a “detected object can be calculated by:  R = ct / 2, where c is the 
speed of light (3 x 108 m/s) x time , in sec. also, λ = c / f, where λ is 
the wavelength in Hz, and frequency, f is the cycles/second for the 
sinusoidal oscillator.” (Toomay, 1982) 
The point of this diversion into Radar history was that the 
performance of both the jamming equation and the radar range 
equation are affected by a power of 4th exponent. This affects 
equipment design, cost, effectiveness of detection or capture. 
 “The principles of a primitive radar are formed. Figure 9-18 
diagrams its functions. A burst of electromagnetic energy, 
oscillating at a predetermined frequency is generated  and radiates 
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into free space from an antenna. A clock is started. The 
electromagnetic energy propagates outward at the speed of light, 
reradiating (scattering) from objects it encounters along its path. 
Part of the scattered energy returns to the radar (is received) and 
can be detected there because it imitates the frequency and 
duration of the transmitted pulse.” (Toomay, 1982) 
Figure 9-19 shows a simple surveillance RADAR. Compare this to 
2019 version in Figure 9-20 which requires computer simulations to 
sort out the parameters. 
 
Figure 9-18 Simple Radar Block Diagram 
Source: Simple Radar PPTX by Linkedin SlideShare (2018) 
https://www.slideshare.net/remotesensor1/radar-transmitter-4-1 
A full derivation of all the terms, the radar spherical geometry and 
derivations of subset equations are in all legacy and modern radar 
texts and papers. 
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Figure 9-19 Simple Surveillance Radar 
Source: Encyclopedia Britannica, (1994) 
 
Complex RADAR / RES Simulations 
Figure 9-20 shows that RADARS can be quite complex. They lend 
themselves to computer simulation to determine optimum 
parameters for a variety of systems. 
Advancement of computer technologies and computer networks 
opens the possibilities of effective modeling of progressively 
sophisticated electronics. Nowadays, the time spent on the 
procedures of modeling complex radio electronic systems (RES) has 
been tangibly shortened. The shortened time spent on computation 
and steadily promoted adequacy of computer models to real 
systems and waveforms make it possible to transform the process 
of designing sophisticated systems (radars, air defense missile 
systems, their components and subsystems) based on modeling. 
Information circulates about real facts of full-scale designing of 
large-size aerial vehicles using adequate computer models. 
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Objects of modeling: 
• RES with easily changeable structure and parameters; 
• various signals circulating in radio electronic systems and in 
air; 
• objects controlling such systems, for example, missiles in the 
process of guidance; 
• influence of physical factors on quality and parameters of the 
processes described (ambient temperature, humidity, pressure, 
influence of the atmosphere on propagation of radio waves, 
etc.). 
Computer modeling radically simplifies and saves time expenditure 
on developing complex RES, considerably alleviates the designer’s 
qualification requirements, minimizes physical modeling and 
financial costs. 
 
They are used for: 
• optimization of the structure and parameters of newly 
developed radars, ADMS, EW assets; 
• analysis of effectiveness of operation of Radars (ADMS), EW 
assets in complex jamming environments, facing the use of 
intensive maneuvers by the targets, etc.; 
• researching the principal operational and technical 
characteristics of radars, ADMS, EW assets (detection 
envelope, kill envelope, tracking accuracy, etc.) 
ADMS computer modeling systems are designed for: 
• analysis of the processes of target detection and tracking in 
surveillance radars 
• analysis of the processes of detection, reception of targeting, 
detection and acquisition of targets (lock-on) by tracking 
radars; 
• analysis of the process of target lock-on and tracking by an air 
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defense missile (SAM); 
• analysis of the process of missile flight, collision with target, 
warhead detonation and effectiveness of the kill; 
• selection and substantiation of the ADMS structure and 
parameters. 
 
The modeling system comprises: 
• models of the detection radar; 
• models of the tracking radar; 
• models of the missile motion; 
• models of the missile signal; 
• models of influence of the atmosphere on propagation of radio 
waves; 
• models of motion of the target(s); 
• models of target echoes; 
• models of clutters induces by volume- and surface-distributed 
reflectors; 
• models of jamming; 
• models of multipath caused by influence of the Earth; 
• models of the atmosphere. 
 
 Figure 9-20 Computer modeling of sophisticated radio 
electronic systems 
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Source: (radiotechnika – Republic of Belarus, 2019) 
 
Conclusions 
 
UAS are vulnerable to a variety of non-kinetic defenses, to wit: 
IO, cyber, EW, and as we shall see next chapter, acoustic. UAS are 
also vulnerable to DE weapons[32] UAS avionics is a prime target for 
both cyber and EW C-UAS defenses. SAA and SCADA systems are 
most susceptible to cyber-attacks. 
 
Discussion Question 
 
• There is a closely related science that intersects with EW and 
that is Cyber. There are distinct parallels and intersections 
between Cyber and EW. For instance, the sister of signal 
spreading techniques is encryption. See Figure 9-21 showing 
the intersection of Cyber, EW, and Spectrum Warfare 
designated as Cyber Electromagnetic Activities (CEA)[33] [34] 
[35] [36] The reader will research all major C-UAS 
intersections viewed in Figure 9-21 and provide examples. 
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 Figure 9-21 Cyber Electromagnetic Activities 
Source: FM 3- 38 (2014) 
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Appendix 9-1 Tri-band Anti Drone Rifle KWT-FZQ/DG10-A[37] 
 
Source: (LRAD Corporation, 2019) 
Manufacturer: Globaldroneuav.com 
https://globaldroneuav.com/Product/Police-drone-jammer-
effective-drone-controller.html 
 
Functions and features 
 
1. Full range cover within three frequency section and high-
power transmission helps to achieve the ideal effects. 
2. Fast trigger, easy use and daughter switch design make control 
more ease and comfort. 
3. Dual lithium batteries for power supply last work time longer. 
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4. The strong internal line connector and external fuses port 
make the whole vehicle and component parts fastened 
securely. 
5. All aluminum alloy case body design and glass fiber material 
for antenna cover make its appearance lighter and faster. 
ce dimension ：（mm）L×W×H；1323mm×403mm×341 mm 
Weight（Kg）:4.7kg±0.2kg（mainframe + battery） 
0.6kg±0.1kg（sighting telescope） 
Source: Tri-band Anti Drone Rifle KWT-FZQ/DG10-A 
Manufacturer: Globaldroneuav.com 
https://globaldroneuav.com/Product/Police-drone-jammer-
effective-drone-controller.html 
 
 
Appearance dimension ：（mm）L×W×H；1323mm×403mm×341 
mm 
Weight（Kg）:4.7kg±0.2kg（mainframe + battery） 
0.6kg±0.1kg（sighting telescope） 
 
Source: Tri-band Anti Drone Rifle KWT-FZQ/DG10-A 
Manufacturer: Globaldroneuav.com 
https://globaldroneuav.com/Product/Police-drone-jammer-
effective-drone-controller.html 
Technical parameters 
 
Chapter 9: Non- Kinetic: Military Avionics, EW,CW,DE,SCADA
Defenses  |  269
SN Parameter name： Parameter index record： 
1 Power supply- Work voltage V 
2 Work current A ≤9A@DC14.8V 
3 Work time ≥1.5h 
4 Radio Frequency Work frequency range MHz 
5 Output power dBm 40dBm@1550～1620MHz（±1dB） 
6 37dBm@2400～2483MHz（±1dB） 
7 37dBm@5725～5852MHz（±1dB） 
8 Out of band rejection 
＜-36dBm@30～1000MHz 
＜-30dBm@≥1GHz 
9 
Specification 
&environment 
Weight 
10 Dimension 1323mm×403mm×341 mm, with battery and an
11 Work environment humidity ≥95% 
12 Work temperature -25℃～55℃ 
13 Storage temperature -40℃～70℃ 
Appearance dimension ：（mm）L×W×H；1323mm×403mm×341 
mm 
Weight（Kg）:4.7kg±0.2kg（mainframe + battery） 
0.6kg±0.1kg（sighting telescope） 
 
Source: Tri-band Anti Drone Rifle KWT-FZQ/DG10-A 
Manufacturer: Globaldroneuav.com 
https://globaldroneuav.com/Product/Police-drone-jammer-
effective-drone-controller.html 
 
 
Appendix 9-2 MQ-4C Triton design features 
270  |  Chapter 9: Non- Kinetic: Military Avionics, EW,CW,DE,SCADA
Defenses
 
The MQ-4C Triton is based on the RQ-4N, a maritime variant of 
the RQ-4B Global Hawk. The main aluminum fuselage is of semi-
monocoque construction, while the V-tail, engine nacelle and aft 
fuselage are made of composite materials. The forward fuselage is 
strengthened for housing sensors and the radomes are provided 
with lightning protection, and hail and bird-strike resistance. 
The UAS has a length of 14.5m, height of 4.7m and a wingspan 
of 39.9m. It can hold a maximum internal payload of 1,452kg and 
external payload of 1,089kg. 
 
Mission capabilities of MQ-4C Triton BAMS UAS 
The MQ-4C is a high-altitude, long-endurance UAS, suitable for 
conducting continuous sustained operations over an area of 
interest at long ranges. It relays maritime intelligence, surveillance 
and reconnaissance (ISR) information directly to the maritime 
commander. 
The UAS can be deployed in a range of missions such as maritime 
surveillance, battle damage assessment, port surveillance and 
communication relay. It will also support other units of naval 
aviation to conduct maritime interdiction, anti-surface warfare 
(ASuW), battle-space management and targeting missions. 
The MQ-4C is capable of providing persistent maritime 
surveillance and reconnaissance coverage of wide oceanographic 
and littoral zones at a mission radius of 2,000 nautical miles. The 
UAS can fly 24 hours a day, seven days a week with 80% effective 
time on station (ETOS). 
 
Payloads of Northrop’s unmanned system 
The payload is composed 360° field of regard (FOR) sensors 
including multifunction active sensor (MFAS) electronically steered 
array radar, electro-optical / infrared (EO/IR) sensor, automatic 
identification system (AIS) receiver and electronic support 
measures (ESM). The payload also includes communications relay 
equipment and Link-16. 
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The MTS-B multispectral targeting system performs auto-target 
tracking and produces high-resolution imagery at multiple field-
of-views and full motion video. The AN/ZLQ-1 ESM uses specific 
emitter identification (SEI) to track and detect emitters of interest. 
Engine and performance of the US’s UAS. 
MQ-4C Triton is powered by a Rolls-Royce AE3007H turbofan 
engine. It is an advance variant of the AE3007 engine in service with 
the Citation X and the Embraer Regional Jet. The engine generates 
a thrust of 8,500lb. 
The UAS can fly at a maximum altitude of 60,000ft. It has a gross 
take-off weight of 14,628kg. Its maximum unrefueled range is 9,950 
nautical miles and endurance is 30 hours. The maximum speed is 
357mph. 
 
Ground control station 
The UAS is operated from ground stations manned by a four-man 
crew, including an air vehicle operator, a mission commander and 
two sensor operators. The UAS can fly 24 hours a day, seven days a 
week with 80% effective time on station (ETOS). 
The ground station includes launch and recovery element (LRE) 
and a mission control element (MCE). The MCE performs mission 
planning, launch and recovery, image processing and 
communications monitoring. The LRE controls related ground 
support equipment as well as landing and take-off 
operations. (Naval Technology Team, 2019) 
 
 
Appendix 9-3:  J/S Calculation Example 
272  |  Chapter 9: Non- Kinetic: Military Avionics, EW,CW,DE,SCADA
Defenses
 Source: Cagalj, M. (2014) & Adamy, D, (2001) EW 101 
Quote from manufacturer Globaldroneuav.com: (Adamy D. , 2009) 
 
Endnotes 
[1]FIRES definition (US DoD – JP 3-0) the use of weapon systems to 
create a specific lethal or nonlethal effect on a target. 
[2]  Danger Close Definition www.benning.army.mil/infantry/
magazine/issues/2013/May-June/Myer.html Nov 14, 2013 
– 1) danger close is included in the “method-of-engagement” line of 
a call-for-fire request to indicate that friendly forces are close to 
the target. … Danger close is a term that is exclusive from risk 
estimate distance (RED) although the RED for 0.1 percent PI is used 
to define danger close for aircraft delivery.  Pi = Probability of 
incapacitation. 2) Definition of “danger close” (US DoD) In close air 
support, artillery, mortar, and naval gunfire support fires, it is the 
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term included in the method of engagement segment of a call for 
fire which indicates that friendly forces are within close proximity 
of the target. 
[3] See Team or SWARM formats, Tables 3-1 and  3-2 in (Nichols, et 
al., 2019) 
[4] (Moir I. &., 2006) provides data on all the listed military avionics 
systems, including role description, key performance 
characteristics, profile, crew component, systems architecture, 
major components (avionics, communications, mission systems and 
weapons), and pictures of aircraft types in the role. The purpose of 
this section is to detail one role, the Military Maritime Role (MPA) 
to show that UASs can perform the role in support of the author’s 
opening contention that manned (piloted) aircraft systems can be 
replaced by unmanned (no crew) aircraft systems for a variety of the 
key performance characteristics for less investment and reduced 
liability to US forces. Every role listed reasonable fits within the 
author’s contention, again presented without any intended 
disrespect to our US military forces. 
[5] Authors conclusions. 
[6] These are legacy definitions from (Moir I. &., 2006) and are 
included for functional purposes. Chapter 14 of (Nichols, et al., 2019) 
update these definitions to USA and NATO categories.  ES = 
Electronic Warfare support ( old ESM); EA = Electronic attack – 
which is the old ECM but also includes ASW and Directed Energy 
(DE) weapons; and EP = Electronic Protection is the old ECCM. 
[7] Again, the chosen material for Table 9-2 has legacy implications 
by design. Many of the included systems have been significantly 
upgraded and, in some cases, classified as to performance. All the 
system names are found in the Abbreviations List. MPA represents a 
huge category in tasks and is a primary user of acoustic data. 
[8] The EW, CW and Acoustic Countermeasures discussions are 
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updated from Chapter 3: Understanding Hostile Use and Cyber- 
Vulnerabilities of UAS: Components, Autonomy v Automation, 
Sensors, SAA, SCADA and Cyber Attack Taxonomy;” Chapter 8:” 
Designing UAS Systems for Stealth;” Chapter 14: Exposing UAS 
Vulnerabilities via EW and Countering with LPI Signals;” and 
Chapter 19: Audiology, Acoustic Countermeasures against SWARMS 
and Building IFF Libraries.” (Nichols, et al., 2019) 
[9] The EW, CW and Acoustical sections are updated / illustrated 
from our previous textbook (Nichols, et al., 2019) 
[10] In (Nichols, et al., 2019), we studied the EMS, datalinks and 
cyber-vulnerabilities of UAS. Here we consider electronic warfare 
as a method of overwhelming, destroying, or controlling the 
information, transmitted by communication datalinks, to alter the 
mission of the UAS deployment. Chapter 14: Exposing UAS 
Vulnerabilities via EW and Countering with LPI Signals;” in (Nichols, 
et al., 2019) and (Moir I. &., 2006) in their Chapter 6 Electronic 
Warfare give reasonable discussions of the fundamentals, 
technologies, missions and key players for EW. They by no means 
cover the field however, they serve as a starting point on the long 
road of EW discoveries. 
[11] Nuclear weapons may be characterized in terms of megatons, 
bullets in terms of muzzle velocity, and particle beams in terms of 
amperes of current. The commonality is amount of energy absorbed 
by the target which leads to similar levels of damage achieved at 
similar levels of energy deposited. (Nielsen, 2012) 
[12] Joules is the preferred unit for DE. A joule is approximately the 
energy required to lift a gallon of milk a distance of three feet or 1/
50,000 of the energy needed to brew a cup of 6 oz coffee. For us 
old-time engineers for reference points: 1 BTU = 1055 J; 1 Calorie = 
4.19 J; 1kw hr = 3.6 x 106 J; 1eV = 1.6 x 10-19 J and 1 erg = 10-7 J. 
[13] For this example, C= 4.2 (J/gm x o C) and ice cube = 50 gm, Ti= 
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-10 (o C), Tm= 0 (o C). (Lm) for water = 334 Joules / gm. So, 16,700 
additional Joules are necessary to melt the ice cube of 50gm. Tv = 
vaporization temperature, (100 o C), 
[14] Aka called “Fluence” Units of fluence are 1 J/cm2  =104 J/m2 
and 1 W /cm2  = 104 W/ m2 
[15] The effect of area can be better understood by looking at the 
energy delivery from the two atom bombs delivered against 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. (Glasstone, 1977) Both weapons had yields 
of about 20kT, they released about 8 x 1013 Joules of energy. At a 
range of z of 0.1 mile (= 1.6 x 104 cm), the energy density would be 
approximately 8 x 1013 Joules / 4πz2 = 2.5 x 104 J /cm2 or fluence. 
So, when spreading of the blast energy is accounted for, the result 
is consistent with other weapon types. Our  damage energy density 
sufficiency is 10,000 J / cm2 or fluence. 
[16] Thermal conductivity varies for materials. Copper (good 
conductor) = 4.2 J/cm sec deg whereas Air (thermal insulator) has a 
value of 0.00042 J /cm sec deg. (Nielsen, 2012) Thermal conductivity 
is not just a simple single order equation. Other effects are observed 
changes in regional temperatures, effects of thermal conductivity, 
thermal diffusion, / diffusivity, temperature propagation v time. 
[17] Black Body radiation is a mathematical ideal surface that 
absorbs all radiation incident upon it. In equilibrium it would radiate 
more energy than any other object. (Nielsen, 2012) 
 
[19] Definitions 
Electronic warfare (EW) is defined as the art and science of 
preserving the use of the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) for 
friendly use while denying its use by the enemy. (Adamy D. , 2001) 
The EMS is from DC to light and beyond.  EW covers the full radio 
frequency spectrum, the infrared spectrum, and the ultraviolet 
spectrum. 
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Nichols (2000) defines Cybersecurity in terms of cyber-conflict. 
(Nichols R. K., 2008) Alford (2000) authored effective definitions 
for the DoD.  These will illustrate the bigger picture of Information 
Operations (IO) and the subset known as Electronic Warfare (EW). 
Cybersecurity (in the context of Cyber conflict) is defined as, “the 
broad tree of investigation and practice devoted to cybercrimes, 
Computer Forensics (CF), Information Assurance (IA), Information 
Security (INFOSEC), Communications Security (COMSEC), and 
especially Cyber Counterintelligence (CCI).” (Nichols R. K., 2008) 
“Cyber Warfare (CW / CyW).  Any act intended to compel an 
opponent to fulfill our national will, executed against the software 
controlling processes within an opponent’s system. CyW 
includes the following modes of cyber-attack; cyber infiltration, 
cyber manipulation, 
Cyber assault, and cyber raid.” (DAU, 2018) (DAU, 2018) 
“Cyber Infiltration (CI / CyI). Penetration of the defenses of a 
software-controlled system such 
that the system can be compromised, disabled,  manipulated, 
assaulted, or raided.” (DAU, 2018) (DoD, 2018) 
“Cyber Manipulation (CM / CyM). Following infiltration, the 
control of a system via its software which leaves the system intact, 
then uses the capabilities of the system to do damage. 
For example, using an electric utility’s software to turn off power.” 
(DAU, 2018) (DoD, 2018) 
“Cyber Assault (CA / CyA). Following infiltration, the destruction 
of software and data in the system, or attack that compromises 
system capabilities.” (Alford, 2000)  Includes viruses and system 
overloads via e-mail (e-mail overflow).” (DoD, 2018; DoD, 2018) 
“Cyber Raid (CR / CyR). Following infiltration, the manipulation 
or acquisition of data within the system, which leaves the system 
intact, results in transfer, destruction, or alteration of 
data. For example, stealing e-mail or taking password lists from a 
mail server.” (DAU, 2018) (DoD, 2018) 
Cyber-Attack. See CyI, CyM, CyA, or CyR. 
Cybercrime (CC / CyC). Cyber-attacks without the intent to 
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affect national security or to further operations against national 
security.” (Alford, 2000) 
“C4ISR. The concept of Command, Control, Communications, 
Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance.” (DoD, 
2018) (Kaye, 2001) See Figure 9-15 (C4ISystems, 2013) 
Electronic Warfare (EW) is defined as the art and science of 
preserving the use of the Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS) for 
friendly use, while denying its use by the enemy. (Adamy D. , 2001) 
“Information Assurance (IA). Measures that protect and defend 
information and information systems by ensuring their availability, 
integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation. 
These measures include providing for restoration of information 
systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction 
capabilities.” (Barker, 2003) (Kaye, 2001) 
“Information Operations (IO). The integrated employment of the 
core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network 
operations, psychological operations, military deception, and 
operations security, in concert with specified supporting and 
related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp 
adversarial human and automated decision-making process, 
information, and information systems while protecting our own.” 
(Barker, 2003) (Kaye, 2001) 
“Information Superiority (IS). The capability to collect, process, 
and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while 
exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same. A newer 
form of this is that: degree of dominance in the information domain 
which permits the conduct of operations without effective 
opposition.” (Alford, 2000) (Kaye, 2001) 
“Information Warfare (IW). Information operations conducted 
during time of crisis or conflict to achieve or promote specific 
objectives over a specific adversary. IW is any action to Deny, 
Exploit, Corrupt or Destroy the enemy’s information and its 
functions, protecting those actions and exploiting our own military 
information functions.” (Alford, 2000) (Kaye, 2001) 
“Intentional Cyber Warfare Attack (ICWA). any attack through 
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cyber-means to intentionally affect national security (cyber warfare) 
or to further operations against national security. 
Includes cyber-attacks by unintentional actors prompted by 
intentional actors. (Also 
see “unintentional cyber warfare attack.”) IA can be equated to 
warfare; it is national policy at the level of warfare. Unintentional 
Attack(UA) is basically crime. UA may be committed by a bungling 
hacker or a professional cybercriminal, but the intent is self-serving 
and not to further a national objective. This does not mean 
unintentional attacks cannot affect policy or have devastating 
effects. 
Intentional Cyber Actors (I-actors). Individuals intentionally 
prosecuting cyber warfare (cyber 
operators, cyber troops, cyber warriors, cyber forces).” (Alford, 
2000) 
“Network Centric Operations (NCO). NCO involves the 
development and employment of mission critical packages that are 
the embodiment of the tenets of Network Centric Warfare (NCW) 
in operations across the full mission spectrum. These tenets state 
that a robustly networked force improves information sharing and 
collaboration, which enhances the quality of information, the quality 
of awareness, and improves shared situational awareness. This 
results in enhanced collaboration and enables self-synchronization 
improving sustainability and increasing speed of command, which 
ultimately result in dramatically increased mission effectiveness. 
(Kaye, 2001)” (MORS, 2018) (Kaye, 2001) 
OPSEC. (Operations Security)  (DoD-01, 2018) “Determining what 
information is publicly available in the normal course of operations 
that can be used by a competitor or enemy to its advantage. OPSEC 
is a common military practice that is also applied to civilian projects 
such as the development of new products and technologies. 
OPSEC – The Official Definition 
(From JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and 
Associated Terms, www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf.) 
Operations Security (OPSEC) is a process of identifying critical 
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information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant 
to military operations and other activities to: 
1.             Identify those operations that can be observed by 
adversary intelligence systems, 
2.             Determine what indicators adversary intelligence 
systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together 
to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries, and 
3.             Select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce 
to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to 
adversary exploitation.” (DoD-01, 2018) 
“Psychological Operations (PO) Planned operations to convey 
selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to 
influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and 
ultimately the behavior of foreign entities.” (Alford, 2000) (Kaye, 
2001) 
“Psychological Warfare (PW / PSYWAR) The planned use of 
propaganda and other psychological actions to influence the 
opinions, emotions, attitudes and behavior of hostile foreign 
groups.” (Kaye, 2001) 
“Unintentional Cyber Actors (U-actors). Individuals who 
unintentionally attack, but affect 
national security and are largely unaware of the international 
ramifications of their actions. 
Unintentional actors may be influenced by I-actors, but are 
unaware they are being 
manipulated to participate in cyber operations. U-actors include 
anyone who commits 
CyI, CyM, CyA, and CyR without the intent to affect national 
security, or to further 
operations against national security. This group also includes 
individuals involved in 
CyC, journalists, and industrial spies. The threat of journalists and 
industrial spies 
against systems including unintentional attacks caused by their 
CyI efforts should be 
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considered high. 
Unintentional Cyber Warfare Attack (UCWA/ UA). Any attack 
through cyber-means, without the intent to affect national security 
(cybercrime).” (Alford, 2000) 
 
[21] Skyjack Drone hack. Drone that flies around seeking Seeks 
wireless signal of any other drone in area. Forcefully disconnects 
wireless connection of true owner of target drone. Authenticates 
with target drone pretending to be its owner. Feeds commands to 
it and all other zombie drones SkyJack primarily a Perl application 
which runs off a Linux. Detect drones by seeking out wireless 
connections from MAC addresses. 
[22] Aircrack-ng© To put wireless device into monitor mode to find 
drones and drone owners. De-authenticate true owner of drone. 
Once de-authenticated, connect as drone waiting for owner to 
reconnect. 
[23] Snoopy is Software that can hack into Wi-Fi and steal data 
– attached to drones. Comprised of various existing technologies. 
Uses Distributed tracking and profiling framework. Runs client-side 
code on any device that has support for wireless monitor mode. 
Collects probe-request and uploads to a central server. Exploits 
handsets looking for wireless signal. Most leave their device Wi-
Fi setting on Spoof network available to Wi-Fi searchers to use. 
Once connected to rogue network, data is stolen. Differs from other 
rogue access points in way data is routed. Traffic is routed via an 
OpenVPN connection to a central server. Able to observe traffic 
from all drones in field at one point. Traffic manipulation only done 
on server. Allows basic data exploration and mapping. 
[24] Special thanks and credit to my co-author Dr. Julie J.C.H. Ryan 
and Dan J. Ryan, Esq who were pioneers in the field information 
security and its associated risks.  (Randall K. Nichols, 2000) 
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[25] Adamy sets the standards for EW instruction. Moir summarizes 
the topic with respect to military operations, UAS, and military 
avionics systems. (Moir I. a., 2006) (Toomay, 1982) and  (Burch, 2015) 
bring Radar to the non-specialist reader. A Google search on the 
key = RADAR yields 296,000,000 results (0.49 seconds). There is 
substantial material on the subject. The challenge is determining the 
UAS applicability. 
[26] Legacy EW definitions- EW was classically divided into: (Adamy 
D. , 2001) 
ESM – Electromagnetic Support Measures – the receiving part of 
EW; 
ECM – Electromagnetic Countermeasures – jamming, chaff, flares 
used to interfere with operations of radars, military 
communications and heat-seeking weapons; 
ECCM -Electronic Counter-Counter Measures – measures taken 
in design or operation of radars or communications systems to 
counter the effects of ECM. 
Not included in the EW definitions were Anti-radiation Weapons 
(ARW) and Directed Energy Weapons (DEW). 
USA and NATO have updated these categories: 
ES – Electronic warfare Support (old ESM) 
EA – Electronic Attack – which is the old ECM but also includes 
ASW and DE weapons; 
EP – Electronic Protection – (old ECCM) (Adamy D. , 2001) 
ES is different from Signal Intelligence (SIGINT). SIGINT is made 
up of Communications Intelligence (COMINT) and Electronic 
Intelligence (ELINT). All these fields involve the receiving of enemy 
transmissions. (Adamy D. , 2001) 
COMINT receives enemy communications signals to extract 
intelligence. 
ELINT uses enemy non-communications signals for determining 
the enemy’s EMS signature so that countermeasures can be 
developed. ELINT systems collect substantial data over large 
periods to support detailed analysis. 
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ES/ESM collects enemy signals, either communication or non-
communication, with the object to do something immediately about 
those signals or the weapons associated with those signals. The 
received signals might be jammed, or the information sent to a 
lethal responder. Received signals can be used to type and locate the 
enemy’s transmitter, locate enemy forces, weapons, distribution, 
and electronic capability. (Adamy D. , 2001) 
[27] This a main theme of this book. In addition, this section started 
off with the answer – Low Probability of Intercept (LPI) as a 
countermeasure to reduce risk of EA to the UAS missions. (Adamy 
D. , 2009) 
[28] Any number expressed in dB is logarithmic base 10. dB 
mathematical concepts with examples may be found in Chapter 2 of 
Adamy, D., (2001) EW 101. A value expressed in dB is a ratio converted 
to logarithmic form. A linear number is converted to dB form by the 
formula: N(dB) = 10 log (base 10) [N].  dB values are converted back 
to linear format by the formula N = 10 **N (dB/10).  dB numbers are 
usually reference to some standard with constant value. A common 
example is signal strength expressed in dBm = dB value of Power / 
1 milliwatt, used to describe signal strength. For example, 4 watts 
power level = 4000 mw. Divide by 1 mw standard then convert 4000 
to dB = 10 log (4000) = 36.02 dBm. dB forms are used because of the 
wide range of numbers and orders of magnitude for the EMS. 
[29] dBi = dB value of antenna gain relative to the gain of an isotropic 
antenna ( perfect antenna). 0 dBi is the gain of an omnidirectional 
(isotropic) antenna. 
[30] Video Report, Quote by Amy Hu. Data Expert Technology LTD, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o057LmNGsJA DLA 07312018 
[31] Source: Tri-band Anti Drone Rifle KWT-FZQ/DG10-A 
Manufacturer: Globaldroneuav.com 
https://globaldroneuav.com/Product/Police-drone-jammer-
effective-drone-controller.html 
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[32] DE weapons are technically kinetic weapons with non-kinetic 
interfaces. The author has included them because they are very cool 
and represent a huge amount of classified advanced research for C-
UAS purposes. 
[33] FM 3-38 (2014) 
[34] Askin, O., Irmak, R, and Avseyer, M. (14 May 2015) 
[35] CEA aka Cyber electronic warfare 
[36] Student will research CEA and its parallels to EW (start with FM 
3 – 38 Cyber Electromagnetic Activities in CANVAS or use Google 
to find the free PDF) How do these intersections support both 
friendly and hostile actions on UAS systems in all classes? Develop 
a PowerPoint presentation with your answers for class submission. 
Look for tools like cyber offensive weapons against key UAS systems 
and cyber defensive weapons/countermeasures that can be used 
to thwart the cyber weapons that you have found in Open Source 
literature (Non- CLASSIFIED). Try to develop a taxonomy around 
your findings. 
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SECTION 3: COUNTER 
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Chapter 10: When the Other 
Side Fights Back - 
Cyberwarfare, Directed 
Energy Weapons, 
Acoustics,Integrating C-UAS 
into Planning 
R. K. NICHOLS 
Student Objectives 
All the C-UAS systems described in this chapter are known by 
USA and friendly forces and, in general, by other countries (China, 
Russia, terror states under CNKI, etc.) So, the object of this chapter 
is to understand the lethal use of the EMS by: 
• Study four classic direct energy weapons (DEW, Laser, 
Microwave, Particle Beams) technologies 
• Learn about acoustic countermeasures and their effects on 
MEMS 
• Sample real-world advanced UAS systems deployed in the 
field. These UAS are able to fight back via EW and have both 
kinetic and non-kinetic countermeasures against friendly C-
UAS systems. 
What Happens When the Enemy Decides to Fight Back? 
There needs to be plans /policies in place. The UK Government 
has developed one and presented it to Parliament in October 2019. 
In the UK Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Strategy we read the 
following objectives: (Norbiton, Oct 2019) 
Chapter 10: When the Other Side
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1 The objective of the strategy is to reduce risk posed by the 
highest-harm illegal use of drones, 
2 The government’s strategy is to mitigate the malicious, criminal 
use of drones, including threats to the UK’s national security and 
critical infrastructure, 
3 To develop a comprehensive understanding of the evolving risks 
posed by the malicious and illegal use of drones, 
4 To take a full spectrum approach to deter, detect and disrupt 
the misuse of drones 
5 To build strong relationships with industry to ensure products 
meet the highest security standards 
6 To empower police and other operational responders through 
access to counter-drone capabilities and effective legislation, 
training and guidance.[1] 
 
(Norbiton, Oct 2019) document considers highest-harm risks 
resulting from malicious use of drones: 
• Facilitating terrorist attacks 
• Facilitating crime, especially in the UK prisons 
• Disrupting Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) 
• Potential use by hostile state actors 
 
The two departments that are responsible for strategy and policy 
associated with the illegal use of drones are Department of 
Transport(DT) (responsible for the safe and lawful use of drones 
within UK airspace) and the Home Office (HO) which has overall 
responsibility for domestic counter-drone activity as part of its 
wider security remit. (Norbiton, Oct 2019) 
 
First Actions 
 Following the Gatwick drone sightings in December 2018, the 
DT and the Center for Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) 
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put in place policies to reduce the vulnerability of sensitive sites to 
drone incursions: 
 
• Guidance for CNI operators, including airports on how to 
assess drone risks and vulnerabilities, and training on available 
counter -drone technologies. 
• Standardized signage to clearly designate areas where drone 
flights are prohibited, and providing information to the public 
on how to report drone sightings, 
• Setting security requirements for manufacturers and end-
users of counter-drone equipment to safely test and refine 
their equipment, 
• Put in place significant additional classified steps to ensure 
that UK airports are prepared to detect, deter, and disrupt 
drone incursions.(Norbiton, Oct 2019) 
 
Regulations 
The Air Navigation Order (ANO) of 2016 established a number 
of offenses regarding the irresponsible use of drones. (National 
Archives, 2019) This is an extensive order much like the FAA multiple 
instructions / regulations / drafts for flight certifications, 
suitability, guidance and penalties for illegal use. APO 2016 was 
updated to include more offenses after the Gatwick 2018 incidents. 
On 30 November 2019, all sUAS drones must be registered and 
owners / pilots must undertake competency testing. 
 
The DT, in its 2018 consultation, Taking Flight: The Future of 
Drones in the UK, (Transport, 2019) announced its intention to give 
police new powers to enforce drone offenses under ANO 2016 by: 
 
• Giving police the power to require a drone to be grounded, 
• Giving police the power to require operators to produce 
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evidence of registration and competency and provide the 
identity of the operator 
• Improving police powers to investigate where an offense has 
been committed, 
• Making an expansion to “no-fly zones” around airports from 
1km to 5 km, effective March 2019, 
• Improved Stop and Search power for offenses relating to flying 
a drone in a restricted zone of an aerodrome.[2] 
Compare this approach to the ineffectual California police handling 
a drone operator misusing his drone during a huge and dangerous 
wildfire. The drone forced rescue helicopters to avoid critical areas 
and to be grounded. (Norman, 2019) 
 
Practical Aviation Security in USA 
An Airport Cooperative Research Project (ACRP), Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems at Airports: A Primer researched the potential use 
and impact of ATC systems, airport facility standards, 
environmental impact, safety management systems and community 
outreach. (K. Neubauer, 2015)  Unfortunately, the report failed to 
envision the security threats posed by UAV operations away from an 
airport. 
 
Security Implications of UAV Operations (5 major threats) 
 The security threats from current enemy drone operations are 
multiple: 
1. A UAV can be used to conduct surveillance on airports or other 
high-value targets (HVT) 
2. A UAV can be purposely flown into a passenger 
aircraft.(Example Figure 3-1 in (Nichols, et al., Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems in the Cyber Domain, 2019) 
3. A UAV can be weaponized with a gun, DEW, Sonic systems, 
lasers, IEDs, to attack a high-value targets, passing quietly over 
the heads of security personnel and any security fencing or 
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barriers 
4. A UAV could combine weapons and surveillance and flown into 
a number of specific targets 
5. A UAV can be equipped with CBR element and dispense the 
agent over an open-air assembly, stadium, ball park, mall or 
concert. (Forrest, 2016) 
 
Most of the authors’ 2nd edition was devoted to expanding the 
threat landscape and countering the risks so determined. (Nichols, 
et al., Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the Cyber Domain, 2019) In this 
text, the authors assume the enemy fights back. All the risks remain 
and must be considered viable scenarios at some level of exposure 
and mitigation. Several Russian and Chinese competitive systems 
are discussed later in this chapter. 
 
Important Changes in Electronic Warfare 
The authors agree with Commander Malte von Spreckelsen, DEU 
N, NATO Joint Electronic Warfare Core Staff that modern conflicts 
will be fought in all dimensions possible and that Electronic Warfare 
(EW) will be the key for modern conflict. (Commander Malte von 
Spreckelsen, 2018)[3] 
The modern “father” of Electronic Warfare technology is David L. 
Adamy. In his textbook (Adamy D. L., 2015) he points out important 
changes in EW (especially after the Iraq wars and the expansion of 
UAS in the battlefield): 
 
• The recognition of the electronic environment as a distinct 
battlespace; 
• New and extremely dangerous electronically guided weapons; 
• New technologies that impact both the accuracy and lethality 
of weapons. 
Adamy defines radio emissions associated with threats as “threats.” 
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This is not technically correct because things that explode or can 
cause great damage are also threats. Adamy refers to signals as 
threats, especially radar and radar-controlled weapons: 
• Search and acquisition radars; 
• Tracking radars; 
• Radio links between radar processors and missiles 
The other significant area defined by Adamy is communication 
threats which include: 
• Command and control communications; 
• Data links between components of integrated air defense 
systems; 
• Command and data links connecting UAVs with their control 
stations; 
• Cell phone links when used for military purposes.(Adamy D. L., 
2015) 
 
Adamy essentially focuses on ADS. Cmd. von Spreckelsen 
considers integration of the EMS the entire battlespace to insure 
effectiveness of IADS suppression. (Stathopoulos, 2018) See Figure 
10-1.[4] 
NATO has a pretty decent view on the threats it may encounter 
on land, on and below sea, in the air, and in space. Furthermore, 
cyberspace is increasingly considered by NATO as critical risk – 
determinative. (Commander Malte von Spreckelsen, 2018) 
“In its EW policy[5], NATO defines Electronic Warfare as ‘a 
military action that exploits electromagnetic energy, both actively 
and passively, to provide situational awareness and create offensive 
and defensive effects’. It is warfare within the Electromagnetic 
Spectrum (EMS) and (shown in Figure 10-2) involves the military use 
of electromagnetic energy to prevent or reduce an enemy’s effective 
use of the EMS while protecting its use for friendly forces.” 
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Figure 10-1 Integration of the Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS) 
into Every Operating Domain 
Source: (Stathopoulos, 2018) 
 
Figure 10-2 Electronic Warfare in today’s military environment 
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Source: (Commander Malte von Spreckelsen, 2018) 
 
Figure 10-2 is a complex reality. Study this in detail. Recognized 
the importance of communications, cybersecurity, and EW 
components. EW can have significant mission impact – even in 
the simplest possible scenario. “For example, having an adversary 
monitor one’s communications or eliminate one’s ability to 
communicate or navigate can be catastrophic. Likewise, having an 
adversary know the location of friendly forces based on their 
electronic transmissions is highly undesirable and can put those 
forces at a substantial disadvantage.” (Commander Malte von 
Spreckelsen, 2018) 
Recall from (Nichols, et al., Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the 
Cyber Domain, 2019) the EMS purview in Figure 10-3: 
 
Figure 10-3 EMS Purview 
Source: (TRS, 2018) 
 
Now integrate the EMS information with the Battlespace 
Dimensions in Table 9-3 from previous chapter (Nichols, et al., 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the Cyber Domain, 2019): 
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The point is that the security environment has changed 
necessitating a refocus on EW, especially integrated with Cyber 
capabilities. Russia and China have significantly upgraded their 
capabilities to operate in the EMS. (Commander Malte von 
Spreckelsen, 2018) These are not threats to be ignored. 
Revisit Figure 9-21  showing the intersection of Cyber, EW, and 
Spectrum Warfare designated as Cyber Electromagnetic Activities 
(CEA).[6] 
 
Cyberwarfare Purview 
When our authors think Cyberwarfare, the consensus is that 
cyber refers to information moved from computer to computer 
over the Internet, within the network of computers comprising the 
Internet. In Chapter 4 of the 2nd edition textbook (Nichols, et al., 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the Cyber Domain, 2019) the authors 
expanded this definition to measures on the information 
superhighway  to gain military advantage by gathering military 
significant information from the enemy or interfering with the 
enemy’s ability to move its own information over the Internet or 
other networks or to process information within a computer or 
finally to be able to make command decisions faster than the enemy 
in all the domains.  In Chapter 1 of this textbook, the authors 
consider the role of information technologies (automated decisions, 
artificial intelligence (weak and strong), communications, 
networking, remote sensing) and later in Chapter 4 the authors 
consider issue of resiliency, i.e. planning for resiliency and 
robustness expecting pushback, when secrecy is needed, how to 
shield operations. In Chapter 9, the authors introduced SCADA 
attacks and vulnerabilities and how important they were in terms of 
UAS operations. 
The uninitiated would see cyber warfare as conducted by the use 
of malware. This is first level software whose purpose is destruction. 
The tools in this view are simply viruses, worms, Trojan Horses, 
spyware, rootkits, attacks on service, protocols storage or data in 
transit. All these are useful. But the real meat especially for UAS, 
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satellite, ground stations and mobile deployment units is SCADA and 
its vulnerabilities.[7] This would be like calling Stuxnet just a virus! 
Stuxnet was an exquisitely designed cyberweapon with vectoring 
in on multiple zero-day vulnerabilities, specific manufacturer OS 
/ maintenance SCADA attacks, multiple coordinating vectors of 
attack, secret target acquisition in Iran. It had the huge effect of 
delaying Iran’s nuclear buildup by destroying their centrifuge 
processes from within by inducing cavitation and turning off 
operator controls / alarms without detection. (Zetter, 2014) The 
only property that Stuxnet didn’t have was self-destruction upon 
discover or self-encryption for protection against 
countermeasures. Stuxnet was not discovered by Iran but 
information was released publicly by commercial interests for 
unknown reasons. 
 
Cyber vs EW Battlespace (Parallels) 
EW in legacy terms has three major subfields and another closely 
related field: 
 
• Electronic warfare (EW) support (ES), which involves hostile 
intercept of enemy transmissions 
• Electronic Attack (EA) in which enemy electronic sensors 
(radars and communications; receivers) are degraded either 
temporarily or permanently by transmission of signals 
designed for that purpose; 
• Electronic protection (EP), which is a set of measures designed 
to protect friendly sensors from enemy EA actions; 
• Decoys, which act as bait to cause enemy missile and gun 
systems to acquire and track invalid targets.(Adamy D. -0., 
2015) 
Cyber warfare (CW) involves attacks on military assets through 
networks, including the internet. Electronic Warfare involves 
attacks on military assets through electromagnetic propagation. 
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Table 10-1 continues the legacy definitions comparison of CW and 
EW functions. 
 
Table 10-1 Comparison of EW and CW Functions in legacy 
terms 
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Operational 
Function EW CW 
Collect 
information 
from enemy 
EW support, 
listens to enemy 
signals to 
determine enemy 
capabilities and 
operating mode 
Spyware, causes information to be 
exported to a hostile location (or 
friendly depending on the side 
employed) 
Electronically 
interfere 
with enemy’s 
operational 
capability 
EA, either covers 
received 
information or 
causes processing 
to give inaccurate 
outputs 
Viruses, reduce available operating 
memory or modify programs to 
prevent proper processing outputs 
Protect 
friendly 
capabilities 
from enemy’s 
electronic 
interference 
EP, prevents 
enemy jamming 
from impacting 
operational 
capabilities 
Passwords, firewalls, VPNs, 
hardware modifications, 
cryptography,[8] steganography 
[9],2-factor authentication, digital 
signatures, prevent malware from 
penetrating a computer and 
breaching information security 
protocols 
Cause enemy 
systems to 
initiate 
undesired 
actions 
Decoys, look and 
act like valid 
targets, when 
acquired by 
missile or gun 
systems point 
away from the real 
target 
Trojan Horses, rootkits, are hostile 
software accepted by the enemy 
computers because they appear 
valid and have acceptable 
credentials (Adamy D. -0., 2015) 
Direct 
damage or 
destruction 
DEW, Acoustic 
grenades, lasers, 
anti-satellite 
weapons all hit the 
UAS target from 
outside and 
destroy it by 
delivering focused 
energy in real time 
on a small slice of 
the target 
Advanced Cyberweapons attack 
SCADA and internal subsystems 
causing them to act in unplanned 
actions (fatal) to either over or 
under perform a critical function or 
subfunction, lose energy, 
destabilize, or prevent operator 
action on a critical fault (Nichols, et 
al., Unmanned Aircraft Systems in 
the Cyber Domain, 2019) 
 
EMS Environment 
It can be deduced from Table 10-1 that the difference between 
cyber warfare and EW has to do with how the hostile function is 
introduced into the enemy’s systems. Historically, EW dealt with 
298  |  Chapter 10: When the Other Side Fights Back - Cyberwarfare,
Directed Energy Weapons, Acoustics,Integrating C-UAS into Planning
the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) as it was related to kinetic 
threats.  Radars that locate targets guide missiles to those targets 
and detonate warheads. EW was purposed to make missiles unable 
to hit those targets. This meant disrupting a receipt of a return 
signal or preventing the missile uplink from delivering guidance 
information. Enemy communications relate to command and 
control (CC). Historically, this referred to kinetic attack protocols. 
The purpose of EW was to prevent CC by the enemy. (Adamy D. -0., 
2015) 
Computers and software are an integral part of almost every 
aspect of modern warfare, and cyber warfare attacks on those 
computers directly impacts kinetic attacks and the defenses against 
those attacks. The new reality is that the EMS itself has become 
a target of enemy actions. By denying USA use of the EMS, the 
enemy can inflict significant economic damage upon society, put 
our military forces at a disadvantage without firing a single shot or 
dropping a single bomb. 
The EMS environment is becoming more complex, congested, 
and contested, making it imperative for Defense agency and 
organizations to continually improve EW capabilities to enable 
reliable use of the EMS. 
 
NATO – EME, EMO 
NATO, like DoD, is evolving how it conducts operations and 
support of emerging technologies. The focus has shifted away from 
isolated EW operations to joint Electromagnetic Operations (EMO) 
in the electromagnetic environment (EME). (Commander Malte von 
Spreckelsen, 2018). 
The EMS is defined as the entire distribution of electromagnetic 
radiation according to frequency or wavelength (Figure 10-3).[10] 
Electromagnetic waves (EMW)  travel at speed of light in a vacuum, 
they do so across a wide range of wavelengths and corresponding 
frequencies. EMS comprises the span of all electromagnetic 
radiation (ER) and consists of many subranges called spectral bands 
such as visible light or ultraviolet radiation. EME is the geophysical 
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environment influenced by terrain, weather and atmospheric 
conditions, which supports the radiation, propagation and 
reception of ER across the entire EMS. (Commander Malte von 
Spreckelsen, 2018) 
Within NATO, EMO is the deliberate transmission and reception 
of EM energy in EME for military operations. This includes 
communications, navigation, attack, battlespace awareness, and 
targeting. Figure 10-4 demonstrates that EMO not only enables 
operations in each domain but also provides the thread which links 
and integrates military forces across domain, and in cyberspace 
and information environments. EMO is conducted by both friendly 
and enemy forces. EMO often leads to contested, overlapping, 
congested or interference with neutral actors in the 
EME. (Commander Malte von Spreckelsen, 2018) 
 
DE Weapons 
In Chapter 9, the authors looked at the basic principles of DE 
weapons. UAS in flight (SWARMS or other configuration) are subject 
to destruction by deployment of DE weapons. DE weapons are in a 
class by themselves and represent huge portion research budgets 
in USA, China and Russia. All military and large commercial UAS 
are potential targets for DEW deployment. There are four types 
of DE weapons, kinetic energy, lasers, microwave and particle 
beams. (Nielsen, 2012) The approach taken is to discuss fundamental 
concepts, then propagation (travel) towards the target, and lastly, 
interaction with the target and the mechanisms by which the target 
is destroyed. 
 
Kinetic Energy Weapons (KEW) 
Kinetic energy (KE) weapons fir the definition of DEW because 
their energy is aimed or directed at a  target and intercepts a small 
fraction of the target’s surface area. 10,000 Joules is a magic number 
because it is close to the energy delivered by a wide range of DEWs. 
10,000 Joules is sufficient energy to vaporize about one cubic 
centimeter of anything! (Nielsen, 2012) 
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 Figure 10-4 EMO in EME 
Source: (Commander Malte von Spreckelsen, 2018) 
 
We need some understanding of the parameters and units 
affecting target response and damage. Table 10-2 shows key 
parameters, units, definitions, and comments 
KEW damage targets with their energy of motion. This energy is 
proportional to a projectile’s mass and the square of its velocity. In 
space, projectile motion is determined by the gravitational force of 
earth, along with the forces from the projectile’s launcher or on-
board engine. Gravitational forces dominate a projectile’s trajectory, 
and KE far exceed damage criteria. Stress in the target exceed 
its internal strength, and it responds like a dense gas. Details of 
projectile and target construction are of minor importance.  In the 
atmosphere, ranges are shorter and energies less due to 
atmospheric drag. At lower energies forces internal to a target are 
important. The target’s response depends on its construction and 
end engagement scenario. Projectile design for efficient 
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propagation and interaction is a priority and may be a compromise 
with optimization for target interaction. (Nielsen, 2012) 
Table 10-2 Parameters , Units affecting Target Response and 
Damage 
 
Parameter Symbol Units Definition Comments 
Kinetic 
Energy K Joules (J) 
K= Mv2 / 
2 
M,v = Projectile mass, 
velocity 
Momentum ρ Kg m/sec Mv 
K and ρ are conserved 
when particles collide 
Force F Newtons (Nt) M dv/dt Also, F= dp/dt 
Pressure P Nt/m 2 Force / Area 
Force/ Area = Energy / 
Volume 
Impulse I Nt sec Force x time 
Fluence[11] 
Or 
Intensity 
F or 
I 
Joules / 
cm 2 
Watts / 
cm 2 
KE /area 
Concentrated KE density 
necessary to damage a 
target measured as an 
output of a radiation field 
or laser beam 
Source: (Nielsen, 2012) 
 
The finite speed of KEW (10 km/sec or less) means that the time 
to engage goes up with increasing distance and moving targets can 
be engaged only if they are “led”[12] with computer calculations 
made in advance on how to bring the weapon and target together. 
There are three truths that hold for all types of DEW. 
1. “Propagation in a vacuum follows well defined physical laws. 
These account for adequate energy placement on the target by 
the weapon. Long ranges associated with engagements in 
space place severe constraints on the energy that the weapon 
launcher requires to ensure lethal energies are brought to bear 
on the target. Orbital motion counts for much of the energy in 
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space. This energy is not free and comes from the energy in 
the rocket engines which placed the weapons in orbit.(Nielsen, 
2012) 
2. In the atmosphere, ranges are much less than in space and 
interactions results in greater energy losses. Therefore, 
weapon characteristics / parameters (bullet shape, laser pulse 
width, etc.) must be tailored to minimize these energy losses. 
(Nielsen, 2012) 
3. When a weapon encounters a target, energy must be 
efficiently absorbed for damage to occur. This places 
constraints on weapon parameters which may be conflict with 
those necessary for efficient propagation.  (Nielsen, 2012) 
 
Lasers 
A Laser is fundamentally nothing more than a device that can 
produce an intense, or highly energetic, beam of light.[13] Light is 
an EM band in the EMS and is subject to Maxwell’s wave equations. 
(David H. Staelin, 1998) Here are the basic ideas about lasers as 
weapons from (Nielsen, 2012): 
 
1. Lasers are intense sources of ER with wavelengths from 10 to 
0.4 μm and frequencies from about 3 x 10 13 to 8 x 10 14 Hz. 
2. The materials with which lasers might interact are 
characterized by an index of refraction, n, and the attenuation 
coefficient, K. When light passes regions of different n, it is 
bent according to the Law of Refraction. When light 
propagates a distance, z, through a region whose attenuation 
coefficient is K, its intensity is decreased by a factor of e (-Kz). 
3. A laser with a wavelength, λ, emerging from an aperture of 
diameter, D, can propagate a distance on the order of D2 / λ, 
as a collimated beam.[14] Beyond this distance, it will diverge at 
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an angle of θ ≈ λ / D. Figure 10-5 shows Collimated light for 
Laser. 
4. Decreases in intensity result from both diffraction and 
attenuation. This results in a fraction of the beam’s energy 
being reduced and reduces the amount of energy that can be 
brought to bear on the target. Compensating parameters to 
reduce this effect are energy level, pulse width, wavelength, 
and diameter of the beam. 
5. In the atmosphere, K, is highly dependent, made up of 
contributions from absorption and scattering from both 
molecules and particles.[15] If a beam becomes too intense, 
free electrons in the atmosphere will multiply and breakdown, 
forming an ionized plasma which will absorb the beam. 
Following the breakdown, plasmas propagate toward the 
source of laser light as combustion or detonation waves.[16] 
 
 Figure 10-5 Collimated light for Laser 
Source: (Jackson, 2017) 
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6. In the atmosphere, n, the index of refraction, can vary through 
turbulence or through expansion induced by absorption of 
laser light. The second effect results in beam expansion 
(thermal blooming) or bending. These effects must be 
compensated for in real time through adaptive optics. 
 
7. When laser light encounters a target , a fraction of the light is 
absorbed in the target surface, and manifests as heat. 
Thresholds for melting and vaporization are established by the 
criterion that energy is deposited so rapidly that it cannot be 
carried away within the pulse width of the laser. Targets can be 
damaged by erosion (thermal melting) or through momentum 
transferred to the target surface by the evolving vapor jet 
(mechanical damage).[17]” (Nielsen, 2012) 
 
Actually, the torch cutting process is a good example of laser 
optimization of intensity versus pulse width concept. Such optimum 
considers propagation and interaction effects as they work together 
to constrain the available operating parameters. Figure 10-6 Laser 
technology processing activities used in manufacturing.[18] 
 
Figure 10-6 laser processing activities as a function of the laser 
pulse width 
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Source: (National Academies of Sciences, 2018) 
It may be concluded (extending the torch thinking) that there is 
very little opportunity to damage targets in the atmosphere without 
operating at intensities where potentially deleterious propagation 
effects must be handled.  Even melting through targets in times less 
than seconds will be influenced by thermal blooming. If mechanical 
damage is needed, the full range of propagation effects could 
constrain the interaction between laser and target. [19] 
 
Microwaves 
Like lasers, microwaves travel through space, carrying energy and 
are characterized by specific frequencies. Microwaves are another 
form of ER, having a much longer wavelength and much lower 
frequency than light. Microwaves have wavelengths of about 1 cm, 
and frequencies on the order of 1010 Hertz, or 10 GHz. (See Figure 
10-7) Microwaves have a long history of use in commercial devices. 
 
Figure 10-7 Microwave portion of the EMS 
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Source: (Micro Denshi Co.,Ltd., 2019) 
Microwaves travel at the speed of light, c, (=3 x 108 m/sec) in a 
vacuum. They have frequency, v, and wavelength, λ, related by the 
expression v = c / λ.  Microwave frequencies lie in the range of 0.1 
– 100 GHz, and the associated wavelengths lie in the range 100 – 
0.1 cm. Microwaves are unique in that their wavelengths are similar 
in size to the physical objects they interact with. (Micro Denshi 
Co.,Ltd., 2019) 
 
Microwave Target Interaction 
Microwaves are likely to damage targets through the soft kill 
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mechanisms (similar to cyber-attacks on SCADA systems) – those 
that exploit inherent target vulnerabilities. There are two types of 
soft-kill: in-band and out-of-band. (Nielsen, 2012) 
 
1. With in-band damage, microwaves enter target through its 
antenna.(Adamy D. , 2009) This requires that the attacking 
microwaves be of the same frequency as those the target is 
tuned to receive. Damage occurs when the target’s circuits are 
loaded beyond their design capacity. (Nielsen, 2012) The best-
known example of in-bound microwave attack is EW jamming, 
a staple of CEA. (Adamy D. , 2009) Although there are shielding 
methods in military UASs to reduce this microwave jamming 
vulnerability, damage may still occur. 
 
2. In out-of-bounds damage, microwaves enter the target 
through the back door – apertures (again similar to some 
cyber-attacks) which were not designed for entry. Damage 
occurs as the microwaves are absorbed in thin, sensitive 
electronic components, heating them to the point of 
exhaustion and damage. (Nielsen, 2012) 
 
Particle Beams 
 The fourth (DEW, Lasers, Microwaves and Particle Beams (aka 
PB)) type of DEW that may be used against UASs are Particle Beams. 
Particle beams are large numbers of atomic or sub-atomic particles 
moving at relativistic velocities. [20] There are a large number of 
particles in these beams. Their interactions among themselves is 
as important as their interactions with the atmosphere and with 
targets. Below are the main concepts as we delve into the 
propagation and interaction forest of charged and neutral particle 
beams. (Nielsen, 2012) 
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 1. There are two types of PB: charged and neutral. Charged PB 
consist of particles such as electrons and photons which have 
an electrical charge. Charged PB tend to spread because of 
mutual repulsion of their particles. Neutral PB consist of 
electrically neutral particles such as hydrogen atoms.(Nielsen, 
2012) 
 
2. A PB is characterized by the current it carries, the energy of its 
particles, and its radius. These quantities are related to more 
weapon related parameters such as intensity, through 
relationships shown in Table 10-3. (Nielsen, 2012) 
3. 
Table 10-3 Quantities Used to Characterize Particle Beams (PB) 
Fundamental Physics Beam Engineering Weaponeering 
Particle charge, q Current, I Beam intensity, S 
I = nqvπw2 S= nKv 
Beam radius, w 
Particle density, n Kinetic Energy, K Beam Fluence, F 
ϓ =1/(1-v2 /c2) 1/2 F= Stp 
Particle velocity, v K= (ϓ-1)mc2 
Pulse width, tp Pulse width, tp 
Source: (Nielsen, 2012) 
 
3. Real PB deviate from perfection, in which all the particles 
propagate in the same direction with the same velocity. Lack of 
perfection is expressed in PB brightness (current/area/per 
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solid angle); divergence (angle which the PB envelope makes as 
it expands); or temperature (small random fluctuations in 
energy about the average value). (Nielsen, 2012) 
4. Neutral PB can propagate only in a vacuum at altitudes greater 
than about 100 km. Charged PB can propagate only in the 
atmosphere at altitudes less than about 200 km.(Nielsen, 2012) 
5. In propagating through the atmosphere, particles in the PM 
lose energy by ionization of the background gas and radiation. 
Further, if the PB contains heavy particles (photons or atomic 
nuclei), it loses current from collisions. These negative effects 
are reduced in magnitude as the atmospheric density is 
reduced. PB can also become unstable and cease to propagate 
when internal perturbations occur and grow. (Nielsen, 2012) 
6. PB interact with targets just as they do with the atmosphere – 
through ionization, bremsstrahlung,[21] and nuclear 
interactions. The energy deposited into the target is a function 
of its density. Energy losses from a PB propagating through the 
atmosphere to a target are less than those within the target 
itself.(Nielsen, 2012) 
7. For PB in the atmosphere, the total time it takes to destroy a 
target may be greater than the time required for a constant 
beam to deposit sufficient energy on it, because of “hole-
boring” and suppression of instabilities. 
 
PB Target Implications (especially large UAS) 
In principle, PB should be ideal as DEW.  Unlike lasers or 
microwaves, their propagation is unaffected by weather, clouds, rain, 
which add very little to the mass a PB might encounter on the 
way to the target. PB are an all-weather weapon. Once the PB 
encounters the target, the long penetration range of relativistic 
310  |  Chapter 10: When the Other Side Fights Back - Cyberwarfare,
Directed Energy Weapons, Acoustics,Integrating C-UAS into Planning
particles ensures that critical components on the interior  of the 
target will be rapidly engaged. Time is not wasted on eroding 
protective layers of matter on the target surface. Shielding targets 
against PB as a defensive countermeasure (CM) is not practical. 
In practice, PB are not technologically “there” yet. Difficulties 
in achieving stable propagation in the atmosphere has caused the 
research funds to focus on space based neutral PB, where physical 
problems of atmospheric propagation are replaced by engineering 
problems of deployment into space and maintaining large 
constellations of particle accelerators. (Nielsen, 2012) 
So, of four DEW, it appears that only Lasers, Microwaves are 
viable and cost-effective approaches.  However, a new EMS team 
player has joined the C-UAS fray. Sound. Sound has some very 
nice properties and is useful as both a countermeasure and an 
identifier in IFF systems.  Sound as a CM was introduced in Chapter 
19: Audiology, Acoustic Countermeasures against Swarms and 
Building IFF Libraries of (Nichols, et al., Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
in the Cyber Domain, 2nd Edition, 2019) [22]  A summary of findings 
of this previous work follows.[23] 
  
Acoustic Countermeasures and Building Identify Friend or Foe 
(IFF) Acoustic Libraries –Revisiting the C-UAS Problem 
 
The Risk of success of Terrorist Attacks on US Air Defense 
Systems (ADS) via sUAS / UAS is higher and improving because of 
commercial capabilities and accessibility. Advanced small drones 
capable of carrying sophisticated imaging equipment, significant 
(potentially lethal) payloads and performing extensive Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) missions are readily available 
to civilian market.  They pose a significant threat to civilian and 
military UAS operations and safety in the NAS. The highest 
threats to ADS are presented by hostile UAS SWARMS. 
 
Problem Solution 
The author’s research suggests that UAS SWARMS can be both 
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identified (IFF) and destabilized / mitigated /eliminated / 
countered in the air by applying harsh acoustic countermeasures 
at resonance frequencies. UAS (in any formation – especially 
SWARMS) present detectable acoustic signatures that can be 
collected in an IFF sound libraries and like fingerprints or DNA 
they are unique to the make, model and origin manufacturer. Once 
identified as hostile, UAS (SWARM units) may be destabilized by 
harsh – explosive amplitude acoustic countermeasures to the 
MEMS or rotor base of the UAS’s causing destabilization of the UAS 
and grounding. Emergency and waypoint recovery functions do not 
work under this approach. 
 
Sound as a Weapon and Countermeasure 
 Next, we add sound to the group of DEWs. The approach taken is 
to discuss fundamental concepts, then propagation (travel) towards 
the target, and lastly, interaction with the target and the 
mechanisms by which the target is destroyed. 
Essentials of Audiology 
The question is why would hitting a UAS going at 100+ mph or 
more be susceptible to a loud noise hitting the MEMS under the 
rotors or the rotors themselves? Why would this same noise or 
variation thereof be capable of characterization of the UAS’s of a 
hostile or friendly power? It is not something we can just take 
for granted without understanding the essentials of audiology 
underlying the process. 
 
Detection Signatures 
(Nichols, et al., Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the Cyber Domain, 
2nd Edition, 2019) found that UAS / UAVs are detected by 
their signatures: noise (acoustic), optical (visible), infrared (thermal) 
and radar (radio). “These acoustic or electromagnetic emissions 
occur at the following wavelengths: (Austin, 2010) 
 
1. A) Noise (acoustic) [16 m-2 cm, or 20 – 16000 Hz] 
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2. B) Optical (visible) [0.4 – 0.7 um] 
3. C) Infrared (thermal) [0.75 um – 1 mm] 
4. D) RADAR (radio) [3 mm – 3 cm]” (Austin, 2010) 
 
“If the designer is to reduce the vehicle detectability to an 
acceptable risk level, it is necessary to reduce the received 
emissions or reflection of the above wavelengths (expressed as 
frequencies) below the threshold signature value.  A good portion 
of the UAS signatures are a function of the operating height of air 
vehicle.” (Austin, 2010) The concept of frequency as a fifth realm 
can be  elucidated in terms of targets, battlespace, and wavelengths. 
(Nichols, et al., Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the Cyber Domain, 
2nd Edition, 2019) One of the parameters, range was a serious 
limitation on performance.  Range has a significant impact on radio 
transmission. Depending on the environment, the strength of a 
received signal, T, is a function of the square or fourth power of a 
distance, d, from the transmitter. (Adamy D. -0., 2015) 
In Chapters 8 and 14 of (Nichols, et al., Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems in the Cyber Domain, 2nd Edition, 2019),  EMS was 
presented with emphasis on sound frequencies, many out of human 
hearing range. The author’s experiments were performed using DJI 
Phantom 4 at 400 ft. This is not a tactical distance for a C-UAS 
countermeasure. However, the LRAD 1000X made by LRAD 
Corporation is effective to a 1.864 miles. See Figure 10-8. Appendix 
10-2 gives the LRAD 1000X specifications. (LRAD Corporation, 2019) 
Longer-range models are in  pipeline.  The upper end of noise – 
Stealth acceptability is 17,150 Hz.  The Stealth range is 20 Hz – 17,150 
Hz. (Austin, 2010) 
 
 Figure 10-8  LRAD 1000x C-UAS 
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Source: (LRAD Corporation, 2019) [24] 
 
Designing a UAS for Stealth 
 Stealth means “to resist detection.”  Stealth applies to the air 
vehicle and materials visible to the enemy plus the internal SAA 
systems that control / create noise, heat, electromagnetic 
emanations, and changes in light. For ISR platforms and missions, 
it is essential the UAS systems be undetected in operation. “It is 
desirable not to alert the enemy (military) or criminals (police) to the 
ISR operation.” It can be assumed that the enemy is using counter-
UAV operations and weapons.  Stealth design protects the air 
vehicle from these counter – UAV measures. Stealth in civilian 
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operations results in minimal environmental disturbances. (Austin, 
2010) 
From a personal privacy standpoint or in civil airspace it is 
desirable to have the UAV stealth features turned off. [It should be 
as if we had flicked a switch.] (Austin, 2010) Thinking again about 
a team or swarm of UAS, the low-hanging fruit target is US 
communications. We depend on connectivity in everything we do: 
daily lives, social interactions, business, manufacturing, 
government, transportation, computers and warfare to name just 
a few in the extensive list. Connectivity is any technique for the 
movement of information from one location or player to another.
Consider the economic impact of having our critical infrastructure 
(banking, air transportation, etc.) shut down. Damaging the 
connectivity of system is real damage. We measure connectivity 
in terms of information flow. In warfare, this is called Information 
Operations (IO). Fundamental to IO is the frequency at which the 
information is transmitted or received. Returning to stealth with 
respect to UAS design, we note that the intelligence, surveillance, 
reconnaissance and weapons payload-delivery functions of UAS. 
These are all IO operations and frequency is at the heart of their 
success against or denial by the enemy. (Adamy D. -0., 2015) 
 
Acoustic Signature Reductions 
“Aircraft noise may be the first warning of its presence; however, 
it may not immediately be directionally/locatable for detection.” 
“UAS noise emanates predominantly from vortices, tips of wings, 
rotors, or propellers. Lowering wingspan or blade span enhances 
acoustical stealth.” Conventional propulsion systems are a concern 
because of the noise of combustion. Electric motors develop 
virtually no noise. “Reducing mass and aerodynamic drag of the 
UAS reduces noise generation.” (Austin, 2010) The human ear is a 
problem for the designer. “It is most sensitive to frequencies around 
3500 Hz and can hear sound down to a practical threshold of 10 
dB. For a given sound pressure level, attenuation of sound with 
distance in air and insulating material varies as the square of the 
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sound frequency.  Low frequency sound presents a greater problem 
for UAS stealth design.” (Austin, 2010) 
 
Audiology Fundamentals 
 
1. The science of sound is called acoustics, which a branch of 
physics. Appendix 10-1 displays the principal physical 
quantities in MKS, cgs, and English units. It is the starting point 
of a trip uphill to resonance frequencies. Sound is small 
portion of the EMS. 
Figure 10-9 shows the conversion for sound and acoustic wave 
period to frequency and back. (Adamy D. -0., 2015) Figure 10-10 
shows the Sound EMS regions (Adamy D. -0., 2015) 
  
Figure 10-9 Conversion for sound and acoustic wave period to 
frequency and back 
Source: (TRS S. , 2018) 
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 Figure 10-10 Sound EMS Regions 
Source: (TRS S. , 2018) 
 
Acoustic waves and Sound Waves in Air 
2. Sound waves are EMS waves which propagate vibrations in air 
molecules. The 1986 standard speed of sound, c, is 331.3 m/s 
or 1125.33 ft/s at a temperature, T = 0 degrees Celsius.”(TRS S. , 
2018) “The formulas and equations for sound are 
 
c = L x f; L = c /f = c x T; f=c /L                Equation 10-1 
Where: 
T = time- period or cycle duration and T = 1/ f and f = 1 / T. 
The unit for frequency is Hertz = Hz =1/s. The unit for 
wavelength, L is meters, m. The time-period or cycle duration, T 
is sec, s. The wave speed or speed of sound, c, is meters/sec, m/
s.” (TRS S. , 2018) 
(Austin, 2010) states that the design limit for UAS Stealth for 
acoustic (noise) or sound waves is “[16 m-2 cm, or 20 – 16000 Hz].” 
The Stealth range is 20 Hz – 17,150 Hz. [25] 
3. Hearing range describes the range of frequencies that can 
be heard by humans, (aka range of levels). The human range is 
commonly given as 20 to 20,000 Hz, there is considerable 
variation between individuals, especially at high frequencies, 
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and a gradual loss of sensitivity to higher frequencies with age 
is considered normal. Sensitivity also varies with frequency, as 
shown by equal loudness contours. (Rosen, 2011) See Figure 
10-11.[26] 
 
Figure 10-11 Equal Loudness Contours 
Source: Equal -Loudness Contours (Fletcher, 1933) (Rosen, 2011) 
 
Intensity and Inverse Square Law 
 
4. “Sound radiates outward in every direction from its source. 
This constitutes a sphere that gets larger and larger with 
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increasing distance from the source.”(Entokey, 2019) Figure 
10-12 shows the relationship between Intensity and the Inverse 
Square Law.(Uni-wuppertal, 2019) Intensity (I) (power divided 
by area) decreases with distance from the original source 
because of finite amount of power is spread over increasing 
surface area. (Entokey, 2019) Proportionately less power falls 
on the same unit of area with increasing distance from the 
source. (Gelfand, 2004) [27] [28] 
 
Figure 10-12: Inverse Square Law, Sound Intensity 
Source: (Uni-wuppertal, 2019) 
 
5. Figure 10-13 shows common decibel and Intensity levels within 
the hearing range. This does not consider environment, 
frequency differences or noise (discussed presently). It does 
show the ease of which decibels may be used to rank the 
sound intensity levels which vary greatly in magnitude. 
Hearing aids are effective from about 6 –90 decibels. Above 90 
dB, they can dampen but not eliminate the very loud sounds 
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unless there is complete loss of hearing. 
 
The Nature of Sound 
 
6. Sound is defined as a form of vibration that propagates through 
the air in the form of a wave. Vibration is the to-and-fro motion 
(aka oscillation) of an object. Some examples are playground 
swing, tuning fork prong, air molecules and UAS rotor blades 
[circular motion]. The vibration is called sound when it is 
transferred from air molecule to air molecule. This transfer 
may be simple like a tuning fork or a very complex pattern like 
the din in a school cafeteria. Naturally occurring sounds are 
very complex. (Entokey, 2019) UAS sounds are not natural and 
supported by machinery, hardware and software. Three 
weaknesses of the UAS are the MEMS, gimbal assembly and 
rotors. Although stealth mechanisms may be employed to 
reduce noise emissions, the former parts are exposed. They do 
produce discernable signatures. 
7. A tuning fork illustrates the oscillations of sound. After being 
struck, the tuning fork vibrates with a simple pattern that 
repeats itself over time. (Entokey, 2019) Figure 10-14 shows that 
the tuning fork when struck exerts a force on the air molecules 
which alternatively exerts a high pressure (compression) and a 
low pressure (rarefaction) zones. The zones exhibit wave 
amplitude and wavelength as a function of air pressure and 
distance. The sound wave is distributed in 360 degrees 
through the air. 
 
Figure 10-13 Shows common decibel and Intensity levels within 
the hearing range. 
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Source: (Carter, 2012) 
 
Figure 10-14 diagrams tuning fork oscillations over time. Sounds 
that are associated with simple harmonic motion are called pure 
tones. Vertical displacement amount of the tuning fork prong 
displacement around its resting position. Distance from left to right 
represents progression of time. One complete round-trip or 
replication of an oscillating motion is called a cycle. The number 
of cycles occurring in one second is the frequency. The duration 
of one cycle is called its period. This form of motion occurs when 
a force is applied to an object having properties of elasticity and 
inertia. Simple harmonic motion (SHM) shows the same course of 
oscillations as in Figure 10-15 because they repeat themselves at 
the same rate until friction causes dampening of the waveform. 
(Entokey, 2019) and (Gelfand S. A., 2009) 
 
Figure 10-14: Tuning for Oscillations 
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Source: (Pierson, 2019) 
 
Figure 10-15: Tuning fork oscillations over time 
Source: (Entokey, 2019) 
 
Other Parameters of Sound waves 
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8. Probably the most useful SHM waveform is the sinusoidal wave 
or sine wave.[29] 
The number of times a waveform repeats itself in one second is 
known as the frequency or cycles per second (CPS). (Gelfand S. A., 
2009)Two useful relationships are: f = 1/ t or t = 1/f; where f is the 
frequency in cps and t is the period in seconds. Amplitude denote 
the magnitude of the wave. The peak- to – peak amplitude is the 
total vertical distance between negative and positive peaks. The 
peak amplitude is the distance from the baseline to one peak. The 
magnitude of sound at any instant is the instantaneous amplitude.
Wavelength (λ) is the distance traveled between one peak and the 
next. (Gelfand, 2004) Wavelength formula is: λ = c / f, where c is 
the speed of sound in air (344 m/s.  f is the frequency of sound in 
Hz.  Similarly, frequency is inversely proportional to wavelength or 
f = c / λ. (Gelfand S. A., 2009) Another interesting sound parameter 
is Pitch. Pitch is the quality of sound and especially a musical tone 
governed by the rate of vibrations producing it. It is the degree of 
highness or lowness of sound. (Merriam-Webster, 2019) 
 
Complex waves 
9. When two or more pure-tone waves are combined, the result 
is a complex wave. (Gelfand, 2004) They may contain any 
number of frequencies. Complex periodic waves have 
waveforms that repeat themselves. If they don’t, they are 
aperiodic. Combining waves may reinforce themselves or 
cancel themselves whether they are in phase or out. The 
lowest frequency component of a complex periodic wave (like 
a combination of sign waves) is called its fundamental 
frequency. (Gelfand, 2004) 
10. Harmonics are whole number or integral multiples of the 
fundamental frequency. Waveforms show how amplitude 
changes with time. (Gelfand, 2004) Fourier’s Theorem shows 
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that complex sound waves can be mathematically dissected 
into its pure tones. Of more interest to UAS designers are 
aperiodic sounds which are made up of components that are 
not harmonically related and do not repeat themselves over 
time. The extreme cases of aperiodic sounds are transients and 
random noise. A transient is an abrupt sound that is very brief 
in duration. Random noise has a completely random waveform, 
so it contains all possible frequencies in the same average 
amplitude over the long run. Random noise is also called white 
noise like white light because all possible frequencies are 
represented. 
 
Standing Waves and Resonance 
11. We have arrived at the crux of the acoustic CM discussion, the 
natural or resonating frequency. “The frequency(ies) at which a 
body or medium vibrates most readily is called its natural or 
resonant frequency(ies).”(Gelfand S. A., 2009) Differences in 
resonance frequency ranges enable different devices to act as 
filters by transmitting energy more readily for certain high, 
low, or band-pass frequencies. UAS with multiple rotors 
circulate the rotors to gain lift and / or hold steady / or 
descend in altitude. Four, six, eight – rotor UAS maintain 
control via internal SCADA systems and send critical 
information through a MEMS component located at the 
bottom of rotors. Rotor frequencies are coordinated, 
monitored, and position -controlled through the MEMS and 
in-board computers. Even though the rotor(s) motions are 
spinning in circular fashion, the sound wave generation is not 
curvilinear, or aperiodic but transferred up through the Y axis 
and back again to its base as it ascends in altitude. There is a 
tendency to maintain equilibrium in terms of position of the 
UAS. 
324  |  Chapter 10: When the Other Side Fights Back - Cyberwarfare,
Directed Energy Weapons, Acoustics,Integrating C-UAS into Planning
12. The author contends that the UAS rotor systems act like 
vibrating strings and resonance frequency information can be 
approximated by this approach. An example of a vibrating 
spring is when you “pluck” a guitar. The waves initiated move 
outward toward the two tied ends of the string. The waves are 
then reflected back, and they propagate in the opposite 
directions. The result is a set of waves that are moving toward 
each other, resulting in a perturbation sustained by continuing 
reflections from the two ends. The superimposed waves 
interact and propagate and appears as a pattern that is 
standing still. Peaks (maximum displacement) and no 
displacement (baseline crossings occur at fixed points along 
the string.[30] Places along the spring where zero 
displacement in the standing wave pattern are called nodes. 
(Gelfand, 2004) Locations where the maximum displacement 
occurs are called antinodes. See Figure 10-16. 
 
Figure 10-16: Standing Wave 
 
(Administrator, 2015) 
13. “The fundamental frequency is defined as the lowest frequency 
of a periodic waveform. It is generally denoted as ‘f’. The lowest 
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resonating frequency of a vibrating object is called as 
fundamental frequency.”(Administrator, 2015) 
14. “Harmonic is a frequency, which is an integer multiple of the 
fundamental frequency. The forced resonance vibrations of an 
object are caused to produce standing waves. At the natural 
frequency it forms a standing wave pattern. These patterns are 
created at specific frequencies, they are called Harmonic 
Frequencies or Harmonics.”(Administrator, 2015) 
15. “The sound produced by a wave form at its harmonic 
frequency is very clear, and at other frequencies we get noise, 
and cannot hear the clear sound of waves. Harmonics may 
occur in any shaped wave forms, but mostly they occur in sine 
waves only. Non – sinusoidal wave forms, like triangular and 
saw tooth wave forms are constructed by adding together the 
harmonic frequencies. The word harmonic is generally used to 
describe the distortions caused by different un- desirable 
frequencies called noise, of a sine wave.”(Administrator, 2015) 
16. “Node and antinodes occur in a wave form. So, the waves have 
harmonic frequency in them. The fundamental frequency is the 
smallest frequency in a harmonic. Hence there is only a single 
anti-node occurs between them. This Antinode is middle of the 
two nodes. So, from this we can say that the guitar string 
produces longest wavelength and the lowest 
frequency.”(Administrator, 2015) 
17. “The lowest frequency produced by any instrument is called 
the fundamental frequency. This is also known as first 
harmonic of the wave. In words of fundamental frequency, 
harmonics are the integer multiples of the fundamental 
frequency.” (Ex: f,2f,3f,4f, etc.… are harmonics.) (Administrator, 
2015) 
18. “Because of multiple integers of fundamental frequency, we 
326  |  Chapter 10: When the Other Side Fights Back - Cyberwarfare,
Directed Energy Weapons, Acoustics,Integrating C-UAS into Planning
will have n number of harmonics like 1st harmonic, 2nd 
harmonic,3rd harmonic, and so forth.”(Administrator, 2015) 
“The fundamental frequency is also called as First harmonic. In 
the first harmonic, we have two nodes and one antinode. he 
numbers of antinodes are equal to the integer multiples of 
specific harmonics. i.e., for 1st harmonic we have 1 antinode, 
for 2nd harmonic we have 2 antinodes etc.”(Administrator, 
2015) 
MEMS 
19. What is a MEMS and how does it relate to the UAS gyroscope? 
As shown in Figure 10-17 MEMS Gyroscope, MEMS (Micro-
Electro-Mechanical-Systems) gyroscopes are located in the 
rotor systems of most drones. Visualization of a MEMS 
gyroscope is a single proof mass suspended above a substrate 
The proof mass is free to oscillate in two perpendicular 
directions, the drive and sense direction.(Said Emre Alper, 
December 2008) 
 
Resonance Effects on MEMS 
20. Achieving resonance frequencies can have a significant effect 
for countering hostile UAS: 
• MEMS Gyroscope can be degraded using harsh acoustic noise 
• MEMS Gyroscope has a resonant frequency that is related to 
the physical characteristics of its structure (Usenix.org, 2019) 
• MEMS Gyroscopes have resonant frequencies much higher 
than can be heard (audible and ultrasonic ranges) 
• Unexpected resonance output caused from an attack will cause 
the rotor system to malfunction 
• Rotors will spin at differing speeds causing the drone to become 
unstable and crash 
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Figure 10-17: MEMS Gyroscope 
Source: (Said Emre Alper, December 2008) 
 
Resonance Tuning 
21. In the operation of MEMS gyroscopes, the bending changes 
the capacitance between the sensing mass and the sensing 
electrode, and this capacitance change is sensed as the output 
of the gyroscope By using an additional feedback capacitor 
connected to the sensing electrode, the resonant frequency 
and the magnitude of the resonance effect can be tuned 
Resonance can be induced by a malicious attacker, if resonant 
frequencies exist in gyroscopes.(Nichols R. K., Hardening US 
Unmanned Systems Against Enemy Counter Measures, 2019) 
 
What is the “so what” for Acoustics? 
22. “Passive detection is much cheaper and cost effective to 
operate vs a complex radar system for a single installation 
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(limited by detection range ~350ft).MEMS gyroscopes 
contained in rotor systems are very susceptible to malfunction 
when struck with rough noise that resonates inside the MEMS. 
Offensive acoustic systems are currently mounted, could 
become man portable. Offensive systems are not detected by 
National ELINT assets not looking for acoustic energy 
signatures, enemy can remain hidden from detection when 
using acoustics.”(Nichols R. K., Hardening US Unmanned 
Systems Against Enemy Counter Measures, 2019) 
23. What is an Acoustical attack on the UAS Gyroscope? 
There are two possibilities: compromising the sound source or 
drone on drone attack: 
Compromising the Sound Source 
• UAM with speakers (consider police and military operations or 
search-and-rescue operations)(Usenix.org, 2019) 
• Counter the source of the sound from the speaker with 
different frequency sound 
• Jamming attack aims to generate ultrasonic noises and cause 
continuing vibration of the membrane on the sensor, which 
make the measurements impossible 
• Level of noise causes performance degradation 
Drone on Drone Attack 
• Taking a picture of a moving object from UAM 
• An adversary drone equipped with a speaker could steer itself 
toward a victim drone and generate a sound with the resonant 
frequency of the victim’s gyroscope to drag it down(Usenix.org, 
2019) 
What are Countermeasures for Acoustic attack on Gyroscope 
24. Countermeasures for attacks on gyroscope include: Physical 
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Isolation – provide physical isolation from the sound noise; 
Surrounding the gyroscope with foam would also be a simple 
and inexpensive countermeasure; using a differential 
comparator; using an additional gyroscope with a special 
structure that responds only to the resonant frequency so the 
application systems can cancel out the resonant output from 
the main gyroscope and improving detect and cancel out 
analog sensor input spoofing against CIEDs.(Nichols R. K., 
Hardening US Unmanned Systems Against Enemy Counter 
Measures, 2019) 
In terms of UAS Countermeasures, why are Acoustics so 
important? (Nichols R. K., Hardening US Unmanned Systems 
Against Enemy Counter Measures, 2019) 
25. They are important because: 
• Offensive systems use ultrasonic frequency resonance 
• Cannot be heard by humans when used to intercept a drone 
• Passive systems are difficult, if not impossible, to detect 
• Able to identify and track drone based on acoustic and/or 
visual signature 
• Acoustic detection systems are limited in range ~ 350 ft to 500 
ft due to environmental variables BUT commercial companies 
like LRAD, Corporation have developed long range acoustic 
devices which can detect a UAS up to a mile away at altitude. 
• Can be a cost-effective way to defend a small area –especially 
against SWARM Attack 
What are the Acoustic Detection Issues? 
26. Detection relies on uniqueness of the UAS and hearing 
capabilities at low frequencies: 
• Detects drones by recognizing the unique sounds produced by 
their motors 
330  |  Chapter 10: When the Other Side Fights Back - Cyberwarfare,
Directed Energy Weapons, Acoustics,Integrating C-UAS into Planning
• Rely on a library of sounds produced by known drones, which 
are then matched to sounds detected in the operating 
environment, however, 
• The human ear is a problem for the designer 
• It is most sensitive to frequencies around 3500 Hz and can 
hear sound down to a practical threshold of 10 dB 
• For a given sound pressure level, attenuation of sound with 
distance in air and insulating material varies as the square of 
the sound frequency 
• Low frequency sound presents a greater problem for UAS 
stealth design 
• The greater noise problem is posed by smaller UAS using 
piston engines 
• Sound comes from their internal combustion and exhaust 
systems 
• Sound emission can be reduced with sound-absorptive 
materials, silencers and mufflers and by directing the intake 
and exhaust manifolds upward 
• Level of sound detected depends on the level of background 
noise for sound contrast 
• Limited range to 500 feet (experimental and research – not 
commercial or military) 
• Noisy backgrounds (airports, city downtown) limit detection & 
interdiction 
• Drone tuning (changing the stock propellers) limits detection / 
Interdiction 
Is Acoustic Quieting possible? 
27. “Yes, under certain conditions: 
•  Disguise sounds from sensors to eliminate its noise and 
passive echoes 
• “Acoustic superiority” used by the Navy to mask detection of 
U.S. submarines 
Chapter 10: When the Other Side Fights Back - Cyberwarfare, Directed
Energy Weapons, Acoustics,Integrating C-UAS into Planning  |  331
• Acoustic technology is “passive,” meaning it is engineered to 
receive pings and “listen” without sending out a signal which 
might reveal their location to an enemy 
• Increased use of lower frequency active sonar and non-
acoustic methods of detecting.”(Nichols R. K., Hardening US 
Unmanned Systems Against Enemy Counter Measures, 2019) 
28. How has the Long-Range Acoustic Device (LRAD) used as a 
sonic weapon?(LRAD, 2019) 
It has been used primarily for denying GPS navigation: 
GPS Denied Navigation 
• GPS navigation relies on measuring the distance or delay, to 
several known transmitters in order to triangulate the mobile 
receiver’s position 
• GPS-denied environment presents navigation challenges for 
UAV and UAM 
• These areas include urban canyons, forest canopy, etc. 
• Strike Resonance frequency – which disrupts balance (vehicles 
tilt, orientation & rotation) 
 UAS Collaboration – SWARM 
A  UAS SWARM as a uniform mass of undifferentiated individual’s 
w/o Chief at automation level 4 or 5. SWARMs exhibit the following 
advantages: 
• Efficient based on numbers, emergent large group behaviors, 
and reactions 
• Not controllable or automated, decentralized intelligence 
• Think shoal of fish w/ evolving local rules; highly resistant 
form 
• Not changing based on survivability of members, no hierarchy 
SWARM Countermeasures include disruption, i.e. changing the 
Strategic Global View of SWARM (its only real vulnerability), 
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complete Defender collaboration  with multiple kinetic and non-
kinetic countermeasures, and use of Acoustic Countermeasures for 
identification as friend or foe (IFF) based on a library of manufacture 
detection signatures and complete , abrupt rotor disablement by 
attacking the SWARM units with resonant, loud ( 100-140 dB) sound 
noise aimed directly at the MEMS gyroscopes or close by on the 
unit. [Think of glass breaking at resonance frequency or a 
submarine under depth charge attack. The former breaks by super- 
excited molecules in the glass and literally shakes apart. The latter is 
destroyed by violent shaking of the submarine so that its parts break 
and flooding ensue. It is not necessary to hit the submarine directly 
because explosions in water, hence sound waves and explosive 
forces, carry very far and effectively to the target.] 
 
South Korean experiment 
 A paper by Yunmonk son, et. Al. From the Korean advanced 
institute of science and technology (KAIST), in the authors 
judgement, is the seminal paper on taken down drones using sound 
noise on gyroscope sensors! (Yunmonk Son, 2015) It is required 
reading for my students. 
(Yunmonk Son, 2015) describes the relationship between Sound 
Pressure Level (SPL) and Sound Amplitude and derives the attack 
distance, d as (in dB): 
 
SPL = SPLref + 20 log (A / Aref )                              Equation. 10-2 
 
Where SPL = sound pressure level, SPLref is the reference, A and 
Aref are the amplitudes of the source and reference point. Using 
real-world experiments (Yunmonk Son, 2015) found that: 
 
SPL = SPLref  –  20 log (d / dref )                              Equation. 10-3 
 
Where d, dref are the attack scenario distances. 
 
KAIST under (Yunmonk Son, 2015) primary conclusions are: 
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• “Many sensing and actuation systems trust their 
measurements and actuate according to them. Unfortunately, 
this can lead to security vulnerabilities that cause critically 
unintended actuations. 
• The sound channel can be used as a side channel for MEMS 
gyroscopes from a security point of view. 
• 15 kinds of MEMS gyroscopes were tested, and seven of them 
were found vulnerable to disruption using intentional noise. 
• The output of the vulnerable MEMS gyroscopes was found 
using a consumer-grade speaker to fluctuate up to dozens of 
times as a result of the sound noise. 
• Authors found that an attacker with only 30% of the amplitude 
of the maximum sound noise could achieve the same result 
(disruption) at the same distance. 
• At 140 decibels, it would be possible to affect a vulnerable 
drone up from around 40 meters away, 
• Some drone gyroscopes have resonant frequencies in both the 
audible and ultrasonic frequency ranges, making them 
vulnerable to interference from intentional sound noise. 
• Authors found that accelerometers integrated with MEMS 
gyroscopes were also affected by high-power sound noise at 
certain frequencies.”(Yunmonk Son, 2015)[31] 
 
Noise 
Loud and abrupt sound as a countermeasure also brings the 
problem of exposure and loss. Chapter 17 of (Gelfand S. A., 2009) 
discusses the effects of noise and hearing conservation. Chapter 20 
of (Gelfand S. A., 2009) discusses occupational standards. Safety is 
an important topic but outside the scope of this writing. 
 
Real World C-UAS 
Time to move from the theoretical into the practical. The balance 
of this chapter will be devoted to a sample of deployed ADVANCED 
UAS / C-UAS multi-mission systems globally. They can fight back! 
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 Chinese CH7 
At the air show China 2018 in Zhuhai, South China, The UAV 
– CH7 was unveiled. The CH7 is China’s new generation stealth 
combat unmanned aerial vehicle. The CH7 makes China the second 
country, followed by the US, to produce HALE combat vehicles with 
advanced penetration capabilities. The CH7 has internal weapons 
bays, making it capable of launching anti-radiation missiles, air-
to-ground (ATG) or anti-ship missiles and long -distance precision 
guided bombs. Its missions favor high altitude, stealth capacity and 
endurance under dangerous conditions such as C4ISR or launching 
missiles at HVTs. The CH7 is 10m long and has a wingspan of 22 m. 
It weighs 13,000 kg, cruises at 0.5-0.6 Mach and can fly for 15 hours. 
The CH7 can intercept radar electronic signals and simultaneously 
detect, verify and monitor HVTs such as US command stations, 
missile launch sites and navy vessels. (Defense Editor, 2018) See 
Figure 10-18. 
 
Russian Okhotnik aka “Hunter Drone” 
Just as General Michael Hayden and Roger N. McDermott 
predicted in their report, Russia’s Electronic Warfare Capabilities 
to 2025: Challenging NATO in the Electromagnetic Spectrum 
(McDermott, September 2017), along comes the Russian Okhotnik 
drone. Flying with the fifth generation Su-57, the Okhotnik, or 
“Hunter,” drone which is able “to broaden the fighter’s radar 
coverage and to provide target acquisition for employing air-
launched weapons.” (Pickrell, 2019) 
Figure 10-19 shows the Okhotnik drone flying next to the SU-57, 
Russia’s most advanced stealth fighter. The latest flight appears to 
confirm suspicions that the drone was designed to fight alongside 
and provide critical battlespace information to Russia’s newest 
fighters. (Pickrell, 2019) 
 
Figure 10-18 Chinese CH7 – UAV 
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Source: (Defense Editor, 2018) 
 
Figure 10-19 Okhotnik drone flying next to the SU-57, Russia’s 
most advanced stealth fighter 
Source: (Pickrell, 2019) 
 
The Iranian Shahed 129 
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The Shahed 129 (Persian for Eyewitness) is an Iranian single-
engine MALE (UCAV) designed by Shahed Aviation Industries for 
the  (IRGC). The Shahed 129 is capable of combat 
and reconnaissance missions and has an endurance of 24 hours; it is 
similar in size, shape and role to the American MQ-1 Predator and 
is widely considered the most capable drone in Iranian 
service. (Taghvaee, 2017) See Figure 10-20. 
 
General characteristics from (Taghvaee, 2017) 
• Crew: none 
• Capacity: 400 kg payload 
• Length: 8 m (26 ft 3 in) 
• Wingspan: 16 m (52 ft 6 in) 
• Height: 3.1 m (10 ft 2 in) 
• Powerplant: 1 × Rotax 914 four-cylinder, four stroke Ac engine 
• Propellers: 3-bladed 
Performance 
• Cruise speed: 150 km/h (93 mph, 81 kn) 
• Combat range: 1,700 km (1,100 mi, 920 nm) 
• Ferry range: 3,400 km (2,100 mi, 1,800 nm) 
• Endurance: 24h 
• Service ceiling: 7,300 m (24,000 ft) 
Armament 
• Bombs: 4 × Sadid-345 PGM 
Avionics 
Oghab-6 electro-optical/infrared sensor 
Laser range finder 
 
 Figure 10-20 The Iranian The Shahed 129 
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Source: (Taghvaee, 2017) 
 
In June, U.S. Air Force F-15Es shot down two Iranian UAVs in 
Syria—both Shahed 129s operated by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary 
Guard Corps. These were rare incursions between U.S. and Iranian 
aircraft in the Middle Eastern country, which Iran has used as a 
testing ground for the Shahed, one of the most advanced armed 
UAVs in the Iranian Revolutionary Guard’s Air & Space Force (IRGC-
ASF) drone unit. It will continue to be a mainstay of the Iranian fleet 
for the foreseeable future. (Taghvaee, 2017) 
 
The Israeli Tactical Heron 
The Tactical Heron, joins drones that have “hundreds of 
thousands of operation flight hours.” Designed for missions on the 
battlefield, the tactical Heron is used by ground troops or coast 
guards. The new Heron can fly up to 7.3 km. with payloads of 180 
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kg. (Frantzman, 2019) The Heron is used for ISTAR missions. Figure 
10-21 shows the Tactical Heron. 
 
Figure 10-21 Israeli Tactical Heron 
Source: (IAI, 2019) 
 “According to IAI,  T-Heron is the best of the best of Heron line, 
with all its sensors, cameras, intelligence and attack capabilities, 
but for the “local” tactical level. Only UAV in the world with the 
abilities of super drones but for tactical levels (according to the 
ISI). It has a versatile design and is all-weather day and night. It 
is 30% smaller than the standard Heron, and most importantly, 
cheaper. It’s for the Brigade tactical level, specifically ground and 
mechanized forces, and can even be operated by them (without 
having to bring specialized drone operators). It can be brought to 
its required location with two trucks and can lift off and land back 
on very short paved low-level runways. Because it’s mobile and 
tactical, it can travel with front-line forces with no logistical long 
tail headaches. It can carry multiple payloads, up to 180 KG, and its 
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gross weight up to 600 KG. It has a flight time of 24 hours, 300 KM 
range, 23000 ft altitude and has a 10-meter wingspan.” (IAI, 2019) 
According to Moshe levy, VP of Aircraft division at IAI, “We are 
proud to introduce the most recent UAS developed by IAI. Our 
T-Heron tactical UAS rounds up the range of operational UAS 
solutions IAI offers to all forces on the battlefield: marine, air, 
ground, and intelligence. IAI preserves its leadership position in 
UAS’s with a continuous stream of solutions for the challenges 
posed by the field.” (IAI, 2019) 
IAI doesn’t foresee much maturity problems as it has the same 
materials and components as the other Heron’s, only in smaller 
amounts. (IAI, 2019) 
 
USA  Predator C Avenger 
The General Atomics Avenger (formerly Predator C) is a 
developmental UCAV built by General Atomics Aeronautical 
Systems for the US military. Its first flight occurred on 4 April 2009. 
Unlike the previous MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper (Predator B) 
drones, the Avenger is powered by a turbofan engine, and its design 
includes stealth features such as internal weapons storage, and an 
S-shaped exhaust for reduced infrared and radar signatures. The 
Avenger will support the same weapons as the MQ-9 and carry 
the Lynx SAR and a version of the F-35 Lightning II’s electro-optical 
targeting system (EOTS), called the Advanced Low-observable 
Embedded Reconnaissance Targeting (ALERT) system. The Avenger 
will use the same ground support infrastructure as the MQ-1 and 
MQ-9, including the GCS and existing communications networks. 
(Staff, General Atomics Avenger, 2019) 
Predator C Avenger can carry Hellfire missiles and guided bombs 
and ammunition. The Predator C Avenger is a remotely piloted 
aircraft developed by GA‑ASI. The first flight of the aircraft was 
conducted in April 2009. The combat drone has a maximum take-off 
weight of 8,255kg.It is capable of carrying multiple sensor payloads 
attached to its wing hard-point mountings while its internal 
weapons bay can carry precision mutations and large sensors up 
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to 1,588kg. The total payload capacity of the aircraft is 2948kg. 
Its weapon payload includes Hellfire missiles, guided bomb unit 
(GBU)-12/49 laser-guided bombs, GBU-31 GBU-32, GBU-38 38 joint 
direct attack munitions (JDMA) and GBU-39 and GBU-16/48 bombs. 
The Predator C Avenger offers greater operational and transit 
speeds than Predator B aircraft. Powered by Pratt and Whitney 
PW545B turbofan engine, the combat drone is capable of reaching 
altitudes up to 50,000ft. It has a maximum speed of 400k and 
endurance of 20 hours. (Army, The world’s top combat drones, 2019) 
See Figure 10-22. 
 
Conclusions 
There are five DE systems (DEW, Laser, Microwave, Particle 
Beams, Acoustic) which use the EMS to attack and defend against 
hostile UAS. Acoustic systems have the secondary advantage that 
their resonance frequencies may be used not only to knock out 
UASs but also characterize and identify friend or foe (IFF) UASs. 
All these EMO technologies have varying success rates against 
SWARMS. 
Acoustical defenses show promise in they represent a two-for. 
Not only can they disrupt the MEMS with explosive sound at 
resonance frequencies, but every UAS has a unique acoustical 
signature. These acoustic signatures can be cataloged and used for 
challenge – response in an Identify Friend or Foe (IFF) algorithm. 
The sampling of advanced attack capability UAV from around the 
world, at the end of this chapter are targets that have the ability 
to fight back – either with ISTAR, missiles, precision guided bombs 
 (PGB) / (PGM) / missiles or EW countermeasures. They are able to 
identify the defender’s transmitters. They can put a world of hurt on 
opposing forces. 
 
Figure 10-22 Predator C Avenger 
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Source: (Staff, General Atomics Avenger, 2019) 
Discussion Questions 
• This chapter explores the use of acoustic countermeasures 
against UAS.  The authors contend that every manufactured 
UAS has unique sound detection signatures. Further these can 
be libraried and used in a search algorithm to IFF the UAS 
group or SWARM. At the DoD 7th Annual Summit, (Nichols R. 
K., Hardening US Unmanned Systems Against Enemy Counter 
Measures, 2019) the author found that several contractors are 
actually doing this and building databases. BUT they refuse to 
share their data because it is proprietary. Assuming this 
situation cannot be changed, suggest two ways to get around 
this problem not involving legal actions. What type of research 
project would you propose to meet an 85% detection criteria 
that would suffice as an initial IFF database for evaluation? 
• Along with attacking the MEMS gyroscopes to disable the UAS 
rotor, propose an experiment to use acoustic countermeasures 
342  |  Chapter 10: When the Other Side Fights Back - Cyberwarfare,
Directed Energy Weapons, Acoustics,Integrating C-UAS into Planning
on the UAS internals, such as SCADA, payload, navigation, 
internal clocks, internal computer, battery, etc. Perhaps loud 
noise can disrupt additional UAS features? 
• This chapter has discussed sound in the in the extended 
hearing ranges from 10 Hz to 20,000 Hz. Many UAS are 
designed for higher frequencies, i.e. ultrasonic and hypersonic. 
Propose an experiment to test sound disruption effects at the 
higher frequencies. (Drones, 2017) Quad Star Drones has some 
interesting “takes” on hypersonic flight and Mach 0.8 speeds. 
• There was a fascinating story in the 4 November 2019 web-
issue of Popular Mechanics about drones being launched from 
submarines. (Mizokami, 2019) See: https://hmg.h-cdn.co/
videos/missle-rc-illustration-1572620289.mp4 The article is 
critical of carrier warfare and suggests that submarine 
launched drones would change the way carriers are deployed. 
Assignment: read the article. Then you be the designer to tie it all 
together. How would you do it? 
Much of the tech needed to develop drone-launching 
submarines—such as creating a large submersible or controlling 
drones at sea—has already been mastered. When someone ties it 
all together, we could see (or rather, not see) a naval event where 
carriers from both sides are totally underwater. 
Now that you have it tied together and plan to bring this new form 
of warfare, now defend against it. What technologies would you use 
from this chapter? 
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Appendix 10-1: Standard Acoustic Principal Physical 
Properties  
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Quantity Formula MKS (SI)Units Cgs Units Comments 
English 
Units 
Mass (M) M kilogram (kg) gram (g) 
1kg = 103 g 
1kg = 
2.2046 lbs 
pounds 
(lbs) 
Time (t) t seconds, (s) s s 
Area (A) A m2 cm2 1 m2 = 104 cm2 ft2 
Displacement 
(d) d 
meter 
(m) 
centimeter 
(cm) 
1m = 102 
cm ft 
Velocity (v) v = d/t m/s cm/s 1 m/s = 102 cm/s ft/s 
Acceleration 
(a) A = v/t m/s2 cm/s2 
1 m/s2 = 
102 cm/s2 ft/s2 
Force (F) 
F = MA = 
Mv/t 
Mv = 
Momentum 
kg x m/
s2 
newton 
(N) 
g x cm2 
dyne 
 
1N = 105 
dynes 
1lbf = 1 lb 
x 
32.174049 
ft -lbs 
/s2   = 
9.80665 
m/s2 
Pressure (p) p = F/ A 
N /m2 
Pascal 
(Pa) 
dynes 
/cm2 
microbar 
(µbar) 
20 µPa = 2 
x 10-5 N/
m2 
reference 
value 
Psi = lbf 
/in2 
1 N/m2 = 
0.000145 
psi 
 
Work (W) 
 
W =Fd 
N x m 
Joule 
 
dyne x cm 
erg 
1 j = 107 
erg/s 
Energy 
-capability 
to do 
Work. 
Potential 
energy for 
a body at 
rest and 
kinetic 
energy for 
a body in 
motion. 
BTU 
[British 
Thermal 
Unit] 
1 BTU 
= 
1055.056 
joules 
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Power (P) 
P = W/t = 
Fd/t =Fv 
Joules/s 
watt (w) 
erg/s 
watt (w) 
1 w = 1 J/s 
= 107 erg/
s 
1 watt = 
3.412 
BTU/hr 
Intensity (I) 
I = P/A 
I = P / 4?r2 
Based on 
sphere 
radius 
 
w/m2 w/cm2 
10-12 w/
m2 
reference 
value 
Sources: (Entokey, 2019) & (Studios, 2017) & (Nielsen, 2012) 
 
Appendix 10-2 LRAD 1000X, Source: (LRAD Corporation, 2019) 
 
Communicate Even Further with Longer Range AHD 
The LRAD 1000Xi is a power efficient, long distance 
communication system designed for applications ranging from 
critical infrastructure protection to territorial water, border and 
port security, and large vessel and vehicle installations. 
Featuring a rugged carbon fiber emitter head integrated with 
electronics and amplification, the LRAD 1000Xi comes standard 
with an MP3 Control Module for playing recorded messages and 
an all-weather microphone for live broadcasts. The MP3 Control 
module also enables remote operation of the device from safe 
locations. 
Superior voice intelligibility and an extended frequency range 
ensure broadcasts are clearly heard and understood over wind, 
engine and background noise. The LRAD 1000Xi provides a long-
range communications capability to issue authoritative voice 
commands and attention-commanding deterrent tones to 
determine intent, safely enhance response capabilities, modify 
behavior, and scale the use of force if necessary. 
Features 
1. Rugged, military tested construction 
2. Low power requirements 
3. All-weather use 
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4. Easy to use 
5. Increased coverage with single operator 
6. Safer alternative to non-lethal deterrent measures 
7. HD Camera (optional) 
 
Directionality, Power Efficiency & Range 
1. Highly intelligible communication up to 3,000 meters (1.864 
miles) 
2. Safely communicates beyond standoff distances to determine 
intent 
3. Variable beam width for extended coverage 
4. Clear, long range, directional communication 
5. Establishes instant acoustic standoff perimeter 
LRAD 1000Xi Specifications 
Acoustic Performance 
• Maximum Continuous Output: 153 dB SPL @ 1 meter, A-
weighted 
• Sound Projection +/- 15° at 1 kHz 
• Communications Range: Highly intelligible voice messages 
over distances up to 3,000 meters; max range of 1,250 meters 
over 88 dB of background noise. 
6+ dB above background noise is based on field trials conducted 
by independent sources. 
Environmental Performance 
• Hot Operating Temperature: MIL-STD-810G, Method 501.5, 
Procedure II, Design type Hot, 60°C 
• Cold Operating Temperature: MIL-STD-810G, Method 502.5, 
Procedure II, Design type Basic Cold, -33°C 
• Hot Storage Temperature: MIL-STD-810G, Method 501.5, 
Procedure I, 70°C 
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• Cold Storage Temperature: MIL-STD-810G, Method 502.5, 
Procedure I, -40°C 
• Operating Humidity: MIL-STD 810G, Method 507.5, Procedure 
II – Aggravated Cycle 
• Rain: MIL-STD-810G, Method 506.5, Procedure I, Blowing rain 
• Salt Fog: MIL-STD-810G, Method 509.5 
• Shipboard Vibration: MIL-STD-167-1A 
• Shipboard Shock: MIL-S-901D, Class I, Shock grade B 
• Random Vibration: MIL-STD-810G, Method 514.6, Wheeled 
vehicles 
• SRS Shock: MIL-STD-810G, Method 516.6, Procedure I, 
(Functional shock) 
Tested by National Technical Systems (NTS) following MIL-STD-810G, 
MIL-STD-167-1A & MIL-S-901D 
Mechanical 
• Dimensions: 36” ACOUSTIC PERFORMANCE x 40“ ACOUSTIC 
PERFORMANCE x 13” D (91cm x 102cm x 33cm) 
• Weight: 87 lbs. without accessories (39.4kg) 
• Construction: Molded low smoke composite, 6061 Aluminum, 
316 Stainless hardware 
Electrical Requirements 
• Typical Power Consumption: 720 Watts (With tone) 
• Normal Power Consumption: 190 Watts (With voice content) 
• Power Input: 90-260VAC 50/60Hz Typical Power with warning 
tone. Normal Power Consumption: with voice content, sound 
projection is wide and voice boost is off. 
Safety 
MIL-STD-1474D 
MIL-STD-1474D standard establishes acoustical noise limits and 
prescribes testing requirements and measurement techniques 
for determining conformance to the noise limits specified therein. 
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Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) 
FCC Part 15 class A radiated emissions, CE 
Requirements for the control of electromagnetic interference 
characteristics of subsystems and equipment. 
 
Endnotes 
 
[1] “Drone” in this document refers to small unmanned aircraft, 
remotely piloted or autonomous, fixed-wing or rotary blade, 
controlled remotely or use satellite navigation systems, or RTF or 
tethered or RC models. 
[2] In 2018, the Home Office ran a public consultation, Stop and 
search: extending police powers to cover offences relating to 
unmanned aircraft (drones), laser pointers, and corrosive 
substances. The result was published in 2019 
[3] A fascinating study by NATO on Transforming Joint Air and 
Space Power via The Journal of the Joint Air Power Competence 
Center (JAPCC) available for download at: https://www.japcc.org/
wp-content/uploads/JAPCC_J27_screen.pdf 
[4] In Chapter 14: Exposing UAS Vulnerabilities via Electronic 
Warfare (EW) and Countering with Low Probability Intercept Signals 
(LPI), EW, CYBER and LPI in modern communications systems is 
covered in detail. (Nichols, et al., Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the 
Cyber Domain, 2019) 
[5] MC 64/11, 4 Jul. 2018 
[6] Student assignment end of Chapter 9. 
[7] SCADA systems, functions, configurations, and their 
vulnerabilities are covered in detail in (Nichols, et al., Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems in the Cyber Domain, 2019) Chapter 3: 
Understanding Hostile Use and Cyber-Vulnerabilities of UAS: 
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Components, Autonomy v Automation, Sensors, SAA, SCADA and 
Cyber Attack Taxonomy. The purpose of this textbook is to move 
forward not rehash materials previously presented. Some Tables in 
Chapter 3 have been republished here for convenience. The reader 
is reminded that  UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS IN THE CYBER 
DOMAIN: PROTECTING USA’S ADVANCED AIR ASSETS, 2nd Edition 
by Nichols, R. K., Ryan, J., J.C.H., Mumm, H.C., Lonstein, W.D., Carter, 
C., Hood, J.P. is available for FREE at www.newprairiepress.org/
ebooks/27 
 
[8] In the authors’ ancient textbook (Nichols R. K., The ICSA Guide 
to Cryptography, 1999) Cryptology is the study of creating codes 
and ciphers (cryptography) and decoding or deciphering codes and 
ciphers (cryptanalysis) when the system is not known. There are 
far better books available. Consider the classic by guru and one-
time competitor, Bruce Schneier, simply entitled 
Cryptography. (Schneiner, 1996) 
[9] The general term for the art and science of concealment ciphers 
is steganography. This includes null, ciphers and image / pixel 
deceptions (hiding in plain sight or in a massive amount of 
storage) (Randall K. Nichols D. J., 2000). 
[10] If the reader is really interested in pain and all things Maxwell 
(James Clerk), consider the textbook Electromagnetic Waves by 
Staelin, et.al. (David H. Staelin, 1998). Prepare for hours of math and 
difficult reading. 
[11]Fluence –  particle density or energy density, used to describe 
the output of a radiation field or of a laser beam (Collins-Dictionary, 
2019) 
[12] Think skeet shooting. 
[13] Laser stands for Light amplification through simulated emission 
of radiation. 
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[14] A collimated beam of light or other electromagnetic radiation 
has parallel rays, and therefore will spread minimally as it 
propagates. A perfectly collimated light beam, with no divergence, 
would not disperse with distance. … Perfectly collimated light is 
sometimes said to be focused at infinity. (Wikipedia, Collimated 
Definition, 2019) 
[15] This effect is referred to as aerosols. 
[16] Plasma weapons are very cool and are more sci-fi than reality, 
certainly against UAS systems. A plasma weapon is a type of” ray 
gun” that fires a stream, bolt(s), pulse or toroid of plasma (i.e. very 
hot, very energetic excited matter). The primary damage 
mechanism of these fictional weapons is usually thermal transfer; it 
typically causes serious burns, and often immediate death of living 
creatures, and melts or evaporates other materials. Fictional plasma 
weapons are often visually analogous to real-life plasma torches 
that cut into materials for industrial use purposes; however, said 
torches currently only produce a plasma jet of several inches at 
most. (Wikipedia, Plasma Weapons, 2019)  Amazon sells a Star Wars 
Nerf Captain Plasma Blaster for a mere $34.57 +tax and shipping. 
Six-year old’s can now melt down a droid. 
[17] Aside from author’s comments in note 19, the ignition of plasmas 
at a target surface, and their subsequent propagation as detonation 
or combustion waves, can greatly enhance the thermal and 
mechanical coupling of a laser to a target, either in a vacuum or air. 
[18] Laser material processing is now a major component of the 
manufacturing process. Lasers accomplish tasks ranging from 
heating for hardening, melting for welding and cladding, and the 
removal of material for drilling and cutting. Typical intensities 
required for such tasks include heat treating at 103 – 104 W/cm2, 
welding and cladding at 105 – 106 W/cm2, and material removal 
107 – 109 W/cm2 for drilling, cutting, and milling. (National 
Academies of Sciences, 2018) 
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[19] These conclusions may be big jump from real earth to 
atmosphere. A better picture of the thermal, mechanical damage, 
stimulated Rama scattering (SRS), vaporization, melting as a 
function of intensity and pulse width is provided by (Nielsen, 2012) 
in Chapter 3, p 191, Figure 3-76. No matter how we dissect the laser 
weapon use concepts, UASs are not cost-effective targets for this 
cool technology. 
[20] Relativistic velocities – Velocities approaching speed of light. 
[21] Bremsstrahlung -radiation loss of energy induced by the 
acceleration of particles they suffer in collisions in the PB. (Nielsen, 
2012) 
[22] Another related  chapter was Chapter 8: Designing UAS Systems 
for Stealth. (Nichols, et al., Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the Cyber 
Domain, 2nd Edition, 2019) 
[23] Refer to Appendix 10-1 for standard acoustical properties and 
units. 
[24]  https://lradx.com/lrad_products/lrad-1000xi/ 
[25] Use the bottom of the page converter. Basis: Speed of sound c = 
λ × f = 343 m/s at 20°C} for 16 m L = 21.4375Hz. This compares to the 
Austin value of 20 Hz. For the 2 cm = 0.02 m, the resulting valued 
for f = 17650 Hz. This is above the 16,000 Hz limit from Austin. This 
might be due to the 20-degree Celsius basis difference. This tells 
the UAS designer that the upper end of noise – Stealth acceptability 
17,150 Hz. 
[26] “An equal-loudness contour is a measure of sound pressure 
(Db SPL) over the EMS spectrum, for which a listener perceives a 
constant loudness when presented with pure steady tones. The unit 
of measurement for loudness levels is the phon and is arrived at by 
reference to equal-loudness contours. Two sine waves of differing 
frequencies are said to have equal-loudness level measured in 
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phons if they are perceived as equally loud by the average young 
person without significant hearing impairment.” (Staff, Equal 
Loudness Contours, 2016) 
[27] “Four important relationships to note are that power is equal 
to pressure squared, P = p2, pressure is equal to the square root of 
power, p = √ P, intensity is proportional to pressured squared, 
I ≈ p2   and pressure is proportional to intensity, p ≈ √I. This 
makes it easy to convert between sound intensity and sound 
pressure.” (Entokey, 2019) These relations yield a few more to relate 
sound pressure, sound intensity and distance r.   Given to pressures 
p1 and p2 at distance r1 and r2, they are proportional: p2 / p1 = r1 / 
r2; and factoring in intensities at I1 and I2, gives I2 / I1 = (r1 /r2)2. 
Finally, r2 / r1 = p2 / p1 = √I1 / I2. (TRS S. , 2018) 
[28] Decibels (Adamy D. , 2001) (Gelfand S. A., 2009) Sound 
magnitudes, intensities, and pressures vary over an enormous 
range. We use decibels (dB) to express sound values.  Decibels takes 
advantages of ratios and logarithms. Ratios are used so that physical 
magnitudes can be stated in relation to a reference value that has 
meaning to us. The reference point chosen is the softest sound 
that can be heard by normal people. The reference value has an 
intensity of 10-12 w/m2 (10-16 w/cm2). In terms of sound pressure, 
the reference value is: 2 x 10-5 N/m2 or 20 µPa (2 x 10-4 dynes/
cm2). An interesting Geek bar bet is what is the logarithm of all 2:1 
ratios, 8:4, 20, 20:10, 100:50, etc.? Even though the distance between 
absolute numbers gets wider, 1,4,10, 50…, the logarithms of the 2:1 
ratios are the same at 0.3. Another interesting factoid about ratios is 
the units generally cancel out. 
The general decibel formula in terms of power level (PL) is as 
follows (Gelfand, 2004): 
 
PL = 10 log P / Po                                                
                           Equation 10-4 
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Where P = power of the sound measured, and Po is the reference 
power to be compared. 
The general decibel formula in terms of power level (IL) is as 
follows (Gelfand, 2004): 
 
IL = 10 log I / Io                                              
                                    Equation 10-5 
Where I = intensity of the sound measured, and Io is the reference 
intensity to be compared. Io is given as 10-12 w/m2 . 
The general decibel formula for sound pressure level (SPL) is 
obtained by replacing all of the intensity values with the 
corresponding values of pressure squared because (I ≈ p2). 
 
SPL = 10 log p2 / po2                                              
                              Equation 10-6 
 
Where p is the measured sound pressure (in N/m2) and po is the 
reference sound pressure of 
2 x 10-5 N/m2 .  A more convenient form of this equation 
recognizes that log x2 = 2 log x. (Gelfand, 2004) 
 
SPL = 20 log p / po.                                   
                                                Equation 10-7 
 
Equation 10-7 is the common formula for SPL. A couple of 
observations a positive decibel value means that the sound pressure 
level is greater than the reference. The decibel value of the 
reference is 0 because reference value / reference value = 1 and 10 
log 1 = 0. This does not mean no sound; it just means the sound 
measured is equal to the reference point. A negative value of 
decibels means that the sound magnitude is lower than the 
reference. (Gelfand S. A., 2009) 
 
 
366  |  Chapter 10: When the Other Side Fights Back - Cyberwarfare,
Directed Energy Weapons, Acoustics,Integrating C-UAS into Planning
[29] It is left to the reader to obtain any standard trigonometry text 
to see all the parameters of the well-known sine wave. 
[30] The formula for the string’s resonant frequency Fo is: 
 
Fo = 1 / 2L x √T /M 
                                                                                          Equation 10-8 
 
Where Fo is resonance frequency in Hz, T is Tension, M is Mass, L 
= λ /2 and f = c / λ and c = speed of sound. L = length of the string. 
(Gelfand, 2004) The strings lowest resonant frequency is f = c / 2 
L but Eq 10-8 considers that the speed of sound is different for a 
vibrating string than it is for air. 
[31] Author’s note although not specified in (Yunmonk Son, 2015), 
according to chapter author research and experimentation, the 
frequencies turn out to be the resonance  frequencies. So agrees 
Dr. Kim at KAIST.  “You would think that the gyroscopes used in 
unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) would have been designed to have 
resonant frequencies above the audible spectrum – i.e., above 20 
kHz – but Kim and his team found that some have not.” (Yunmonk 
Son, 2015) In the case of a gyroscope, “you can get it to spit out 
very strange outputs, as researcher Yongdae Kim, a professor in the 
electrical engineering department of the Korea Advanced Institute 
of Science and Technology (KAIST), told ComputerWorld” (Kirk, 
2015) An example of resonance frequency and breaking glass can be 
found on youtu.be at https://youtu.be/BE827gwnnk4 
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Chapter 11: Thinking Like the 
Enemy: Seams in the Zone 
W.D. LONSTEIN 
Student Learning Objectives 
The student will gain knowledge of the balance between effective 
C-UAS strategy and the many ways that technological and non-
technological attack vectors can be implemented to defeat even the 
most robust Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems (“C-UAS”) tactics 
and strategies. Designing and new technology to respond to and 
counteract new, and rapidly developing technologies presents a 
daunting challenge. The C-UAS student must recognize that they 
are placed at an inherent disadvantage if only by the nature of their 
mission, responding to and addressing known and unknown threats. 
Students Will Be Able To: 
Understand the challenges confronting those who research, 
design and implement C-UAS systems, tactics, and strategies. 
Acquire a historical understanding of C-UAS systems, their 
strengths, weaknesses, and lessons learned from prior successes 
and failures. 
Describe how to “think like the enemy” and incorporate the 
thought process in the development of C-UAS Technology and 
strategy. 
Understand the importance of ensuring that the physical security 
of C-UAS systems, personnel and data is often the first step in an 
attacker’s playbook. 
Develop a healthy skepticism of new technologies that claim to be 
able to address most or all threats posed to the public, assets, and 
personnel by Unmanned Systems. 
Establish as a foundational underpinning of any C-UAS analysis 
that every technology or strategy has inherent vulnerabilities and so 
must have robust and rapid failure response. 
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 Preliminary Statement 
It is assumed those who may read this chapter do so with the 
intent of learning to benefit not harm upon innocent citizens and 
lawful combatants engaged in conflict under the modern rules of 
warfare. Drone and other unmanned automated technology 
provides a vehicle to weaponize payloads once thought impossible 
to transport and efficiently disperse upon targets. A delicate 
balance exists between what is appropriately disclosed and 
discussed in the educational realm against supplying information 
to those who intend or be inclined to inflict great harm upon 
innocents. The prospect of using UAS to efficiently and 
economically deliver weaponized chemical, biological and 
radioactive agents is of constant concern. It would be foolish to 
assume that scenarios discussed in this text are incapable of being 
independently created by those who seek to inflict harm, yet it is all 
of our duty to do our utmost to prevent such a reality. 
Although the balance must always tip in favor of using information 
for education and defense of freedom-loving nations and citizens, 
we must also be mindful that other eyes are reading, and ears are 
listening to the information contained in this book. The fact that 
this text and its prior works printed by this group of authors and 
the works of many others are freely available in various formats 
online. To pretend that only those who seek to benefit mankind will 
access the information would be folly. While we will be discussing 
various scenarios that exploit vulnerabilities in C-UAS systems and 
strategies, let us remain vigilant to prospect and re-double our 
efforts to ensure that by critical thinking and analysis we remain a 
step ahead of adversaries. 
 
Keeping it Simple 
To fully examine C-UAS vulnerabilities across the spectrum of 
civilian, commercial, homeland security, and military applications 
these pages would number in the thousands and the content 
become impossible to digest. No matter what the strategy or 
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technology, inherent vulnerabilities will always exist. In recognition 
of the in-depth information proved by many of the co-authors of 
this textbook, we will limit our examination to the civilian-hobbyist 
realm. I believe that there are universal truisms of C-UAS 
vulnerabilities which can serve as the foundational underpinnings 
of the broader study and implementation of effective processes and 
technology to mitigate their risk. 
Vulnerability evaluation must be a dynamic process since as UAS 
technology rapidly evolves, so too must C-UAS strategy and 
technology. Students and professionals should develop robust and 
continual processes, similar to those common to IT best practices. 
Focus points should include, but not be limited to, penetration 
testing, hacking, physical access exploitation, and social 
engineering attack simulations. 
We will examine one multi-part scenario which is quite simple 
and use it to explain how C-UAS students and professionals might 
address challenges and vulnerabilities one might encounter in a C-
UAS framework. The scenario and sub-parts will be simplistic and 
generic, it is for the reader to expand on the base assumptions 
and consider how they might affect their ability to develop C-UAS 
strategies, deploy or develop technologies and prepared for 
response based upon vulnerabilities which may be inherent therein. 
 
History as a Guide 
In the 1930s, before the outbreak of World War II, a system known 
as Radio Detecting and Ranging, commonly referred to today by 
the acronym RADAR was successfully deployed to detect an aircraft. 
This feat was accomplished by Sir Robert Winston Watt in 1935 
and by 1937 a network deployment of this technology was deployed 
across Britain called Chain Home. 
During the early years of WW II, it was a particularly effective 
technological advantage for Britain against the air raids of the 
German Luftwaffe. (Foley, 2019) 
Sadly, the same type of radar system was present on the Hawaiian 
island of Oahu on December 7, 1941, known as the Opana Radar 
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site. Two lightly trained privates were operating the unit when, just 
shortly after 7 am, a return was received which they interpreted as 
squadrons of inbound aircraft. They immediately called Fort Shafter 
where superiors were stationed to express their concern. They were 
allegedly told “don’t worry about it,” if anything it was an 
approaching group of B-17’s expected from San Diego. (Bureau, 2019) 
Though the technology deployed in both locations was largely the 
same, it provides an all too painful reminder that no matter how 
good the technology or strategy, there will always be vulnerabilities. 
These vulnerabilities may be human, mechanical, environmental or 
even unexplainable, yet their exploitation often has consequences 
that are real and deadly. History has witnessed numerous examples 
of seemingly impenetrable defenses, even those employing state-
of-the-art technology and strategy, failing under attack for a variety 
of reasons. 
For example, a seemingly impenetrable defense based on lessons 
learned during World War I was constructed by France to prevent 
similar invasions, most particularly from its then constant adversary 
Germany. Sadly, when Germany sought to once again invade France 
during WWII, the Maginot line failed. Why? Because an apparent 
frontal attack, which in actuality was an intentional distraction 
delayed French troops from responding to two larger Axis forces. 
One, attacking through Belgium and the Ardennes forest and 
another acting as a pincer from the north from Poland. These are 
just two historical examples of why defense is never static, and 
adversaries are always on the hunt for vulnerabilities in the defenses 
of their prey. 
 
Figure 11-1: Opana Radar Site 
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Source: (Bureau, 2019) 
The latter example has led some in the cybersecurity industry 
to caution “Don’t let your cybersecurity become another Maginot 
Line.” (Mirza, 2019) 
Always be mindful of the truism no matter how perfect the plan 
or “foolproof” the strategy or technology risk of failure or 
circumvention is a constant. For any C-UAS technology or strategy 
to be truly robust, it must assume the inevitability of failure and 
therefore incorporate responsive capability. 
The threats posed by UAS are broader and far more complex 
(and therefore unpredictable) than any other technology mankind 
has ever encountered. Acknowledging vulnerabilities are inherent, 
and that adversaries will constantly probe any defensive system 
for them, failure must be engineered into C-UAS technology and 
responsive best practices are of primary importance, not an 
afterthought. 
 
Figure 11-2 Battle of Constantinople 
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Source: (medievalwarfare.info, 2019) 
Improved technology has led to more effective weapons from the 
dawn of mankind.  See Figure 11-2 Siege of Constantinople in 1453 
for all out use of new weapons. Historians have documented such 
occurrences as early as 400,000, BC when humans used spears as a 
tool of warfare, defense, and hunting. This is a historical continuum 
where more mobile, lethal and functional weapons progress over 
time. Spears evolved into the atlatl, a type of dart, to the bow 
and arrow, the boomerang and eventually the sword. Between 800 
and 1300 AD, primarily related to the invention of gunpowder by 
the Chinese, led to the cannon, hand cannon, and other forms of 
artillery. 
Over time, hand weapons, once requiring a match to ignite 
gunpowder during the Ming Dynasty between 1368 and 1644 
eventually evolved to better and faster ignition technology such as 
the matchlock and then the wheel lock. (PBS, 2014) With the dawn 
of the modern age rocket technology evolved and forever changed 
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warfare in the mid-1700s. Rapid-fire artillery and automatic 
machine and handguns developed in the mid-1800. Through the 
19th century and two World Wars during the early 20th accelerated 
the creation of a broad spectrum of weaponry culminating with 
nuclear warfare which debuted in 1945 with the bombings of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki Japan. Delivery systems also improved to 
where nuclear ordinance could be delivered efficiently, rapidly and 
using land and sea-based missiles, aircraft, submarines, surface 
vessels, and even space-based platforms. Later laser, acoustic, 
stealth, space, and cyber weapons presented a dizzying array of 
threats that confront today’s security and defense professionals. 
As the millennium came and went vast improvements in using 
rapid data and information processing technology led to the 
widespread implementation of automated, unmanned intelligent 
weapons systems. Drone warfare almost immediately went from 
theoretical to and actual and present tool of warfare. (Marshall, 
2009) 
Unmanned technology has gained rapid acceptance by the 
military as well as being deployed in a myriad of civilian uses from 
transportation, to logistics and hundreds of other applications in 
everyday life. Therein lies the challenge facing C-UAS students and 
professionals alike, the need to differentiate and distinguish drones 
being used innocently versus with malice. Even the harmless use of 
UAS in recreational applications presents a risk to everything from 
civilian aviation, governmental functions, critical infrastructure and 
even inhabiting one own private domicile. With history as a guide, 
we will examine how best to predict and discover risks from this 
rapidly evolving, asymmetric technology. 
 
Hiding in Plain Sight; Distinguishing the Attacker from the 
Hobbyist 
Generally speaking, one of the biggest challenges confronting C-
UAS professionals lies in the prediction and defending against risks 
associated with UAS technology in daily life as well its use as an 
attack vector in hostile activity.  When considering the multitude 
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of possibilities of threats from UAS differentiating between what is 
normal versus what is not, it is essential if we are to have any ability 
to predict, detect, deter and defend against UAS threats. 
 
Scenario: 
A single UAV hovers over an elementary school playground during 
recess. (Andrews, 2017)  See Figure 11-3 Talking Drone. Children are 
loud playing and seemingly happy carnival-style calliope music is 
broadcast from above with the voice of Sponge Bob, Square Pants 
saying “follow me, kids!  Once a sight that would cause alarm, has 
now become somewhat “normal” considering the increased 
popularity of UAV’s ranging from aerial photography to educational 
and other STEM programs. 
 
Figure 11-3: Talking Drone 
Source: (Andrews, 2017) 
The need to instantly identify the capability, payload, operator, 
and mission has become far more complex. The more popular and 
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affordable drones become, the more faculty, students, parents, and 
authorities will tend to assume such sightings are regular and 
innocuous. 
Not too long ago, it was a rarity to see multiple jet aircraft flying 
overhead. Today, especially near metropolitan areas the sights and 
sounds associated with modern have become part of the ambient 
environment. Think back to your first day of elementary school. 
Everything was new, faces, places, sounds, smells and experiences. 
With time environmental familiarity became part of the daily 
routine. 
 
Vulnerability Axis 1: Familiarity 
From a defense and security perspective familiarity and normality 
are major inherent vulnerabilities to any C-UAS deployment. As 
automation becomes more ubiquitous in our lives the vulnerability 
from attack proportionately increases. This vulnerability can be 
largely attributed to a decrease in “Situational Awareness.” 
Situational awareness or situation awareness (“SA)” is generally 
defined as a perception of environmental elements and events 
concerning time or space, the comprehension of their meaning, and 
the projection of their future status. (Endsley, 1995) 
It is now well accepted that as automation and routine increase 
situational awareness (“SA”) decreases. “Situational awareness is 
very important, not just for personal security but as a fundamental 
building block in collective security.” (STRATFOR, 2012) 
Returning to the schoolyard the more students, staff, and 
authorities become acclimated to UAV’s in everyday life the less 
likely they will perceive them as an abnormality or threat. 
 
Attacker Perspective: 
Once again it is important to note that the “Attacker Perspective” 
is included in terms of generalities only, not specifics. All of the 
concepts, information, and discussion is an open course, not 
classified and within the grasp of any reasonably astute person with 
or without specialized education or technical expertise. They are 
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not intended to be a “How To” tutorial on C-UAS exploits, rather 
and general overview of the mindset and considerations an attacker 
might consider when considering an attack. The key is for the C-
UAS student or professional to learn to “think like the enemy” to 
be prepared for their attacks and attempts to exploit C-UAS 
vulnerabilities. 
Using VPNs and other anonymization techniques, research the 
most popular consumer UAS in the target region, check blogs, sales 
figures advertisements and enforcement information from news, 
police websites, the FAA, state and local authorities. Consider 
demographics including age of the local population, popularity of 
drone hobbyists locally, stores that sell UAV’s and their sales 
volumes. Are there farms or other industries that may use UAS in 
any capacity such as spraying, surveillance, powerline management, 
policing or education? Are there local photographers, surveyors, 
appraisers or realtors who advertise a UAS capability online or in 
online publications? 
 
Vulnerability Axis 2:  Environmental Concealability 
A recent trend of many civilian UAV manufacturers in the 
introduction of smaller and lighter products. In many ways, their 
size, when coupled with distance can easily be mistaken for a bird, 
small airplane or simply fit in as another drone in an area. Open 
spaces such as farm fields, rivers, parks or other sparsely populated 
areas are often places where drone enthusiasts may practice UAV 
flight or in the case of farms, may see UAS use for spraying, 
surveying crops of other agricultural purposes. 
 
Attacker Perspective: 
Research features, payload, speed, altitude and price attributes 
of various UAS available to the attacker. Consider the affordability 
of mini swarms to various locations to leverage distraction and 
confusion. Remotely research line of sight issues or BLOS capability 
of UAV including live stream capability to avoid local detection and 
enable remote operation. Consider the attacker (s) capability to 
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operate remotely and whether local assets are required. Are there 
cultural, linguistic or other factors that might enhance risk 
detection Consider ornithological and other wildlife factors that 
may hinder or aide in stealth operation and avoidance of detection 
by the public or C-UAS technology? 
 
Vulnerability Axis 3: Conformity with Regulation. 
UAV’s under .55 pounds (250 grams) are currently exempt from 
FAA Part 107 registration licensure requirements. According to the 
latest FAA guidance: 
“Drones being used for commercial purposes under the Part 107 
regulations need to be registered with the agency, regardless of 
weight. “Only those drones flown under the Exception for Limited 
Recreational Operations and weighing less than .55 pounds, or 250 
grams, do not require registration.” (Mintz, 2019) 
 
Attacker Perspective: 
Researching laws to find UAS which have little or no regulatory 
and administrative footprint (i.e. not subject to registration). Learn 
nuances, train and develop proficiency in its operation  Depending 
on type of planned attack research the most effective payload 
capable of being delivered (if employing swarm, consider lighter 
payload upon multiple UAS’s in order to account for detection, C-
UAS countermeasures, human and mechanical failure and risk of 
environmental factors upon types of agents. (Biologic, radioactive, 
chemical, SCADA, even EMP attack or other) 
 
Vulnerability Axis 4: Adapting Appearance to Attract 
Susceptible Targets: 
When the drone allegedly broadcast a message to children on the 
playground a message to “follow me” it is a social engineering tool 
designed to attract a curious and less skeptical target. The more an 
attacker can adopt a “wolf in sheep’s clothing” appearance the less 
chance of onlookers expecting any sinister motive. The more begin 
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the appearance the less likely to cause alarm and therefore inquiry 
by authorities. 
 
Attacker Perspective: 
Consider the objective. Locate targets for research which fit 
objective and capable of success using practical, affordable and 
technological factors as a guide. Scour news for reports of crime, 
public discontent with facility operations and staff. Employ satellite 
imagery, social media, live stream research to determine any 
actionable intelligence about physical features, recent 
improvement, and planned projects. Check the schedule for dates 
and times of operation. Research surround areas for airports, radar 
facilities, military bases and assets, times of day with highest and 
least traffic. Research local EMS, Police, and Military response times 
in the area. Research other federal, state and local law enforcement 
assets nearby. Will the use of multiple, swarms or even multiple 
swarms be possible to avoid C-UAS detection and disperse risk to 
total mission failure? Is there a heavy security presence? Depending 
on the type of attack will there be times when targets are out in 
the open instead of within a building. What are work shifts, class 
or other staffing schedules which can provide predictability and 
reduce the chance of detection? 
 
Vulnerability Axis 5: Attraction – Distraction – Stealth: 
When coupled with strobing, colored, anti-collision lights, the 
allure of the drone becomes even more powerful.  The result? A 
simple yet effective blending of technology, social engineering, and 
legality which theoretically would allow a child predator to hide the 
nature of their intention in the open. 
This type of attack is nothing new and has supposed origins as far 
back as the 12th Century in the age of the Iliad and Odyssey of Greek 
Mythology lore.  See Figure 11-4 Trojan Horse. 
Figure 11-4 Trojan Horse 
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Source: (Rischgitz, 2019) 
The Trojan horse was a seemingly “normal” occurrence in this 
myth as a form of boasting by Odysseus who was renowned for his 
architectural and construction prowess. (Remember its mythology 
so please suspend belief.) What was not expected, just like a hidden 
payload in a UAV today was a lethal brigade of the best warriors of 
the time, hidden within the hollow belly of the horse. (Maro, 2019) 
Current UAS technology allows the average citizen, terrorists and 
military forces globally the ability to achieve a stealth attack 
capability simply by blending in, operating relatively quietly and 
out of the field of normal ground focused visual attention. Today’s 
Trojan horse is compact, remotely operated, stealthy and capable 
of acting with overwhelming force in large numbers creating lethal 
swarms. 
 
Attacker Perspective: 
Which normal activities in and around the target are capable of 
providing cover to the attack vector. For example, in loud industrial 
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areas, there is usually more ambient noise and therefore rotor 
“whir” is less likely to be heard and therefore make detection less 
likely? Are there time, color, feature or other forms of concealing 
the UAS in the open to minimize the risk of detection? The greater 
the distance from the launch site increases the risk of the UAS 
being observed and therefore remediated. Consideration of signal 
emanation from the controller’s location will also play a role in 
the risk of detection by C-UAS technology. Some UAS use multiple 
forms of communication for operational control. Can the UAV be 
rebranded to make it look more like a toy or hobby vehicle with 
bright colors or even relevant images to lessen suspicion and delay 
reporting? 
 
Vulnerability Avis 6: A Studious Attacker 
According to translation from the epic military strategy work, 
“The Art of War”, its author Sun Tzu is reputed to have written 
“The general who wins the battle makes many calculations in his 
temple before the battle is fought. The general who loses makes but 
few calculations beforehand.” (Sun-Tzu, 1964) C-UAS students must 
always assume that an attacker who seeks to inflict harm or worse 
using UAS must have done significant research and preparation 
before commencing an attack. It would make little sense for such 
an attacker to simply fly a drone to a target and attempt to inflict 
damage. Students must assume that an attacker is not going to 
remotely pilot a UAS to a location they are unfamiliar with. 
Familiarity comes with study, research, even spies. Since so much 
information is available online one of the most concerning 
vulnerabilities inherent in all C-UAS deployments is ease of access 
to almost any information. Students must, therefore, assume an 
attacker is familiar with the target, the C-UAS systems if any which 
is in place as well as the size, nature, and location of any possible 
defensive and/or responsive force. 
 
Attacker Perspective: 
As we have discussed almost any type of information is available 
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online. That which may not be available may be able to be acquired 
by compromising information systems (hacking), cultivating and 
recruiting spies or informants or engaging in cyber, in-person or 
even UAS reconnaissance of the target. A well prepared and 
research attack is created by patiently securing information without 
leaving an actual or digital footprint. Scouring budgets, work orders, 
new stories, building permits, business filings, and police blotter 
records are but a few of the areas the diligent attacker can acquire 
to prepare themselves to exploit C-UAS vulnerabilities. 
 
Vulnerability: More Than a Seam – A Gaping-hole 
Almost every roadway across the globe is subject to maximum 
speed restrictions it would seem that eventually full compliance 
would be achieved through education enforcement and penalties. 
Figure 11-5 Drone Enforcement.   Nothing can be farther from the 
truth. 
According to a 2018 study by the British Home Office, 2.2 million 
speeding tickets were issued in 2017, a 2.4% increase from the prior 
year and a 26% increase from 2011, all while automated speed 
enforcement technology was increasing in scope and coverage. 
(Office, 2018) 
 
Figure 11- 5: Drone Enforcement 
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Source: (French, 2018) 
 
If drivers disobey a heavily monitored and enforced activity like 
driving,   what is the likelihood that UAS operators, with little to no 
method to detect and enforce violations, will choose to comply? The 
takeaway when it comes to predicting vulnerabilities in any C-UAS 
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deployment is to expect that many operators will not comply with 
the law. Whether innocent or intentional it does not matter since 
the interface of civilian or other UAS everyday activities can result 
in serious, if not tragic results. 
An extensive review of public and court records search to fully 
grasp the vigor with which authorities are enforcing violations of 
UAS regulations in the United States. Not surprisingly I was hard-
pressed to find more than a handful of prosecutions, and when 
they occurred the penalties enforced were warnings. (French, 2018) 
This begs a critical question, is there even an enforcement arm of 
the FAA or other law enforcement agencies capable of enforcing 
current UAS regulations? While many of the vast majority of 
operators will choose to comply with the law to the extent, they 
understand it, the fact that detection and enforcement are virtually 
non-existent is a fact that will not be overlooked by an attacker and 
is there a major vulnerability confronting any C-UAS professional. 
 
The Information Age – A Tool for Attackers 
According to a report issued by the General Accounting Office on 
October 17, 2019, three recommendations were made to the Ranking 
Member, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure: 
“GAO has three recommendations, including that FAA: (1) develop 
an approach to communicate to local law enforcement agencies 
expectations for their role in UAS investigations, and (2) identify 
and obtain data needed to evaluate FAA’s small UAS compliance 
and enforcement activities, as the UAS environment evolves. FAA 
concurred with the recommendations.” (GAO, 2019) 
Facially, the GAO recommendations suggest the FAA’s current 
strategy to regulate civilian UAS activity is one of the evaluation 
and development of tools and processes all while studying the best 
methods to enforce compliance with laws and regulations. The 
current UAS enforcement regime is a vulnerability in and of itself. As 
of October 2019, it appears that little or no coordinated monitoring, 
response, and enforcement mechanism is in place to address the 
growing risk of UAS attacks. 
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The United States Government Accounting Office (“GAO”) issued 
a “Law Enforcement Guidance for Suspected Unauthorized UAS 
Operations”, on August 14, 2018. According to the report, the FAA 
uses the acronym D-R-O-N-E to instruct State and Local Law 
Enforcement Agencies on how best respond to a suspected case of 
illegal or dangerous UAS operation within their jurisdictions: (GAO, 
2019) 
Ø DIRECT: attention outward and upward, attempt to locate and 
identify individuals operating the UAS. 
Ø REPORT: the incident to the FAA Regional Operations Center 
(ROC). 
Ø OBSERVE: the UAS and maintain visibility of the device. 
Ø NOTICE FEATURES: Identify the type of device, whether it is 
fixed wing or multi-rotor, its size, shape, color, and payload, such as 
video equipment, and the activity of the device. 
Ø EXECUTE appropriate action. Follow your policies and 
procedures for handling an investigation and securing a safe 
environment for the public and first responders.” (FAA, Law 
Enforcement Guidance for Suspected Unauthorized UAS Operation 
– Version 5, 2018) 
Criminals, terrorists, hostile nations and other bad actors can 
find and search the exact reports we have referenced above. To 
assume they are not using this information in planning UAS attacks 
is likely a dangerous if not deadly mistake. Even were the systems 
for monitoring and enforcing illegal UAS activity to fully exist, the 
sheer number of UAS operating legally or illegally will make pre-
attack intervention a longshot. The solution? Create the best C-UAS 
technology and strategy possible but make responsive capability 
equally if not more robust. 
 
Rapid Advancements in Technology -Amplified Vulnerability 
In July 2018, a supplementary letter was issued updating a letter 
sent by the FAA Office of Airports Safety and Standards in October 
2016, discussing the evaluation process for C-UAS technology 
deployments at major airports in the United States. Of prime 
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importance was the following admonition which every C-UAS 
student, professional or educator must never lose sight of. “An 
additional and critical component of this finding is that technology 
rapidly becomes obsolete upon installation as UAS technology is 
rapidly changing.”  (FAA, Airport Safety Media, 2018)  To minimize 
the challenge from C-UAS vulnerabilities being exploited would not 
only be against the lessons taught to us by history but, also to ignore 
the reality of human ingenuity when it comes to circumventing the 
technology. The longer new technology remains in the market, the 
more motivated attacker can probe it for weakness, look to disable, 
circumvent, confuse or reverse engineer. The challenge facing C-
UAS professionals is one of the endless cycle of point-counterpoint. 
As this chapter is being written rest assured somewhere in the 
world motivated attackers are probing systems for vulnerabilities 
and likely examining ways to equip UAS with Anti- C-UAS 
technology. If the future of C-UAS is to be one of efficacy and 
reliability, all engaged in this noble work must take heed of the 
warning given by Albert Einstein to President Harry Truman. “I 
know not with what weapons World War III will be fought,” Albert 
Einstein warned President Truman, “but World War IV will be fought 
with sticks and stones.” As quoted by Rosa Brooks who continued: 
Certainly, history offers plentiful examples of escalating 
technological “measure, countermeasure, counter-
countermeasure”. (Brooks, 2013) 
 
Conclusions 
While it is impossible to predict the future, what is possible to 
look to the past. Students must keep this in mind going as they 
embark on careers in this exciting, important and ever-changing 
field. If there is one takeaway that will benefit any current or future 
C-UAS technology it that no matter what the defensive technology 
or strategy, it is always best to “be prepared” for any contingency. 
In a field where only perfection will ensure safety sobriety and 
preparedness dictates that perfection will never be achievable and 
professionals and the public alike must be cognizant of this reality. 
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 Questions: 
1. Do you believe that an all-encompassing C-UAS system of 
technology and strategy will ever be a reality? 
 
2. List 3 steps you would take to proactively discover possible C-
UAS vulnerabilities both from a technological and strategic 
standpoint? 
 
3. If you were responsible for crafting a C-UAS strategy and 
deploying technology what would be your top three objectives 
when beginning the process? 
 
4. Do you believe civilian use of UAS not matter the size should 
be regulated as an inherently dangerous technology much like 
handgun laws? 
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Chapter 12: C-UAS 
Regulation, Legislation, & 
Litigation from a Global 
Perspective 
W.D. LONSTEIN 
Student Learning Objectives 
 Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems (“C-UAS”) have opened the 
latest example of the dynamic interface between technology and 
law. It is the strong suggestion of the author that students access 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the Cyber Domain, as a launch point 
for this chapter. Many of the fundamental principles and 
considerations discussed concerning law and UAS will serve as a 
primer to this chapter’s discussion of Counter UAS regulation and 
jurisprudence. (Nichols, et al., 2019) With the rapid development 
and implementation of automation and artificial intelligence (“AI”), 
including Unmanned Aircraft Systems (“UAS”), legal systems globally 
will be forced to balance public safety with the many benefits to 
everyday life. Legal scholars and legislators have wrestled with the 
friction between technology and law centuries. Students will be 
exposed to historical, examples of the techno-legal balance and 
asked to consider how best to as apply general principles to the 
challenges posed by C-UAS technology and its implementation 
globally. 
 
Once Completed Students Should: 
 Have a broad perspective on the global variances and gaps within 
C-UAS law globally. 
• Consider the impact of the ability to operate UAS remotely and 
Chapter 12: C-UAS Regulation,
Legislation, & Litigation from a Global
the possibility C-UAS activity may cause legal ramifications 
beyond the jurisdiction where it occurs. 
• Examine whether a particular C-UAS technology such as 
Kinetic, non-kinetic, passive, active, laser, acoustic, jamming, 
and spoofing, might be subject to direct or indirect, regulation, 
and possible liability. 
• Consider the sufficiency of the current statutory framework 
and jurisprudential precedent as it pertains to C-UAS design, 
deployment, or operation. 
• Appreciate the likelihood of conflicting civilian and military C-
UAS regulations impacting a particular deployment, 
technology, or location. 
 
Current C-UAS Regulatory Landscape 
The current state of C-UAS jurisprudence is in its infancy with 
widely divergent regulatory landscapes around the globe. From a 
general perspective, most nations prohibit an individual or private 
company’s right to a “self-help” C-UAS policy (i.e., the prohibition of 
shooting down a drone at all with kinetic or non-kinetic measures). 
Much the same as is the case within the United States, 
internationally, private C-UAS activity is strictly prohibited unless 
conducted under the auspices of the military or police function. 
Students might ask why there is no right for a person (s) to protect 
their physical safety, property, pets, farm animals, and privacy from 
the threats posed by unwanted drones. The answer, though less 
than satisfactory to many, is that there may be many unintended 
consequences from self-help C-UAS activity.  What if police were 
seeking a poacher of animals in the forest next to the farm? Now 
the facts implicate damage to police property, interferes with legal 
police activity, not to mention creates risks to others caused by the 
crash of the drone once disabled. 
 
At first glance, it might seem that such a policy runs contrary to 
individual and property rights (Figure 12-1), especially if the drone is 
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flown over private property or otherwise being flown dangerously 
or recklessly in public the prohibitions are grounded in logic. 
 
Figure 12-1 Angry Farmer Spoof 
Source: (Junkin Media , 2016) 
A global survey of current C-UAS regulations reveals near 
uniformity in most nations, prohibiting any C-UAS activity taken by 
any entity other than the National Security Apparatus, Civil Aviation 
Authorities, and military. Most notably and understandably, “self-
help” C-UAS, such as that depicted in Figure 12-1, may seem a simple 
and understandable reaction to an apparent privacy invasion or 
aerial trespass. The challenge for C-UAS practitioners is when 
dealing with perceived threats from an aerial trespasser, shooting it 
out of the sky can have serious consequences. 
Let’s assume the farmer in Figure 12-1 is actually in Scranton, 
Pennsylvania, instead of the United Kingdom. What are the 
ramifications of a landowner, seeing a drone fly over his land at 
low altitude, deciding to use a shotgun to shoot it out of the sky? 
Applying current C-UAS law to this scenario reveals a confusing 
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and uncertain landscape for confronting what is sure to become a 
more common occurrence Figure 12-3 traces the growing spectrum 
of Federal C-UAS regulation in the United States.[1] In addition to 
federal laws that prohibit “self-help” C-UAS activity, international 
laws, state laws, agency regulations, rules, and precedential court 
decisions can subject the farmer to significant criminal or civil 
consequences. Depending on the action 
taken, and for our purposes, we will use the farmer with the 
shotgun that may result in criminal or civil liability under a complex 
interaction of various federal, state, and local laws. 
 
Figure 12-2 Global C-UAS Legal Implication Matrix 
Source: (West, 2019) 
 
Back to our farmer, not only is he subject criminal liability under 
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an array of federal laws and regulations, but he may have also run 
afoul of numerous state, local laws as well as subject himself to civil 
liability. A civil action is one brought by an injured or aggrieved 
party for monetary damages against the party who allegedly caused 
the loss. In the case of the farmer, a lawsuit might be filed by an 
injured party, including the drone owner, the drone operator, and 
even the person who may have hired the operator to perform a 
specific mission or task. 
When the force of gravity added to the scenario, the situation 
gains complexity.   According to Michael Hamann, there are many 
risks attendant to these kinetic countermeasures. The payload, if 
harmful, may well be dispersed throughout the crash area as well 
the impact of a plastic rotary falling from the sky has caused a 
crash test dummy to receive a powerful effect ranging from 9 foot-
pounds and 233 foot-pounds, depending on the angle and speed of 
the falling drone. (Michael Hamann, 2018), citing (FAA UAS Center of 
Excellence, 2017) 
 
To further complicate things, if the farmer successfully shot down 
the drone, and it landed on the head of his neighbor who 
succumbed to the injuries, he sustained an additional set of legal 
consequences will unfold. For example, the heirs of the deceased 
neighbors might seek to bring claims for civil damages, including 
but not limited to wrongful death and negligence. Criminal charges 
may result from the illegal shooting and the killing of the neighbor. 
Tables 12-3 – 12-5, below demonstrate the complexity of 
implications from the United States, as well as other nations, 
relating to C-UAS activity. 
 
TABLE 12-1: UNITED STATES FEDERAL LAW 
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Federal Law or 
Regulation Countermeasure 
Prohibition or 
Rule Penalty 
FAA 
Reauthorization 
Act of 2018 
N/A 
Limits C-UAS 
authority to DHS, 
DOJ & U.S. Coast 
Guard and 
requires 
consultation with 
Department of 
Defense 
N/A 
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Title 47 U.S.C. § 
301 et., Seq. 
Radio 
Interference 
Signal Disruption 
47 U.S.C. § 301 
Radio Transmitter 
License Required 
 
47 U.S.C. § 302 
Illegal to own 
sell, import, or 
operate radio 
signal “jamming” 
technology. 
 
47 U.S.C. § 320 
Allows FCC to 
require any radio 
station which in 
its opinion may 
interfere with 
distress signal of 
ships be required 
to have a licensed 
operator listening 
for distress 
signals. 
 
47 U.S.C. § 325 
Prohibits False, 
fraudulent or 
unauthorized 
distress or other 
re-broadcast of 
radio signals. 
 
47 U.S.C. § 333 
Prohibits willful 
or malicious 
interference with 
radio 
communications. 
 
47 U.S.C. § 605 
Unlawful 
interception of 
radio transmission 
 
 
 
47 U.S. 
Code § 502 
not more 
than $500 for 
each and 
every day 
during which 
such offense 
occurs 
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18 U.S.C. 
Chapter 119 
Interference 
with 
government & 
satellite 
communications 
Jamming, 
Spoofing & 
similar 
countermeasures 
18 U.S.C. § 1362 
Interface with 
Government 
Communications 
 
18 U.S.C. § 1367 
Interference 
with Satellite 
Communications 
 
 
Fines and 
imprisonment 
of not more 
than 10 years 
18 U.S.C. § 32 
Destruction of 
Aircraft or 
Facilities 
Destruction of 
aircraft – 
Fines and/or 
imprisonment 
of not more 
than 20 years. 
18 USC § 2510, 
2511 
Wiretap Act 
 
“Spoofing” a GPS 
or other 
controlling signal 
or 
communication. 
18 U.S.C. § 2511 
Interception of 
Wire 
Communications 
 
Fines up $ 
250,000 and 
imprisonment 
of not more 
than 10 years 
Source: (Federal Aviation Administration, 2018) 
 
TABLE 12-2: STATE LAWS IN CALIFORNIA & NEW YORK 
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State Law 
or 
Regulation 
Countermeasure Prohibition or Rule Penalty 
New York 
Penal Law 
Shooting Drone 
with Shotgun 
NY Penal Law § 145.05: 
Criminal Mischief in the 
Second  Degree: 
 
Intentionally damage 
someone else’s property 
in an amount that 
exceeds $ 1,500.00 
 
NY Penal Law § 
145.05: Criminal 
Mischief in the Second 
Degree: 
 
Intentionally damage 
someone else’s property 
in an amount between $ 
250.00 and  $ 1,500.00 
 
NY Penal Law § 265.35 
(2) Unlawfully 
discharging a firearm at 
an aircraft. 
 
 
Civil Liability 
 Class D 
Felony 
Fine & 
Imprisonment 
of up to 5 
years 
imprisonment 
 
 
 
 
Class E 
Felony 
Fine & 
Imprisonment 
of up to 4 
years 
imprisonment 
 
 
Class E 
Felony 
Fine & 
Imprisonment 
of up to 4 
years 
imprisonment 
 
Monetary 
Damages 
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California 
Penal 
Code 
Shooting Drone 
with Shotgun 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Penal Code 246.3 PC 
1. 
2.      Willfully 
discharge a firearm, in 
a grossly negligent 
manner, which could 
result in someone’s 
injury or death 
 
Penal Code 246 PC 
 
Maliciously and 
willfully fire a firearm at: 
An occupied 
aircraft**[2] 
 
Penal Code 594 PC 
Vandalism: 
Maliciously commits any 
of the following acts 
with respect to any real 
or personal property 
not his or her own: 
(2) Damages; 
(3) Destroys 
 
Crime of Carrying a 
Loaded Firearm in 
Public 
 
Civil Liability 
Misdemeanor 
or Felony 
depending on 
facts 
 
Misdemean
or – 1 Year in 
jail – Fine up 
to $ 1,000 
 
Felony – 16 
months – 4 
years in jail. 
 
Fine up to $ 
10,000 
 
Misdemean
or 
6 – 12 
Months 
imprisonment 
 
Felony 
3– 7 years 
imprisonment 
 
Fine up to $ 
10,000 
Damage 
over $ 400.00 
Fine up to $ 
10,000.00 
1 Year 
County Jail 
 
Damage up 
to $ 10,000.00 
Fine up to $ 
50,000.00 
 
Fine up to $ 
10,000.00 
1 Year 
County Jail 
 
Monetary 
Damages 
 
TABLE 12-3: GLOBAL LEGAL EXAMPLES[3] 
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Country Countermeasure Prohibition or Rule Penalty 
United 
Kingdom 
GPS Jamming or 
signal 
interference 
Wireless Telegraphy Act 
2006 
UK Public General Acts, 
2006 c. 36, Part 2 
Chapter 4 
Unauthorized use etc. 
of wireless telegraphy 
station or apparatus 
Fine of up to £ 
250,000; and 
5% Gross 
Revenue 
Imprisonme
nt up to 2 
years 
Misleading 
messages 
(spoofing), 
Interception 
Wireless Telegraphy Act 
2006 
UK Public General Acts, 
2006 c. 36, Part 2 
Chapter 4 
A person commits an 
offence if, by means of 
wireless telegraphy, he 
sends or attempts to 
send a message to 
which this section 
applies. 
(a) is false or 
misleading; and (b) is 
likely to prejudice the 
efficiency of a safety of 
life service or to 
endanger the safety of a 
person or of a ship, 
aircraft or vehicle. 
 
Fine of up to £ 
250,000; and 
5% Gross 
Revenue 
Imprisonme
nt up to 2 
years 
Computer 
Hacking 
Computer Misuse Act of 
1990 
 
Up to 2 years 
Imprisonment 
and up to £ 
5,000 Fine 
Shooting UAV 
with illegal 
weapon 
Section 5(2A)(c) of the 
Firearms Act 1968 
·         For 
possession, 
purchase or 
acquisition – 
10 years 
imprisonment. 
·         For 
manufacture, 
sale of 
transfer – Life 
imprisonment. 
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Chapter 27, Part 1 (16) 
Firearms Act of 1968 
Possession of firearm 
with intent to endanger 
life or cause serious 
injury to property 
Chapter 27, Part 1 (18) 
Firearms Act of 1968 
Carrying firearm with 
criminal intent 
Chapter 27, Part 1 (19) 
Firearms Act of 1968 
Carrying a Firearm in 
a Public Place 
 
Chapter 27, Part 1 (20) 
Firearms Act of 1968 
Trespassing with a 
Firearm 
 
 
·         6 
months – 4 
years 
imprisonment 
Damaging or 
attempting to 
damage a UAV 
Criminal Damage Act 
1971 Chapter 48 Part 1 
(1), (2) 
Destroying or damaging 
property 
Criminal Damage Act 
1971 Chapter 48 Part 3 
(a), (b) 
Possessing anything 
with intent to destroy 
or damage property 
 
 
· 
Russian 
Federation 
Using a weapon 
to destroy a UAV 
Chapter 27. Crimes 
Against Traffic Safety 
and the Operation of 
Transport Vehicles 
Article 263. Violation of 
the Rules for Traffic 
Safety and Operation of 
the Railway, Air, 
Sea and Inland Water 
Transportation 
Systems, as Well as of 
the Underground 
Railroad 
·         100,000 
– 300,000 
Rubles Up to 4 
Years in 
prison or 2 
years in labor 
camp. 
Chapter 12: C-UAS Regulation, Legislation, & Litigation from a Global
Perspective  |  405
Article 267. Putting out 
of Commission 
Transport Vehicles or 
Communications 
1. Destruction, damage, 
or putting out of 
commission transport 
vehicles, warning 
devices, 
communications or 
communications 
facilities, or any other 
transport equipment, 
and likewise 
blocking transport 
communications, if 
these acts have 
involved, by negligence, 
the infliction of 
grave injury to human 
health, or the infliction 
of large damage 
100,000 – 
300,000 
Rubles Up to 4 
Years in 
prison or 2 
years in labor 
camp. 
Article 271.1. Breaking 
the Rules for Using the 
Airspace of the Russian 
Federation 
Up to 7 years 
imprisonment 
Using GPS 
Jamming, Radio 
interference of 
other disabling 
of computer 
systems or 
hacking 
Chapter 28. Crimes in 
the Sphere of Computer 
Information 
Article 272. Illegal 
Access to Computer 
Information 
1. Illegal access to 
legally protected 
computer information, 
if this deed has involved 
the 
destruction, blocking, 
modification or copying 
of computer 
information 
fine up to 200 
thousand 
rubles, , or 
with restraint 
of liberty for a 
term of up to 
two years, or 
with 
compulsory 
labor for a 
term of up to 
two years, or 
with 
deprivation of 
liberty for the 
same term. 
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Article 273. Creation, 
Use, and Dissemination 
of Harmful Computer 
Programs 
1. Creation, 
dissemination or use of 
computer programs or 
another computer 
information, which 
are knowingly intended 
for unsanctioned 
destruction, blocking, 
modification 
or copying of 
computer information 
or for balancing-out of 
computer information 
security 
facilities – 
fine up to 200 
thousand 
rubles, , or 
with restraint 
of liberty for a 
term of up to 
two years, or 
with 
compulsory 
labor for a 
term of up to 
two years, or 
with 
deprivation of 
liberty for the 
same term. 
Article 281. Sabotage 1. 
Perpetration of an 
explosion, arson, or of 
any other action aimed 
at the destruction or 
damage of enterprises, 
structures, transport 
infrastructure facilities 
and transport vehicles, 
or vital supply facilities 
for the population, with 
the aim of subverting 
the economic security 
or the defense capacity 
of the Russian 
Federation 
Punishable by 
deprivation of 
liberty for a 
term of ten to 
15 years 
Australia 
Damaging or 
Shooting A 
Drone 
1 Crimes (Aviation) Act 
1991 –No. 139, 1991 
Compilation No. 
257 Destruction of 
aircraft 
(1)  A person must not 
intentionally destroy a 
Division 3 aircraft. 
 
Penalty: 
Imprisonment 
for 14 years. 
Dangerous Use of 
Firearms Section 93 H 
(2) of the Crimes Act of 
1900 
 
10 Years 
Imprisonment 
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Endangering safety of 
aircraft—general 
 (1)  A person who, while 
on board a Division 3 
aircraft, does an act, 
reckless as to whether 
the act will endanger 
the safety of the 
aircraft, commits an 
offence. 
section 195 of the 
Crimes Act 1900 THE 
OFFENCE OF 
MALICIOUS DAMAGE 
The offence of 
Malicious Damage is 
contained in section 195 
of the Crimes Act 1900 
 
 
Penalty: 
Imprisonment 
for 10 years 
 
GPS Jamming 
Prohibition relating to 
RNSS jamming devices 
Under section 190 of 
the Act, the ACMA 
declares that: 
 
Penalties for 
breaching the 
rules can be a 
fine of up to 
$1.05 million 
or up to 5 
years in 
prison 
Radio Signal 
Interference 
Use of Non-approved 
Radio 
Transmission devices 
Fines of up to 
$25,200 up to 
two years in 
prison 
Sources: (Federal Aviation Administration Office of Airports Safety 
and Standards, 2016) (Secretary of State for the Home Department, 
2019) (Russian Federation, 1996) (United Nations, 2019) (United 
Nations, 2019) 
 
 
CAN C-UAS BE REGULATED? THE C-UAS FABLE 
 The current paucity of global C-UAS regulation is not only a 
product of the fact that UAS legislation is still in its formative stages, 
but it is also equally a result of the speed with which UAS, and 
consequently C-UAS technology is developing. 
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When considering whether and to what extent to regulate C-UAS 
technology, I turn to one of my favorite legal fables where the moral 
of the story is that when legislating,  less can be more, particularly 
apropos when considering C-UAS regulation, more specifically 
micro-drones, and swarms. 
In an attempt to eliminate a problem with pesky flies, the local 
town decides to deploy a solution to make life more pleasant for 
its residents. Although there are many more possible solutions, the 
village elders provide the three which they feel to be representative 
of different levels of risk vs. reward. 
 
Choice 1: 
Provide each household a fly swatter to give them a tool to stop 
flies coming into their homes. 
 
Result: 
Somewhat useful, but in the long run, not a solution that will 
eliminate the nuisance. 
 
Unintended Consequence: 
Sore elbow, broken items in the home, the species survives intact. 
Figure 12-3 Cockroaches and Nuclear Bombs 
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 Source: (Daftardar, Depressed Man Meme, 2019) & (Daftardar, Can 
Cockroaches Really Survive A Nuclear Explosion?, 2015) 
 
Choice 2: 
Use aerial or water sprayed dispersion of pesticides. 
 
Result: 
 
Most flies eliminated, no method to contain ingestion by 
unintended targets or limit environmental pollution in a safe & 
effective manner. 
 
Unintended Consequence: 
 
May cause side effects to the population of humans, pets, farm 
animals, plant life, crops, air purity, and water. Causing a cascading 
series of complications ranging from remediating the environmental 
410  |  Chapter 12: C-UAS Regulation, Legislation, & Litigation from a Global
Perspective
damage to treating generations of diseased humans, animals, and 
plants. 
 
Choice 3: 
 
Deploy a unique acoustic wing-speed signature detection 
technology for the species of fly native to the region where the 
village is situated. Once confirmed, a radio frequency 
countermeasure would cause the fly to die from brain injury within 
one minute. 
 
Result: 
 
Current species of native flies mostly eliminated. 
 
Unintended Consequence: 
 
Flies evolve where their wing-speed changes, and their acoustic 
sensitivity and brains become immune to the technology. 
Additionally, aircraft, radios, GPS, and other technologies adversely 
affected, causing mass disruptions to daily life. 
 
 
Primum Non Nocere – First Do No Harm 
 
The Latin phrase “Primum non Nocere” – First Do No Harm, 
borrowed from the field of medicine seems to be a worthy objective 
for C-UAS legislation. C-UAS covers a broad spectrum of kinetic and 
non-kinetic measures taken to destroy, disable, confuse, hijack, or 
otherwise interfere with the intended operation of an Unmanned 
Aerial System. A C-UAS tactic might be as simple as throwing a 
stone at a drone or as complex as introducing malware into its 
operating systems and everything in between. My talented co-
authors more than amply discuss these technologies and tactics 
in other chapters of this text. For our purposes, it is necessary to 
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determine (1) whether C-UAS regulation on a globally functional 
basis is possible?  (2) If it was possible, how would such law impact 
the rights of individuals, technology companies, the respective 
national security interests of each nation, individual security rights 
and cultural differences between countries around the globe; and 
(3) how are inevitable conflicts in law resolved given the inherently 
international nature of UAS and C-UAS technology? 
While the United States and other nations are currently studying 
the issue, as of late November 2019, it is safe to summarize the 
current global C-UAS specific legislation landscape as non-
existent. (Jason Snead, 2018) Since UAS technology is currently 
being used in both military and civilian applications worldwide, 
NGO’s such as the United Nations (“UN”) and individual nations are 
to create effective C-UAS regulation, some degree of commonality 
must exist. 
What is meant by commonality? For our examination, 
commonality means uniform foundational principles that must be 
recognized globally. Much like a Geneva Conventions for warfare, 
this policy is best run by an NGO, the most logical being the UN. 
Unfortunately, history teaches than UN enforcement is inherently 
challenging due to having 193 member states, each with separate 
values, cultures, religions, political and economic systems. (United 
Nations, 2019) Add the all too common realities of formal and 
informal military conflict, and it becomes a certainty that nations 
will interpret the regulations in a manner that supports its 
objectives. Accordingly, a uniform global C-UAS law does not appear 
to present a viable option.  However, the Geneva Conventions, 
Hague Conventions, War Crimes, Genocide, Ethnic Cleansing, 
International Humanitarian laws and adjudication thereof by the UN 
War Crimes Tribunal should be amended to include UAS and C-
UAS activity warfare specifically. (International Committee of the 
Red Cross, 2016) (United Nations, 2019) 
When technology becomes widely available and less expensive, 
not to mention remotely operable, it becomes attractive to those 
with nefarious intent. Add the capability to deliver biologic, 
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chemical, and nuclear payloads, and the potential to be used as 
a Weapon of Mass Destruction by non-state actors becomes a 
frightening reality. (Office of the President of the United States, 
2018) 
Most nations eschew C-UAS specific legislation instead of 
choosing to provide-UAS authority to military, civil aviation, and 
homeland security functions and relying upon existing criminal 
statutes and aviation rules and regulations to control widespread C-
UAS activity. The Federal Aviation Administration issued one of the 
most recent pronouncements on the subject on August 14, 2018. In 
short, the Law Enforcement Guidance letter discussed the primacy 
of the Federal Governments’ role in any C-UAS activity in the United 
States with state and local Law Enforcement being invaluable 
partners in ensuring safe drone operation. According to the 
guidance letter, Law Enforcement’s role in C-UAS activity should be 
in accord with the process described by the acronym D-R-O-N-E: 
 
• Direct attention outward and upward, attempt to locate and 
identify individuals operating the UAS. Look at windows/
balconies/rooftops. Law enforcement is in the best position to 
locate the suspected operator of the aircraft, and any 
participants or personnel supporting the operation. 
 
• Report the incident to the FAA Regional Operations Center 
(ROC). Follow-up assistance can be obtained through FAA Law 
Enforcement Assistance Program (LEAP) special agents. 
Immediate notification of an incident, accident, or other 
suspected violation to one of the FAA ROCs, located around 
the country, is valuable to the timely initiation of the FAA’s 
investigation. These centers are manned 24-hours a day, seven 
days a week, with personnel trained to contact appropriate 
duty personnel during non-business hours when there has 
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been an incident, accident, or other matter that requires 
timely response by FAA employees. 
 
• Observe the UAS and maintain visibility of the device. Note 
that the battery life of a UAS is typically 20 to 30 minutes. Look 
for damaged property or injured individuals. Local law 
enforcement is in the best position to identify potential 
witnesses and conduct initial interviews, documenting what 
they observed while the event is still fresh in their minds. 
Administrative proceedings often involve very technical issues; 
therefore, we expect our own aviation safety inspectors will 
need to interview most witnesses. During any witness 
interviews, use of fixed landmarks depicted on maps, diagrams, 
or photographs, immeasurably help in fixing the position of the 
aircraft, and such landmarks should be used to describe lateral 
distances and altitude above the ground, structures or people 
(e.g., below the third floor of Building X; below the top of the 
oak tree located at Y; or any similar details that give reference 
points for lay witnesses). We are mindful that in many 
jurisdictions, state law may prohibit the transmission of 
witness statements to third parties, including the FAA. 
However, capturing the names and contact information of 
witnesses to provide to the FAA will also be extremely helpful. 
 
• Notice features. Identify the type of device, whether it is fixed 
wing or multi-rotor, its size, shape, color, and payload, such as 
video equipment, and the activity of the device. Pictures taken 
in close proximity to the event are often helpful in describing 
light and weather conditions, any damage or injuries, and the 
number and density of people, particularly at public events or 
in densely populated areas. 
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 • Execute appropriate action. Follow your policies and 
procedures for handling an investigation and securing a safe 
environment for the public and first responders. 
 
• It must be noted, any investigations conducted by LEAs should 
be in accordance with local or state authorities, as the FAA’s 
statutes and regulations do not permit their use as a basis for 
LEAs to conduct investigations. (Federal Aviation 
Administration, 2018) 
 
In order to reinforce current C-UAS restrictions, a recent FAA 
Law Enforcement Guidance letter cites specific Federal laws and 
regulations which are implicated when an unauthorized person 
engages in C-UAS activity in the United States. (Figure 12-4) 
 
By way of comparison, the United Kingdom allows Law 
Enforcement a broader use of C-UAS technology and tactics 
including DTI (Detect Track and Identify) technology, and effector 
technology which can disable hostile drones. In a recent Counter 
Unmanned Aircraft presentation given to Parliament in October 
2019, the British Home Department established a multifold strategy 
for C-UAS preparation and capability. 
 
The stated objective of the plan is: 
1. 1. Developing a comprehensive understanding of the evolving 
risks posed by the malicious and illegal use of drones; 
 
2. Taking a ‘full spectrum’ approach to deter, detect and disrupt 
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the misuse of drones; 
 
3. Building strong relationships with industry to ensure their 
products meet the highest security standards and, 
 
4. Empowering the police and other operational responders 
through access to counter-drone capabilities and effective 
legislation, training and guidance.(Secretary of State for the 
Home Department, 2019) 
 
Figure 12-4: FAA Law Enforcement Guidance 
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Source: (Federal Aviation Administration, 2018) 
The current UK C-UAS policy differs from that of the United 
States in that it provides for a more active C-UAS role given to Law 
Enforcement agencies: 
“The police are able to legally deploy a range of DTI and counter-
drone effector systems. We will develop options for the creation of a 
UK national counter-drone capability that will reduce our domestic 
reliance on defence capability to respond to the most challenging 
drone security incidents and will allow the police to protect national 
iconic events, or support crisis response. We will identify the most 
appropriate equipment and resource to procure and deliver this 
capability.” (Secretary of State for the Home Department, 2019) 
While current C-UAS regulations and enforcement regimes vary 
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significantly, given time and study, it is likely that more certainly will 
come to C-UAS practice. The challenge facing C-UAS practitioners 
will be multi-fold. Off the shelf obsolescence, Counter- Counter-
UAS technology will inevitably be incorporated into many UAS just 
as chaff, flares, jamming, DIRCM (Directed Infrared Counter 
Measures), and other technologies rapidly developed to counteract 
anti-aircraft technology from the dawn of military aviation up to 
today. 
Students must account for the reality that a measure-
countermeasure dynamic will present challenges to any scheme of 
C-UAS legislation or regulation.  Therefore, it is incumbent upon 
those who enact C-UAS laws to avoid the temptation of focusing 
upon specific technologies or tactics instead of focusing upon the 
establishment of general principal legislation. 
For example, a regulation that proscribes C-UAS technology or 
tactics which are likely to endanger the public nationwide is far 
more flexible than a statute that prohibits the use of C-UAS 
technology in or near cities with a population over 100,000. 
 
The principle of legislative generality was affirmed by the 
Government of Victoria, Australia when it issued the following 
guidance: 
“Regulation of specific activities, industries or professional groups 
is a last-resort option. Preference will be given to promoting 
industry self-regulation and best practice, including codes of 
conduct, assessing whether existing broader legislation (State or 
Commonwealth) applies to particular cases, using other non-
legislative methods (e.g. government provision of information) to 
address concerns. (DTF 2005, p. 1–7) (Consumer Affairs Victoria, 
2006) 
Regulating technology can have many unintended consequences, 
which were articulated by Christopher Fonzone and Kate 
Heinzelman in a 2018 opinion piece regarding legislating Artificial 
Intelligence. 
“Decisions made today may have substantial ripple effects that 
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legislators could easily miss on the development of AI technology 
down the road. Who could have possibly imagined the full 
implications of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act 
when it was enacted in 1996? Or the effect of the Electronic 
Communication Privacy Act’s warrant requirement for emails less 
than 180 days old in 1986? Early legislative enactments about new 
technologies tend to persist.” (Christopher Fonzone, 2018) 
There are no clear answers when it comes to ethics, technology, 
warfare, terrorism, and crime. C-UAS Students, Practitioners, and 
Regulators would be wise to remember that job 1 in public safety and 
national defense is first not to harm those you seek to protect. 
 
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS – Self Defense 
 Recently Hollywood has been capturing the imagination of 
audiences globally with thrillers involving UAS attacks by traditional 
and non-traditional combatants, terrorists, and other bad actors. 
The 2019 film, “Angel Has Fallen” takes quite a bit of license, 
however, is undoubtedly demonstrative of how UAS technology, in 
the hands of a bad actor, could wreak havoc on society. (Waugh, 
2019) The use of mobile launched mini-drone swarm technology 
presents a growing threat to all society. Let’s hope it’s a case of art 
imitating imagination instead of creativity imitating life. 
 
Figure 12-5: Angel Has Fallen 
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Source: (Waugh, 2019) 
 
Films including Star Trek, War Games, Star Wars, Runaway, and 
Terminator are a few examples of films that examine AI, Automation, 
Unmanned technology, and the attendant risks they pose when 
falling into the wrong hands or become out of control due to a fault 
or defect. In a world where weapons of war have been finding their 
way off the battlefield and onto the streets, we must be prepared 
and assume the reality that UAS technology will also be a prime 
target for the black-market profiteers. Even worse, UAS technology 
designed for the hobbyist, farming or other non-military functions 
is currently flooding the market at low prices. This new affordability 
begs the question, if technology falls into the hands of those who 
present asymmetric threats, and can appear to be part of everyday 
life, is it ethical for the government to prohibit individuals from 
engaging in self-defense? Isaac Asimov, the noted writer, and 
scientist first introduced and right of self-defense against 
automated technology (“robots”) in the short story 
Runaround published in 1942. 
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 Figure 12-6:  Asimov’s 3 Laws for Robots 
 
Source: (Asimov, 1942) 
To allow for an orderly introduction of robotics into our lives, 
Asimov, a visionary futurist, created the “The Laws for Robots.” 
 
1. A robot may not injure a human being or, through inaction, 
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allow a human being to come to harm. 
    2. A robot must obey the orders given to it by human beings, 
except where such orders would conflict with the First Law. 
    3. A robot must protect its own existence as long as such 
protection does not conflict with the First or Second Law. 
 
He later introduced a zeroth law which stated: 
 
1. A robot may not harm humanity, or, by inaction, allow 
humanity to come to harm. (MIT Technology Review, 2014) 
 
Subsequently, other scholars examined Asimov’s three laws in the 
context of the drone age, where remotely piloted or autonomous 
aircraft are now capable of inflicting harm to humans on a massive 
scale. Ulrike Barthelmess, Koblenz Ulrich Furbach expanded upon 
this concept when they wrote in a paper discussing whether 
Asimov’s laws of robotics in 2014: 
“But we also should mention that there do exist autonomous 
vehicles and robots designed per se to harm humans. Military robots 
or autonomous drones are aiming explicitly at violating Asimov’s 
laws. What we desperately need are legal and ethical rules for the 
commitment of robots. We can see this from the debate around 
drone strikes in Pakistan, Yemeni Somali. According to the Bureau of 
Investigative Journalism there is a kind of covert drone war in those 
countries. Drones are used to strike against targets in countries, 
without being officially in war according to the international law 
of armed conflict. More or less autonomously operating drones are 
destroying targets i.e. humans, which are associated with terrorism. 
And as can easily be imagined there is a significant number of 
civilians killed or injured as collateral damage. We want to argue that 
a similar procedure would not so readily be accepted by the world 
public, if instead of drones manned aircrafts would be used.    It 
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seems as if there is much lower acceptance threshold to use robots 
instead of regular military forces for illegal or covert warfare. 
 
Besides of moral and ethical considerations, this raises a lot of 
legal questions. Is it legal to strike targets with unmanned drones 
in a country which is not in a formal state of war with the owner 
of drones? Is it legal for a third-party country to support such an 
action, e.g. by delivering   data for military reconnaissance or by 
hosting the pilots of the drones? In the context of this discussion 
it would be more likely to answer the question from the title as 
follows: It is not allowed to build and to use robots which violate 
Asimov’s first law.” (Barthelmess, 2014) 
 
Currently, it is hard to establish whether a drone flying overhead 
is benign or a threat to the safety of those below. The stealthy 
nature and ability to deliver payloads, surveil or interrupt activities 
of normal daily life drones that pose a threat can often appear as 
harmless as a hobbyist learning to fly the gift they received for their 
birthday. With literally millions of drones flying daily, the reality 
is that no law enforcement strategy, much less C-UAS military 
deployment, can reasonably be relied upon to 100% protect military, 
domestic, and individuals from the risks posed by UAS technology. 
Students are strongly urged to read the 2015 article in the 
Connecticut Law Review entitled “Self-Defense against Robots and 
Drones.” Although it is now four years later and the UAS industry 
continues to grow exponentially in the military, commercial and 
civilian applications alike, the subject of self-defense against drones 
lies at the heart of C-UAS regulation. The authors correctly observe 
that absent a reliable system that the everyday citizen can use to 
determine whether a UAV is a friend or foe, individuals must have, at 
least to a certain degree, the right of self-defense. (Colangelo, 2015) 
 
Conclusions 
 While there will be no shortage of pain points in the creation of 
a robust yet flexible C-UAS legislative and jurisprudential scheme, 
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students should consider the reality that no matter how broad the 
policy may be, a motivated attacker will always find a way to exploit 
it. One need look no further than to constant friction between those 
who want to make certain classes of firearms illegal, and those 
who feel the right is a natural inheritance in countries such as the 
United States. Both make valid arguments yet were either side to 
prevail; those who are intent on harming will find a way to legally 
or illegally acquire a weapon. As we head further into the age of 
ubiquitous automation, there will be no shortage of debates about 
how best to regulate the legal and prevent the illegal use of the 
technology. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., delivered a speech in 1963 
when he discussed the challenge of legislating morality, as opposed 
to regulating behavior: 
 
“Religion and education must play a great role in changing the 
heart. But we must go on to say that while it may be true that 
morality cannot be legislated, behavior can be regulated. It may be 
true that the law cannot change the heart, but it can restrain the 
heartless. It may be true that the law cannot make a man love me, 
but it can keep him from lynching me and I think that is pretty 
important, also.” (Dr. Martin Luther King, 1963) 
 
Those who seek to engage in a career in the UAS / C-UAS field 
will undoubtedly have to confront this challenge regularly. Whether 
you are creating CUAS technology, deploying that technology, or 
designing strategies, the result of what you do will inevitably have 
a long-lasting consequence to humanity. Risk, reward, cost, and 
morality are but a few of the factors you will have to balance while 
the speed of new technology will make the ground beneath your 
feet feel like a treadmill moving 100 miles per hour. 
 
No matter how good the technology, strategy, or defense, a 
motivated actor will find a way to exploit vulnerabilities inherent 
within it. So too is the case when legislating and regulating C-UAS 
activity. Every exigency, contingency, circumstance, and location 
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will challenge the applicability of the law, not to mention possible 
provide a means for malevolent actors to exploit it to inflict great 
harm legally. Laws can inhibit the development of technologies that 
may offer more safety, certainty, and clarity to the field of UAS / C-
UAS jurisprudence, and so knee-jerk, reactionary rules can do more 
harm than good. The best course of action? Think for today but 
be flexible enough to understand the consequence tomorrow. No 
law can be perfect, particularly when it comes to technology in its 
infancy. 
 
QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER: 
 
1. If the farmer in Figure 12-1 shot down the drone flying near his 
farm, only to find the payload was a vial of liquid with a timer 
attached. Thankfully the buckshot from the shotgun and the 
fall to earth did not damage the vial ort timer. The farmer 
immediately calls authorities who respond and disarm the 
timer. They rush the drone away to a secure facility where they 
discover that vial contained an aerosolized form of the Ebola 
virus. But for the farmer’s action, thousands may have died. 
Should he be charged with violating the various statutes listed 
in Figures 12-3 – 12-5 above? 
 
2. Would your opinion change if the buckshot damaged the vial 
and let the virus escape into the atmosphere? What if the 
target location was 20 miles away with a dense population 
while the population within 5 miles of his farm was under 100? 
 
3. Imagine the drone launcher from “Angel has fallen,” as depicted 
in Figure 12-7, was pulling up to a remote area within proximity 
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of Camp David, Maryland. Further, assume that a C-UAS 
hobbyist, uncertain of the law, was nearby and coincidentally 
testing a new C-UAS technology using magnetized plasma 
energy. Despite excellent efficacy, its components are military-
grade and, therefore, illegal for a citizen to possess. 
Understanding the fact that Camp David is near and not seeing 
any indicia of Secret Service or other lawful entities on the 
launcher vehicle, he deploys the plasma energy weapon, 
disables the swarm, and saves the president, his family, and 
those in protection party. Should the hobbyist be treated as a 
criminal or a Good Samaritan? 
 
4. What if the scenario in number 3 above was the same, and the 
president was safe; however, the plasma energy cause three 
helicopters overhead to lose computer-assisted guidance, 
power and control surface function resulting in all three 
crashing and the lives of 16 agents were lost. Should the 
hobbyist be held criminally responsible? 
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[1] It is notable that beginning on 2016 Title 49 of the U.S. Code was 
amended to establish a pilot program for C-UAS mitigation at and 
around airports and critical infrastructure. 
[2] The issue of whether a UAV qualifies as an “occupied aircraft” is 
currently unclear 
[3] The survey of laws listed in tables 12-1, 12-2 and 12-3 are by no 
means complete in terms of applicable laws within the respective 
jurisdictions listed or the overall global C-UAS regulatory 
framework. 
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